Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour, Human Trafficking by Cockayne, James
The Sustainable Development Case  
for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced  
Labour and Human Trafficking
Developing 
Freedom
ii Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
ISBN: 978-92-808-6523-5 © United Nations University, 2021.
 
All content (text, visualizations, graphics), except where otherwise specified or attributed, is published under a 
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial-Share Alike IGO license (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO). Using, re-posting 
and citing this content is allowed without prior permission.
 
Citation: James Cockayne, Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, 
Forced Labour and Human Trafficking (United Nations University: New York, 2021).
Acknowledgment and disclaimer
This publication was made possible through the funding provided by UK aid from the UK government, under the 
terms of HQS/FGBR/ME0034.2018 DFID. The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK 
government or its official policies.
CONTRIBUTIONS
Author, project manager and lead researcher: Prof. James Cockayne
CONTRIBUTING RESEARCHERS: 
Chapter 1 – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research: Otilia Enica, Dr Kelly Gleason, Nesrien Hamid, 
Angharad Smith; University of Nottingham Rights Lab: Dr Katarina Schwarz, Dr Deanna Davy, Dr Daniel Ogunniyi, 
Dr Hannah Jeffery
Chapter 2 – Professor CAF Dowlah
Chapter 3 – Angharad Smith 
Chapter 4 – The Purpose Business: Patricia Dwyer, Rebecca Walker Chan, Thomas Tang, Mabi David
Chapter 5 – Angharad Smith 
Chapter 6 – University of Nottingham Rights Lab: Dr Jessica Sparks, Dr Bethany Jackson
Chapter 7 – Partnership for International Development: Anna Bryher, Jim Cranshaw, Frances Hill 
Chapter 8 – Nesrien Hamid
Contributions to project management:
Anthony Dursi, Alice Eckstein, Martin Kinuthia, Christina McElwaine, Julie Oppermann, David Passarelli
Additional thanks to: Marielle Ali, Prof Kevin Bales, Ginny Baumann, Bonnie Berry, Phoebe Blagg, André Campos, 
Rachel Davis, Dr Caroline Emberson, Morgan Flynn, Will Gargent, Marcel Gomes, Nick Grono, Gabriela Helm, 
Alistair Kelsey, Prof Todd Landman, Dr Sabina Lawreniuk, Jakesh Mahey, Lucy McQueen, Sandip Rama, Marília 
Ramos, James Roscoe, Leonardo Sakamoto, Dr Alexander Trautrims, Prof Zoe Trodd, Dan Vexler, Raakhi Williams.
iii Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Table of 
Contents
List of figures ...................................................................vii List of acronyms .............................................................viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................X
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1
Our analysis ........................................................................ 4 Our methodology ...............................................................6
PART ONE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERN SLAVERY ....................7
CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENT’S  
BLIND-SPOT ............................................... 8
Where does slavery reduction fit in the 2030  
Agenda for Sustainable Development? ......................... 10
What do development practitioners think? ...................13
What does the literature tell us? ..................................... 15
Methodology ................................................................ 15
Results ........................................................................ 16
What does ODA spending tell us? ..................................20
Our methods  .............................................................20
Our results ..................................................................21
Overall spending and project size ............................ 21
Who gave what? ......................................................... 21
To whom?  .................................................................. 26
For which forms of exploitation? ............................ 29
What do development organization practices tell us?  31
Bilateral development cooperation agencies ..........31
United States of America.......................................... 32
United Kingdom ........................................................ 32
Norway ........................................................................35
Australia ......................................................................35
Development finance institutions and export credit 
agencies ...................................................................... 36
Multilateral development banks .............................. 38
World Bank Group .................................................... 38
Regional MDBs .......................................................... 40
New MDBs .................................................................. 42
China ........................................................................... 42
China’s overseas lending .......................................... 44
China’s domestic development practice  ................ 46
The UN development system ...................................50
Reflections: development’s blind-spot revealed...........55
CHAPTER 2: RETHINKING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SLAVERY  
AND DEVELOPMENT ............................... 58
Ten ways slavery impedes sustainable development .. 59
1. Slavery reduces productivity ................................ 59
2. Slavery creates inter-generational poverty ........60
3. Slavery institutionalizes inequality  .................... 61
4. Slavery weakens multiplier effects ......................62
5. Slavery discourages innovation in production .. 63
6. Slavery produces a capital market failure .......... 63
7. Slavery hits the public purse  ............................... 65
8. Slavery weakens governance  ............................... 65
9. Slavery fuels corruption and illicit  
financial flows ............................................................66
10. Slavery harms the environment ......................... 67
iv Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Rethinking global value chains  
and the role of the State ..................................................68
Do global value chains promote  
modern slavery?  .......................................................69
The supply-lines of a global economy .................... 69
What is there to smile about?................................... 72
Bringing the state back in .........................................74
Developing Freedom: a systems-based approach  
to fighting modern slavery  ............................................ 76
After Sen: the ‘Developing Freedom’  
framework  ..................................................................77




PART TWO SIX SECTORAL CASE STUDIES ............................................................88
Introduction .....................................................................89
Explaining the focus on agriculture ........................89
CHAPTER 3: BRAZIL’S CATTLE  
SLAVERY: “I GOT A NEW SOUL” .............. 92
The slavery system in the Brazilian cattle industry .....96
Institutional environment  .......................................96
People’s vulnerabilities .............................................98
Exploiter strategies ..................................................101
Disruption and resistance  ........................................... 104
Mobilizing to disrupt slavery ................................. 104
Counter-mobilizing resistance ..............................107
From disruption to transformation ...................... 108
Lessons and opportunities  .......................................... 109
CHAPTER 4: PALM OIL: “SO FREE  
IT IS VICIOUS”.......................................... 112
Fuel for growth or unsustainable scourge?  ................ 113
Modern slavery risks in the palm oil industry ............ 117




People’s vulnerability and exploiter strategies  ... 120
Domain maintenance: corruption  
and plantation autonomy ........................................ 125
Transformation, resistance – and convergence?  ...... 127
Transforming palm oil governance: the RSPO ..... 127
Resistance: contestation and convergence ...........129
The emergence of labour exploitation as a 
sustainability concern.............................................. 131
Lessons and opportunities ............................................132
From transformation to disruption –  
the global politics of palm oil sustainability ......... 133
Towards an approach focused on  
maximizing economic agency .................................134
The central role of finance ...................................... 137
CHAPTER 5: UZBEK COTTON:  
“IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO REFUSE”  
TO “WORK LIKE A SLAVE” .................... 139
Forced and child labour in the Uzbek  
cotton industry, 1992-2017 .............................................143
Institutional environment .......................................143
People’s vulnerabilities and exploiter  
strategies ...................................................................144
A drag on Uzbek development ............................... 148
Dismantling Uzbekistan’s forced and child  
labour system ..................................................................150
Disrupting demand for Uzbek cotton ....................150
World Bank and ILO engagement ........................... 152
ILO third party monitoring  .................................... 155
Perestroika? ..............................................................158
Creating an outside option for Uzbek elites ..........159
Lessons and opportunities ............................................ 161
From boycott to certification?  ............................... 161
Upgrading the Uzbek cotton industry  ................... 161
What has worked? ....................................................162
What about remedy?  ...............................................164
CHAPTER 6: FISHERIES AND 
AQUACULTURE: “A MOUNTAIN  
OF BONES UNDER THE SEA” ................ 166
Modern slavery in global fishing and aquaculture  ... 168
Understanding the value chain .............................. 168
Responses: policy action to protect  
v Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
fishing workers’ rights ............................................. 171
What kind of fisheries development  
do we seek? ...............................................................172
Modern slavery risks in South and South East  
Asian fisheries ................................................................. 174
Thailand ..................................................................... 174
Contrasting cases: The Philippines, India  
and Bangladesh.........................................................183
The Philippines ......................................................... 183
India .......................................................................... 183
Bangladesh ................................................................184
Lessons and opportunities ............................................185
CHAPTER 7: GARMENTS AND  
APPAREL: A “CAPTIVE AND  
VULNERABLE LABOUR FORCE” ............187
Prologue: Modern slavery risks in Leicester? .............187
The garment and apparel value chain  
as a modern slavery ‘system’ ........................................ 189
Institutional environment ...................................... 190
People’s vulnerabilities ............................................193
Exploiter strategies ..................................................194
Tackling risks for workers in the garment  
and apparel value chain .................................................195
Bangladesh: the Rana Plaza disaster and its 
aftermath ...................................................................195
From disaster to disruption ....................................196
Did modern slavery risks reduce or increase?  ..... 197
India: from multi-stakeholder disruption to 
community-based Developing Freedom .............. 199
Ethiopia: when workers vote with their feet  .......202
Ethiopia’s developmental State  
and the garment industry  ..................................... 202
Escaping the low-wage trap ................................... 203
Missing links in the value chain ............................ 204
Lessons and opportunities  .......................................... 205
What COVID-19 has revealed  ................................ 205
Harnessing the garment value chain  
for sustainable development ..................................206
Need for more systemic engagement ....................209
CHAPTER 8: CONSTRUCTION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE: WHEN DOES 
“CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT”  
WORK?  ..................................................... 211
Global construction and the infrastructure  
of debt bondage...............................................................213
Outsourcing risk .......................................................214
Recruitment fees as a drag on development .........216
Kafala: what does it guarantee? ..............................217
Qatar: Constructing a free labour market in a  
“21st Century slave State”? ............................................218
Disrupting the domain ...........................................220
Changing the calculus: FIFA and the Gulf  
blockade  ................................................................... 222
Towards a free labour market ................................ 223
Myanmar: forced labour, military power  
and market governance ................................................ 224
Forced labour, military rule and  
State-building  ..........................................................225
Forced labour rents as a peace dividend:  
bringing international capital in ............................227
ILO supervision and engagement ......................... 228
From command economy towards  
a market economy  ...................................................231
The continuing plight of the Rohingya  
and other minorities ............................................... 232
Lessons and opportunities ........................................... 234
When do regimes abandon systematic  
forced labour?  ..........................................................235
Developing Freedom through Mega  
Sports Events  .......................................................... 236
Changing sectoral business practices .................. 236
The development case for ending  
recruitment fees ........................................................237
Disrupting late payment practices ........................ 238
Infrastructure as an asset class ............................. 238
Social finance in the Indian construction sector 240
Sharing responsibility across the value chain  .....241
vi Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
PART NEW PATHS TO DEVELOPING FREEDOM ................................................. 243
CHAPTER 9: FROM CRISIS TO 
OPPORTUNITY ........................................ 244
Introduction ................................................................... 244
COVID-19’s impact on modern slavery ....................... 245
More people are more vulnerable ......................... 245
Exploiter strategies are adapting ...........................247
Institutional responses to the pandemic  
may increase vulnerability  .....................................247
The turn to sustainable finance: opportunities  
and risks ......................................................................... 248
Ghosts of crisis past: financialized  
development, slavery and the Panic of 1837  ...............250
Slavery as an asset class  .........................................250
Who monitors and manages social risk?  ............. 252
At the systemic level .................................................252
At the project level ...................................................253
CHAPTER 10: AN AGENDA FOR 
DEVELOPING FREEDOM  ...................... 255
Recommendation 1:  




Recommendation 2:  
Slavery-proof development pathways .........................257
Development pathways that reduce  
modern slavery…  .................................................... 258
…develop human capital ......................................... 259
… promote entrepreneurialism and  
pre-distribution of wealth ..................................... 259
… provide safety nets ..............................................260
… promote high-skilled growth ............................260
… reduce inequality of economic agency .............260
Recommendation 3:  
Supply freedom  ..............................................................261
Protect workers’ health, incomes  
and livelihoods ..........................................................261
Work together  ..........................................................261
Recommendation 4:  
Finance freedom  ........................................................... 263
Responding to the crisis: keeping  
people afloat  ............................................................ 263
Increase liquidity and financial access  
at all levels ............................................................... 263
Protect microfinance ............................................... 263
Expand digital financial inclusion ....................... 264
Using development finance as leverage for systemic 
change ....................................................................... 264
Exclude known modern slavery risks from 
multilateral financing ............................................ 264
Strengthen ESG risk information  
management ............................................................ 265
Monitor systemic levels of modern  
slavery risk ............................................................... 265
Tackle illicit financial flows from  
modern slavery and human trafficking................ 265
Recommendation 5:  
Organize communities for freedom ............................266
A Developing Freedom Forum ...............................266
Identify the price of freedom ................................. 267
Expect resistance – and strategize  
accordingly  .............................................................. 267
Appendices .....................................................................268
Appendix 1 – List of search terms used  
in literature mapping ..............................................268
Appendix 2 – PRISMA flow chart  
for sources in the literature mapping ................... 270
Appendix 3 – Literature mapping –  
initial coding terms  .................................................271
Intervention categories ............................................ 271
Outcome categories ................................................. 273
Cross-cutting themes and additional coding .......275
Appendix 4 – Literature mapping –  
consolidated coding terms  .................................... 276
References ......................................................................280
Endnotes ......................................................................... 366
vii Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
List of figures
Figure 1: Connections between the SDG  
Targets and ending modern slavery ............................... 11
Figure 2: Proportion of SDG Targets that,  
if achieved, would contribute to ending  
modern slavery  ................................................................12
Figure 3: Development practitioners’ self-reported  
level of understanding of the impacts of anti-slavery  
efforts on development concerns (no. reporting) .........14
Figure 4: Development organizations’ perceptions  
of the area of practice most closely related to modern 
slavery concerns ...............................................................14
Figure 5.a: What evaluations tell us about the  
relationship between anti-slavery interventions  
and development outcomes ............................................ 17
Figure 5.b: What evaluations tell us about the  
relationship between development interventions  
and anti-slavery outcomes ............................................. 18
Figure 5.c: What evaluations tell us about  
the relationship between development  
interventions and development outcomes ................... 19
Figure 6: Number of donors committing  
ODA towards SDG 8.7 concerns, 2000-2017 ................. 22
Figure 7: Year-on-year ODA commitments  
on SDG 8.7 concerns, 2000-2017, USD,  
bilateral donors ................................................................ 23
Figure 8: Portion of total ODA commitment on  
SDG 8.7 concerns, 2000-2017, by country .................... 24
Figure 9: Year-on-year ODA commitments  
on SDG 8.7 concerns, 2000-2013, USD,  
multilateral actors ........................................................... 25
Figure 10: ODA receipt patterns, 2000-2017 ................26
Figure 11: Top recipients of ODA commitments  
relating to SDG 8.7, 2000-2017 .......................................28
Figure 12: Allocations of ODA to address  
SDG 8.7 concerns, by region, 2000-2017 .......................29
Figure 13: Number and value of ODA commitments  
2000-2017 by type of exploitation – aggregated ..........29
Figure 14: Number of ODA commitments 2000-2017  
by type of exploitation (year on year) ............................30
Figure 15: Value of ODA commitments 2000-2017  
by type of exploitation (USD, year on year) ...................30
Figure 16: DfID’s ‘Modern Slavery  
conceptual framework’ ................................................... 34
Figure 17: Chinese official lending to countries  
with high estimated modern slavery prevalence ......... 43
Figure 17.a: Chinese lending in percent  
of recipient GDP ............................................................... 43
Figure 17.b: Estimated modern slavery prevalence  
per capita, 2018 Global Slavery Index ............................ 44
Figure 18: UN country-level development  
framework mentions of modern slavery  
and related phenomena, 2000-2020..............................51
Figure 19: Distribution of value in the iPhone  
value chain, 2010 ..............................................................70
Figure 20: The smile curve ..............................................73
Figure 21: The Developing Freedom framework –  
Modern slavery as a system .............................................77
Figure 22: Survivor care programming –  
number of countries per type  .......................................84
Figure 23: Activities from which enslaved people  
were rescued in Brazil, 1995-2018  .................................94
Figure 24: Sectoral breakdown of those rescued  
from slavery in Brazil 1995-2018 (total)  ........................ 95
Figure 25: Rescues from selected industries,  
cumulative, 1995-2018 (Brazil) ........................................ 95
Figure 26: Racial distribution in Brazil  
by municipality ................................................................99
Figure 27: Location, size of rescues, birthplaces  
of enslaved workers (Brazil, 2003-2018) .....................100
Figure 28: Top 15 palm oil exporting  
countries (2019, USD billions) ....................................... 116
Figure 29: Palm oil labour management concerns  
of stakeholders – Indonesia & Malaysia  .....................123
Figure 30: State and private regulatory  
initiatives in the palm oil sector ...................................128
Figure 31: ILO estimates of Uzbek cotton  
production and labour force (2015-2019) .................... 140
Figure 32: Indexed growth in cotton exports  
(Uzbekistan v. world, 2002-2018) .................................. 141
Figure 33: ILO estimates of Uzbek cotton  
industry forced labour vs. pay rate (2015-2019) ...........142
Figure 34: The seafood supply chain ........................... 169
Figure 35: ILO estimate of forced  
labour in Thai fishing (2020) .........................................178
Figure 36: Thai fishing – involuntary work..................179
Figure 37: Number of different types of abuses  
experienced in Thai fishing – involuntary work .........179
Figure 38: Thai fishing – coercion ............................... 180
Figure 39: Number of different types of abuses  
experienced in Thai fishing – coercion....................... 180
Figure 40: The construction  
and infrastructure value chain .....................................214
viii Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
List of acronyms
AAAA Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third 
International Conference on Financing  
for Development (2015)
Accord Accord on Fire and Building Safety  
in Bangladesh
ADB Asian Development Bank
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Alliance Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety
AML Anti money laundering
APIMI Association of Palm Oil Investors  
of Malaysia in Indonesia
BGMEA Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers  
and Exporters Association
BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social (Brazil)
BRICs Brazil, Russia, India and China
BSC Bangladesh Sustainability Compact
BWI Builders’ and Wood Workers’ International
CAS ILC Committee on the Application  
of Standards
CBP US Customs and Border Protection
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CDC UK development finance institution,  
previously Commonwealth  
Development Corporation
CEACR ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations
CGF Consumer Goods Forum
COFI FAO Committee on Fisheries
COFI:FT COFI Subcommittee on Fish Trade
CONAETE Comissão Nacional de Erradicação do 
Trabalho Escravo (Brazil)
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease caused by severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2)
CPT Comissão Pastoral da Terra (Brazil)
DBE Development Bank of Ethiopia
DFIs Development finance institutions
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development
EIB  European Investment Bank
EMDEs Emerging markets and developing 
economies
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front
ESG Environmental, social and governance
EU European Union
EUR Euros
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI Foreign direct investment
FELDA Federal Land Development Authority 
(Malaysia)
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association
FLSA US Fair Labor Standards Act
FoKSBI Forum Kelapa Sawit Berkelanjutan 
Indonesia
FPIC Free, prior, informed consent
G20 Group of 20
GAPKI Gabungan Asosiasi Pengusaha Kelapa 
sawit Indonesia
GDP Gross domestic product
GERTRAF Grupo Executivo de Combate ao Trabalho 
Escravo (Brazil)
GFEMS Global Fund to End Modern Slavery
GHG Greenhouse gas
GNI Gross national incomes
GSP General System of Preferences
GVC Global value chain
HRW Human Rights Watch
IACHR Inter-American Commission  
on Human Rights
IACtHR Inter-American Court on Human Rights
ICAT UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on 
Trafficking in Persons
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFC PS IFC Performance Standard(s)
ILC International Labour Conference
ILO International Labour Organization
ILO C29 ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 
ix Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
ILO C188 ILO Work in Fishing Convention, 2007
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMO International Maritime Organization
InPACTO Instituto Pacto Nacional pela Erradicação 
do Trabalho Escravo (Brazil)
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPOP Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge
ISPO Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil 
framework
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
IUU Illegal, unregulated and unreported 
(fishing)
LDCs Least developed countries
LICs Low-income countries
MDB Multilateral development bank
MPOA Malaysian Palm Oil Association
MPOB Malaysian Palm Oil Board
MSPO Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil framework
NFAT National Fisheries Association of Thailand
NTPA National Tripartite Plan of Action on 
Fire Safety and Structural Integrity 
(Bangladesh)
OAS Organization of American States
ODA Official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
POIG Palm Oil Innovation Group
PPE Personal protective equipment
RBC Responsible business conduct
RFMOs Regional fisheries management 
organizations
RSPO Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
SDG UN Sustainable Development Goal
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(Myanmar)
SME Small and medium enterprise




UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNU-CPR United Nations University Centre for Policy 
Research
UNSDPs UN Sustainable Development Partnerships 
(country-level development assistance 
frameworks)
US United States of America
USD United States dollar
VSI Vertically specialized integration
VSS Voluntary sustainability standard(s)
WDR 2020 World Development Report 2020
WPS Wage protection system (Qatar)
WRO US CBP Withhold Release Order
WTO World Trade Organization
WWF World Wildlife Fund
XPCC Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Corps
x Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Executive 
Summary
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40.3 million people – around 1 in every 185 people alive – experienced 
modern slavery or forced labour in 2016. States have committed 
to take immediate and effective measures to end modern slavery, 
forced labour and human trafficking by 2030, and child labour by 
2025 (Target 8.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals). Since 2017, 
92 countries, including the UK, US, China and Saudi Arabia, have 
committed to a Call to Action calling for ending modern slavery to be 
“a priority” for multilateral development action. Yet development 
sector voices are often notable for their absence from global anti-
slavery discussions. 
This study is the result of eighteen months of work to answer a 
simple question: How can fighting slavery contribute to sustainable 
development? We used comprehensive literature reviews, 
quantitative analysis, surveys and mixed methods case studies 
to develop a thorough answer to that question. In summary, our 
answer is: By maximizing people’s economic agency – their ability to 
make choices, for themselves, about how to develop and use their 
own capabilities and how to use factors of production such as land, 
labour and capital.
PART ONE: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
AND MODERN SLAVERY
Modern slavery denies people’s economic agency
Modern slavery involves some people treating others as if they own them. As former IMF Director Peter 
Doyle has recently pointed out, slavery, forced labour and human trafficking (often referred to by the 
catch-all term ‘modern slavery’) all involve the intentional restriction or denial of the basic economic 
agency that is assumed by our economic models. In each case, someone is profiting by controlling 
or stealing another’s economic agency, in part or in whole – even as survivors find creative ways to 
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assert their agency in other domains. (Where that loss of agency is the central explanatory trait of 
the conduct in question, we refer to that conduct throughout this text simply as ‘slavery’, in part to 
highlight the continuity between chattel slavery, as was practiced in the era of trans-Atlantic slavery and 
contemporary ‘modern slavery’.) 
Existing approaches to development, including the human development approach inspired by Amartya 
Sen, focus on developing people’s capabilities, but assume people have basic economic agency, for 
example the ability to leave a job they do not like, or to control their own consumption, savings and 
investment choices. Slavery disrupts that assumption. It requires a different response that seeks to 
protect and maximize agency. 
10 ways slavery impedes development
The agency theft that slavery represents has significant negative externalities. They ripple through the 
economy, snowballing into large-scale, inter-generational effects that create major impediments to 
sustainable development, and leave everyone worse off. This occurs in 10 ways.
1. Slavery reduces productivity
Coercion in labour relations demotivates workers, encouraging them to leave if they can. If 
they cannot, productivity drops. The employer can use coercion to set wages below the value 
of marginal product of labour, pocketing whatever labour cost savings result. This leads to an 
inefficient allocation of labour at the economy-wide level, driving capital towards inefficient parts 
of the economy where exploiters capture these rents. The inefficient allocation of labour leads to 
a depressed equilibrium wage, so all workers – not just slaves – end up worse off. Slaves become, 
as Datta and Bales have put it, “unwilling agents of economic stagnation”. As the history of trans-
Atlantic slavery shows, slavery only connects to gains in productivity when those who capture the 
rents use them to drive forward and backward linkages in the value chain, moving the economy 
from a predatory, rentier pathway to a developmental one.
2. Slavery creates inter-generational poverty
Slavery negatively impacts the health of its victims, through multiple physical and psychological 
vectors. It also deprives victims of education and human capital formation opportunities, with 
impacts that last for the rest of their lives. Large-scale slavery can lead to demographic skewing, 
with implications for agricultural production and for reproduction rates, gender discrimination 
and violence, and sexually transmitted disease. Slavery has had inter-generational impacts in 
Africa, Latin America, North America and Eastern Europe, reducing income, health outcomes, and 
national income, and even regional economic performance.
3. Slavery institutionalizes inequality
Slavery privatizes the profits from one person controlling another’s agency, while socializing the 
resulting costs. It is an extractive system that enriches exploiters and reduces prices for consumers, 
while allowing rent-takers to entrench political power. This rapidly entrenches inequality. Those 
who benefit lean on legal forms and political narratives such as race, caste, gender or simply ‘free 
capital’ to justify this unequal allocation of control of agency. Slavery is consequently more likely 
where political freedoms are more constrained, regardless of how integrated they are into global 
markets (as Landman and Silverman have recently shown), and where societies are vertically 
unequal (as Piketty has shown). 
xiii Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
This inequality is enduring: once slavery is institutionalized, slavers tend to use their profits to 
entrench their power, perpetuating structural inequality. Efforts to end slave-based economies 
will require both political power and significant financial incentives. In the UK, the price of ending 
the slave trade in 1830 was a compensation package to the West Indies lobby worth 5 per cent of 
British GDP at the time (20 per cent of the government budget), which was still being paid off by 
the British public 180 years later. Haiti spent over two hundred years paying off the debt her former 
French slave masters demanded to accept Haitian independence. And Russia’s former serfs paid 
the bill for their own emancipation for 49 years. 
4. Slavery weakens multiplier effects
Slaves’ control over their own consumption, savings and investment choices is restricted or denied. 
Employers may withhold wages altogether, or force wages that are paid to be spent in certain ways 
– such as at company stores, or on mandatory ‘fees’. This prevents slaves improving their nutrition 
or healthcare, investing in education or household enterprise, or otherwise increasing their own 
welfare as they see fit. This reduces the contribution to economic multipliers these people would 
make if they controlled their own agency. Once that agency is restored, through emancipation, 
significant economic bumps usually follow.
5. Slavery discourages innovation in production
Slaves have no reason to innovate, since they know they will not enjoy the fruits of innovation. 
And employers also have disincentives to innovate, since it may actually reduce rent income, for 
example because exploitation becomes harder as skill-levels increase. 
6. Slavery produces a capital market failure
Slavery may however foster (nefarious) financial innovation, since it invites collateralization of 
people. Even today, when it is not legally permitted to hold slaves as capital against which mortgages 
can be raised, the enslavement of workers continues to underpin the financial valuation of 
companies that rely, perhaps unwittingly, on slavery in their value chains. Through the introduction 
of coercion after people enter employment, debt or marriage contracts, those people can effectively 
be treated like low to zero cost factors for capital formation and accumulation. Whole value chains 
emerge out of this governance manoeuvre, with those at the top using their power to capture the 
value developed, through multiple levels of mark-ups, securitization and leveraging, out of the seed 
of the worker’s collateralized freedom. Capital markets reward firms that operate on this model, 
since they seem to have low labour costs. Market regulation does not yet properly factor social costs 
into pricing, just as markets have historically failed to price in environmental costs. This is a classic 
market failure. Enterprises relying on unlawful forced labour have an unfair advantage on capital 
cost over those that do not. In effect capital markets are subsidizing illegality, leaving us all worse 
off.
7. Slavery hits the public purse
…on both the revenue and expenses side. It reduces income tax receipts because wages are unpaid 
and reduces consumption tax receipts because those unpaid wages are unspent. This may be 
significant: in 2009, the ILO calculated underpaid wages connected to forced labour at around 
USD 21 billion per annum, globally. Slavery also increases public expenditure, on enforcement, 
criminal justice, health services and victim services. UK Home Office researchers estimated direct 
and victim costs in the UK from modern slavery at around GBP 3.3 to 4.3 billion per year.
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8. Slavery weakens governance
It increases social stratification and violence, and appears to impede State formation, increasing 
ethnic fractionalization. Its introduction can degrade the strength of existing governance, and reduce 
spending on public goods and institutions, with implications for all. Slavery appears to destroy 
social capital – trust – and create new norms of mistrust that are transmitted intergenerationally. 
To succeed, anti-slavery interventions may need to address governance questions (SDG 16) and not 
only decent work (SDG 8). 
9. Slavery fuels corruption and illicit financial flows
Slavers pay bribes and corrupt officials to protect the space that allows them to conduct the illicit 
wealth transfer that slavery represents. (Andrew Crane calls this ‘domain maintenance’.) Where 
value is captured in a country other than where the labour was stolen, this may represent an illicit 
transnational financial flow. So stolen asset recovery tools may be relevant, for example to deal with 
illicit transfers of wealth from migrant workers’ countries of origin to the countries in which they 
are exploited. 
10. Slavery harms the environment
It skews production to unsustainable labour-intensive methods, and frequently coincides with 
illegal deforestation, fishing and land use. This reduces space for carbon sequestration, increases 
carbon emissions, and often leads to loss of biodiversity and natural capital stock. All of this 
connects slavery to unsustainable production and consumption practices, suggesting a need to 
develop interventions that combine work on SDG 8 with SDG 12.
The developmental impacts of slavery are 
enduring
Transatlantic slavery may account today for 72 per cent of income disparity between African nations 
and the rest of the world – and 99 per cent of the disparity between these nations and other developing 
countries. This means, though, that ending slavery would unleash significant growth: IMF researchers 
recently suggested that eliminating child marriage – one element of modern slavery – would offer poor 
countries GDP per capita growth of around 1.05 per cent.
Work to end slavery will help achieve other SDGs
Since slavery reduces growth and has other negative development impacts, ending it will promote 
growth and have other positive development impacts. Efforts to reduce slavery, forced labour and 
human trafficking connect to 113 of the 179 Sustainable Development Goal Targets. Work in the areas of 
Goals 1 (Ending Poverty), 4 (Quality Education), 8 (Decent Work), 13 (Climate Action) and 16 (Peace, Justice 
and Strong Institutions) is likely to be especially aligned with anti-slavery efforts.
The development sector has a slavery blind-spot
What approach do development actors currently take to modern slavery, forced labour and human 
trafficking? To answer that question, we surveyed practitioners from 16 countries and reviewed the 
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practice of bilateral development agencies (US, UK, Norway, Australia), multilateral development banks 
(the World Bank; ADB, AfDB, EBRD, EIB, IDB), export credit agencies, development finance institutions, 
new development lenders (AIIB, New Development Bank), and China.
Although Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom framework pointed the development sector to thinking 
about human capabilities as a foundation of development, most development entities continue to 
assume that all people – at least all adults – control their own basic economic choices. Most development 
actors fail to account meaningfully for the economic implications of the loss of agency experienced by 
40.3 million people. 67 per cent of development practitioners surveyed said their organizations perceive 
slavery not as an economic, trade or industrial policy concern, but as a social or criminal justice policy 
concern. Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, most development actors treat slavery risk reduction 
as a project safeguarding question – a risk management issue – not as a strategic objective of capital 
allocation decisions or policy advice. Only 21 per cent of practitioners surveyed said modern slavery 
risks are factors guiding investing or lending objectives.
Slavery is not treated as a predictable outcome of how risk is structured and distributed by prevailing 
economic arrangements and development strategies. The sector lacks a coherent policy approach that 
locates anti-slavery as part of a strategy to promote sustainable development. 
ODA spending on SDG 8.7 has been low and 
fragmented
We analysed more than 2 million official aid project records from 2000 to 2017. On average, less than USD 
12 per victim was committed in aggregate ODA, globally, each year. Spending is highly fragmented into 
a large number of small projects, usually receiving around USD 109,000 for bilateral projects, and just 
USD 18,000 for multilateral projects. Only 1,327 projects in the more than 2 million project records we 
reviewed were worth USD 1 million or larger. There is also evidence suggesting that ODA spending was 
spread increasingly thinly over time. 
ODA spending on these issues is concentrated in a small number of donors, with the US contributing 
around 43 per cent in the period studied, four times the EU commitment, and 7 times the commitments 
of Norway, Germany, Canada, Australia, Spain, Sweden, UK and Switzerland. UNICEF has been the most 
consistent multilateral donor, while the World Bank has been the largest. 
Tracking estimated prevalence, most spending is for programming in Asia-Pacific, then Sub-Saharan 
Africa. But spending does not appear to be based on need alone. Some countries that are thought to 
have very high prevalence have received little ODA to address this issue, while some major recipients are 
not thought to be amongst those countries hosting the largest victim populations. Spending on forced 
labour and human trafficking has been an order of magnitude higher than spending on forced marriage, 
modern slavery and child soldiering. 
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ALLOCATIONS OF ODA TO ADDRESS  
SDG 8.7 CONCERNS, BY REGION, 2000-2017
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Development entities treat slavery as a 
safeguarding question, not a strategic question
Most development actors treat slavery risk reduction as a project safeguards question – a risk 
management issue – not as a strategic objective of capital allocation decisions or policy advice. Only 21 
per cent of practitioners surveyed said modern slavery, forced labour or human trafficking are factors 
in investing and lending.
Project safeguards arrangements increasingly align around international expectations of responsible 
business conduct and business respect for human rights. These are reflected in the UN Guiding Principles 
and Business Human Rights, and relevant OECD Guidance. There is a growing cohort of development 
actors actively learning on their own, and from each other, what effective safeguards, due diligence and 
business engagement looks like. 
Their operational practice varies significantly. Some conduct their own risk assessments, while others 
rely on borrowers, beneficiaries and clients to do so. Some hold their partners to international labour 
standards; others defer to national arrangements. That creates a real risk that where States do not already 
respect international standards, development efforts will not only do nothing to generate behavioural 
change, but could in fact amplify labour violations and reinforce institutional environments conducive 
to such violations. And most safeguards are limited to project lending. They do not extend to so-called 
‘policy lending’, or advisory work.
DFIs and ECAs may need to consider not just how slavery risk may arise within their business relationships, 
but also how contextual risk can heighten project risk, and vice versa. In Ghana, for example, World Bank 
funding for a dam in the 1960s led to the disruption of traditional agricultural livelihoods, which then led 
to families trafficking their children into slavery on Lake Volta. And presently, in Eritrea, EU financed 
road construction, managed by the UN, may contribute to demand for forced labour supplied through 
a controversial government conscription scheme. Yet where safeguards fail, development actors often 
seem unwilling or unable to provide or enable effective remedy for resulting modern slavery harms, as 
required by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
The UN approach at country level  
does not take an integrated approach
UN development frameworks at the country level do not treat anti-slavery as a strategic opportunity 
to promote integrated programming for sustainable development. We reviewed 396 UN country 
development strategy documents covering 2000 to the present, looking at whether they addressed 
modern slavery, forced labour, human trafficking or child labour in a country. 74 per cent of the time they 
did not. Most references were to human trafficking and child labour, with references to forced or child 
marriage, and forced labour well behind. Modern slavery and slavery were almost never mentioned. 
Nearly all these references were contextual or described programming by one individual UN entity. Only 
1.3 per cent of the time was there a reference to one of these forms of exploitation as a target of overall 
country strategy requiring integrated programming and action. Such ‘strategic’ programming has 
actually declined substantially since 2000-2005, even as the overall number of references has increased, 
suggesting that while these issues are more often referred to, integrated action is less likely than it was 
twenty years ago. 
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There is a tight connection in these documents between how exploitation is described, the UN 
operational agency involved, and the type of programming proposed. Where the framing was focused 
on child and forced labour, the interventions proposed tended to deal with access to education, rural 
finance, and protection mechanisms. Where the framing used was ‘human trafficking’, interventions 
focused on strengthening criminal justice and victim support. The absence of an operational agency 
developing programming on ‘slavery’ or ‘modern slavery’ explains the absence of references to these 
issues. Institutional path dependency also appears to explain geographic and temporal clustering in the 
kind of programming rolled out. 
The lack of integrated thinking is reflected in the existence of two separate UN-wide coordination 
mechanisms focused on human trafficking (ICAT) and forced and child labour (Alliance 8.7). Neither 
has attracted significant commitment from the main economic development organizations in the UN 
system – such as UNDP and the World Bank. The Alliance 8.7 Pathfinder process offers an opportunity 
to strengthen integration in anti-slavery efforts – but also risks creating a separate silo of country-level 
development assistance, disconnected from the broader UN development strategy for the country and 
existing UN Country Team mechanisms. This risks missing out on opportunities for synergies between 
anti-slavery programming and broader sustainable development initiatives. 
China’s domestic practice and overseas lending is 
increasingly important to outcomes
China is the world’s largest official creditor, with outstanding claims in 2017 surpassing the loan books 
of the IMF, World Bank and of all other 22 Paris Club governments combined. Chinese-held debt may 
represent 8 per cent of world GDP and involve 80 per cent of all countries. Many of these countries 
grapple with high modern slavery risks. And most of this debt is on commercial, not concessional terms, 
and is collateralized, so Chinese debts will be treated preferentially where repayment problems arise. 
For all these reasons, Chinese approaches to modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking may 
have a significant bearing on how modern slavery risks are handled in the development context in years 
ahead. 
The Chinese Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank account for more than 75 per cent of 
overseas lending. Both are State-owned, so Chinese Government positions on modern slavery risk 
reduction will be significant. There is a growing body of Chinese Government and industry-generated 
norms directing and encouraging this lending to address forced labour and child labour risks, including 
some industry-specific norms that explicitly align with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. Most, however, merely require conformance with local law, and uptake by Chinese firms 
operating overseas remains limited.
Difficult questions are also raised by China’s domestic development policies and practices, especially 
the development and poverty-alleviation strategy for the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region known as 
‘Xinjiang Aid’ (援疆). Credible reports suggest development instrumentalities, including financing from 
China’s domestic development banks, may be underwriting imposition of systematic forced labour on 
the region’s Uyghur and other ethnic minority populations, both in Xinjiang and in factories elsewhere 
in China. Chinese authorities frame these policies in terms of development, poverty alleviation and 
counter-terrorism, arguing that allegations of forced labour are a “political manoeuvre” by the US and 
like-minded countries. The allegations generate questions about the consistency of China’s development 
policies with anti-slavery norms. Both Chinese and international development actors operating or 
financing projects in Xinjiang, or working with organizations involved in the execution of the Xinjiang 
Aid policy, may need to build and use leverage to address forced labour risks and enable effective remedy.
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Global value chains can contribute to modern 
slavery risks
Incorporation into global value chains (GVCs) can be a powerful motor for poverty eradication, 
increase formal employment and create jobs for women. This developmental model, central to much 
contemporary development spending, programming and advice encourages countries to compete for 
access to global capital by lowering overall labour costs and increasing labour market ‘flexibility’. But 
GVCs can also end up concentrating value-capture and market power at the ends (design and sales), 
while pushing risk to the middle (production). This can leave producers and workers with most of the 
risk, and force producers and countries to compete on labour costs, incentivizing coercion and labour 
exploitation. 
GVC management practices can sometimes foster precarious work. These include short-term supplier 
relationships, downward price pressures, volatility in order volumes and specifications, late payment 
and lack of access to working capital, labour subcontracting and production quotas. The result can be 
that GVCs reproduce vulnerability in the workforces and communities they depend on, undermining 
their development. The managerial challenge differs from value chain to value chain, depending on how 
they intersect with local institutions (laws, policy regimes, social norms), vulnerabilities and business 
strategies. Factors that emerge as particularly salient are: industry structure (with oligopsony power 
increasing modern slavery risks); skills-intensiveness (higher skill work is less prone to exploitation); and 
conditions of production (isolation and precarity increases modern slavery risk). Different businesses at 
different points in the GVC have different levels and forms of leverage to address these risks. 
GVCs work economically because they unbundle production into different tasks, each performed 
wherever is cheapest. This drives efficiency and increases overall welfare. The danger is that in the 
process GVCs may accidentally unbundle communities, detaching high-skill, high-wage workers 
who operate at the ends of the value chain (design, sales), from low-skill, low-wage workers who are 
pushed into the risky, precarious middle (production). This can put different communities within the 
same country on different development pathways, and contribute to structural inequality, political 
polarization and vulnerability to modern slavery.
The reorganization of production into GVCs is the result not only of technological changes such as 
reduced costs of transport and communication and improved IT that have made global dispersal of 
production of possible. It is also the result of States’ policy choices, particularly on trade, FDI, intellectual 
property, tax, competition law, migration, labour regulation and land. GVCs are the outcome of collective 
policy choices, made in a decentralized way, about how to distribute wealth, risk and power in our global 
economy. 
Tackling modern slavery requires taking this political dimension seriously. The narrative that forced 
labour and slavery promote development is a political narrative offered by those who benefit from such 
rentier arrangements. Where private interests capture the State, they can even dress up private profit-
taking from a slave-rent system as national economic growth, but only by externalizing the true social 
and economic costs of slavery – literally keeping them off the books. This is how many colonial economies 
worked, by leaving forced labour literally unaccounted for, allowing for unaccounted transfers of wealth 
from colonies to colonizers. 
Just as carbon-based ‘development’ is proving to be a chimera, an accounting sleight of hand, made 
possible only by excluding from our account the harms done to entities deemed to be outside our 
narrative frame – including our descendants – so slavery-based development may prove illusory if 
we do not account for the true social and economic costs of modern slavery. Tackling this requires 
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going beyond safeguarding projects. It requires thinking about the developmental role of the State in 
maximizing people’s economic agency. 
Addressing modern slavery requires a developmental model that reaps the pro-growth and job-creating 
benefits of GVCs, while also protecting people’s economic agency. GVCs are the product of State choices, 
so State policies will all be involved in adjusting the GVC model to reduce modern slavery risks. 
A systems approach to intervening to end modern 
slavery 
Altering our development model to protect economic agency requires system-level change. It requires 
demonstrating that the medium to long-term benefits to all that result from change are worth the 
short-term costs to some, and assembling coalitions of actors with sufficient power to sustain those 
short-term costs. To understand how to design such interventions, we need a framework for analyzing 
modern slavery systems.
We call this the ‘Developing Freedom’ framework. It explains modern slavery as an extractive system 
that arises where 1) institutional environments intersect with 2) people’s vulnerabilities in ways that 
allow 3) profitable exploiter strategies to emerge. 
Intervention pathway: 
Transformation
• strengthen protection, 
rights and governance 




• change strategic calculus 
of exploitation by 
1) making it more costly; and 
2) making non-exploitation 
options less costly
Exploiter Strategies:
• Business and management practices
• Criminal strategy 
Vulnerable People:




• strengthen capabilities of vulnerable people to make them more resistant to 




• Formal and informal rules
• Physical environment
THE DEVELOPING FREEDOM ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
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Exploiters use the institutional resources in the environment – including laws, social norms and business 
practices – to turn people’s vulnerability into stable control of their economic agency, allowing rent 
capture. These practices may further contribute to people’s vulnerability (e.g. ‘adverse incorporation’), 
creating a reinforcing feedback mechanism that helps sustain the system. 
Rent-takers also maintain these systems by actively undertaking ‘domain maintenance’ (Andrew Crane’s 
term) to protect their autonomy from anti-slavery norms. That often includes alliances with political 
power and corruption, but can also include alignment of interests with global buyers, consumers and 
investors. 
Interventions can seek to 1) transform the institutional environment, 2) empower people to make them 
more resistant to exploitation, or 3) disrupt exploiter strategies by changing their strategic calculus. 
Transformation requires more than just legal reforms, since slavery often operates beyond the reach of 
the law, and is sustained more by social norms. Empowerment works to increase people’s resistance to 
exploitation, including by enhancing their agency and capabilities, including their financial capabilities. 
Disruption aims to make slavery too costly, or alternative strategies more profitable. 
Where development actors intervene, rent-takers can be expected to resist, pre-empting, counter-
mobilizing or coopting interventions (Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick’s typology). To be effective, development 
interventions must be strategic, anticipating such resistance. And since modern slavery systems are 
embedded in larger sectoral and political structures that stretch from the local to the global level, 
development interventions intended to address them may need to operate across multiple institutional 
levels. 
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PART TWO: SIX SECTORAL CASE 
STUDIES
The study presents six mixed-methods, sectoral case studies that explore different modern slavery 
systems operating in the global economy, and identifies the dynamics around efforts to intervene in 
those systems to promote sustainable development. These studies, and other detailed discussions in 
Chapters One and Nine, cover: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Thailand, UK, US and Uzbekistan.
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CASE STUDY: CATTLE (BRAZIL)
For the last 25 years, the Brazilian State has led arguably the most sustained, sophisticated domestic 
anti-slavery disruption effort of any country in recent times. This has been supported by civil society, 
the ILO, US, Norway and – to some extent – Brazilian business. It has rescued over 55,000 people from 
conditions of slavery. Around one third of those people worked on cattle ranches. 
Slavery in Brazil’s cattle industry is a product of several interacting factors:
• Institutional environment: a development model that encourages meat production in areas where 
the State’s enforcement power is weak, including the Legal Amazon and Cerrado, combined with 
a supply chain that relies on outsourcing and competition on labour costs. Brazil has invested 
significant State and international development funds in cattle industry firms that have tolerated 
workplace illegalities. 
• People’s vulnerabilities: a pool of marginalized, poor rural labourers (peões) susceptible to 
discrimination and exploitation. It is not the poorest of the poor, but the working, landless poor, 
with limited access to education, capital and finance that appear most susceptible to enslavement.
• Exploiter strategies: use of coercion and fraud by recruiters (gatos), contractors and producers to 
compete on labour costs, while harnessing traditional norms of social dependency and obligation, 
and market norms of financial debt, to control workers’ economic agency. 
These factors interact to generate stiff competition amongst primary producers, who on-sell to other 
producers and to slaughter-houses. They compete by using coercion to drive down wage bills. Supply 
chain traceability is limited, and producers blame recruiters and foremen for poor labour practices. 
Many producers also enjoy effective impunity because of the isolation of their ranches, deliberate 
corruption of police and government officials, and intimidation of workers. 
Brazil’s disruption effort has evolved over time, through a series of collaborations between government, 
civil society and business, notably the Commission for the Eradication of Slave Labour (Comissão Nacional 
de Erradicação do Trabalho Escravo – CONATRAE) and a successor National Pact. The government 
has developed a series of powerful tools for disrupting exploiter strategies, including mobile labour 
inspections and courts, and the famous ‘dirty list’ (lista suja) of companies found to have engaged in 
slavery or employed workers in slavery-like conditions. The lista suja became an important reference 
for both buyers and public and private lenders to use in screening out businesses that rely on slavery. 
Yet disruption efforts have lost momentum in recent years, as actors with interests in the cattle and 
other affected industries have counter-mobilized through judicial, political and extra-judicial channels. 
The National Champions Policy, 2008-2013, saw the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (BNDES), Brazil’s national development bank and the second largest in the world, provide billions 
of dollars of concessional financing to and take equity positions in several Brazilian beef companies, 
allowing them tomove up the global value chain. IFC also provided financing. By 2013 one of these 
companies, JBS, had become the largest meat-processing firm in the world. But it has also been linked 
to bribery scandals, and in 2014 was Brazil’s largest political donor. Politicians with close ties to the 
agribusiness sector have pushed back openly against the anti-slavery agenda in recent years.
As government steps back, there is a growing effort from civil society to encourage private sector 
leadership in efforts to transform the institutional environment, changing supply chain management 
practices. This is accompanied by a turn to big-data solutions, which appear promising. Brazil arguably 
has a global competitive advantage in developing data-driven supply chain risk analysis, given its 
uniquely long effort at government-led disruption, and the strong IT and computational capabilities of 
its workforce. This model may have significant export potential. 
ACTIVITIES FROM WHICH ENSLAVED PEOPLE  
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CASE STUDY: PALM OIL  
(INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, NIGERIA)
Oil palm is an exceptionally profitable and adaptable crop, used in a wide array of consumer products 
and as a biofuel. Development actors have promoted its uptake across equatorial countries since the 
1960s, leading to over 500 per cent production growth. Today, the livelihoods of 17 million people depend 
on the industry. Palm oil seems to promote growth and poverty reduction at the national level, but also 
to have variable impacts at the community level, depending on the prior institutional setting and the 
commercial structure of production.
In Indonesia and Malaysia most production occurs on private plantation estates, or on the land of 
smallholder ‘outgrowers’ who operate under a long-term commercial relationship with a buyer. 
Malaysia’s industry has been shaped by close cooperation between the State and the industry, especially 
regulating access to land and labour, sometimes described as a ‘palm oil industrial complex’. This 
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developmental State approach has fostered significant growth. 70 per cent of agricultural land use is now 
for palm oil. Indonesia’s industry has been shaped by efforts by Malaysian firms to replicate the close 
relationship with the State that those firms enjoy in Malaysia. This has again fostered significant growth, 
with palm oil now contributing around 12 per cent of export earnings. But it has also led to significant 
corruption at the local level, with district governors (bupatis) competing for access to foreign capital 
through facilitating access to low-cost land and labour. In Nigeria, we see more cooperative production 
and wild harvest from traditional, pre-industrial groves. Efforts to develop a plantation-based system 
have only begun to succeed in the last 10 years, with the arrival of firms from South East Asia. 
Modern slavery risks vary across these contexts. Exploitation in the sector is always about competition 
on labour costs, and production quotas, wage penalties, isolation, debt and coercion are often used 
to force work. But vulnerability seems to vary on two main dimensions: political agency (i.e. reduced 
protection by the State) and control of land. In Indonesia, forced and child labour risks arise amongst 
the casual labour force on plantations and smallholdings, especially amongst indigenous people and 
internal migrants. In Malaysia, risks are connected in particular to the management of foreign migrant 
workers, who are often in debt bondage connected to recruitment fees. Women are at heightened risk, 
as are the ‘Stateless’ children born to foreign migrant workers in Malaysia. In Nigeria, risks relate to 
adverse incorporation of smallholders into export-oriented plantations. 
Plantation systems are often relatively autonomous domains, separated from their larger social 
setting but exercising influence over their surroundings. That autonomy is maintained through active 
collaboration between security forces and plantation owners, and creates space for illegality – including 
illegal land-grabbing and environmental practices. There is a growing recognition of the environmental 
costs of conversion of land to oil palm, including carbon emissions, biodiversity loss, and harmful haze 
– which is thought to have caused 100,000 deaths in South East Asia during one episode in 2015. 
Recognition of these growing costs led to efforts to transform supply chain management practices to 
strengthen sustainability. Efforts focused particularly on consumer-facing brands and on processing 
and refining companies, where 70-90% of global capacity is controlled by just 8 companies, all in Asia. 
The central push came through the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a multi-stakeholder 
supply chain governance initiative led by private actors, based on certification at the plantation and 
mill level. It currently covers around 19 per cent of global supply. After initial cooperation, both the 
Indonesian and Malaysian Governments ultimately resisted this initiative after prompting from 
national industry leaders. Both countries characterized the RSPO’s prioritization of environmental 
concerns as a threat to their sovereign choices to prioritize other aspects of sustainable development, 
such as economic growth, poverty reduction and people’s livelihoods. Both countries created national 
certification schemes, which they presented as lower-cost options better tailored to local realities and 
development priorities. 
This served to fragment global value chain governance in the industry, leading to normative 
entrepreneurialism from a variety of public and private actors. The RSPO was essentially appealing to 
retailers and consumers in the global North; the others, to local audiences in the global South. What 
presented as a technical dispute was in fact a deeply political one. And it has become more so, as different 
States have allied with different economic actors in the global value chain – especially since the EU’s 
decision to remove palm oil from its list of approved biofuels (on deforestation grounds), and the US’ 
move to hold some palm oil products at its border (based on forced labour concerns). This represents the 
emergence of a State-backed disruption strategy alongside the privately-led transformation strategy 
represented by the RSPO. Yet some major consuming countries, notably India and China, have not 
pursued either a transformation or disruption strategy, though their positions are evolving. 
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Most of these sustainability efforts focused at first on environmental sustainability, but after disruptive 
pressures from human rights, labour activists and journalists, have begun in recent years to consider 
labour exploitation. Yet they nearly all continue to treat the issue as a “techno-managerial” question of 
workforce management, without addressing underlying questions of economic agency such as access 
to and control of land, migration governance, corruption and structural inequality. They focus on the 
physical production of palm oil without addressing its social production, and the ways in which State 
policies shape the interaction of land, labour and capital flows to generate rents from the control of 
vulnerable people’s economic agency.
In recent years, there have however been attempts to foster convergence across the palm oil ‘regime 
complex’ around shared public policy goals, particularly through the RSPO certifying entire political 
and legal jurisdictions. This may offer opportunities for addressing these questions of sustainability 
governance in a more direct way, but also raises questions about voice and representation in these 
processes. The RSPO’s establishment of a ‘Shared Responsibility’ Working Group may help, giving space 
to financiers, supply chain actors and civil society. 
Further work is needed to identify the content of the public policy goals around which convergence 
should be fostered, particularly around how to maximize the economic agency of not only casual 
workers, but also smallholders, addressing people’s underlying vulnerabilities. The World Bank, IFC, 
UNDP and UN Environment Programme are all doing work to promote palm oil smallholding as a path 
to sustainable development, and private capital markets and development finance entities may have a 
bigger role to play both in financing and in addressing barriers to smallholder financing (opaque land 
tenure, exposure to local political risk, lack of access to credit histories, lack of policy space allowing 
private actors to focus on sustainability issues). More work is also needed to address the State policies 
that reproduce a vulnerable labour force available for the industry’s exploitation, including through 
promoting standardization of contracts, collective bargaining and other agency-enhancing measures. 
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CASE STUDY: COTTON (UZBEKISTAN)
According to the ILO, the number of people in forced labour in the annual cotton harvest in Uzbekistan 
has fallen from 448,000 in 2014 to 102,000 in 2019. While Brazil may have ‘rescued’ the most people from 
slavery-like conditions in recent years (see above), this effort to disrupt systematic forced labour in 
Uzbekistan is arguably the most effective large-scale prevention campaign in recent times.
Forced labour in the Uzbek cotton harvest is a product of a command economy left over from the Soviet 
era, enforced by the State through a range of administrative, law enforcement, security and social 
institutions. For several decades, farmers were forced to grow cotton and sell it to the State at suppressed 
prices, while one fifth of the adult population – around two to three million people – was mobilized 
each summer in a corvée to pick cotton for between two and eight weeks, unless they could buy or 
bribe their way out. Mobilization was organized through multiple institutions of society: local mahalla 
neighbourhood committees, universities and colleges, hospitals and clinics, public and private sector 
employers, and through mosques. Until 2012, children were not spared. A range of coercive techniques 
was used, from violence and intimidation, to prosecution, quotas, taxes and social pressure. That 
coercive pressure was, however, frequently dressed up through use of social norms such as patriotism, 
piousness and solidarity. The system appears to have siphoned off billions of USD in rents to ruling 
elites, some of it moved offshore. Forced labour in the cotton industry was made possible by, and helped 
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Since 2016, however, Uzbekistan’s approach to the cotton sector has changed dramatically, leading to 
significant reductions in forced labour. This is the result of concerted leadership from the highest levels 
of Uzbek Government, notably President Mirziyoyev after he succeeded former President Karimov 
in late 2016. This study considers the factors that contributed to this policy shift. First, coordinated 
international pressure from labour rights activists, buyers and foreign States, including a boycott of 
Uzbek cotton, disrupted access to global markets. This steadily raised the costs of systematic forced 
labour for the Uzbek elite. Second, the pay-offs from the forced-labour based system dropped, as the 
command economy approach to the management of the industry generated declining output, yields, 
income – and rents. Cotton accounted for 90 per cent of Uzbekistan’s exports in 1992. By 2016 it was just 
3.4 per cent, and Uzbekistan had moved from the largest to tenth-largest producer in the world. One 
study calculated the indirect costs of the forced labour system at USD 211 to 291 million per year, but it 
also contributed to inflation, hurt human capital formation (by disrupting educational systems every 
year and discouraging upskilling of the workforce), retarded innovation, and led to environmentally 
harmful land management.
Third, when a political opening for reform arrived as President Mirziyoyev succeeded former President 
Karimov in late 2016, the World Bank and ILO were ready and in place to deploy programming that 
aimed not just at project safeguards but at broader systems change. This involved projects aimed at 
working with the government to dismantle the annual cotton-picking mobilization and, increasingly, 
to transform the cotton value chain in Uzbekistan, through changed purchasing and payment practices. 
This was the result of pressure arising from a complaint to the World Bank Inspection Panel about an 
existing World Bank grant, and a carefully coordinated response from the Bank, ILO and like-minded 
bilateral partners (including France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the UK and US; the EU, OSCE and 
other UN entities; and the EBRD). 
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Fourth, brave civil society activists and human rights defenders kept pressure on the Uzbek Government, 
the World Bank and the ILO to ensure the transparency, reliability and legitimacy of these assistance 
efforts, especially ILO monitoring. This led to a growing emphasis in all these actors’ efforts, including 
those of Government and the ILO, on empowerment of Uzbek people and workers to resist coercion. 
The result of these converging factors has been a steady and genuine process of reform by the Uzbek 
authorities, with the withdrawal of the State system’s support for forced labour, increasingly rigorous 
punishment of those who engage in it, and changes in the management of the cotton value chain to 
disincentivize it – including increased pay for workers. In May 2020, the Government abolished the 
centralized production system for cotton altogether.
ILO monitoring provides unique insights into the dynamics of this successful reform process in 
Uzbekistan. One insight is the importance of effective strategic coordination between international 
actors with leverage, to achieve such rapid and large-scale reform. Consistent and coherent messaging 
from international actors to the Uzbek Government, over an extended period, constrained its strategic 
options – even as tactical differences between different members of the international coalition created 
leverage. A ‘good cop bad cop’ dynamic, with boycotters as the bad cop, and engagers as the good cop, 
ultimately proved effective. 
A second is the fact that informal social institutions may continue to promote forced labour (‘systemic 
forced labour’) even after the formal institutions of the State abandon it (‘systematic forced labour’). 
Forced labour exists on a spectrum of broader labour exploitation. The ILO definition requires that 
work be both involuntary and subject to penalty, to constitute forced labour. Involuntary work subject 
only to “social pressure” is not, in the ILO’s eyes, forced labour; yet in a political context such as 
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Uzbekistan, where social institutions have long been controlled by an authoritarian State apparatus, 
people frequently do not separate social pressure from threat of real harm by the State. This suggests 
that the problem of labour exploitation may remain larger than the ILO’s forced labour statistics may 
lead observers to believe. And it also suggests that the focus of intervention should not be the question 
of what penalties flow from following one’s economic preference (i.e. not working if you do not want to), 
but rather whether people feel they have that choice in the first place. That may require development 
interventions that focus more explicitly on people’s economic – and political – agency. 
Third, the story in Uzbekistan is not yet complete. As the ILO’s monitoring reports make clear, while 
vastly reduced, forced labour continues. And Uzbekistan is just at the beginning of a road to upgrade its 
cotton value chain to achieve sustainability, through localized production and manufacturing ‘clusters’. 
Yet there is still a significant chapter of that story missing: on remedy. Development actors have not 
yet taken steps to address the need for remedy of past harms. There may be more they can do here, 
including by supporting stolen assets recovery, and thinking about the role of transitional justice in 
fostering accountability for past systematic human rights violations, without terminating much-needed 
reforms.
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CASE STUDY: FISHERIES (BANGLADESH,  
INDIA, PHILIPPINES, THAILAND)
Global fish production has grown seven-fold since 1950, and will grow further in years ahead. Fishing 
and aquaculture is a very heterogeneous industry, with especially complex (and non-linear) supply 
chains. Different contexts give rise to a variety of modern slavery risks and systems. 
In competitive marine capture fisheries, firms resort to labour coercion as they compete for profits 
from often dwindling fish-stocks. Over-fishing of coastal fisheries has led to increased distant-water 
fishing, making State regulation more difficult – both due to distance, and due to the involvement of 
multiple States (coastal, flag, port, migrant workers’ countries of origin). Distant-water fishing often 
involves more technologically advanced, capitalized vessels, whose owners make use of off-shore legal 
structures, open international registers, secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens to protect profits. 
This pattern is visible in the Thai fisheries sector. Its fishing fleet grew from 99 vessels in 1961 to 57,000 in 
2011. It is the largest exporter globally of canned tuna, and a major source of shrimp exports to Western 
supermarket chains. Depletion of coastal stocks in recent decades through over-fishing led some Thai 
investors to focus on inland aquaculture, while others moved further offshore. Economic growth drew 
the Thai workforce to other sectors, so fishing and aquaculture have relied heavily for several decades on 
recruitment of poor migrant workers – first from within Thailand, and then from poorer neighbouring 
countries (Laos, Cambodia and Rohingya displaced from Myanmar). Many are undocumented, heavily 
indebted, and deeply vulnerable to trafficking into slavery, including on illegal vessels far offshore, 
which are essentially beyond the reach of the State. A 2008 UN study found that 59 per cent of trafficking 
victim respondents had witnessed the murder of a fellow worker on a Thai fishing vessel. Some distant 
water vessels stay at sea for months at a time, trans-shipping cargo back to shore, and operating from 
informal bases in foreign countries. One, between Australia and Indonesia, was found to have 600 men 
in iron cages when it was raided in April 2015. 
Forced labour is also present in seafood processing. Declining marine fish-stocks have led to significant 
investment in – and growth of – aquaculture over the last thirty years, with annual growth around 
3 to 4 per cent. It now accounts for roughly half of all fish production. In industrial aquaculture and 
processing, modern slavery risks arise primarily for migrant labourers, especially women and children, 
and may be higher in export-oriented firms that are exposed to greater labour cost pressures. In each of 
these areas, debt is a crucial mechanism of control, and often amounts to debt bondage. Many migrant 
workers pay recruitment fees, and workers are frequently forced to buy food, accommodation, travel and 
other services from their trafficker. Physical isolation is also used as a means of control, with identity 
documents often withheld, and pay is frequently provided only at the end of a long contract period. A 
2012 UN study found 33 per cent of workers in one main processing region in Thailand were trafficked. 
A 2011 ILO study found over 10,000 migrants in child labour.
Civil society, ILO, FAO and more recently UNODC have drawn growing attention to modern slavery and 
associated organized crime risks in fishing, especially in Thailand, since around 2007. These responses 
have informed a wide variety of private governance initiatives and certification schemes, as well as 
national-level actions such as extension of labour laws to off-shore vessels and decent work programmes. 
The EU has used a ‘carding’ system to warn countries their seafood products may be excluded from 
European markets if changes are not made to address concerns related to illegal, unregulated and 
unreported (IUU) fishing. It gave Thailand a ‘yellow card’ in 2015, leading to a 21 per cent drop in Thai 
fishing export revenues the next year. The US has also used State policy levers to try to incentivize reform. 
In 2014, it downgraded Thailand to Tier 3 in its annual Trafficking in Persons status report, disrupting its 
access to US Government engagement. In 2015 it threatened to revoke preferential trade status for Thai 
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fish and seafood exports. And it has subsequently issued detention orders for seafood products thought 
to be made with forced labour. Private actors also took action, incorporating labour management issues 
into sustainability certification regimes, and, in some cases, divesting from Thai supply chains. 
Prompted by this disruption, the Thai Government took numerous steps to address the situation, 
including extending a minimum wage to fishers, overhauling fisheries monitoring and management, 
and strengthening anti-trafficking capabilities. Many of these reforms were supported by the ILO’s 
2016-2020 Ship to Shore project, financed by the EU. These efforts led to the EU removing Thailand’s 
yellow card and the US promoting Thailand in its Trafficking in Persons watch list. But human rights 
actors have continued to allege ongoing labour rights violations, and in October 2019 the US Trade 
Representative suspended USD 1.3 billion in trade preferences. A March 2020 ILO estimate found that 10 
per cent of fisheries workers had experienced forced labour, with larger numbers experiencing 1 of its 
two components (coercion – 12 per cent; involuntary work – 27 per cent) but not both. The ILO estimates 
there are still tens of thousands of workers in Thai fishing and seafood processing facing similar risks.
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The Thai case reveals a number of insights into the dynamics of anti-slavery reform efforts. 
First, it reveals a familiar pattern of resistance to disruption. An ILO study from early 2020 concludes 
that coercion and involuntary work are still prevalent in Thai fishing because “[o]fficials either do not 
see or simply ignore these abuses… the industry and Government officials have apparently reached 
an accommodation … that causes some violations to go undetected or unreported.” There is well-
documented evidence of fishing companies corrupting executive, judicial and security officials at the 
local level to not only protect but participate in human trafficking. The relaxation of pressure by the EU 
and US may in turn have led to a relaxation of pressure by the Thai Government on such networks. There 
were just 304 prosecutions in 209, and only five compensation orders have been paid since 2014. 
Second, the Thai case shows the importance of strategic coordination of external actors around a 
substantive reform agenda. In contrast to Uzbekistan, where the Cotton Campaign has marshalled 
international actors around a shared set of reform demands, there is no central entity coordinating 
advocacy on fisheries reform towards the Thai Government. Moreover, there has been an apparent 
willingness by external actors to accept narrow, techno-managerial solutions – such as screening 
apps, training, port monitoring, and supply chain audits – and avoid engaging on deeper questions 
of unionization, worker voice, and civil society freedom. This stands in contrast to the situation in 
Uzbekistan, where broader political liberalization has created an opportunity to address the political 
economy of cotton. In Thailand, perhaps due to the different political climate, there has been no serious 
effort by external actors to engage with the questions of the fishing industry’s political economy, little 
effort to protect space for human rights defenders raising issues related to worker rights, and little effort 
by buyers to connect procurement to questions of worker voice and collective action. The ILO’s Ship to 
Shore project concludes that while the underlying questions are “problems of power and the uses of 
power”, they have instead been treated “as technical problems”. 
The chapter contrasts the Thai situation with modern slavery risks in three other countries. In the 
Philippines, risks arise in production and processing, but especially for Filipino migrant workers on 
foreign-flagged vessels. Some efforts to encourage small-scale Filipino fishers to participate in markets 
and incorporate into supply chains may have increased debt bondage and precarity. In India, debt 
bondage in aquaculture and processing is a concern, especially for lower-caste, domestic migrant 
workers, as well as risks for male migrant workers on foreign fleets. In Bangladesh, there are similar 
concerns around forced labour of women and children in fish processing facilities, and increased 
precarity for traditional fishing and aquaculture-based livelihood as efforts to industrialize the sector 
take hold. 
These cases point to a need for development interventions to develop a more coherent approach to 
economic agency for producers, workers and stakeholders across these complex value chains. To the 
extent that governance efforts address modern slavery risks, they have tended to do so in narrow labour-
management terms, without addressing related questions of smallholder vulnerability and agency, or 
the institutional drivers of underlying exploitation strategies. The FAO’s new guiding principles on 
social sustainability in fish and seafood value chains, which includes a cross-cutting commitment to 
the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour and child labour, may provide the basis for 
developing a more coherent, cross-cutting agenda for promoting economic agency across this sector. 
But it will need to be operationalized in different governance forums. At present the anti-slavery agenda 
is absent from key venues such as the regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). RFMOs 
could use their IUU registers to underpin exclusion from procurement, financing and insurance of 
vessels and supply chains connected to modern slavery, as well as addressing questions of worker voice 
in fisheries governance (as the Indonesian Government has recently advocated). 
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CASE STUDY: GARMENTS AND APPAREL  
(BANGLADESH, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, UK)
The garments and apparel sector accounts for roughly 2 per cent of global GDP. It employs approximately 
60 to 70 million people, two thirds to three quarters of whom are women. Its economic geography 
is especially mobile: production is frequently relocated to capture marginal gains created by the 
intersection of changing trade, investment and labour migration regimes. In the process, textile and 
apparel production have come to be seen as an important catalyst for industrialization and movement 
out of agricultural production, especially in countries where backward linkages can be fostered into raw 
materials and textile production. 
Production centres actively compete for investment by reducing labour costs and regulatory burdens. 
Global buyers, typically headquartered in the US, Europe or Japan, have the widest margins and the 
greatest power in the value chain. They determine who produces what, where and at what price. 97 per cent 
of profits for the whole fashion industry are earned by just twenty companies, most of them in the luxury 
segment. Beneath them, the value chain is highly fragmented and disarticulated. Producers operate 
on the narrowest margins and carry most of the risk. Supply chain outsourcing and fragmentation has 
promoted efficiency, but impedes traceability and accountability, inadvertently fostering exploitative 
purchasing practices. These include: contract terms that are vague on price and financial implications 
of delays; unilateral changes on order specifications, without extending deadlines, and without reliable 
forecasting or order planning; unrealistic order completion times and unpredictable placement of 
orders; pricing arrangements that treat labour cost as a residue, not a necessary input; and late payment. 
Lead firms’ control over suppliers and supply chains thus mirrors the nature of contemporary slavery: 
it operates through both legal and extra-legal mechanisms of control, but does not necessarily imply 
formal ‘ownership’. 
Suppliers survive by managing capital and their workforce in ways that allow them to rapidly increase 
and reduce labour supply to respond to buyer demand, while maintaining low prices. That translates to a 
highly casualized and atomized workforce, often working from home, under informal or no contractual 
arrangements, with zero-hours contracts or piece rate payment systems. Workers are frequently 
recruited through brokers and intermediaries who demand fees from workers for placing them in work. 
Unionization and collective organization are often absent. Unauthorized subcontracting by suppliers is 
ubiquitous. So too is under-payment and wage theft. One estimate put underpayments in the Chinese 
apparel sector at around USD 275 to 300 million per month.
Jurisdictions compete for investment and export contracts by promising “low business costs” – often 
a cipher for lax enforcement of labour protections and standards. Governments refrain from enforcing 
protections, and outsource responsibility for enforcement to business and private supply chain 
governance initiatives. Yet in many places audits are easily gamed, and worker grievance and support 
mechanisms are poorly adapted to the reality of casualized, atomized workforces. Suppliers are left 
to choose between the norms promoted, weakly, by the State, and the institutional demands of their 
customers – especially their demands for low price and fast turnaround. 
The move to ‘fast fashion’ has placed a further premium on supplier responsiveness, yet cost remains 
the over-riding factor shaping consumer and brand purchasing choices. In the last ten years, the rise 
of social media driven advertising strategies and online sales has seen a turn to ‘ultra fast fashion’, with 
brands increasingly looking to locate production as close as possible to major consumer markets (‘on-
shoring’ or ‘near-shoring’), to reduce delivery times even further. As a result, the global garments and 
apparel value chain now includes low-wage, low-skill workforces not only in traditional production 
centres such as Europe, but also in newcomers such as China, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Viet Nam 
and Los Angeles, competing with each other for buyers’ custom and for capital investment. 
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The chapter explores how these dynamics play out in four different contexts: Leicester in the UK – a 
traditional textile hub that has recently re-emerged as a leader, in the context of ultra-fast fashion; 
Bangladesh; India; and Ethiopia. In each place, the institutional dynamics of the value chain work to 
encourage labour exploitation. In some of these places, there is a ‘captive’ population – often refugees, 
migrants and those socially marginalized by language, gender or caste – with few outside options, 
vulnerable to exploitation. In each place, there are also signs that a lax approach to sustainability imposes 
costs not only on the worker population, but also on the broader community – including public health 
costs, lost tax revenue and environmental costs associated with unsustainable production practices. 
Bangladesh is the world’s second largest garment exporter after China. Garment production accounts 
for roughly 20 per cent of its GDP, and employs around 4.5 million people. It has been a powerful driver 
of development, especially for women, in recent decades. But it has also exposed millions of children 
to child labour in the production of leather and textiles. And as Bangladesh was exposed to competition 
from Ethiopia, India and other producers in recent years and suppliers were forced to reduce costs, 
working conditions deteriorated. This culminated with the Rana Plaza disaster in April 2013, in which 
1,138 people were killed in the collapse of a building housing several garment factories supplying global 
brands. In response to the resulting global outcry, three different supply chain governance initiatives 
emerged: a government-ILO led National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural 
Integrity; the European company led Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (which was legally 
binding and included union representatives); and the US company led Alliance for Bangladesh Worker 
Safety (not binding, no unions). At the inter-governmental level, Bangladesh, the EU, US, Canada and 
ILO also agreed a Bangladesh Sustainability Compact together to commit to strengthening respect for 
labour rights, building and workplace safety, and responsible business conduct. This created a strategic 
coordination framework, backed up by the threat of loss of trade preferences.
The chapter considers the dynamics of interaction of these initiatives and their impacts. Overall, they 
appear to have significantly enhanced worker safety. But their scope was limited, both in terms of their 
reach into unauthorized factories, and into issues beyond worker safety – such as worker voice, sexual 
harassment, involuntary work and wage theft. Moreover, a World Bank study suggests that because 
buyers would not pay for the remediation and renovation of factories found to be unsafe, suppliers 
passed the costs of doing so on to workers – specifically, to female workers. That is significant, because 
it suggests that efforts that aim to address working conditions may generate trade-offs by suppliers on 
wages. A more holistic approach to workers’ economic agency may be needed. Unlike the Alliance and 
Accord, this may need to grapple with broader labour rights questions, such as unionization. Garment 
suppliers in Bangladesh have counter-mobilized in recent years to resist broader reform pressures 
on such questions, working with allies in Government to protect the industry’s domain from foreign 
interference, framing these efforts in openly political terms. 
In India, a large part of production is through informal, home-based work, where child labour may 
be prevalent. Perhaps only 2 million of the roughly 45 million jobs in the sector are export-oriented, 
limiting the leverage of foreign buyers and investors. Export-oriented production is clustered around 
Delhi, Bangalore and Tirupur, and there is evidence of labour exploitation, rising to and including forced 
labour, in each region. In recent years there has been particular international mobilization around 
forced labour in the Tirupur area, the location of the majority of India’s spinning units and knitted 
production. This has focused on the sumangali (‘married woman’) recruitment scheme – an indentured 
servitude scheme recruiting poor, unmarried, lower-caste, rural teenage girls, with the promise of 
earning enough money for a dowry – and thus the respectability of becoming a ‘married woman’. In 
reality, workers often received less than promised, only at the end of a three-year term of service, while 
being subjected to coercion and involuntary work during that period. Local and foreign civil society 
groups mobilized in the late 2000s to organize public relations, judicial and divestment campaigns, and 
stood up a local multi-stakeholder initiative. Local suppliers now argue the scheme is defunct. There 
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are however signs that some of the exploitative practices persist. A new approach, pioneered by the 
Freedom Fund, combining elements of disruption, transformation and empowerment, may be having 
more sustained success: in the 400 villages participating in its regional programme between 2015 and 
2018, the prevalence of households experiencing bonded labour fell on average from 56 per cent to just 
11 per cent. That represents more than 63,000 fewer individuals in bonded labour. 
Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has sought to diversify its agriculture-focused economy, through a labour-
intensive, export-led industrialization model, based on East Asian models. Textile and garment 
manufacturing is seen as key to this process, fostering backward integration to cotton production, while 
harnessing preferential trade access to the EU and US to deliver rents that can be used to invest in 
infrastructure, basic services and social programming. The Government’s industrial policy has, since 
2008, focused on attracting foreign investment in the industry, through favourable investment and tax 
regimes, low-cost electricity, and access to land and Government-funded industrial parks. Ethiopia also 
has the lowest textile industry wage in the world, no statutory minimum wage, and low union density. 
The strategy was significantly supported by development partners including DfID, GIZ and IFC, as well 
as domestic banks. The result has been 51 per cent growth in the industry between 2013 and 2018, and 
45,000 new jobs. Yet wages are so low that they may push workers into debt, once living expenses are 
factored in. This, combined with poor management practices, seems to lead both to low total-factor 
productivity, and to high workforce turnover, as workers leave to start their own informal businesses. 
Workers may experience involuntary work, or coercion, but not both. This is not a ‘captive’ workforce. 
Workers seem to retain the ability to exercise outside options. 
Ethiopia also differs from India, Bangladesh, and the UK, in another key respect: it is a developmental 
patrimonialist State. Patronage networks continue to retain strong control over the economy, even as 
liberalizing reforms move arrangements towards a market footing. This means that efforts to intervene 
in the garment sector, to reduce modern slavery risks, will not involve engagement with local private 
sector actors (or indeed unions) in the same way that they will in more market-oriented economies. 
Instead, the conversation will be essentially between foreign buyers and investors, the Ethiopian State, 
and development actors. This offers both opportunities and risks. Once the Ethiopian State is behind a 
certain reform, it means there is relatively reduced chance of local business acting as a spoiler. But this 
also means that extra care will be needed to take local stakeholders’ interests into account – placing a 
premium on fostering worker voice. The ILO’s new Siraye programme, which commenced in 2019, may 
provide a framework for such efforts. 
These cases offer important insights for harnessing the growth potential of the garments and apparel 
industry, while reducing modern slavery risk – including after COVID-19. The pandemic has hit the 
global industry especially hard, with income drops for workers in Asia of around 30 to 50 per cent. 
Some two million female garment workers may have been laid off globally. Development actors and civil 
society have mobilized to pressure buyers to take action to support workers during the pandemic, but 
with rolling bankruptcies at the higher ends of the value chain, there is a limit to what these firms can do. 
States have a key role but will need to take a more strategic approach. The garments value chain works 
the way it does because States have chosen to take a hands-off approach, favouring returns to capital 
over returns to labour. That is a choice; they could, equally, now choose to take a more interventionist 
path, guiding the global garment sector towards greater sustainability and resilience. Upgrading long-
term resilience almost certainly means reducing short-term efficiencies – which may mean slower 
turn-arounds, less responsiveness to consumers, and possibly higher prices. But it may also lead to 
productivity gains, as more stable supplier relationships allow suppliers to save more, and to invest 
more in the well-being and training of their own workforce. The chapter canvases creative options for 
States to strengthen their role, drawing on examples from Australia (Fair Work Ombudsperson) and the 
US (Fair Labor Standards Act). 
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Development actors could mobilize stakeholders around a shared vision for system transformation. This 
might involve creating incentives for improved supply chain transparency and information-sharing; 
modelling how adjustments to trade and investment regimes could be harnessed to foster greater 
supply chain resilience; identifying and financing investments to promote resilience and sustainability 
upgrading; facilitating local market arrangements that foster longer-term planning and sustainability 
while protecting economic agency (such as worker and supplier cooperatives, framework agreements 
or accords between government and industry); and engaging global unions to develop and effectively 
implement global framework agreements. The chapter lays out what such arrangements might look like 
in the Leicester, Ethiopia and Tirupur contexts. 
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CASE STUDY: CONSTRUCTION AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE (INDIA, MYANMAR, QATAR)
Construction and infrastructure may account for 14.7 per cent of global GDP by 2030. The sector already 
employs around seven per cent of the global workforce. It is at the heart of global plans for achieving 
the 2030 Agenda, with the G20’s Roadmap for Infrastructure as an Asset Class, the China-backed One 
Belt One Road Initiative, the Japan, US and Australia-backed Blue Dot Network, and other inter-State 
efforts. Yet there are perhaps 4.5 million people in forced labour in the construction industry worldwide, 
according to the ILO. That is 18 per cent of the global victim population, second only to domestic work. 
In a 2018 study, one third of construction workers in one UK survey indicated that they had worked for 
no pay. Modern slavery risks have been identified in the construction sector in countries from Angola 
to the United States. 
Modern slavery in the construction sector shares many characteristics with exploitation in the other 
sectors addressed in the study, drawing on the same vulnerable populations, the same institutional 
logic of outsourcing risk through multiple supply chain tiers until it rests with workers. But construction 
and infrastructure also have one key difference: construction capital is sunk in a specific place. Several 
things flow from this. 
First, production cannot move to the place where labour is cheapest, as is the case in the garment and 
apparel industry, for example. Instead, labour must come to the building site. Those journeys become 
a key site and source of vulnerability related to construction and infrastructure. Construction firms 
outsource recruitment and push the costs of recruitment onto workers themselves, through recruitment 
fees charged by brokers, which workers often finance by taking on high-cost debt. These fees have 
been systematically linked to debt bondage. But they also cause broader social economic harm. They 
are essentially a roughly USD 4 billion rent charged annually by market intermediaries for access to 
information and work, serving to redirect capital from more productive and multiplicative uses through 
remittance to migrant workers’ families and home communities.That rent never shows up in the books 
of the industry. Poor migrant workers are, essentially, subsidizing construction in foreign, often high 
income, countries. 
Yet because much construction work is relatively low-skill and barriers to entry are low, competition for 
these jobs is nevertheless intense. What is more, contractors are themselves usually competing primarily 
on labour costs (since material costs are essentially fixed). This structure puts vulnerable construction 
workers – especially migrant labourers – at significant risk of exploitation. We see this pattern at work 
in a case study of Qatar, where 40 per cent of people work in construction, and migrant workers are 87% 
of workers. 
Second, because construction and infrastructure capital is sunk in a particular place, physical control 
of that place, building or infrastructure, and the populations on and around them, can become a prize 
for political, territorial and even military competition. We explore this aspect of the sector in a case 
study of Myanmar. Over several decades, forced labour has been an aspect of the military’s strategy 
for controlling territory and population – in other words, of governance. Yet that strategy has evolved. 
From independence until the 1990s, the Tatmadaw used forced labour as a counter-insurgency tool of 
pacification, designed to establish the State’s territorial control in Burma’s post-colonial periphery, 
and to subjugate ethnic minorities. By the mid-1990s forced labour on infrastructure projects was 
worth perhaps 7 per cent of GDP, or 25 per cent of the public budget. From the 1990s on, as the military 
steadily shifted towards a more market-oriented governance strategy, extracting profit from Myanmar’s 
natural resources through partnership with ethnic leaders and foreign capital, the logic of forced labour 
also evolved in a more commercial direction. In the last few years, however, the old logic of terror has 
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resurfaced as the Tatmadaw has revived its counter-insurgency approach in Rakhine state, particularly 
targeting the Rohingya. 
Third, the value-add from construction and built infrastructure is typically consumed domestically. 
Construction is not an export-oriented industry, and thus is not necessarily subject to sustainability 
pressures from foreign consumers or trade boycotts in the same way that some of the other sectors we 
studied here may be – though foreign investors may still play an important role. However, this equation 
alters when the infrastructure in question is built in order to generate revenue tied to foreign markets. In 
Myanmar, for example, we study the impact of civil society pressure on France’s Total, the US oil company 
Unocal (now Chevron) and Thailand’s PTT, foreign energy companies involved in the construction of a 
gas pipeline in the mid-1990s that allegedly involved forced labour. In Qatar, we study the impact of the 
2010 award of the FIFA World Cup 2022, which invited the global spotlight, disrupted the ‘climate of fear’ 
in the industry (as described by a UN Special Rapporteur in early 2020), and created opportunities for 
concerted pressure from civil society, the ILO, labour unions, and FIFA itself – including through the 
FIFA’s independent Human Rights Advisory Board. 
Modern slavery risks are further exacerbated in the industry by a number of institutional factors not 
linked to ‘place’. Small contractors typically operate on razor-thin margins, in part because of the 
normalization in the industry of late payment, ‘pay when paid’, and withholding a portion of contract 
value as a surety against timely and complete performance. These practices lead workers to be paid 
last, late, and often incompletely. And it disincentivizes efforts by employers to invest in workforce 
development. Another institution that contributes to modern slavery risks is the system of visa 
sponsorship, especially the kafala (‘guarantee’) system in the Gulf. The kafala system gives control of 
key aspects of a worker’s economic agency – especially their ability to exercise outside options in the 
labour market – to their employer. And kafala arrangements also tend to operate alongside restrictions 
of worker voice, especially restriction of freedoms of association and collective bargaining.
In both the Myanmar and Qatar cases, we look in depth at the dynamics of ‘constructive engagement’ 
reform efforts, in which the ILO has played a central role. 
In Qatar, the World Cup spotlight has intersected with both heightened attention to forced labour 
concerns by the ILO system, and the strategic opening created by the blockade of Qatar instituted 
by Gulf Coalition Council and other countries in June 2017. This created an opportunity for Qatar to 
accelerate liberalization of its labour market. It soon agreed to an ILO request to open an office in the 
country. Together, ILO and Qatar have worked since late 2017 to reform Qatari labour market regulation, 
adopting a series of liberalizing and protective reforms that have enlarged worker agency. New dispute 
resolution and worker voice systems were established, worker welfare standards were adopted, some 
recruitment fees started to be reimbursed, a workers’ insurance fund was set up to move the risk 
from late payment from workers to the State. Finally in August 2020, Qatar abolished its system of ‘No 
Objection Certificates’ and, with it, the kafala system in the country, while also moving to institute a 
non-discriminatory minimum wage. Yet issues around worker voice remain unresolved. 
In Myanmar, the ILO has been calling for an end to forced labour since 1964. Attention increased 
markedly in the late 1990s after a union complaint to the ILO Committee of Experts led to the creation 
of a Commission of Inquiry. After receiving extensive evidence and testimony, it concluded that there 
was widespread and systematic forced labour associated with infrastructure projects in Myanmar, 
especially targeted at the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities. ILO offers of technical assistance were 
rejected, leading the International Labour Conference to all but suspend Myanmar’s participation in ILO 
activities. Matters trickled along for several more years, until around 2007 the ILO and Member States 
began to mobilize to send the matter to the ICJ, ICC and/or UN Security Council. 
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This, however, coincided with a turn by the Tatmadaw away from China, toward the West. In 2007 
Myanmar agreed to cooperate with the ILO to address forced labour. In 2008, Myanmar adopted 
a new, more democratic constitution – though one in which the military retained key veto powers 
and, behind the scenes, its control of key economic assets and levers. Together, these reforms set the 
stage for the re-entry of Western capital into Myanmar’s markets, giving the military new commercial 
partnership and patronage options. Increasingly, forced labour took on a commercial cast. In Rakhine 
state, however, the counter-insurgency logic of forced labour in construction has re-emerged since 
2012, as inter-communal violence, militancy and armed conflict have drawn the Tatmadaw back onto its 
old counter-insurgency footing. Since 2018 UN investigators have found a consistent pattern of forced 
labour against both the Rohingya and ethnic Rakhines, as well as in Kachin and Shan states. At the time 
of writing, the World Bank is proposing USD 100 million in programming for Rakhine, intended as a 
form of constructive engagement promoting the reestablishment of inclusive, non-sectarian economic 
activity. This raises challenging questions about how to prevent development finance contributing to 
ongoing modern slavery through effective human rights due diligence, and about the effectiveness of 
constructive engagement more generally. 
In the final section of the chapter, we consider several lessons: the need for strategic coordination; the 
disruptive opportunity provided by Mega Sports Events; and the challenges facing global sustainability 
frameworks for this sector, such as the Equator Principles (project financing) and Building Responsibly 
(a coalition of six major construction and engineering firms supported by Business for Social 
Responsibility). 
We consider entry-points for development programming to address the impediment to development 
imposed by the industry’s reliance on recruitment fees including: improving access to market information, 
providing a lower-cost public recruitment option, providing low-cost and safe financing, and promoting 
adoption of and action on the Employer Pays principle. Development actors could push the industry’s 
value chain away from normalized late payment by financing worker insurance schemes, promoting use 
of Project Bank Accounts, and using social finance to link capital costs to ESG performance. We look at 
one such instrument being rolled out in the Indian construction sector, consider the role the Blue Dot 
Network may play as a transnational sustainability ratings agency for large-scale infrastructure projects, 
and the rise of infrastructure financing as a core focus of multilateral development banks. And finally, 
we consider the early turn by the regulators in many countries towards joint liability frameworks for 
worker welfare in the construction sector.
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PART THREE: NEW PATHS TO 
DEVELOPING FREEDOM
COVID-19 and the Developing Freedom agenda
The pandemic’s impacts on modern slavery risks can be understood through the three dimensions of 
the Developing Freedom framework. 
First, the pandemic has a vulnerability dimension. It makes people more vulnerable to exploitation by 
putting their health at risk, making livelihoods more precarious and reducing income – all of which 
reduce their economic agency. The pandemic is regressive: those who are most marginalized and 
impoverished suffer the greatest increase in risk of exploitation. Risks will grow particularly where 
governments’ ability to provide temporary protection is limited by fiscal bandwidth, technical and 
technological reach into informal workforces, or limited social support for extending protection to 
marginalized or migrant communities.
Women and girls are at heightened risk. Lockdowns increase risks of exploitation and violence during 
periods of isolation. Increased domestic work and childcare leads to reduced workforce participation 
and educational participation, engendering longer-term vulnerability. As the downturn reduces 
household income, this will lead to worse access to food and healthy nutrition for women and girls, 
making them more susceptible to health crises and vulnerable to risky labour market decisions. 
Children’s vulnerability is also likely to increase. Parental ill-health and morbidity are a key driver of 
child labour, as is impoverishment. A 1 per cent rise in poverty leads to a 0.7 per cent increase in child 
labour rates, pointing to a high risk of reversal of the reductions of child labour achieved in recent 
decades. Remittances are expected to decline by roughly 20 per cent, likely removing household income 
that helps keep children in school. And reduced incomes can induce child labour migration and child 
marriage. 
Stranded migrant workers are at heightened risk of exploitation as they seek to avoid deportation, 
compete for jobs, seek to avoid loss of securities or deposits and fight to keep visas and work permits 
valid. And repatriated migrant workers risk exclusion from social assistance programmes. Lost jobs 
will mean a rise in informal work, a key factor determining vulnerability to modern slavery, in part 
because informal firms are more labour-intensive and informal incomes are lower than equivalent work 
in the formal sector. And the pandemic is also threatening an insolvency crisis for global microfinance, 
removing a crucial cashflow-smoothing mechanism for poor households and SMEs. Reduced access 
to microcredit will mean worse economic, social and health outcomes for women and girls, reduced 
household investment in education, reduced education participation rates, and increased child labour.
Second, the pandemic has an exploiter strategies dimension: disrupting supply chains, markets and 
business models, leading to innovation and adaptation. In some sectors, the collapse in demand means 
firms are competing – often on labour costs – for shrinking business, incentivizing coercion. In other 
sectors, such as PPE, there is a boom in demand on short turnaround that is driving forced work. Sadly, 
there appears to be a global surge of online child sexual exploitation, representing a tragic inter-net 
based adaptation in exploiters’ profit-making strategies. 
Finally, the pandemic’s impacts have an institutional dimension. Reduced resources disrupt some 
institutional anti-trafficking responses, such as inspections, and may have other institutional effects 
that impact vulnerability (such as school closures, or withdrawal of income support and social protection 
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coverage). Some countries have responded to the economic downturn in ways that could further heighten 
risks, for example reducing worker protections with a view to securing foreign investment and demand.
In the area of development finance, the pandemic will reduce public revenues and most likely ODA 
commitments (the term used to describe both promised and actually disbursed ODA allocations). But it 
may also have accelerated a turn to environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in investment 
and lending decisions. Capital markets are realizing that worker vulnerability can spell vulnerability 
for both firm performance and economic growth. This offers a significant opportunity for ‘maximizing 
finance for development’. Multilateral actors already looking to use public spending to crowd-in private 
capital investment have an opportunity now to do this in a way that helps reduce modern slavery risks, 
develop freedom and achieve SDG targets such as those in 5.2, 8.7 and 16.2.
Ghosts of crisis past: financialized development, 
slavery and the Panic of 1837
The turn to private finance carries some risks. To understand them, we look to a key episode in Western 
economic development – the 1830s development of the Mississippi Valley and American south-west, 
which led to a financial Panic in 1837 with important similarities to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
Public actors worked to create a market for private investment in the development of the American 
southwest, leading to a boom in cotton – and in slavery. The unintended results were catastrophic – not 
only for the Native Americans displaced and the hundreds of thousands of African-Americans enslaved, 
but for America. In the short term, the boom led to a financial bubble, the Panic of 1837 and an economic 
depression not matched until the 1930s. In the longer term, the bursting of the cotton bubble led to a 
shift in financial power from New Orleans and Philadelphia to New York, an altered balance of power 
between Southern and Northern elites, and the destabilization of the American political settlement 
leading later to the American Civil War.
The key financing strategy used to develop the Mississippi Valley was very similar to a strategy at the 
heart of current multilateral approaches to Financing for Development – the creation of a tradeable asset 
class pooling risk from multiple underlying development projects. In the 1830s, public actors facilitated 
the creation of bonds, underpinned by mortgages of plantations and even of slaves themselves. These 
bonds were sold into European capital markets. Today, public actors again aim to maximize finance for 
development by creating tradeable assets from development projects.
We highlight two lessons from the earlier episode for today’s development sector: first, the dangers of 
encouraging private risk-taking without mandating centralized monitoring and management of resulting 
systemic risk; second, the dangers of delegating risk assessment and management to private actors, 
whose incentives may not align with the public interest. But the episode also points to the possibility 
of creative solutions, such as the construction – by American abolitionists including a young Abraham 
Lincoln – of a market for reliable risk information. We show how this may point to an important role for 
development actors in regulating today’s sustainable finance to help reduce modern slavery risks. 
This points to a final lesson: the fact that development is shaped not just by single interventions or even 
national development strategies, but by global market regulation and conditions. If the development 
sector is serious about reducing vulnerability to modern slavery, it must think not only about how to 
safeguard against modern slavery at the individual project level, but also at the systemic level. That 
means thinking about how aid interacts with trade, investment, tax and competition law, about whether 
the growth models and development pathways promoted by the development sector are in some cases 
conducive to modern slavery, and about the limitations of a country-by-country approach. 
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An Agenda for Developing Freedom
The last section of the report sets out a Developing Freedom Agenda. (Please see the full report for the 
full discussion of these recommendations.) This Agenda aims to mobilize development actors to protect 
and sustain economic agency to prevent enslavement and unlock the potential of those who have been 
enslaved. We offer five broad recommendations to development actors, addressing implications both for 
pandemic recovery and longer-term efforts. 
1. Commit to develop freedom: make maximizing economic agency 
a development goal.
We argue for treating developing freedom – maximizing economic agency – as an explicit goal of 
global development efforts, alongside economic growth, poverty alleviation or conflict prevention. This 
requires:
• moving from safeguarding to a strategic approach, treating developing freedom as an aim of 
intervention, something to be prioritized and proactively pursued through lending, spending and 
policy advice;
• recognizing that pandemic recovery requires commitment to an economy that works for people – an 
economy that promotes their economic agency and helps them develop their freedom;
• connecting anti-slavery efforts to ongoing development work on resilience, empowerment and 
governance. 
2. Slavery-proof development pathways: use the developmental role 
of the State to maximize economic agency. 
We argue for rethinking the developmental role of the State, to focus not just on economic growth and 
social development, but on maximizing people’s economic agency. Pandemic recovery policies should 
not promote protectionist policies, but rather harness the increased State presence in economies 
brought about by COVID-19 to promote a more equal, entrepreneurial and educational growth model 
than is currently offered in models of incorporation into Global Value Chains. We suggest aligning this 
model on five lines:
• emphasizing human capital formation, including investment in education, life-long learning and 
skills development, and fostering migrant education, skills recognition and skills development;
• promoting entrepreneurialism and wealth pre-distribution, through improvements to labour market 
mobility, financial inclusion, and capital formation – for example through promoting retirement 
savings, democratizing ownership of new technologies such as green technologies and industrial 
robots, and fostering use of cooperative production systems;
• providing safety nets, to protect in crisis and encourage responsible risk-taking, through wage 
insurance schemes, protection floors, access to healthcare and childcare, and strengthened 
government-to-person (G2P) platforms;
• promoting high-skilled growth, for example through industrial policy promoting skills-intensive 
exports backed up by necessary education, training, wage policy and incentives for private 
investment; and
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• reducing inequality of economic agency, through progressive taxation, effective competition policy 
and executive compensation rules.
3. Supply freedom: turn GVC practices towards responsible business 
conduct. 
We argue for development actors to use their resources and leverage to encourage responsible business 
conduct in global value chains, prioritizing sectors and value chains where COVID-19 has most severely 
reduced economic agency. Development actors should encourage companies and suppliers to which 
they are connected to protect people as effective economic agents, for the long-term health of the whole 
economy. This includes:
• protecting workers’ health, incomes and livelihoods, through workplace safety measures, maintaining 
supplier relationships, promoting wage subsidies, loan guarantees and flexible payment 
arrangements. Remedial measures may also be needed where supplier decisions have contributed 
to or caused increased modern slavery risks. 
• working together, through joint approaches to high-risk supply chains, social dialogue, promoting 
worker voice, managing migrant labour repatriations, and mobilizing around share GVC 
transformation plans. 
Realizing these goals may require working across multiple institutional levels and action in new forums 
(such as the UN Regional Economic Commissions and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations). 
Pandemic recovery offers a new start – a chance for governments and development actors to work with 
value chain stakeholders to reshape those value chains, collaborating, rather than competing. This could 
begin with development of a set of shared expectations of suppliers in high-risk value chains – such as 
PPE.
4. Finance freedom: use development finance to reduce modern 
slavery risks.
We argue for the development sector to take a more active role using its collective leverage to shape how 
capital markets address modern slavery risks. In the short term, during pandemic recovery, this should 
focus on keeping people afloat, by:
• increasing liquidity at all levels, to help governments and enterprises access needed resources, 
including by enlisting intermediary financial institutions; 
• a microfinance rescue plan, to ensure that hundreds of millions of at-risk households and enterprises 
survive the global economic downturn; 
• increasing digital financial inclusion, using the opportunity created by the crisis to invest in efforts 
to address the 1.7 billion people who remain unbanked, and to improve access to working capital for 
the SMEs and micro-contractors that may be most prone to use forced labour. 
In the longer term, the focus should be on collective leverage to ensure capital markets accurately price 
modern slavery risks, including:
• coordinated exclusion of known modern slavery risks from public financing, lending and investment;
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• active participation in the construction of a harmonized ESG risk information infrastructure;
• systemic risk monitoring to identify when privately-incurred ESG risks are reaching toxic levels; and
• concerted action to tackle illicit financial flows connected to systematic forced labour, including 
stolen asset recovery and disrupting the recruitment fee system. 
5. Organize communities for freedom: empower stakeholders to 
maximize economic agency. 
The study identifies community organization and strategic coordination as central requirements for 
developing freedom. Slavery is not only an economic, but a political system, that redistributes wealth 
from labour to coercive capital. Disrupting slavery systems has always generated a political backlash and 
will do so in future. To develop freedom therefore requires effective community organization – from the 
local to the global level. We argue for:
• Creating a Developing Freedom Forum, where development actors can share information, learn 
lessons, and develop coordinated strategy to apply in a coordinated manner across different 
institutional settings and global value chains. 
• Developing new tools for tracking progress, including new (DAC) programming codes, and common 
monitoring and evaluation variables,
• Joint value chain mapping and transformation planning, to develop shared understandings of how 
modern slavery risks can be addressed in specific sectors. 
The cases in the study make clear that only where the international community organizes around a 
shared substantive agenda for reform, building and using leverage in a coherent and coordinated way, 
can we expect to see the scale of slavery reduction needed to end modern slavery by 2030.
1 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Introduction
2 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
“[T]he work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end 
than that performed by slaves.”1 
- Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776). 
“Slavery benefits no one but its immediate, individual owners, 
and them only in a pecuniary point of view. Does the slaveholder, while he 
is enjoying his slaves, reflect upon the deep injury and incalculable loss 
which the possession of that property inflicts upon the true interest of the 
country?”2 
- H.R. Helper, The impending crisis of the South: How to meet it (1860). 
“For centuries, millions of Africans and their New World 
descendants had their decision-making rights, their status as economic 
agents, removed for profit… there may be enormous private returns to 
compromising economic agency, [yet] doing so gives rise to the ultimate and 
most fundamental of all externalities… [Slavery is] a pathology of economics, 
corrupting variation and diversity… into means of extracting rent.”3 
- Peter Doyle, former IMF Director, On Economic Agency, June 2020. 
Around 40.3 million people – around 1 in every 185 people alive – are estimated to have experienced 
modern slavery or forced labour in 2016, the best global estimate we have available.4 Slavery involves 
some people treating others as if they own them.5 This restricts and even denies victims the opportunity 
to make decisions – centrally, economic decisions – for themselves.6 Slavery is an intentional denial 
of the basic economic agency that is assumed by our economic models – their ability to make choices 
about how to use factors of production such as land, labour and capital, or how to develop their own 
capabilities.7 And for that simple reason, enslavement imposes an unrecognized drag on development 
– not only at the individual level, but also, we increasingly understand, at the community and national 
level too. 
Adam Smith recognized almost 250 years ago that slavery reduces productivity. In this report, we argue 
that the knock-on effects of denying people their full economic freedom do not stop there. We show 
how they ripple out through the economy, snowballing into large-scale, inter-generational effects that 
create major impediments to sustainable development, and leave everyone worse off.By denying people 
economic agency, slavery reduces the multiplier effects at work in the economy, discourages innovation 
and imposes costs on the public purse. Slavery also impacts the descendants of those forced into labour, 
by measurably increasing inter-generational, multidimensional poverty, by increasing inequality, and by 
reducing social capital. It distorts financial markets, by fostering mispricing not only of labour but also 
capital. It fosters corruption and illicit financial flows. Slavery increases ethnic fragmentation, impedes 
State formation, and reduces investment in public goods including infrastructure and education. It 
fosters gender discrimination, reduces health outcomes and even, we are now learning, harms the 
environment. 
These results are not limited to cases of ‘chattel’ slavery, where ownership of humans is formally 
sanctioned. They appear to hold also for other forms of forced and coerced labour, including 
contemporary human trafficking, where people are treated as if others owned them, or owned parts of 
their agency, even if that is formally not so. In this study, we refer to all of these forms of exploitation 
that involve an intentional restriction or denial of the victim’s agency in a way that amounts to de facto 
3 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
‘ownership of agency’ by the catch-all term ‘modern slavery’. Where that loss of agency is total or 
totalizing, we refer to the conduct simply as ‘slavery’, in part to highlight the continuity between chattel 
slavery, as was practiced in the era of trans-Atlantic slavery, and contemporary ‘modern slavery’. So 
serious are the long-term impacts of restricted agency on sustainable development that – on both sides 
of the Atlantic – the communities that were most involved in transatlantic slavery hundreds of years ago 
are now significantly worse off than those that were not. One influential analysis, from Harvard scholar 
Nathan Nunn, suggests that transatlantic slavery accounts today for 72 per cent of income disparity 
between African nations and the rest of the world – and 99 per cent of the disparity between these 
nations and other developing countries.8 This also implies, however, that ending slavery would unleash 
significant growth: IMF researchers recently suggested that eliminating child marriage – one element 
of modern slavery – would offer poor countries GDP per capita growth of around 1.05 per cent.9 And 
an unpublished estimate by economists in Australia suggests that ending contemporary slavery would 
deliver GDP growth of between 3 and 5 per cent.10
Yet the long-term impacts of turning a blind eye to slavery – as we continue to – are not just economic 
under-development, but also economic and institutional fragility. Slavery and lack of resilience are 
intimately connected. Communities that are heavily exposed to organized slavery are more likely to 
later suffer armed conflict. And the COVID-19 crisis is teaching us that our value chains and even our 
economic system rely too heavily on low-wage, insecure and dangerous work, without rewarding the 
workers that assume the risks associated with that work. The crisis has shown us that such an approach 
may not be resilient or sustainable in the face of an exogenous shock like a pandemic – even as we 
can expect more such shocks, including from climate change. At the same time, the Black Lives Matter 
movement, with its efforts to grapple with systemic discrimination descending from trans-Atlantic 
slavery, forces us to contemplate the long-term, systemic risks of failing to address the impacts of such 
slavery systems. 
The global development sector has intellectual resources available to address slavery. Thirty years ago, 
Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom made the case for putting human agency and capabilities at the 
heart of development, giving rise to the ‘human development’ discourse. Yet the development sector has 
had a blind-spot when it comes to contemporary slavery, failing to appreciate both that it represents 
a foundational denial of economic agency, and that its costs ripple across the economic system and 
multiply to severe proportions. Even where they focus on ‘human development’, development actors – as 
we show in this report – by and large do not treat slavery reduction as an objective of their interventions. 
They spend relatively little on interventions targeting modern slavery, forced and child labour, and 
human trafficking – less than USD 450 million per year, on average, in Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) between 2000 and 2017 – or around USD 11 per victim per year.Development actors treat slavery 
and forced labour as marginal, technical issues, to be safeguarded against in project delivery. Slavery 
reduction has not been a focus of most development actors’ investments, policy lending, or advice 
to governments. This is true across the UN Development System, the traditional multilateral lenders 
and their ‘new’ counterparts (such as the AIIB, the BRICS bank), bilateral development agencies and 
development finance institutions. 
Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that the growth model at the heart of many contemporary 
development efforts – incorporation of low-skill, low-wage workforces into Global Value Chains (GVCs) 
– may increase some workers’ vulnerability to labour exploitation and modern slavery. This is even 
acknowledged in the 2020 edition of the World Bank’s flagship World Development Report. To understand 
why the ‘Smile Curve’ economics associated with GVCs generates this result, we consider how GVCs 
map onto what we know about how contemporary slavery systems work. To do that, we introduce in 
this study a conceptual framework that analyses slavery systems as the product of interaction of three 
factors: 1) institutional environment; 2) people’s vulnerabilities; and 3) exploiter strategies. We show how 
current ‘Smile Curve’ growth strategies, which encourage developing economies to start with low-wage, 
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low-skill sectoral growth and then move up the value chain, create institutional conditions amplifying 
vulnerabilities and empowering exploiters. Drawing on six sectoral case studies – cattle, palm oil, cotton, 
fisheries and aquaculture, garments and apparel, and construction and infrastructure – we show how 
this model helps make sense of where modern slavery risks arise, and why they persist. Modern slavery 
systems operate as extractive systems that deliver not only wealth but also significant political power to 
the rentiers that control them, and their allies. 
In the final part of the study, we lay out a ‘Developing Freedom Agenda’ – a set of recommendations 
for reducing modern slavery through concerted, strategic development sector action to intervene in 
modern slavery systems. This agenda focuses centrally on enlisting States to protect and maximize 
people’s economic agency – a new articulation of an old developmental role for the State. We draw on 
lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as from the financialized development of the American 
southwest in the 1830s, to offer five recommendations to development actors for Developing Freedom, 
including during short-term efforts to recover from COVID-19. 
Our analysis
In this study, we consider the relationship between slavery and development in depth, through 
comprehensive literature reviews, quantitative analysis, surveys and mixed methods case studies. The 
study builds on earlier analysis at the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research on the role 
of the multilateral system in the fight against modern slavery,11 and quantitative analysis of official 
development assistance (ODA) aimed at SDG Target 8.7 objectives.12 In this study, we extend that analysis 
by posing a larger question: How can fighting slavery contribute to sustainable development? 
Part One considers the relationship between Sustainable Development and Modern Slavery. 
In Chapter 1, Development’s blind-spot, we look at how the relationship between slavery and development 
is currently handled in global development actors’ discourse and practice. We use a mixture of 
practitioner surveys, quantitative analysis and desk research to explore practitioner perspectives, more 
than 2 million official aid project records, as well as development entity policies and practice. We review 
400 country development strategy documents, the practice of multilateral development banks, export 
credit agencies, development finance institutions, and new development lenders, including China. Across 
this broad array of practice, we identify a clear ‘blind-spot’ in contemporary development analysis and 
discourse regarding the systemic nature of slavery and its economic impacts, and a resulting absence 
from development practice of systematic effort to address the impacts of modern slavery on sustainable 
development. 
In Chapter 2, How slavery impedes development, we look at what research tells us about how slavery and 
development intersect, and consider the implications for development programming. Drawing on both 
a bibliographic and a systematic survey of relevant literatures, we identify ten ways in which slavery 
creates a drag on sustainable development. We consider what this tells us about how contemporary 
approaches to development – especially through incorporation into global value chains (GVCs) – may 
contribute to modern slavery risks, and what this means about the developmental role of the State. And 
we identify a gap in the relevant literature and practice: there is no overarching conceptual framework 
explaining how these causal vectors inter-relate, contributing to analytical fragmentation and policy 
incoherence. 
To remedy this, we draw on Amartya Sen’s seminal explanation of development as a process of maximizing 
human capabilities and freedoms – Development as Freedom. We identify a shared central objective for 
development actors and those fighting slavery, forced labour and human trafficking: protecting and 
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maximizing people’s economic agency in order to allow them to develop their capabilities.13 Drawing 
on epidemiological and systems thinking, we present a framework for understanding how modern 
slavery impedes development. This framework characterizes modern slavery as an extractive system 
that emerges out of the interaction of institutional environments, people’s vulnerability and exploiter 
strategies. Exploiters capture rents by monopolizing and stealing not just their victims’ labour, but their 
very economic agency.This generates the significant economic, social and environmental externalities 
described earlier in the chapter. Understanding slavery systems in this way helps clarify how existing 
programming approaches inter-relate, and what may be missing – especially the recognition of the 
political power of rentiers within this system, the need for multi-level governance strategies, and the 
consequently complex role of the State as both a partner in and obstacle to sustainably developing 
freedom.
Part Two of the study consists of, Six sectoral case studies, in which we use the Developing Freedom 
framework established in Part One to discuss the possibilities for addressing slavery systems in six 
economic sectors: Brazilian cattle (Chapter 3); palm oil – with a focus on Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria 
(Chapter 4); Uzbek cotton (Chapter 5); fisheries and aquaculture – with a focus on Thailand, plus the 
Philippines, India and Bangladesh (Chapter 6); garments and apparel – focusing on the UK, Bangladesh, 
India and Ethiopia (Chapter 7); and construction and infrastructure – focusing on Qatar and Myanmar 
(Chapter 8). These sectors were selected in consultation with the project donor to provide diversity 
on a variety of dimensions, including geography and country income-levels, forms of exploitation, 
and market structure. In each case, we identify the aspects of the institutional environment, people’s 
vulnerabilities and exploiter strategies that generate modern slavery. We show how these differ by 
context. We explore how past intervention efforts have combined technical know-how, financing and 
political capital in attempts to end these systems of modern slavery, and consider the results of those 
interventions. In line with the Developing Freedom model, we find that in many cases rentier exploiters 
– working in both legitimate and illegitimate business – have resisted interventions, highlighting the 
importance of a strategic approach. In each case, we use this analysis to point to potential new entry 
points for development actors. 
Part Three is entitled Building Back Better by Developing Freedom. In Chapter 9, Freedom in a time of 
crisis, we consider how COVID-19 is exacerbating modern slavery risks. We consider how the COVID-19 
crisis is accelerating consideration of social risk factors by donors and investors and the opportunity 
– and risks – this creates as the development sector turns increasingly to blended finance, public-
private partnerships and efforts to crowd-in private capital to ‘Maximize Finance for Development’. To 
understand those risks, and drawing inspiration from the Black Lives Matter movement, we look to the 
lessons from the use of blended finance and global capital markets to develop the Mississippi Valley in 
the 1830s. We identify several lessons for contemporary development practice about the challenges of 
effective financial and social risk assessment and management. 
Finally, in Chapter 10, An Agenda for Developing Freedom, we draw on these lessons and earlier chapters 
to set out a Developing Freedom Agenda. We describe the measures that this will require of development 
actors, in both the short-term context of Building Back Better after the COVID-19 crisis, and for the 
longer term: 1) commit to develop freedom; 2) slavery-proof development pathways; 3) supply freedom; 
4) finance freedom; and 5) organize communities for freedom. Taken together, these measures would 
involve an important shift in development thinking about anti-slavery, from treating it as a question of 
risk minimization to a question of agency maximization. This would entail an important change in how we 
understand the developmental role of the State, enlisting the State to prevent people with greater access 
to power and capital from stealing the agency of those more vulnerable. This will require shifting growth 
models from development pathways focused on low-wage, low-skill industrialization, to those focused 
more on enlarging protection systems, encouraging high-skilled industry through both investments 
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in human capital and through wage policy, and fostering entrepreneurialism. Given the global nature 
of markets and institutions, that will require states to work together, and with other stakeholders, to 
ensure global market regulation and GVC governance protect people’s economic agency. 
Our methodology
This study was led over eighteen months (2019-2020) by Professor James Cockayne, drawing on research 
undertaken by a team operating out of and managed by the United Nations University Centre for Policy 
Research (UNU-CPR). Chapter 1 draws on a literature review commissioned from the University of 
Nottingham’s Rights Lab, led by Dr Katarina Schwarz, with support from Dr Deanna Davy, Dr Hannah 
Jeffery and Dr Daniel Ogunniyi. The analysis of ODA spending draws on an earlier study undertaken 
by Cockayne and Dr Kelly Gleason,as well new data covering 2013-2017 collected by Dr Kelly Gleason.14 
This Chapter also draws on survey and grey literature research into development actor sentiments and 
strategies undertaken by several researchers at UNU-CPR, notably Otilia Enica, Angharad Smith and 
Nesrien Hamid. Chapter 2 draws on a bibliographic survey commissioned from Professor CAF Dowlah. 
Chapters 3 to 8 reflect deep dive research by James Cockayne, supplemented by mixed-method studies 
commissioned from several research teams working to a shared set of research questions. Research for 
the cattle, cotton and construction chapters (3, 5 and 8) was contributed by UNU-CPR (Angharad Smith 
and Nesrien Hamid, respectively). Research for the palm oil chapter (Chapter 4) was contributed by The 
Purpose Business (Patricia Dwyer, Rebecca Walker Chan and Thomas Tang). Research on fisheries and 
aquaculture (Chapter 6) was contributed by the University of Nottingham Rights Lab (Dr Jessica Sparks, 
Dr Bethany Jackson). And research on garments and apparel (Chapter 7) was contributed by Partnership 
for International Development (Anna Bryher, Jim Cranshaw and Frances Hill). The analyses used by these 
teams used a variety of methods, including desk review and in-country engagement with representatives 
of different stakeholder groups (including those representing survivor and worker organizations). Out of 
an abundance of caution and in the interests of frank disclosure by interview subjects, the identities of 
interviewees will not be published, but are on file with UNU-CPR.
The report does not attempt to provide a systematic review of evidence on the factors that drive modern 
slavery.15 Instead, it attempts to answer the deceptively simple question: How can fighting slavery contribute 
to sustainable development? It offers a new approach to answering that question, and seeks to provide a 
conceptual and programming approach that will, we hope, underpin more effective development sector 
engagement with the anti-slavery agenda. 
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CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENT’S  
BLIND-SPOT
In 2015, all 193 United Nations Member States committed to take immediate and effective measures 
to end modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking by 2030, and child labour by 2025. This 
is Target 8.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), known as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. States also committed to eliminating trafficking and other types of exploitation of women 
(SDG 5.2), children (SDG 16.2), and forced marriage (SDG 5.3) – also by 2030. This is an agenda that all 
countries have committed to pursue, wherever modern slavery, forced labour, human trafficking and 
child labour are found – not just in countries traditionally described as ‘developing’ countries. It offers 
a clear statement by UN Member States that ending modern slavery should be an integral part of global 
development efforts, or even, as a subsequent Call to Action endorsed by 92 countries puts it, “a priority” 
for multilateral development action.1
There have been occasional calls over the years for the development sector to bring a more concerted 
strategic and operational focus to its work on slavery reduction. Anti-Slavery International has 
advocated for understanding anti-slavery efforts through an anti-poverty and development lens since 
at least 2007.2 That is the same year in which Roger Plant, a pioneer of work on forced labour at the 
International Labour Organization, spoke at a conference convened by the UK Foreign Office and UK 
Department for International Development about the role of development actors in fighting slavery.3 In 
May 2009 a World Bank Social Policy Discussion Paper called for the Bank to play a greater leadership 
role through measurement, knowledge capture and coordination,4 and a Bank Social Development Note 
set out a number of programming areas in which the Bank could make a contribution.5 The same year, 
the UN Development Programme published a research paper canvasing how the anti-trafficking and 
human development agendas could be better integrated, arguing that “the human development gains 
from greater mobility could be significantly enhanced if there was greater coherence between policies to 
combat trafficking and policies to promote development.”6 Also, that year, an independent quantitative 
study found that incidence of slavery was one of the best ways to explain regional variations in the Human 
Development Index.7 A subsequent study developed and tested this hypothesis through multivariate 
regression analysis, finding that a 1 percent increase in the prevalence of slavery is associated with a 0.045 
percent decrease in human development, and is also negatively associated with GDP and equality.8 In 
2015, a joint United Nations University/Freedom Fund study entitled Unshackling Development suggested 
a need to join-up multilateral responses to deal with exploitation through development interventions.9 
And a July 2016 briefing note by the UN’s Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development also 
provides a high-level overview of intersections between UN development and anti-trafficking practice.10 
Yet this has not led to slavery reduction being a major focus of development sector strategy or practice.
In fact, there have frequently been voices and data points suggesting just the opposite: that forced 
labour is an unfortunate but unavoidable by-product of economic development, or even that forced 
labour is a valid and rapid pathway to development. We know, for example, that economic growth can 
facilitate migration by the poorest, and that in some circumstances this increases vulnerability to human 
trafficking.11 There has long been a narrative that slavery and forced labour were central to the national 
economic development of great powers such as the United Kingdom and United States,12 and even to the 
emergence of industrial capitalism more broadly.13 More recently, the People’s Republic of China has 
faced allegations that its development strategy for Xinjiang province has created a market for the forced 
labour of Uyghurs and other minorities – a market in which numerous global brands, from Abercrombie 
& Fitch to Zara, and BMW to Uniqlo, are said to participate.14 The New York Times recently reported that 
there has been a surge of exports to overseas markets of personal protective equipment (PPE) produced 
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using forced labour in and from Xinjiang.15 (We consider these allegations and the Chinese government’s 
response at more length in Chapter 2.)
We know, too, that some major infrastructure projects supported by development actors have led to 
increased slavery and forced labour. In the 1960s, for example, the World Bank, United States and United 
Kingdom provided 25 per cent of the funding for the construction of the Akosombo Dam on the River 
Volta in Ghana. The dam delivered an additional 912MW of hydroelectric capacity, underpinning Ghana’s 
subsequent economic development. But it also brought significant social and environmental costs.16 The 
lake that it formed – Lake Volta, the largest man-made lake in the world – is now the site of endemic, 
multi-generational enslavement of children in the fishing industry.17 More recently, as we explore 
further in Chapter 5, there have been allegations that World Bank funding has been used to support 
cotton production in central Asia relying on forced labour. The European Union and United Nations 
have confronted similar allegations in recent months. Under its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the 
European Union has provided road-building aid to Eritrea worth EUR 80 million, with the United Nations 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) serving as the project manager.18 The aim is curb irregular migration 
to Europe by supporting job creation. But it is alleged that these roads are built by workers conscripted 
through the controversial Eritrean National Service programme, which UN inquiries have previously 
linked to forced labour.19 In May 2020, the Dutch-based Foundation for Human Rights in Eritrea lodged 
papers suing the European Commission.20 The next day the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
calling on the Commission to avoid indirectly financing forced labour in Eritrea.21
The moral case for ending slavery, forced labour, human trafficking and child labour – that knot of 
crimes collected today under the rubric of ‘modern slavery’ – needs no rehearsing. Nor does the legal 
case: slavery is illegal under public international law at all times, in all places. Freedom from slavery, 
like freedom from torture, is considered jus cogens and is a non-derogable and universal human right.22 
Any person with standing in public international law can enforce that norm against any other such 
person.23 Yet the best estimate we have of the number of people enslaved today, the 2016 Global Estimates 
of Modern Slavery, suggests some 40.3 million people were subjected to modern slavery that year, 24.9 
million of them in forced labour – of which some 4.1 million are victims of State-imposed forced labour. 
63 per cent of all victims are female. Victims are found in every region, with the highest real numbers 
in Asia and the Pacific, and the highest per capita rates in Africa. People are forced into slavery through 
withholding of wages, threats of violence, actual violence, and threats against family members, amongst 
other means.24 And numbers may be going up, due both to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting 
economic downturn, and to other drivers such as State fragility, rising food insecurity, environmental 
change and automation. 
While the norm against slavery is strong in theory, all of this evidence suggests it is weak in practice – or 
at least weakly enforced. In fact, the victimization rates involved – roughly 1 in every 200 people alive 
today – suggest that violation of the norm is not at all exceptional. It begs the question: is there some 
other, additional case for ending modern slavery that we are missing, that could help to close this gap 
between aspiration and achievement? 
This study argues there is: the sustainable development case for ending modern slavery. In this first 
chapter, we begin our inquiry into that case by asking how the development sector currently understands 
modern slavery, forced and child labour, and human trafficking. We begin by situating SDG 8.7 within the 
broader 2030 Agenda, to understand where anti-slavery efforts fit in the broader project of sustainable 
development reflected there. Next, we share the results of a survey of development practitioners from 
16 countries undertaken for this study, mapping the major contours of their understanding of where 
slavery reduction efforts fit into their work. Third, we present the results of a literature review examining 
how the ties between slavery and development are understood in relevant scientific and academic 
literature. Fourth, we look at aid commitments between 2000 and 2017 to see what they tell us. And fifth, 
10 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
we provide a broader review of the operational practice of, in turn: (1) bilateral development cooperation 
agencies, (2) development finance institutions (DFIs) and export credit agencies (ECAs), (3) multilateral 
development banks (both old and ‘new’), (4) China, and (5) the UN development system. 
Where does slavery reduction fit in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development?
Slavery involves exploiters treating victims as if the exploiter owned the victim.25 This amounts to the 
victim being treated not as an economic agent, but as an economic object. This can lead to a range 
of forms of exploitation, arising both in sexual, domestic and commercial contexts (those three not 
necessarily being exclusive). Modern slavery can arise in domestic servitude, construction, fisheries and 
aquaculture, agriculture, manufacturing, hospitality, sex work, and a wide range of other industries. It 
is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that efforts to address modern slavery – that is, to achieve Targets 
5.2, 5.3, 8.7 and 16.2 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals – and efforts to achieve other aspects of 
sustainable development – all the other UN Sustainable Development Goal Targets – frequently intersect. 
To understand where slavery reduction efforts ‘fit’ in the 2030 Agenda, we explored the scientific 
literature to identify ways in which there may be causal connections between these Targets and other 
SDG Targets. We do not assume that development reduces (or indeed increases) slavery, since we 
recognize that the relationship is non-linear and context dependent.26 We found evidence (of varying 
levels of scientific rigour) that efforts to achieve 113 of the 179 Targets in the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals (i.e. 63 per cent) could directly or indirectly help to reduce modern slavery. This is displayed in 
Figure 1 below. Each line running from an SDG Target on the outside of the wheel to the central node – 
‘Ending modern slavery’ – represents one such scientifically-supported linkage. (The different colours 
represent whether development programming aimed at that SDG Target will contribute to anti-slavery 
efforts by reducing the conduciveness of the institutional environment to modern slavery, by addressing 
people’s vulnerability, or by disrupting exploiter strategies – the three dimensions of the ‘Developing 
Freedom’ approach that we introduce later in the report.) 
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FIGURE 1: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE SDG TARGETS  
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Figure 2 breaks this down further, showing the percentage of Targets within each Sustainable 
Development Goal that, if achieved, would also likely directly contribute to ending modern slavery. 
(Again, we disaggregate this by programming dimension of the Developing Freedom framework, for 
later reference.) This suggests that, of the 17 SDGs, work in the areas of Goals 1 (Ending Poverty), 4 
(Quality Education), 8 (Decent Work), 13 (Climate Action) and 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) 
is likely to be especially aligned with anti-slavery efforts. As we explore further in Chapter 2, the 
connection to Climate Action lies particularly in the fact that climate change exacerbates numerous 
factors that increase vulnerability to modern slavery – such as conflict onset, disaster risk and risk of 
forced migration, but also runs in the other causal direction: reducing slavery may itself help reduce 
various negative environmental impacts.
Yet alignment of objectives does not tell us anything particular about how or how much efforts to achieve 
different SDGs will impact each other. These visualizations do not tell us which SDG Target, if achieved, 
would make the greatest contribution to ending modern slavery. Nor do they tell us anything about the 
inverse relationship – which other SDG Target we are most likely to achieve if we first achieve Target 
8.7. And while visualizations like this are useful heuristic devices, they are limited by the assumptions 
embedded within them. Figures 1 and 2 capture only those development objectives and interventions 
already encapsulated within the SDGs; there may be other approaches to development programming 
relevant to slavery reduction that are not captured in the specific Targets listed in the SDGs. What is 
more, because they do not tell us about the strength of these interactions, they offer little guidance on 
which intersections are most significant or should be prioritized for programming. For guidance on 
those questions, we turned to three other sources of evidence: practitioner perspectives, spending 
patterns, and development organization practice.
FIGURE 2: PROPORTION OF SDG TARGETS THAT, IF ACHIEVED,  
WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENDING MODERN SLAVERY 
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What do development practitioners think?
In the second half of 2019, we surveyed development practitioners from 16 countries on their views on 
the relationship between development interventions and anti-slavery efforts.27 Respondents worked for 
foreign ministries, domestic development institutions, bilateral development cooperation ministries, 
multilateral entities and an export credit agency. Our sample was small and not scientific, with the group 
self-selecting into the sample. Indeed, 85 per cent indicated they had more than a passing familiarity 
with modern slavery issues. As a result, the survey results give us a useful basis for understanding 
how development practitioners who are already paying attention to this issue perceive the intersection 
between modern slavery and development efforts, but may not tell us much about how development 
actors who are not paying attention to these issues perceive the (ir)relevance of modern slavery to their 
work. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, 50 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that “it is hard to see 
sustainable development being achieved unless we reduce modern slavery”, while another 35 per cent 
agreed that “achieving sustainable development will depend in many places on reducing modern 
slavery”.No respondent agreed with the statement that “achieving sustainable development does not 
require reducing modern slavery”. 85 percent thought that anti-slavery programming should be given 
“important” or “top” priority in the development sector; only 15 percent thought it was “somewhat”, “not 
very” or “not at all” important. 
Notably, however, just 24 percent of respondents perceived the development sector’s ability to eradicate 
modern slavery as currently “excellent” or “good”, while 76 percent felt it was “fair” or “poor”. (None, 
though, perceived its ability to do so as “nil”.) When asked where they saw the greatest opportunity for 
the development sector to contribute, respondents described a range of objectives from improving data 
collection, to strengthening safeguards in development programming, to regulation of supply chains 
and labour markets. Interestingly, however, respondents indicated that they understood least about the 
economic impacts of anti-slavery efforts – such as their impact on costs of capital and public revenue 
– and most about the social policy impacts of anti-slavery efforts, for example in the areas of social 
protection and inequality (see Figure 3 below). 
A similar pattern was evident when practitioners were asked questions about their organization’s practice, 
as demonstrated in Figure 4 below. A majority of respondents nominated policy and programming areas 
focused on social outcomes – such as gender, social protection and migration – as being the area of 
their organization’s work that was most aligned with anti-slavery efforts. Fewer respondents nominated 
areas of economic policy such as labour market regulation, investment policy, trade policy or industrial 
policy.
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There was also a clear split in responses to questions about how modern slavery was factored into 
organizational practice. 62 per cent of respondents indicated that their organization perceived modern 
slavery as a contextual factor to be considered prior to intervention and 38 percent described it in 
operational risk management terms. Some 56 percent perceived it as an organizational programming or 
policy objective, yet 59 per cent of respondents said modern slavery was “never”, “rarely” or “sometimes” 
factored into programming and policy choices, rather than “usually” or “always”. Only 21 percent 
described it as a factor in investing or lending decisions.
Two clear messages emerge from this survey. Fist, that development practitioners perceive anti-slavery 
efforts not in terms of their impact on economic growth or broader economic performance, but primarily 
through the lens of social and criminal justice policy. And second, that they see slavery concerns as more 
likely to be addressed during project management, rather than in the context of strategic investment 
and lending prioritization, or programme design. To test that second conclusion, we turned to three 
further sources of data: analytic literature, spending data, and a review of development organizations’ 
practice.
What does the literature tell us?
What does research and evidence tell us about how modern slavery and development are related? To 
begin to answer this question, we commissioned research by a team at the University of Nottingham’s 
Rights Lab, led by Dr Katarina Schwarz, and including Dr Deanna Davy, Dr Daniel Ogunniyi and Dr 
Hannah Jeffery. They explored relevant grey and academic literature to map what we know about 
the impacts of slavery and anti-slavery programming on development outcomes, and the impact of 
development interventions (with stated anti-slavery objectives) on anti-slavery outcomes. 
Methodology
The mapping involved a search for relevant academic and grey literature resources published in English 
between 1990 and 2019.28 The team used an initial search to generate a list of search terms which was 
then used to undertake the full search. (That list is available in Appendix 1.) Next, they reviewed the 
title and abstract of every record retrieved, to determine which texts should be assessed further. 138 
potentially relevant articles were investigated as full text. An adapted PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items 
for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) flow-chart of study selection was produced summarizing 
studies retrieved, reviewed, included and excluded (see Appendix 2.) Records were not excluded on the 
basis of quality, but were excluded if they did not meet defined inclusion criteria or were simply popular 
media pieces or reportage. Records considered included reports evaluating antislavery interventions, 
and reports evaluating development interventions with an explicit antislavery objective included in the 
design.
This process yielded 602 records, which were then further screened and a sample manually coded to 
reflect different types of development interventions and outcomes, and different types of anti-slavery 
interventions and outcomes, addressed in the records. (See Appendix 3.) This analysis revealed that much 
of the literature was unclear or ambiguous about both the interventions and especially the programming 
outcomes under consideration, and thus despite providing for a mixed deductive-inductive coding 
system could not be reliably coded. It also revealed, however, that evaluation studies could be usefully 
categorized. The review team coded the included records across four types of evidence used: systematic 
review or probabilistic collection of primary data; literature review; non-probabilistic collection of 
primary data or modelling; non-specific primary data; and discussion papers. It also synthesized codes 
within the earlier mixed deductive-inductive classification system (i.e. in Appendix 3) to generate a new, 
16 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
consolidated classification system (Appendix 4). The team then mapped the 138 records generated by the 
search against this classification system. The full results, including the citations of the relevant studies, 
are available online at the project website www.developingfreedom.org.
Results
The first thing that emerges from this analysis is the relative weakness of the evidence base. Of the 
sampled resources, only 4 per cent were systematic reviews or used probabilistic analysis. 2 per cent 
involved literature reviews. 46 per cent involved non-probabilistic analysis or modelling. 35 per cent 
were non-specific about primary data. And 13 per cent were discussion papers. This suggests that 
the evidence-base assessed is best understood as providing lines of inquiry, rather than detailed, 
scientifically-rigorous insights. 
For that reason, we chose to map the sampled literature to understand in broad terms what the 
relevant relationships might be between different types of development interventions and outcomes, 
and different anti-slavery interventions and outcomes. Figure 5 below (which, like those that follow, is 
available in interactive form on www.developingfreedom.org) shows how the identified studies connect 
anti-slavery interventions to development outcomes (Figure 5.a); development interventions to anti-
slavery outcomes (Figure 5.b); and development interventions (with a stated anti-slavery component) to 
development outcomes (Figure 5.c). In each case, the thickness of the line connecting the interventions 
(on the left) to the outcomes (on the right) represents the number of times these variables are connected 
in the identified records. (The thickness of each line is detailed in a scroll-over pop-out box in the online 
version.) Analysis of these diagrams reveals several things. 
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In Figure 5.a, it is noticeable that evaluated studies deal most often with awareness campaigns, rather 
than other types of anti-slavery interventions. Very few deal with information and communications 
technology-based interventions, and private sector-oriented interventions were also relatively 
infrequent. Even more notably, improved economic conditions were the least frequently cited 
development outcomes, reinforcing the sense from our survey of practitioners that relatively little 
attention is paid to the economic impacts of modern slavery. However, against that trend, it does seem 
notable that where the intervention focused on survivor rehabilitation, economic outcomes were the 
most mentioned, suggesting there is a greater focus on economic justifications for and impacts of 
survivor rehabilitation than in other programming areas. 
FIGURE 5.a: WHAT EVALUATIONS TELL US ABOUT THE  
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In Figure 5.b, we see that the type of development intervention most frequently linked to anti-slavery 
outcomes in the identified literature relates to education and skills. By contrast, economic programming 
is the least mentioned. Also notable is that the outcomes most often cited – Increased Awareness and 
Improved Institutional Frameworks – are both preventive.
FIGURE 5.b: WHAT EVALUATIONS TELL US ABOUT THE  
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Finally, Figure 5.c deals with development interventions (with a stated anti-slavery objective) and looks 
at how they are linked to development outcomes. Here, interventions are seen as being connected 
fairly evenly to a broad range of outcomes, with no obvious clustering. Again, however, the focus is on 
education and social protection outcomes – with less focus on economic benefits. 
This mapping gives us a sense of the broad contours of how connections between anti-slavery efforts 
and development efforts are understood in the analytic literature. They suggest that programmers and 
developers see ties between anti-slavery efforts and development efforts focused on education and social 
protection. However, whereas the SDGs frame efforts to address modern slavery squarely in terms of 
promoting decent work (SDG 8), there has been comparatively little focus in the research literature on 
the connections between anti-slavery efforts and the economic aspects of development interventions. 
And almost no focus – at least in the ‘development’ literature – on the relationship between anti-slavery 
efforts and environmental outcomes.
FIGURE 5.c: WHAT EVALUATIONS TELL US ABOUT  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT  
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What does ODA spending tell us?
To deepen our understanding of how modern slavery, forced and child labour, and human trafficking 
are addressed in development assistance, we reviewed official data for 2000 to 2017 reported by donors 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This analysis extends and 
improves on earlier research conducted by Dr Kelly A. Gleason and Prof. James Cockayne for UNU-
CPR’s Delta 8.7 project (www.delta87.org).29 This new research includes an improved methodology for 
capturing programming officially justified through reference to modern slavery, forced and child labour 
and human trafficking, strengthened coverage of multilateral and regional programming between 2000 
and 2013, and adding additional data from 2014 to 2017.
Our methods 
Governments and other official donors report their commitments of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) through the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS). These data are compiled and coded by 
the AidData Institute at the University of William and Mary.30 From this data source we compiled a set of 
2,016,905 programming records, reported by donors between 2000 and 2017. We searched this data for 
programming addressing modern slavery, forced and child labour, and human trafficking. 
Data in the CRS set are tagged with inter-governmentally agreed programming codes to help with 
analysis of ODA spending patterns and impacts. These codes pre-date the adoption of the SDGs, and 
do not always align well with them. Existing codes may not capture, for example, ODA interventions 
targeting forced labour, forced marriage, slavery or sexual exploitation. To solve this problem, in 2018 
Dr Gleason developed a natural language processing algorithm to process and code original, reported 
project descriptions. Running this algorithm over CRS data allowed us to identify a set of root terms 
used in these descriptions that reference seven over-arching forms of exploitation that fall within SDG 
Target 8.7: forced labour, child labour, child soldiering, human trafficking, forced marriage, modern 
slavery, and sexual exploitation.31 We used Dr Gleason’s algorithm again in 2019 and 2020, having it trawl 
through an enlarged dataset of 2,016,905 aid project descriptions, to identify which projects targeted 
which forms of exploitation. From these, we identified 11,690 projects that addressed different forms of 
SDG 8.7 exploitation in the relevant period. We adjusted our analytic methodology from that used in our 
earlier 2018 publication to improve capture of multilateral – and especially regional – programming. The 
original datasets are available from the AidData Institute. 
This counting and coding methodology comes with various limitations. 
First, it is limited to declared DAC commitments. It does not cover domestic government spending, 
nor overseas spending that is not DAC-able, some of which may be sizeable. Nor does it include foreign 
spending by non-OECD countries—and it is clear that non-OECD countries spent significantly on 
addressing Target 8.7 exploitation during the period in question. Qatar, for example, which only joined 
the OECD DAC in April 2016, was a major contributor to global efforts to fight human trafficking such as 
the UN.GIFT programme during the years in question, yet that spending is not captured in this data set.32 
Private charitable giving also appears to have become an important source of anti-slavery programming 
funds in recent years, but it, too, is not captured in this analysis – and indeed there does not appear to 
be any reliable dataset that would permit such analysis. 
Second, the methodology also relies on the official description furnished by the governments in 
question. If the reporting donor justified an entire programme spend with reference to SDG 8.7 forms of 
exploitation, our methodology counts the entire spend as linked to this form of exploitation, even if only 
part of the funding was in fact used on activities directed at that form of exploitation. Additionally, if the 
reporting donor described the project as working to reduce more than one form of SDG 8.7 exploitation, 
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it is so coded. Equally, if the project in fact worked to achieve reductions in more than one form of SDG 
8.7 exploitation, but was not so described, this fact is not captured in the data or our analysis. We count 
only what the official State records indicate. Still, it is hard to identify anyone better placed to articulate 
the programming objectives of each project than the DAC donor. We chose not to second-guess or 
disturb these assessments – some of them over 20 years old – and relied entirely on these descriptions. 
Finally, due to changes in how data were reported and captured, there is a significant discontinuity in the 
dataset between 2013 and 2014, limiting comparability for data in the 2000-2013 period and those in the 
2014-2017 period. The 2014-2017 data seem to include significantly fewer reported commitments from 
fewer bilateral donors than the 2000-2013 dataset, suggesting there may have been changes in donor 
reporting behaviour or significant lags in reporting for this period. Moreover, the 2014-2017 data we 
report does not include reporting by multilateral donors (due to a change in how Dr Gleason’s algorithm 
processed such records). In contrast, the 2000-2013 dataset used here does include commitments by 
multilateral reporters (UN donor entities, the World Bank, regional development banks and other 
international entities such as the OPEC International Development Fund and Islamic Development 
Bank). We caution against direct comparison across this 2013/2014 discontinuity, and have tailored our 
analysis of results, below, accordingly. In particular, we caution that all figures below are estimates only. 
Our results
OVERALL SPENDING AND PROJECT SIZE
Between 2000 and 2013, donors committed an estimated USD 6,430,111,533 in ODA to bilateral projects, 
and an estimated USD 796,071,765 in ODA to multilateral projects, addressing SDG 8.7 – or an estimated 
USD 7,226,183,298 overall. Between 2014 and 2017 donors committed at least a further USD 587,620,155 
to bilateral projects, bringing the total identified ODA commitment from 2000 to 2017 to at least USD 
7,813,803,453.
These contributions were split across 10,777 donor-recipient dyads reported between 2000 and 2013 and 
913 dyads in the 2014-2017 reported dataset we use here. This means that the average commitment (i.e. 
contribution by a donor to a project) was USD 668,417.75. However, most commitments were far smaller 
than that. For bilateral projects, the median commitment was around 15 per cent of the average: USD 
108,726 vs USD 727,639.64 for 2000-2013; USD 101,454 to USD 643,614.63 for 2014-2017. For multilateral 
projects (2000-2013), the median project commitment was just 4.5 per cent of the average project 
commitment – USD 18,228.50 versus USD 410,346.271. 
What that tells us is that most ODA commitments addressing SDG 8.7 concerns in the 2000 to 2017 
period were quite small; there were a few larger commitments that drove up overall averages. In fact, 
in the total sample of 2,016,905 ODA commitments we reviewed, we found only 1,327 projects valued at 
USD 1 million or more that tackled SDG 8.7 concerns. This means that 10,363 projects (or 89 per cent) of 
ODA-funded projects dealing with these issues were less than USD 1 million in size, even if they were 
multi-year projects. That raises real questions about both the scale of ambition and commitment of ODA 
donors, and programming efficiency. 
WHO GAVE WHAT? 
43 distinct donors committed ODA to projects addressing forms of exploitation covered by SDG 
8.7 between 2000 and 2017 – 30 bilateral donors, and 13 multilateral donors. The number of donors 
committing ODA to projects justified with reference to SDG 8.7 concerns rose steadily each year between 
2000 and 2013 – see Figure 6 below.Participation of bilateral donors appears to have declined somewhat 
since 2014, though due to a data discontinuity at 2013/2014, and the absence of multilateral donors from 
the later dataset, we caution against direct comparison. 
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As well as an increase in the number of donors participating each year, there was also considerable 
variation in the amount that donors gave, as Figure 7 below makes clear. Again, we caution against 
comparing patterns in the period 2000-2013 to the 2014-2017 period. Yet certain patterns do stand out 
clearly, and seem to hold across the two periods, notably the outsized role that the US has played as an 
ODA donor on these issues. It is the source of 42.8% of the declared bilateral commitments (by value), 
four times the contribution of the next largest ODA committer in this area (the European Union), and 
more than 7 times what the next largest donors such as Norway, Germany, Canada, Australia, Spain, 
Sweden, UK, Switzerland committed. 
FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF DONORS COMMITTING  
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FIGURE 7: YEAR-ON-YEAR ODA COMMITMENTS  
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FIGURE 8: PORTION OF TOTAL ODA COMMITMENT ON  
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Multilateral donors declaring ODA commitments relevant to SDG 8.7 between 2000 and 2013 showed 
even more variation (see Figure 9 below). UNICEF emerges as the multilateral most consistently 
committing ODA in this area, while the World Bank committed the largest amount overall.
FIGURE 9: YEAR-ON-YEAR ODA COMMITMENTS ON SDG 8.7  
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TO WHOM? 
Between 2000 and 2013, ODA commitments were dispersed to a growing range of countries and regional 
programmes, rising from 64 recipients in 2000 to a high of 143 in 2008 (see Figure 10 below). The 
numbers of recipients recorded since 2014 are lower, but again these should not be directly compared to 
the 2000-2013 data, due to a discontinuity in data sets around 2014. 
We can also learn more from interrogating the data to understand how many ‘pairs’ were connected 
in giving-receiving relationship. Between 2000 and 2009 the number of donor-recipient ODA dyads 
rose from 171 to 1378 – an 800 per cent rise. Yet as Figure 6 (above) shows, in the same period, the 
number of active donors rose only from 19 to 28 – less than a 50 per cent rise. This means that the rise in 
dyads is primarily attributable to a rise in recipients – in other words, donors were spreading their ODA 
commitments on SDG 8.7 concerns to more recipients, or, alternatively, were using SDG 8.7 concerns 
to justify a broader range of programming. Over the same period, however, all ODA commitments rose 
only from USD 84,135,117 to USD 372,059,700. At 442 per cent, that is a considerable rise – but much less 
than the >800 per cent rise in donor-recipient dyads. The implication is that although donor spending 
was increasing, the number of recipients was growing faster than the actual spending. In other words: 
while more recipients were benefiting from ODA funds to address SDG 8.7 concerns, the size of the 
average individual commitments was actually shrinking. ODA funds to fight modern slavery, forced and 
child labour, and human trafficking were being spread more thinly.
FIGURE 10: ODA RECEIPT PATTERNS, 2000-2017
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The data also allow us to see which countries received ODA commitments related to SDG 8.7, and when. 
Because there were so many recipients each year (see the right-hand axis of Figure 10, above), it is 
not useful to chart these receipts year on year. That data is available online. However, it is useful to 
consider aggregate receipts over the entire period (Figure 11 below). This shows that some countries 
with recognized high prevalence of bonded labour, such as Afghanistan, India, Nepal and Pakistan were 
amongst the largest recipients over this period. But some countries that are known to host populations 
working in slavery or slave-like conditions have received relatively low sums. Brazil has received around 
USD 55.6 million in ODA to address these issues, over 18 years – whereas over USD 307 million in ODA 
directed to Colombia was justified through reference to SDG 8.7 issues. Similarly, while over USD 256 
million of South African aid has been reported in terms related to SDG 8.7 issues, Mauritania, recognized 
as one of the last countries in the world struggling with relatively entrenched ‘traditional’ forms of 
chattel-like slavery, has received only just over USD 4 million in ODA to tackle the problem.
Just over a quarter of commitments were to the Asia-Pacific region, and just under a quarter to Sub-
Saharan Africa (see Figure 11, below). The Americas, MENA and Eastern Europe follow, in that order. 
Around 11 per cent of all ODA commitments were made to regionally designated recipients, across 
multiple donors (and consistent across 2000-2013 and 2014-2017), suggesting some level of coordination 
amongst donors to give to programming organized at a regional level. 
Yet the data are also limited in what they can tell us on this score, not least because 15 per cent of all 
commitments were made to ‘unspecified’ recipients – possibly signalling the funding went to DAC-able 
entities’ global operations, rather than country-level programming.
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FIGURE 11: TOP RECIPIENTS OF ODA COMMITMENTS  
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FOR WHICH FORMS OF EXPLOITATION?
Finally, we explored the data to consider which forms of exploitation were referenced in ODA 
commitments between 2000 and 2017. These results, charted in Figures 13, 14 and 15, below, tell a clear 
story. 
FIGURE 12: ALLOCATIONS OF ODA TO ADDRESS  
SDG 8.7 CONCERNS, BY REGION, 2000-2017
FIGURE 13: NUMBER AND VALUE OF ODA COMMITMENTS  
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FIGURE 14: NUMBER OF ODA COMMITMENTS 2000-2017  
BY TYPE OF EXPLOITATION (YEAR ON YEAR)
FIGURE 15: VALUE OF ODA COMMITMENTS 2000-2017  
BY TYPE OF EXPLOITATION (USD, YEAR ON YEAR)
Child labourModern slavery Forced labour


































































































































Child labourModern slavery Forced labour































































































































31 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
The story they tell is that between 2000 and 2017 both the number and value of ODA commitments 
addressing modern slavery (including forced marriage) and child soldiering were an order of magnitude 
below the number and value of those addressing forced labour and human trafficking. The number 
and value of ODA commitments to child labour was somewhere in between. While the number of ODA 
commitments on child labour surged for several years starting around 2005, the aggregate value of those 
commitments did not – suggesting the same resources may have been spread more thinly. In contrast, 
commitments addressing human trafficking increased massively from around 2004 to 2009 – increasing 
more than seven-fold in the wake of concerted outreach and communications efforts by UNODC and 
others. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, spending on forced labour seems to have increased on a similar 
pattern – though this may also explain why commitments to child labour declined over the same period. 
These results suggest that once the development community comes to understand how certain aspects 
of exploitation relate to its own objectives and work, there is scope for increased resource allocation.
Yet they also make clear that, as of now, ‘modern slavery’ is not a significant part of most development 
actors’ discourse (how they justify their commitments), or indeed their resource allocation choices. The 
results also point to the constraints that development actors are operating under – including a lack of 
complete, timely data about ODA spending on different forms of exploitation. 
What do development organization practices tell 
us? 
The final place we turned to assess development sector approaches to SDG 8.7 was the operational 
practice of development entities – multilateral development banks and programmes, multilateral 
and bilateral development finance institutions, export credit agencies, and bilateral development 
cooperation agencies. 
That practice is of course far from uniform. The development landscape today is highly complex. Donors 
provide funds to developing economies through bilateral and multilateral concessional lending, export 
and trade finance, and through grants. Increasingly, donors also look to use public finance to ‘crowd-
in’ private finance aligned with the SDGs – a topic we return to in Chapter 8 (exploring Infrastructure 
as an Asset Class) and Chapter 9 (on sustainable finance more generally). There is also a growing 
diversity of other modalities for delivering development assistance, such as South-South cooperation, 
triangular co-operation and multi-stakeholder partnerships. Accordingly, it is not possible to provide 
a comprehensive picture of how ‘the development sector’ considers modern slavery risks. In the sub-
sections that follow, however, we provide an overview of practice by five different clusters of development 
actors: (1) bilateral development cooperation agencies, (2) development finance institutions (DFIs) and 
export credit agencies (ECAs), (3) multilateral development banks (the World Bank, regional banks, and 
new MDBs such as the BRICs bank and AIIB), (4) China, and (5) the UN development system. 
Bilateral development cooperation agencies
As the ODA spending figures detailed in the previous section make clear, there are varying levels of 
attention to SDG 8.7 exploitation as a programming objective in ODA allocation. Here we provide an 
illustrative summary of the approaches taken by four of the countries with more active programming in 
this area: the US; UK; Norway; and Australia.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
As we saw in the previous section, the country that has committed the largest sum of ODA on these issues 
has been the US. Counter-trafficking work has been a focus for USAID for almost two decades, with 
programming in over 81 countries and regions since 2001. USAID describes trafficking as “a fundamental 
obstacle to our mission as a development agency [that] undermines the development objectives we seek 
to accomplish through our programming”.33 In 2012, USAID launched a Counter-Trafficking in Persons 
(C-TIP) Policy. The policy noted that “[w]ith few exceptions, to date, USAID investments in combating 
trafficking [had] been stand-alone projects. Integrated and leveraged investments have greater potential 
than stand-alone projects to advance prevention and protection.” On that basis, the policy moved to 
integrate C-TIP objectives into its broader programming, especially in health, agriculture, economic 
growth, education, humanitarian assistance, and security sector reform projects.34 
Anti-trafficking objectives have subsequently been pursued through and integrated into a range of 
programming across multiple sectors, including efforts that address the dimensions we characterize (in 
Chapter 2) as institutional environments, vulnerable people and, to a lesser extent, exploiter strategies.35 
This has involved developing and making tools and expertise available to field missions, greater 
codification and application of learning, increased investment, and greater internal accountabilities. This 
work is led by the USAID Counter Trafficking in Persons (C-TIP) office, housed within their Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Governance program. The C-TIP office published a Counter-Trafficking in Persons 
Field Guide, which serves three primary purposes: (1) providing guidance on monitoring and evaluation 
of C-TIP programs; (2) education on human trafficking; and (3) recommending ways to integrate C-TIP 
work into existing development programmes.36
USAID’s role in advancing US Government counter-trafficking objectives is part of a larger inter-agency 
effort. C-TIP objectives are integrated into other government programming.37 Under the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act, the US State Department is given a central role in leading US Government 
international efforts on counter-trafficking including the drafting of the Trafficking in Persons Report 
(TIP Report), and chairing the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking. In preparing 
the TIP Report, the US State Department assesses countries’ efforts to address trafficking in persons, 
and assigns countries a ‘tier’ ranking – which determines whether countries are eligible for non-
humanitarian non-trade-related foreign assistance. Counter-trafficking objectives are also supported 
by both ODA-based and non-ODA based programming at the US Department of Labor, addressing forced 
and child labour. This includes periodic reporting on Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor; a 
List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor; and a List of Products Produced by Forced or 
Indentured Child Labor. 
An important strategic development in the US approach took place in early 2019. On 9 January 2019, 
President Trump signed into law the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2017. The law 
requires the US Executive Directors of multilateral development banks such as the World Bank to work 
to develop anti-human trafficking provisions in their bank’s project development, procurement, and 
evaluation policies, as well as integration of human trafficking risk analysis into country strategies and 
programming.38 We return to the role of MDBs in a later section of this Chapter.
UNITED KINGDOM
Another country that has focused on modern slavery and anti-trafficking objectives in its development 
cooperation is the United Kingdom. A review of UK aid efforts by the Independent Commission on Aid 
Impact, published in October 2020 as this report was being finalized, found that they had “successfully 
raised awareness of modern slavery globally” but “lacks a systematic approach” based on evidence of 
“what works” to develop an effective set of programmes in the future. It found “only limited attempts to 
mainstream modern slavery interventions across the wider aid programme”.39 
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Overall government spending on anti-slavery initiatives has been worth at least GBP 225 million since 
2014, across roughly 86 projects.40 The Home Office manages two funds dedicated to modern slavery: 
the Modern Slavery Fund and the Modern Slavery Innovation Fund. The Home Office also manages two 
modern slavery projects within the Commonwealth Security Programme of the Commonwealth 2018–
2020 Fund. DfID funded some modern slavery work by NGOs through the UK Aid Direct mechanism. 
The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) supported modern slavery work within its International 
Programmes Fund. Average spends varied: around GBP 6.8 million per project for DfID, 660,000 for the 
Home Office projects, and GBP 70,000 for the FCO.41 
The Department for International Development (DfID) has played a key role in the development aspects 
of the UK’s response, including through commitment of over GBP 200 million to modern slavery 
projects since 2014.42 Over 90 per cent of its projects are in South Asia, East Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa.43 DfiD’s commitment was shown in the existence of a Migration and Modern Slavery unit within 
the department. DfID was also the custodian for the Call to Action on Forced Labour, Modern Slavery 
and Human Trafficking, launched by UK Prime Minister Theresa May at the UN General Assembly on 
19 September 2017, and subsequently endorsed by 92 countries.44 This includes an explicit call for 
“enhanced international cooperation” including through efforts by “Donors and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) to enhance cooperation and address the resourcing gap, and build capacity for an 
effective response; including by leveraging resources from the Private Sector”. This led, a year later, 
to the adoption of Principles to Guide Government Action to Combat Human Trafficking in Global Supply 
Chains by the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom.
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DfID also made a singular analytical contribution. Its programming in this area had three focuses: 
“reducing vulnerability to exploitation, addressing the permissive environments that enable the 
criminality of modern slavery to thrive, and supporting business to employ innovative approaches to 
eradicate exploitation in their supply chains”.45 This strategy draws on the DfID conceptual framework, 
reproduced in Figure 16 above.46 We return to this important framework in Chapter 2.
NORWAY
Norway’s aid agency, NORAD, published a Programme document for the Norwegian Government’s 
development cooperation programme to combat modern slavery in July 2020.47 This was based on a 2019 
mapping of existing work in the area.48 The document characterizes the fight to end modern slavery as 
a “priority for Norwegian development cooperation”, and points out that stepped-up efforts in this area 
were part of the political platform of the current Norwegian Government.49 It also places these efforts 
in the larger context of Norway’s efforts to promote business respect for human rights,50 and domestic 
discussions on anti-trafficking regulation. 
The document indicates that “The common denominator for all forms of modern slavery is vulnerability.” 
These vulnerabilities are exploited for profit: “Modern slavery is a business model in which vulnerable 
people are grossly exploited.”51 Concluding that “international efforts to end modern slavery are clearly 
underfunded and do not match the scale or complexity of the problem”, the Norad programme commits 
NOK 170 million, or around USD 20 million, with the aim to “bring about necessary changes in government 
and business so that the selected partner countries can put an end to modern slavery.” The document 
acknowledges that this may require action going beyond the national level. And it also acknowledges that 
more effective country-level coordination will be required amongst donors. Initial indications are that 
this programme will seek to allocate funding to where there is both significant vulnerability to modern 
slavery, but also a willingness to consider new approaches, including in sub-Saharan African countries, 
and with a focus on the agricultural sector.52
AUSTRALIA
Australia has had an International Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking and Slavery since March 2016.53 
This recently expired, and a new strategy is now under development. The new strategy will inform 
Australia’s aid spending strategy, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region,54 expanding the South-East 
Asia focus of the prior International Strategy.55 Implementation of the earlier strategy took place through 
both bilateral and multilateral channels, especially ASEAN.56 This has included a series of multi-year 
flagship investments, most recently the Australia-Asia Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons, worth 
AUD 50 million between 2013 and 2018, which focused on strengthening legal institutions, and national 
and regional cooperation;57 followed by an AUD 80 million 10-year follow-up commitment.58 These 
initiatives include a range of bilateral programmes in the region, with a particular focus on criminal 
justice capacity-building and cooperation.59
Since 2002, Australia and Indonesia have co-chaired the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking 
in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. This Process brings together 45 Member States and 
international organizations, including UN agencies (UNHCR, UNODC, IOM and ILO). In recent years 
it has also included a Government and Business Forum, which is now working to generate awareness 
and action by government and business actors throughout Asia-Pacific on a range of human trafficking 
issues. Australia also served for a time as the Chair of Alliance 8.7, the global partnership of governments, 
UN agencies, businesses and civil society to achieve SDG Target 8.7.
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Development finance institutions and export credit agencies
Private-sector facing development entities include development finance institutions and export credit 
agencies. Development finance institutions (DFIs) are government-backed financial institutions that 
invest in private-sector projects in low- and middle-income economies. Export credit agencies (ECAs) 
finance domestic companies’ international export operations and other activities. DFIs and ECAs are 
particularly important to the discussion of anti-slavery efforts since they tend to have high proportions 
of investments in low-income countries, since they are often mandated to encourage investment in 
countries where business otherwise may not venture.60 
There is growing attention to modern slavery issues in these organizations’ practice. They have tended to 
see slavery risk reduction as a question of project risk management. The response has been to institute 
various ‘safeguards’ intended to screen out such risks from investment and improve management where 
they do arise. Only more recently have DFIs and ECAs begun to turn their attention to how they can use 
investment portfolios, loan books and leverage over their partners to foster more responsible business 
conduct and respect for human rights, including modern slavery risk reduction. 
This is part of a larger recognition, noted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), that “sustainable and inclusive development cannot be achieved without responsible business 
conduct (RBC).”61 In a recent survey, the OECD identified growing practice by DFIs and ECAs to reflect 
RBC objectives in their strategies, policies, operational guidelines, and procurement practices.62 This 
practice suggests convergence around the expectations reflected in the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, ILO core conventions and Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, as well as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD Guidelines).63 These expectations are increasingly reflected in conditionalities placed by DFIs 
and ECAs on funding recipients, in how they conduct their business. 
DFIs engage directly with businesses through a wide range of instruments, notably equity investments, 
loans, loan guarantees, and risk insurance. Many DFIs also provide technical assistance to the institutions 
they invest in.64 Many DFIs have safeguards in place for ensuring investments are not associated with 
negative impacts65, such as the Association of European Development Finance Institutions’ Principles 
for Responsible Financing of Sustainable Development.66 These arrangements frequently align to the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC’s) Environmental and Social Performance Standards,67 which 
define clients’ responsibilities for managing their environmental and social risks, and to a large extent 
align with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, reflecting the core expectation 
that businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights. IFC Performance Standard 2 (IFC PS2) 
deals with labour and working conditions, and aims at marrying economic growth with protection of 
the fundamental rights of workers, as defined in a specific set of ILO Conventions, notably including 
ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour, ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour, ILO 
Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and others.68 IFC PS2 specifically requires that 
clients not employ children in any manner that is in “any manner that is economically exploitative, or is 
likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development”, and “not employ forced labour… or trafficked 
persons”. IFC PS2 and an accompanying Guidance Note69 set out expectations regarding the steps 
expected to prevent identify risks of child labour or forced labour in certain business relationships, and 
to remedy cases. These expectations depend on the client’s “level of management control or influence 
over its primary suppliers”, and the Guidance Note explores how expectations may differ for direct, 
third-party contracted and supply chain workers.70 Working with CDC (the UK DFI), and with DfiD and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IFC has recently offered guidance to clients 
seeking to comply with IFC PS2 and manage risks associated with modern slavery, taking the form of a 
detailed Good Practice Note,71 public power-point72 and an introductory webinar73. And, as we explore 
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further below, there are also questions about how the Performance Standards handle risks arising not 
from a project, but from the context in which a project is undertaken, and the interaction between that 
context and the project.
Export Credit Agencies are also increasingly moving in this direction – that is, to apply global labour 
standards to investment decisions and relationship management. The OECD plays a key role as a forum 
for governance of the export credit arrangements that are often used to facilitate projects in developing 
countries. Since 2003, OECD Members have agreed ‘Common Approaches’ for addressing the potential 
environmental and social impacts of projects receiving such support. These were last updated in 2016.74 
These mandate screening of projects and human rights due diligence for severe human rights impacts, 
including benchmarking against the IFC Performance Standards. 
ECAs are quite effectively networked and have been actively sharing practice and learning – including 
relating to management of modern slavery risks.75 The OECD is reportedly working on a due diligence 
guide concentrating on modern slavery. Export Development Canada has issued a stand-alone Human 
Rights Policy that aligns its practice to the UN Guiding Principles framework.76 And GIEK, the Norwegian 
export credit agency, has used its leverage to address neg-ative human rights impacts not only arising 
from businesses it finances directly, but in the supply chains in which many of its beneficiaries operate. 
This includes forced labour in hull construction, an upstream risk for many of its shipbuilding clients. 
To do this, GIEK engages directly with the construction yards, with whom it has no direct commercial 
relationship. Its leverage arises not from any direct commercial link, but from its importance to the 
value chains that these construction yards feed into; its established and recognized expertise; the unity 
of messaging it offers between relationship managers and its ESG team; and its ability to translate social 
risk into the language of business opportunity.77 
These efforts by some DFIs and ECAs to model and encourage responsible business conduct make an 
important contribution by the development sector to the fight against modern slavery. They may, in time, 
encourage business towards this good behaviour, not least by reducing the cost of capital for firms that 
adopt these practices, and increasing it for those that do not. Yet there are limitations to this approach. 
With some notable expectations such as GIEK’s approach, described above, these strategies are focused 
primarily on removing the risk of modern slavery from the top tiers of suppliers of beneficiaries of DFI 
and ECA funding; as we discuss further later in this study, we know much modern slavery risk resides 
further upstream, often where formal businesses blur into the informal workforce. There are other 
limitations, too: the risk, for example, of businesses providing ceremonial compliance, and learning 
how to game audits; the risk that inadequate availability of social specialists in the DFIs and ECAs 
will undermine the implementation of the approach; and the limited impact of these conditionalities 
operating within bilateral funding relationships, rather than through public policy modalities.78 One 
review suggests this approach has had an impact only in the most propitious of conditions, especially 
where labour unions are already present.79 This is often not the case in the places where vulnerability to 
modern slavery is highest. Another risk is that business’ risk mitigation efforts default to what is feasible, 
not what will have the biggest impact for those affected – especially where organizations have limited 
understanding of what effective anti-slavery efforts in business operations look like.80 DFIs and ECAs 
may need to consider not just how slavery risk may arise within the project itself and its value chain, but 
also how the financed project could heighten other contextual risks that then lead to modern slavery – as 
the Lake Volta and Eritrea cases mentioned in the Introduction to this Chapter makes clear.81
This points to perhaps the most significant limitation of this approach. It focuses on minimizing risks to 
the organization and business concerned once programming has been chosen, rather than strategically 
allocating the resources of the organization to undertake projects that will set out to maximize slavery 
reductions. It is a safeguarding approach, not a strategic one. There is a need, as the OECD Secretariat 
has recognized, to move from RBC as a programming principle to promotion of RBC as a programming 
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objective. Currently, the projects that promote RBC in that way are not a major focus of DFI and ECA 
spending, with their focus on private-sector recipients.82 Increasingly, DFIs and ECAs also finance other 
financial intermediaries; yet it remains unclear to what extent and how these beneficiaries incorporate 
anti-slavery efforts into their own business. A more proactive approach may require greater engagement 
with financial system regulation, corporate disclosure, supply chain governance, and the rules of 
international trade and development. These are areas beyond the existing mandates of DFIs and ECAs. 
To the extent development actors have engaged with such issues, it has primarily been the MDBs and 
the UN development system that have done so. It is to each of these segments of the global development 
system that we now turn. 
Multilateral development banks
With some exceptions, the approach taken by multilateral development banks (MDBs) to slavery 
reduction largely reflects that taken by DFIs and ECAs: focused more on safeguarding than strategic 
intervention. This is the conclusion we reached after reviewing the practice of three major clusters of 
lenders: the World Bank Group, regional MDBs, and ‘new’ MDBs (AIIB, BRICs bank, and China). 
WORLD BANK GROUP
Research suggests that the World Bank “has substantially greater influence over the direction, design, 
and implementation of government policies than most of its bilateral and multilateral peers”.83 Notably, 
research establishes that the World Bank’s influence flows not only through its lending, but also – and 
arguably more – through its analytical approach and advisory services.84 It is consequently important to 
understand the approach to modern slavery risks taken by the World Bank, as this is likely to play an 
outsize role in shaping government policy and behaviour amongst borrowers. 
In 2009, as awareness of human trafficking issues was rising in international policy circles, 30 of 66 
World Bank country poverty reduction strategies at least referenced trafficking. But these mentions were 
usually marginal, and offered little clarity on whether or how programming impacts were measured.85 
The Bank has long argued that it can address these issues only if partner governments identify them 
as poverty reduction priorities.86 Even today, after the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, 
slavery, forced labour and human trafficking risks do not appear to factor in any significant way into 
the Bank’s processes for deciding where to allocate capital. We might, for example, expect it to be a 
factor in allocations to the poorest countries, where modern slavery risks are arguably highest, through 
the International Development Association (IDA). States committed USD 82 billion to replenish IDA 
in December 2019, yet neither the Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD), the Country Partnership 
Framework (CPF), the Bank’s Regions’ engagement strategies, nor the Bank’s plans for considering 
Fragility, Conflict and Violence in IDA spending,87 make any mention of modern slavery, forced labour, 
human trafficking or child labour, despite their focus on human capital development.88 The 2018 SCD 
for India, for example, makes no mention of debt bondage, bonded labour, modern slavery or human 
trafficking, despite a widespread recognition that India likely has more people in such situations 
of exploitation than any other country, and that debt bondage is a major obstacle to human capital 
development.89 Similarly, the 2018 SCD for Mauritania mentions the legacies of slavery in that country 
and the steps that the government is taking to address them as contextual factors, but slavery is not 
mentioned amongst the Bank’s own programming support objectives.90
What explains the Bank’s reluctance to focus on these issues? Two explanations present themselves. The 
first is an institutional one. The World Bank has been reluctant to push governments to address what 
are often framed as ‘human rights’ issues, in part due to provisions in its Articles of Agreement that 
seem to limit the Bank’s engagement with a State’s political affairs.91 In 2011 a Deputy General Counsel, 
Hassane Cissé, stated that the Political Prohibition Provisions in the Articles of Agreement, “allow the 
Bank to make decisions based only on economic considerations”.92 Yet the Articles of Agreement give it 
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an explicit mandate to assist in “raising productivity, the standard of living and the conditions of labour”, 
which strongly suggests that programming to address forced labour and slavery should be seen as within 
the bounds of permitted activity. There is little doubt that the Bank is entitled to use its lending power 
as an instrument for ensuring respect for human rights where pervasive violations have significant 
economic effects – a point made in the early 1990s by World Bank General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata,93 
and developed at some length in the mid-2000s by then-General Counsel of the World Bank, Roberto 
Dañino.94 Indeed, that logic – that the Bank is entitled to support State’s efforts to address institutional 
and good governance factors with economic relevance – has underpinned the Bank’s involvement in 
supporting State’s criminal justice reform efforts for some time.95 
The second possible explanation is analytical. The Bank may not have focused on these issues because 
it may, at root, not see modern slavery as a development issue – or at least not perceive a connection 
between its lending and programming choices and modern slavery outcomes. There are two reasons 
to think this explanation may get closer to the heart of the matter. First, as former IMF Director Peter 
Doyle has recently pointed out, dominant economic theories and models simply do not account for 
the intentional denial of economic agency that slavery represents.96 They assume that people (or at 
least adults) are always economic actors. They may be more or less rational, more or less driven by 
behavioural impulses, more or less capable and endowed – but they are always actors. This is a simple 
but devastating theoretical blind-spot, that does not account for the lived reality of coercion in today’s 
economy – coercion that seeks to turn some people from actors into objects, whose economic behaviour 
is controlled by others. And since these are the economic theories and discourse that underpins the 
work of the World Bank, it is perhaps not surprising that much of the World Bank – and the global 
development sector more broadly – suffers from this same blind-spot. 
Second, this explanation chimes with a long-standing critique of the Bank: that it has failed to account 
for the social externalities of its pro-growth economic policies. More specifically, this critique postulates 
that the Bank has encouraged borrowers to deregulate labour markets and reduce worker protections 
in ways that have contributed to vulnerability to labour exploitation. This critique traces this tendency 
back to the Bank’s initial engagement with structural adjustment programming under Tom Clausen, 
whom President Reagan nominated to lead the World Bank in 1981, after he had spent a decade in charge 
at the Bank of America. Structural adjustment programmes required economic liberalization on many 
fronts, paving the way for both the growth that came from resulting integration into global trade and 
economic circuits, and the vulnerability that came from integration into global financial circuits. Under 
the discipline of this ‘Washington Consensus’, countries liberalized labour markets and suppressed 
wages in a hunt for foreign investment. Yet the result was a drop in both average growth rates, and 
countries’ social outcomes.97 The model shifted power away from local governments and workers, to 
foreign capital, fostering the misconception that markets could externalize environmental, workforce 
and other systemic risks. 
Those who advance this critique suggest that despite tweaks to and rebranding of the approach in the 
last two decades, the fundamental macroeconomic model embedded in the World Bank’s approach has 
not shifted. Over the last decade, there has been a growing recognition in Bank policy circles of the need 
for a more ‘balanced’ approach to labour market regulation to ensure equity and efficiency.98 But debates 
around worker protections, social dialogue, wage levels and social protection remain flashpoints.99 And 
some argue that the analytical approach that underpins today’s ‘Development Policy Loans’ continues to 
assume that the need is to remove obstacles to countries’ incorporation into global trade and financial 
circuits, in particular by removing the State as a barrier. State policy is seen as facilitating, rather than 
shaping, private sector activity. The aim is to remove ‘constraints’ holding countries back from achieving 
growth and poverty reduction, with the assumption being that markets are the best way to achieve both. 
There is no expectation, despite the evidence of several decades that market-based growth will lead 
to significant environmental and labour exploitation vulnerabilities. This is arguably also the logic that 
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underpins today’s emphasis on blended finance to ‘Maximize Financing for Development’ – a topic to 
which we return in Chapter 9. 
That the Bank does not perceive modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking as risks resulting 
from the policies it promotes is also borne out by the steps it has taken to address such risks. These are 
in the manner of project-level ‘safeguards’ – steps to ensure that the projects it lends to do not generate 
unintended environmental and social risks, including forced labour and child labour. A Labour and 
Working Conditions Standard was adopted as part of the Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework 
in August 2016, coming into force for projects coming online since late 2018, and addresses.100 ESS2, as it 
is known, aims to prevent the use of forced labour and child labour “in connection with”101 Bank-funded 
projects, by setting standards relevant to project screening, management and accountability.102 It sets 
out requirements for labour management procedures for different categories of workers connected with 
Bank-funded projects, including the primary tier of contracted labourers. ESS2 was criticized by the 
ILO for watering down international labour standards around freedom of association, and for passing 
risk management responsibilities from lenders to suppliers.103 As we explore in more detail in Chapter 5, 
there have been questions about whether this system has always prevented the Bank financing projects 
connected to forced labour.104
Yet the safeguards arrangements have helped ensure that forced labour and child labour risks are 
considered during project design and investment, through due diligence. They have moved into the 
world of private finance, through the World Bank’s private-sector lending arm, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and from there, to the Equator Principles, a set of voluntary standards for 
project finance institutions involved (discussed further in Chapter 8).105 To some extent, safeguards 
arrangements have also helped strengthen accountability, with an independent Inspection Panel 
mandated to investigate complaints of harm by Bank-funded projects.106 This accountability system 
has been emulated in various ways by other multilateral development finance institutions and some 
bilateral aid agencies. 
While these safeguard arrangements apply to the Bank’s project lending, they do not apply to the Bank’s 
(growing) portfolio of ‘policy lending’. This is the stock of loans and grants intended to help borrowers 
“address actual or anticipated development financing requirements that have domestic or external 
origins”. These typically support a programme of policy and institutional development, for example 
to improve the investment climate, diversify the economy, create employment, and meet applicable 
international commitments.107 The absence of anti-slavery (and other) safeguards in this area points to 
an assumption that slavery reduction neither represents a ‘development financing requirement’ of the 
relevant macroeconomic or policy kind, and an assumption that these reforms will not be responsible 
for generating modern slavery. In sum, for the World Bank slavery reduction is in operational terms a 
safeguarding issue, not a question of policy or strategy.
REGIONAL MDBs
The emphasis on safeguards over strategy is replicated in the regional MDBs.108
A decade ago the Asian Development Bank developed programming aimed at addressing human 
trafficking risks arising in the context of its post-2008 Financial Crisis investments in regional 
infrastructure development.109 This focus has since waned, and the ADB’s main engagement with modern 
slavery risks now comes via its safeguards machinery. Since 2001, the ADB has committed to respect for 
ILO core labour standards in its projects, including elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labour and effective abolition of child labour, as part of its social protection strategy.110 Since 2009, it has 
instituted a prohibited investment list that that notionally prevents financing “production or activities 
involving harmful or exploitative forms of forced labour or child labour”.111 There have, however, been 
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questions about whether this has proven effective, with allegations, for example, that ADB loans to the 
Uzbek Government to support agricultural sector investments may have financed child labour (see 
further Chapter 5), and ADB involvement in project financing in Myanmar (see further Chapter 8). 
The African Development Bank has an Operational Safeguard (No. 5) in place intended to prevent lending 
to projects “employing” forced or child labour or trafficked people.112 It also seeks to address social issues 
through its Country Strategy Papers and Regional Integration Strategy Papers. Yet, as with the World 
Bank, even in countries with notable ongoing challenges relating to slavery and forced labour, while 
these issues may be mentioned as contextual factors, they are not with any frequency made the targets 
of development programming or projects.113
The pattern also repeats where regional MDBs and lenders have a more explicitly ‘human rights’-oriented 
mandate or approach, as is the case in the Americas and Europe. The Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) has committed to respect internationally recognized human rights standards, as provided 
for in the International Bill of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work. In a December 2019 draft Environmental and Social Policy Framework, the Bank 
took steps to align this commitment with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
This takes the ‘safeguards’ route, by requiring Borrowers to have due respect for human rights, avoid 
infringement on the human rights of others, and address adverse human rights risks and impacts in 
IDB-supported projects.114 The Framework also sets out in some detail the steps required of borrowers 
to cascade safeguards through sub-contracting arrangements, and to deal with incidences of forced and 
child labour that arise.115 But modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking have not been made 
central targets for targeted IDB programming or lending. Similarly, the European Investment Bank has 
specifically committed to a human rights-based approach to social safeguards. The EIB “restricts its 
financing to projects that respect human rights and comply with EIB social standards”, which are aligned 
to the ILO core labour standards. This requires funding recipients to “develop and implement verifiable 
programmes and procedures to ensure that the core labour principles and standards are adhered to”, 
even where that goes beyond national law. The relevant EIB guidance specifies that this includes “no 
workers under the age of 15” and “no forced labour, including prison or debt bondage labour; no lodging 
of deposits or identity papers by employers or outside recruiters”.116 Uniquely amongst these banks, the 
EIB also specifically rules out lending to projects related to the sex trade, infrastructure and related 
media.117 Yet here, as elsewhere, modern slavery reduction does not appear to have been a specific 
objective of programming or lending choices. 
Finally, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, founded in the wake of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, differs from other regional banks in having an explicit political component to its mandate – 
and serves in some ways as the exception that proves the rule. Its mandate allows the EBRD to go beyond 
development narrowly conceived in terms of economic growth and even social development, and instead 
embraces institutional and governance objectives such as multi-party democracy, pluralism and market 
economics. The EBRD specifically considers human rights, especially civil and political rights, in that 
context.118 Its 2014 Environmental and Social Policy recognized the responsibility of the bank’s clients 
to respect human rights and declares that the EBRD will be guided by the International Bill of Human 
Rights, the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the eight core ILO conventions. The Policy was revised 
in 2019, strengthening various aspects of worker protections, including by cascading requirements to 
subcontractors.119
The EBRD is exceptional in how far it has gone in operationalizing these safeguards specifically in the 
context of modern slavery risks. The EBRD Performance Requirements (PRs) for clients must assess 
risks of forced and child labour in their supply chains, and its Environmental and Social Policy sets out 
what steps must be taken if a risk of forced or child labour is identified.120 The EBRD has published official 
guidance on how to meet the relevant Performance Requirement,121 and guidance for private sector 
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actors on Managing Risks Associated with Modern Slavery, produced in collaboration with IFC, CDC and 
DfID.122 An internal gap analysis conducted by the EBRD also highlights areas for potential strengthening 
of its own – and other MDBs’ – practice, such as access to relevant tools like forced labour risk screens 
in due diligence and assessment processes; strengthening access to relevant assessment expertise, 
including through use of experts with relevant sectoral and supply chain expertise in the due diligence 
process; increasing emphasis on implementing formally-recognised social and labour management 
systems (such SA8000); and increased attention to the performance of grievance mechanisms.123 All of 
this shows, however, how MDB practice on modern slavery continues to be conceived in terms of project 
risk management and safeguards, rather than seeing modern slavery reduction as a strategic objective 
around which programming and lending should be organized. 
NEW MDBs
Finally, we canvased the operational practice of the so-called ‘new multilateral development banks’. 
Several of these have emerged in recent years, in part in reaction to the unwillingness of traditional 
powers to give Brazil, Russia, India and China greater say in the governance of existing MDBs. While 
they have paid some lip service to safeguards against financing forced labour and child labour, these 
arrangements are generally seen as being weak enough to create market segmentation – they may 
attract clients that cannot meet the standards set by the traditional MDBs, or that prefer not to.124
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a multilateral investment bank initiated by China in 2013, 
headquartered in Beijing. Officially launched in January 2016, as of early 2019, the bank had 93 members 
and a total authorized capital of USD 100 billion. China holds the largest minority share in the bank. It 
mostly focuses on financing infrastructure projects in Asia, including energy and power transmission, 
transportation, urban development and sanitation. The AIIB has committed to “not knowingly finance 
projects involving… forced labor or harmful or exploitative forms of child labor”, including work 
involuntarily performed by trafficked persons.125 To operationalize this, AIIB Environmental and Social 
Standard 1 includes specific expectations on labour that must be assessed before a project is signed 
off. But it leaves it up to the borrower to assess these risks.126 AIIB offers a ‘Project-affected People’s 
Mechanism’ (PPM) to allow lodging of complaints of breaches of these standards in projects it funds. 
These arrangements have been criticized on a variety of grounds, including that the definition of child 
labour in the AIIB framework appears not to encompass the standards set out by the ILO’s Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Convention,127 and whether the safeguards actually work: AIIB has faced forced labour 
questions around a port infrastructure development project it financed in Oman.128
The New Development Bank, sometimes known as the BRICS multilateral development bank, arguably 
has even weaker safeguards in place. Initially authorized to hold USD 100 billion in capital, as of December 
2019 it had only approved projects worth USD 15 billion. Like the AIIB, infrastructure investment is its 
primary focus.129 Like the AIIB, its Environmental and Social Framework places the responsibility for 
assessing social risks on the borrower, rather than the Bank. And, rather than requiring borrowers to 
assess risk against international standards, it calibrates risk assessment to the standards in place at 
the national level: “Meet labor protection requirements of national laws and regulations and relevant 
International Labor Organization conventions as applicable to the country.”130 We return to the 
implications of this devolution of responsibility for social risk assessment in Chapter 9.
China
No discussion of contemporary development practice is complete without canvasing Chinese practice. 
China is the world’s largest official creditor, with outstanding claims in 2017 larger than those of the IMF, 
the World Bank and indeed of all other 22 Paris Club governments put together.131 In investment terms, 
China is the third largest source of investments after the US and Japan.132 One estimate puts the stock of 
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debt to China from sovereign debt, FDI, trade credit, direct loans and investments, and equity, at around 
8 per cent of world GDP, involving more than 4 in 5 of all countries.133 It is now the largest creditor of low-
income countries, surpassing the IFIs.
Much of this lending is to countries thought to have significant modern slavery risks. Figure 17 below 
juxtaposes two world maps. The first shows the scale of Chinese lending to countries as a percentage 
of the recipient’s GDP. The second shows the estimated country prevalence in the 2019 Global Slavery 
Index. This is not to suggest any causal connection. In fact, evidence suggests that Chinese lending to 
infrastructure projects, for example, can narrow economic inequalities within poor countries,134 while 
Chinese aid, like other countries’, contributes to growth.135 Our point is simply that China is lending to 
countries where modern slavery may be high (just as other countries and development actors may be). 
Heightening this link still further, much of this debt is for investments in infrastructure, mining and 
energy136 – all sectors with known modern slavery risks. How China approaches modern slavery risks 
may have a significant bearing on how modern slavery risks develop in future. China is also, notably, an 
endorser of the Call to Action on Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, which includes 
a commitment by donors to “enhance cooperation and address the resourcing gap, and build capacity 
for an effective response, including by leveraging resources from the Private Sector”. So what can we 
learn from China’s existing practice as a donor and development actor? We break this practice into two 
streams: overseas lending, and domestic development practice.
FIGURE 17: CHINESE OFFICIAL LENDING TO COUNTRIES  
WITH HIGH ESTIMATED MODERN SLAVERY PREVALENCE
Figure 17.a: Chinese lending in percent of recipient GDP
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CHINA’S OVERSEAS LENDING
After the Chinese Government adopted the ‘Go Out Policy’ (走出去战略) in 1999, Chinese entities began 
rapidly increasing foreign investment and lending. This further accelerated in 2013 after the adoption of 
the One Belt One Road framework (一带一路)(also known as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’). As a result, in 
recent years, China has emerged as a major player in development finance and official lending.
Yet only around a quarter of these flows meets ODA (or foreign aid) criteria. Unlike ODA and other 
development spending, most of this lending is on commercial (not concessional) terms and backed by 
collateral (secured against assets or future revenues).137 This means Chinese debts are likely to be treated 
preferentially in the event of repayment problems, making Chinese practice on modern slavery issues 
especially important, even when compared to other lenders – especially as there are signs surfacing of 
some countries facing repayment difficulties in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.138 The largely 
non-concessional nature of Chinese lending also means that Chinese aid is more likely to be driven 
by economic interests, whereas access to Chinese concessional aid seems linked to alignment with 
Chinese foreign policy positions (more so than concessional lending from other global sources).139 One 
government think-tanker in Beijing indicated that access to interest payment relief during the pandemic 
may be restricted to “countries that are friendly with us”.140
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Analysis of China’s operational practice in relation to modern slavery, forced labour and human 
trafficking risks associated with its lending is hampered by the opacity of that lending. China does 
not participate in the OECD Creditor Reporting System or Export Credit Group, nor in commercial 
debt tracking infrastructures such as those provided by Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. So it can be 
difficult even to size Chinese lending; one estimate of the stock of ‘hidden lending’ from China puts it 
at over USD 200 billion as of 2016.141 One thing that is clear, however, is that the Chinese State plays a 
large role in shaping this practice. While there is a huge array of financial entities involved in foreign 
lending and investment from China,142 privately-owned banks play a minor role. The stock of lending is 
dominated by two banks owned by the Chinese State Council; between them the Chinese Export-Import 
Bank and China Development Bank account for more than 75 per cent of overseas lending.143
An increasingly thick body of norms and regulations shape this lending – though uptake by Chinese 
firms operating overseas remains somewhat limited.144 Chinese lenders have proven reluctant to directly 
target and address labour standards through their lending, in part because of a government prohibition 
on foreign aid interfering in recipient countries’ internal affairs.145 Yet a growing body of guidance and 
regulation encourages lenders to protect workers’ rights. At the most general level, the Nine Principles 
on Encouraging and Standardizing Outbound Investment, issued by the State Council in 2006 mandate 
both “[c]omplying with local laws and regulations” and “fulfilling the necessary social responsibility to 
protect the legitimate rights and interests of local employees, … caring for and supporting the local 
community and people’s livelihood”.146 In 2008, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (the body responsible 
for regulating Chinese State-owned enterprises) issued the Circular on Regulation of Overseas Investment 
and Cooperation of Chinese Companies (MOFCOM [2008] #222). This contained a specific injunction 
relating to:
“Labor related issues. Effectively apply the ideology of “people-oriented” into 
the business’ management based on the requirements of the “Scientific Concept 
of Development” in China; provide employees with wages, benefits and working 
conditions that are in accordance with laws and contracts; broaden communication 
channels with employees, and actively respond to their legitimate demands in order to 
establish a more harmonious working environment.”147
This approach has been reinforced by subsequent regulation. In 2013, the Ministry of Commerce issued 
the Provisions for Regulating Competition in Foreign Investment and Cooperation (MOFCOM [2013] #88) 
which require companies to “safeguard legitimate interests of local employees… and fulfil necessary 
social responsibility”. (Art 7(2)) These provisions apply to all Chinese companies operating overseas or 
providing contracting services for foreign projects, and stipulate that the Ministry of Commerce and all 
other relevant ministries will maintain a “credit record” of any violation of this regulation. A negative 
rating can notionally disqualify companies from benefiting from investment-related State support in 
the future (Article 11).148 Further official guidance in 2017 contains a (non-exclusive) list of prohibited 
overseas investments. This includes prohibition of investment in “industries such as gambling and 
sexual services” and anything “banned by international treaties concluded with or signed by China”.149 
And China Banking Regulatory Commission guidance from that same year calls for strengthened ESG 
risk management, including through learning from international best practice, and maintaining the 
“rights and interests of local people”.150
The most specific guidance has been issued by industrial associations. The China International 
Contractors Association (CHINCA) issued the Guidelines of Sustainable Infrastructure for Chinese 
International Contractors (2017).151 The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals 
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Importers and Exporters has issued Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments.152 
Both of these call for preventive efforts related to forced labour. The latter specifically align with the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The CCMC has also released UNGPs-aligned Chinese 
Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains.153 China Chamber of Commerce of 
Foodstuffs and Native Produce has also worked towards guidance for investment and involvement in 
palm oil, including prohibitions on forced labour.154 The extent to which firms conform with these laws 
remains unclear.
Still further strictures are in place for China’s State-owned enterprises and lenders. The 2008 Circular 
on Regulation of Overseas Investment and Cooperation of Chinese Companies states that central State-
owned enterprises should play an “exemplary role”, and “enhance the sense of social responsibility” 
through “people-centred corporate behaviours that contribute to the building of a harmonious 
enterprise”. This was further elaborated in 2008 Guidelines to State-owned Enterprises Directly Under 
the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities (SASAC [2008] #1), which details 
the legal rights of employees that are to be respected.155 In response, the two major State-owned lenders 
– China Development Bank and ExIm Bank – have both adopted environmental and social impact 
frameworks, including due diligence frameworks.156 The ExIm Bank framework seeks to screen out 
financing for “Production or activities involving harmful or exploitative forms of forced labour/harmful 
child labour”.157 The CDB framework has not been published.
And this is indicative of the broader challenge of assessing the effectiveness of all this regulation. The lack 
of transparency around much of this lending makes that difficult. There are some signs that the system 
is weakly implemented and enforced.158 The regulatory framework in place provides opportunities 
for Chinese leadership, but greater institutional transparency and accountability might foster more 
effective implementation.159
CHINA’S DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE 
More difficult questions are raised, however, by allegations of connections between China’s domestic 
development policies and practices, and large-scale involuntary servitude, forced labour and human 
trafficking, especially in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
China is not alone in facing such allegations. As we saw earlier, concerns have recently been raised 
about EU financing of an infrastructure rehabilitation project in Eritrea that may rely on large-scaled 
forced labour. Other instances of possible connections between States and forced labour are canvased 
in Chapters 3 to 8, and involve countries ranging from Brazil to Thailand, Ethiopia to the UK. And as we 
discuss at more length in Chapters 2 and 9, the US, UK, France and Russia all have instances of large-scale 
forced labour in their past, closely linked to their own economic development. Those episodes may have 
imposed costs not only on the victims of forced labour, but on the countries whose policies underpinned 
those slavery systems; they might be better off now had they not opted to rely on systematic forced 
labour then. So from both a Chinese perspective, and from the perspective of multilateral norms and 
institutions, there may be benefits to considering and addressing the possible links between Chinese 
domestic development policy and large-scale contemporary forced labour, before similar costs are 
incurred in this instance.160
These alleged links have been identified in a series of investigative reports and analyses, including 
from a large group of UN Special Rapporteurs and special procedure mandate-holders, a bipartisan 
US Congressional Commission, published Chinese Community Party (CCP) records, and independent 
investigation and analysis.161 These allegations are hard to verify given the tight control exercised by 
Government authorities over the visits, mobility and inspections traditionally used to review allegations 
of forced labour in supply chains and otherwise conduct due diligence.162 The Chinese government 
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strongly contests key aspects of these reports, especially relating to the involuntary nature of the labour 
involved, describing them as a “smear”.163 The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson has described 
allegations of forced labour as a “political manoeuvre” by other countries.164 The Chinese authorities 
point to statements by “nearly 70 countries” at the UN General Assembly in September 2020 “in support 
of China’s position” and opposed to “interference in China’s internal affairs”, including a statement 
made by Cuba on behalf of 45 countries relating to Xinjiang.165
Multiple reports set out a consistent narrative of a domestic development and poverty-alleviation policy 
for Xinjiang province, one of China’s poorest, known as ‘Xinjiang Aid’ (援疆). The Xinjiang Aid strategy 
is based on attracting low-skilled, labour-intensive industry,166 and mandating participation of minority 
households as ‘rural “surplus labour” (fùyú láodònglì, 富余劳动力),167 or “destitute labour” (pínkùn 
láodònglì, 贫困劳动力). The result is a system that may compel as many as hundreds of thousands of 
Uyghurs and other minorities to work in textile, agriculture and electronic industries, as a livelihood 
creation exercise.168 Indeed, in a White Paper issued in response to concerns raised about such practices, 
the Chinese Government State Council Information Office stated that the total number of people 
employed in Xinjiang rose by 17.2 per cent in just five year (2014 to 2019), including “average annual 
relocation of surplus rural labor [of] more than 2.76 million people” – or about 10 per cent of all residents 
of the region “relocated” each year.169 The Chinese Government describes this as the State “guiding” 
or “helping” people “to find work” and “guid[ing] the orderly flow of labor” to industry.170 Despite this 
scale, according to critics, these relocations and associated forced work rely on tracking and sanctioning 
participants on an individual basis. The New York Times cited one local government instruction under 
the programme as bluntly directing State agents to “[m]ake people who are hard to employ renounce 
their selfish ideas. Turn around their ingrained lazy, lax, slow, sloppy, freewheeling, individualistic 
ways so they obey company rules.”171 Workers are allegedly forced to accept lower-than-market wages.172 
Local governments and private brokers are allegedly paid a price per head by the Xinjiang provincial 
government to organize labour assignments,173 drawing on workers who have been through involuntary 
‘vocational training’. 
This ‘vocational training’ allegedly forms part of a larger mass detention, without trial, of Muslim 
residents of Xinjiang, for “concentrated educational transformation” (集中教育转化).174 The Chinese 
Government acknowledges that it organized vocational training for an average of 1.29 million workers 
in Xinjiang each year from 2014 to 2019, but describes this training as the basis for the emergence of 
a “large knowledge-based, skilled and innovative workforce” in Xinjiang.175 The training improves the 
“employability of workers” and promotes “stable employment”.176 Detainees made to work appear to be 
housed in internment camp workshops, large industrial parks and village-based satellite factories,177 
and may be forced to undergo mandatory political and military education of workers and internees, and 
family separation.178 Some of them are explicitly styled “poverty alleviation workshops”. Many of these 
worksites rely on government security forces and are allegedly run under “paramilitary management” 
(bàn jūnshì huà guǎnlǐ, 半军事化管理).179
CCP sources frame this regime (and in some cases the broader Belt and Road Initiative)as a way to “get 
rid of poverty” (tuōpín gōngjiān, 脱贫攻坚) through “industrial poverty-alleviation” (chǎnyè fúpín,产业扶
贫).180 Global Times – a State-run media outlet – also describes poverty alleviation as the central basis for 
employment policy in the region,181 and the afore-mentioned government White Paper puts development 
at the heart of its justification for labour policies in Xinjiang, arguing that government labour policies 
in Xinjiang have led to significant household income increases and welfare improvements.182 It claims:
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From 2013 to the end of 2019, Xinjiang wiped out poverty in 25 poor counties  
and 3,107 poor villages, and the poverty incidence dropped from 19.4 percent to  
1.24 percent. From 2014 to the end of 2019, a total of 2.92 million people from 737,600 
households shook off poverty. By the end of 2020, poverty will be completely eliminated 
in Xinjiang.
The Chinese Government also frames the policy as part of its counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalization efforts in Xinjiang, aimed at addressing conditions conducive to terrorism. The State 
Council Information Office’s White Paper argues the programme is necessary for dealing with those in 
Xinjiang who “resist learning the standard spoken and written Chinese language, reject modern sciences, 
and refuse to improve their vocational skills, economic conditions, and the ability to better their own 
lives.” This includes “chang[ing] people’s outdated mindset”, to inculcate a commitment to hard work.183 
Yet the same source argues that these programmes are provide for “voluntary actions made based on 
individuals’ own choices”, and that “China applies international labor and human rights standards to 
effectively safeguard workers’ rights”.184 The programme, alleges the White Paper, “ensures that people 
can make their own choices about work”.185 An earlier article in Global Times indicated that research into 
more than 70 companies, including on-the-ground conversations, had found “[n]o evidence of forced 
labour”.186 The White Paper asserts that all incidents of forced labour lead to criminal prosecution, and 
that international labour standards and rights are respected.187 China has, it argues, “taken a resolute 
stance against forced labor and eradicated it in any form”.188 Above all, it emphasizes, this strategy 
alleviates poverty and “protects human rights through development”.189 
In this narrative, forced labour is reframed as ‘vocational training’, re-skilling and re-education of 
Uyghurs and other minorities, transforming them into a low-wage, low-skill workforce.190 That narrative 
must be evaluated, however, in the context of China’s longstanding systems of ‘Reform through Labour’ 
(láodòng gǎizào, 劳动改造) aimed at criminal rehabilitation, and ‘Re-education through Labour’ (láodòng 
jiàoyǎng, 勞動教養) aimed at political re-education. The latter was a system of administrative, extra-
judicial detention run by the police, and used from 1957 to 2013 to detain not only petty criminals but 
also political dissidents and Falun Gong. It was a formalization of a programme begun in 1955 by the 
Chinese Communist Party to deal with “counter-revolutionaries”, which was used to coerce dissidents 
into ideological and political conformism. It was repeatedly singled out for expressions of concern 
and critique by UN human rights bodies, including the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.191 
It was abolished by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 28 December 2013.192 
The system of mass internment and ‘vocational training’ in Xinjiang allegedly shares many of the 
characteristics of the ‘Re-education through Labour’ system, except that it is allegedly being used to 
intern and ‘vocationally train’ entire minority ethnic groups.193 By late 2018, cheap labour emerging 
from ‘re-education camps’ associated with the Xinjiang Aid strategy had become an important driver 
of Xinjiang’s economy, according to an official statement by the Xinjiang Development and Reform 
Commission.194 This suggests that State development instrumentalities are being used in ways that 
have led to large numbers of rural workers being forced into industrial labour both inside Xinjiang and, 
increasingly, after transfer, in other Chinese provinces. Critics argue these transfers are involuntary. 
Chinese sources, such as Global Times and the White Paper, dispute this, and Chinese authorities argue 
these policies “protect the human rights of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang”.195
The Government subsidies incentivize employers, especially in cities and towns in eastern China ‘paired’ 
with urban centres in Xinjiang under earlier development policies, to hire this ‘re-educated’ labour 
force.196 Importantly, these subsidies seem to draw on “poverty alleviation and development funds” (fúpín 
fāzhǎn zījīn, 扶贫发展资金) provided by the central Government – worth around 6.9 billion yuan in 2018 
(around USD 1.1 billion at the time). Some companies involved in the scheme have received credit from 
China’s Agriculture Development Bank.197 Other funds come from local and provincial governmental 
49 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
authorities in the east, encouraging local firms to pair with Xinjiang entities to foster labour flows from 
Xinjiang.198 Documents associated with some of these pairing schemes specifically refer to the need to 
find employment for Xinjiang residents undergoing re-education.199 
Some of these factories appear to feed into the global supply chains of brand-name companies from 
Apple to BMW to Zara. The global cotton supply chain is particularly implicated. Around a sixth of world 
cotton supply comes from China, with around 85 per cent of that production in Xinjiang. In July 2020, 
the US Government sanctioned nine Chinese companies allegedly involved in the programme,200 with 
additional sanctions against specific production sites and companies following in September 2020, 
including several involved in cotton production and processing.201 One of the targets of US sanctions, 
the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) or Bingtuan (兵团), a paramilitary organization 
closely involved in CCP administrative policy for Xinjiang since 1949, including repopulation policies, is 
heavily involved in this supply chain, running cotton farms and processing facilities.202 It is reported to 
have over 800,000 holdings in other companies.203 Cotton production and textile and apparel manufacture 
are central to the Chinese Government’s development plans for the region, with the Xinjiang Textile and 
Apparel Industry Development Plan 2018-2023 aiming to create one million jobs, 650,000 of them in 
southern Xinjiang, where the XPCC controls perhaps 20 per cent of production. 
If these allegations are based in fact, this would indicate that development instruments and discourse 
may be being used to underpin and organize systematic forced labour. This raises difficult questions for 
the global development community, including around potential exposure to measures taken by other 
countries in an attempt to address the situation. US Congress has adopted the Uyghur Human Rights 
Policy Act 2020 (S.3744), under which the U.S. Government will receive periodic reports on these alleged 
forced labour policies, and can freeze the assets of individuals and entities found responsible for human 
rights abuses in Xinjiang, as well as ban the identified individuals from entry to the United States. The 
US federal executive has warned entities with exposure to US markets and banking systems to beware 
handling goods produced through the scheme, or the proceeds of trade in such goods.204 In September 
2020 the US Government announced orders preventing goods from four XUAR companies and one 
factory from entering the US market.205 In mid-October 2020, US Customs and Border Patrol detained a 
shipment of women’s gloves as a California port after tracing it to a factory of the Yili Zhuowan Garment 
Manufacturing Company in Xinjiang, one of the companies on the WRO.206 The Chinese Foreign Ministry 
has suggested that this approach “violates international trade rules and sabotages global industrial, 
supply and value chains” and “seriously infringe upon other countries’ basic human rights”.207
Development lenders may face complications. The World Bank has scaled back a project in the region 
after allegations, that the Bank could not substantiate, that its funding was being used in relation to 
internment camps.208 Some lenders may need to revisit earlier project social risk assessments. For 
example a USD 200 million ADB project in the region, executed by the regional government and focused 
on urban development, identified involuntary resettlement as a risk. But a 2011 risk assessment suggested 
there was no risk of human trafficking and asserted that core labour standards would be protected,209 
though contemporaneous reporting suggested such development projects sometimes reflected a non-
participatory approach to development planning.210 Such risk assessments may require heightened 
scrutiny and due diligence in future, or development actors may face unexpected reputational or legal 
consequences from connections to organizations suspected of contribution to forced labour.
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The UN development system
Despite the inclusion of modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, the UN development system – the development-oriented funds, programmes 
and agencies within the UN family – has not gone notably further in integrating slavery reduction into 
its own strategic thinking and operational practice than the other development actors discussed above. 
Some UN development entities incorporate forced and child labour safeguards into their project 
work. For example the UNDP’s project-level Social and Environmental Procedure, launched in 2012, 
implements a set of Standards that commits UNDP to meet ILO standards relating to the elimination of 
forced or compulsory labour and the worst forms of child labour.211 Similarly, the UN Supplier Code of 
Conduct, which governs suppliers operating through the UN’s common procurement system, commits 
suppliers to prohibit forced or compulsory labour in all its forms.212
Looking beyond safeguards to understand programming choices, we reviewed two decades’ worth of 
country-level development strategies that the various UN Development System entities collectively agree 
with host governments – previously known as UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), now 
known as UN Sustainable Development Partnerships (UNSDPs). These covered 147 countries and regions, 
between 2000 and 2020 – in all almost 400 country strategy documents. Because these are multi-year 
plans, commencing in different years and of different durations, we broke them into four cohorts, each 
covering five years, assigning the plans to cohorts based on the year of their commencement (2000-
2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014, 2015-present). 
We examined whether and how these documents mentioned modern slavery, forced labour, child 
labour, and human trafficking. Our aim here was to identify where references were merely contextual 
(‘Contextual’); where they went beyond that to identify specific programming or indicators associated 
with tackling these problems, usually undertaken by one agency or as part of a larger or different overall 
objective (‘Programming’); and where they went even further, identifying one or more of these problems 
as a strategic focus, either representing a stand-alone outcome of the strategic plan or requiring 
programming by more than one UN system entity (‘Strategic’). We treated these three categorizations 
as lying on a spectrum of strength: thus, if a document included both a contextual and a programming 
reference to child labour, it was coded as ‘Programming’ (and not as a contextual mention). If it included 
human trafficking as a ‘Strategic’ target, then we did not record programming or contextual references 
to human trafficking in that document (though both were there).We coded each document’s references to 
modern slavery (including forced and child marriage), forced labour, child labour and human trafficking 
separately. 
Our results are shown in Figure 18 below. They reveal some interesting trends. 
The first thing to note is how few references there are, overall. We identified 396 UNSDP-style documents. 
We coded references to 4 different types of exploitation for each. There was thus a maximum of 1,584 
possible codings. Yet we coded only 413 entries – meaning that 74 per cent of the time UNSDPs were 
essentially silent on these issues. The second point to note is how the remaining 26 per cent broke down. 
There were only 50 codings of any kind for references to modern slavery, slavery, forced or child marriage 
– and even fewer (just 30) on forced labour. UNSDPs essentially ignore questions of forced labour. There 
was a much greater focus on child labour (155) and human trafficking (178). Yet of the 413 positive codings, 
only 21 rose the strength of ‘strategic’ references – that is, making the form of exploitation in question a 
strategic focus of programming under the UNSDP. More than half of these were focused on child labour. 
Next, we notice the temporal distribution. Just 114 of the coded entries are from UNSDPs developed 
before 2010. 299 (or 72 per cent) of the positively coded entries are from the last decade. And most of the 
increased focus has come in Asia-Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa countries.
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FIGURE 18: UN COUNTRY-LEVEL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK MENTIONS  
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Delving below what we can see in the coded data, into the strategies themselves, several other trends 
emerge. First, most of the entries that we have coded as entries for ‘modern slavery’ are in fact references 
to forced and early child marriage. There are only a few references to ‘slavery’ (e.g. in Mauritania, 
Niger, Bolivia and Nepal) – and no reference that we could find to ‘modern slavery’ specifically. Second, 
there were clear differences in the types of programming offered under UNSDPs based on the way the 
exploitation was framed. Where the framing was focused on child and forced labour, the interventions 
proposed tended to deal with access to education, rural finance, and protection mechanisms. Where 
the framing used was ‘human trafficking’, interventions focused on strengthening criminal justice and 
victim support. This result seemed to hold even for UNSDPs that, in their narrative portions, described 
the problem to be addressed in ambiguous terms – that is, as ‘child trafficking’ or ‘trafficking for labour 
exploitation’.Once the UNSDP came to proposing solutions, the framing of the problem closely matched 
the types of interventions proposed.
54 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
This may be due to another trend that becomes visible through reading these 396 UNSDPs: different 
framings and types of programming are closely associated with different UN agencies. Forced and 
child labour interventions are closely associated with the ILO and, to a lesser extent, UNICEF. Human 
trafficking interventions are associated with the IOM and UNODC. And interventions to address forced 
and child marriage are associated with UNFPA, and, to a lesser extent UNICEF and UN Women. In many 
ways this is not surprising: different UN entities have specific mandates, and develop particular framings 
and repertoires that they deploy around the world. 
Yet it is also revealing in several ways. For one, it offers one explanation for another trend visible in Figure 
18: the significant regional variation in which issues are focused on, and when. This may be an artefact 
of investment by different UN agencies in rolling out programming in specific regions on this topic. 
This helps to explain why Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa both experienced jumps in UNSDPs 
focusing on child labour in the 2010-2015 period – because this was when both ILO and UNICEF had a 
major push on these issues in these regions. In the last five years, in contrast, that focus has somewhat 
faded in UNSDPs in those regions – while the focus on human trafficking has grown, just as UNODC has 
expanded its offerings in the region. 
Second, it helps to explain why there are so few mentions of modern slavery – at least until recently. 
‘Modern slavery’ has no ‘home’ in the UN development machinery. There is no operational, development 
entity that promotes interventions using that frame or runs country programming to address slavery 
or modern slavery. The closest analogue is the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), since it provides secretarial functions to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, which 
is the source of the ‘contemporary forms of slavery’ discourse, and the Special Rapporteurship focused 
on that issue. But OHCHR is quite distinct from other UN Development System entities, since it has a 
normative mandate, rather than a programming-oriented one. Only with the greater focus in recent 
years on forced and child marriage from some of the more programming-oriented entities (UNFPA and 
UNICEF) has there been an uptick in UNSDP attention to these issues. 
There is however no a priori reason why there should be a specific UN entity with a ‘modern slavery’ 
mandate. And, in fact, the data reflected in Figure 18 suggests that adding one might only lead to further 
fragmentation. Because the final, and in some ways most striking, result of our analysis of UNSDPs 
is just how siloed much of this programming is – and what, as a result, may be getting missed.213 Our 
‘strategic’ code was designed to capture UNSDP discussions that elevate modern slavery, forced or child 
labour, or human trafficking issues to the level of a shared concern that UNSDP goals and ‘outcomes’ 
typically represent – and which typically become the basis for shared programming. As we have noted 
above, we found very few such references. And in fact, they are far less likely now than they once were: 
in the 2000-2004 period, 27 per cent of all UNSDP treatments of these issues rose to the ‘strategic’ level, 
whereas in 2015-2020 only 4 per cent did. This suggests that UN development system efforts to tackle 
these issues have become less integrated over time, not more integrated. 
The lack of integrated thinking is reflected not just at the field level (i.e. in country-level development 
frameworks), but in global coordination. The UN has not one but two rival coordination mechanisms 
in this domain: the Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT) focused on 
human trafficking, and Alliance 8.7, which has largely focused on forced labour and child labour.214 Yet 
what is especially striking about them both is that neither has attracted significant commitment from 
the key economic development organizations in the UN family. While both UNDP and the World Bank are 
ICAT members, neither is a member of its Working Group, “ICAT’s forum for substantive policy, expert 
exchange and coordination”.215 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is scant evidence that ICAT has made an 
impact on development thinking or practice.216 A July 2016 Issue Brief prepared for the UN Inter-Agency 
Task Force on Financing for Development as it sought to understand the financing implications of the 
SDGs, sets out a long laundry list of possible programming areas, with no clear conceptual framework 
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for prioritizing amongst them.217 Similarly, while some UN Development System entities including FAO, 
ILO, UN Women and others are listed amongst Alliance 8.7’s claimed 226 partners on its website, neither 
UNDP nor the World Bank is.218 There is notably no ‘development’ track in Alliance 8.7’s work streams or 
Action Groups. The Alliance does, however, include a ‘Pathfinders’ programme intended as a framework 
to assist countries that volunteer to “go further and faster” to Achieve SDG 8.7. At the time of writing, 
twenty-two countries had joined this important Programme. They agree a “workplan that sets out 
priorities, key actions, responsibilities, timelines and budgets”. This workplan is developed in a country 
workshop that “should identify what a country needs to do to meet Target 8.7”.219 This arguably sets up a 
coordination path essentially disconnected from the UN Sustainable Development system (focused on 
UN Country Teams), unhelpfully segregating the Target 8.7 discussion from the larger-scale projects and 
financing associated with that process. 
What is more, the Alliance 8.7 Pathfinder process determination of “what a country needs to do to meet 
Target 8.7” is not based on a published country needs assessment, comprehensive baseline data about 
the forms of SDG 8.7 exploitation that the partner country faces, lessons learned about what works to 
accelerate progress at scale to address such exploitation in comparable countries, or, crucially, published 
economic (or political economy) analysis. Instead, the assessment of “what a country needs to do to 
meet Target 8.7” is a product of dialogue between host country ministries and programming agencies 
represented at the invite-only workshop. The result is that Alliance 8.7 Pathfinder national strategies 
risk deriving as much from what existing implementation partners can pitch successfully to donors as 
from a thorough assessment of how efforts to achieve SDG 8.7 relate to the country’s larger sustainable 
development pathway and economic strategy.
What this all tends to suggest is that the practice of the UN development system, like the practice of the 
other development actors reviewed in this chapter, suffers from something of a blind-spot when it comes 
to tackling modern slavery: an unwillingness to consider these concerns in the context of the larger 
socio-economic project of sustainable development, and a related overlooking of the opportunities anti-
slavery efforts may offer for promoting broader sustainable development.
Reflections: development’s blind-spot revealed
Across the various different sources of evidence we have reviewed in this chapter – practitioner 
perspectives, the scientific literature, spending patterns, and organizational practice – several insights 
emerge.
First, there is a growing recognition amongst development practitioners of the need to safeguard 
development programming, lending and investment against modern slavery risks – that is, to take steps 
to prevent unintended promotion of modern slavery, forced labour, human trafficking and child labour. 
That ‘safeguards’ approach has potential, but also limitations. 
There is movement – at different speeds in different quarters – to align project safeguards arrangements 
around international expectations of responsible business conduct and business respect for human 
rights. These are reflected in the UN Guiding Principles and Business Human Rights, and relevant 
OECD Guidance – both of which are seen as authoritative guides to expectations of development finance 
institutions. And behind this, there is a growing cohort of development actors actively learning on their 
own, and from each other, what effective safeguards, due diligence and business engagement looks like. 
Their operational practice varies significantly. Some conduct their own risk assessments, while others 
rely on borrowers, beneficiaries and clients to do so. Some hold their partners to (various) international 
labour standards; others defer to national arrangements. That creates a real risk that where States do 
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not already respect international standards,220 development efforts will not only do nothing to generate 
behavioural change but could in fact amplify labour violations and reinforce institutions conducive 
to such violations. (We return to this point in Chapter 9.) And most safeguards are limited to project 
lending. They do not extend to so-called ‘policy lending’, or advisory work. 
What is more, where safeguards fail, there has not been evidence of a deep commitment by development 
actors to provide or enable remedy. In fact, development actors seem reluctant to acknowledge 
that some of the activities they fund have been – and likely will continue to be – connected to actual 
cases of modern slavery, forced labour, human trafficking and child labour. Although the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises set 
clear expectations around actors’ provision and enabling of remedy where human rights harms occur, 
development actors have been relatively hesitant to take steps to enable remedy. Undoubtedly, the recent 
US Supreme Court decision in Jam et al. v. International Finance Corp. has increased anxieties in the 
MDBs, by raising the spectre of legal liability arising from multilateral development actors’ commercial 
lending.221
Second, the willingness to embrace modern slavery, forced labour, child labour and human trafficking 
in the safeguards context is not matched by a willingness to target modern slavery risks as a focus of 
development programming, capital allocation or strategic intervention. Development practitioners and 
development organizations continue to see modern slavery as a social problem or criminal behaviour 
to be addressed through strengthened law enforcement, with social programming mitigating its 
worst effects.222 It is not treated as a predictable product of how risk is structured and distributed by 
prevailing economic institutions, raising questions about the orthodox approach to economic growth 
and development. Nor is much thought given to whether it creates a drag on economic growth. 
These patterns are reflected across these different sources and types of evidence. As a working paper 
commissioned by the World Bank in 2009 noted, there has been a sense that while development actors 
could use labour market regulation levers to tackle “consensual exploitation” of workers, it was up to 
law enforcement entities to tackle illegal “non-consensual exploitation”, even where it was economic 
vulnerabilities that “forced” people into these situations.223 This characterization automatically places 
modern slavery as a marginal, rather than a core, concern for global development actors. Even where 
slavery reduction is seen as a development programming objective, it is frequently characterized as an 
anomalous criminal behaviour to be disrupted and repressed through more stringent enforcement of 
the existing rules, rather than an inevitable outcome of those rules that may require us to think about 
changing them if we truly wish to prevent this outcome.
A 2009 conclusion of the IOM Head of Research and a Senior Economist at the US General Accountability 
Office in 2009 still seems accurate:
Global efforts to combat trafficking in persons have focused mainly on the 
criminalization of trafficking, along with measures to protect and assist victims. 
Relatively little attention has been given to the relationship between development 
policy and trafficking. Anti-trafficking policy has been dominated by the prevention, 
protection and prosecution paradigm, which tends to focus policy primarily on 
short-term interventions. What is lacking is a policy approach, which locates the fight 
against human trafficking as part of a strategy to promote sustainable and long-term 
development.224
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What emerges clearly from this review of practice is thus an absence, or a blind-spot. It is an absence 
of a coherent narrative, across the global development sector, that explains in terms understood and 
recognized by development practitioners why slavery reduction is and should be a core concern for 
development actors. Fighting modern slavery may be a social good, but what will fighting slavery bring 
to the broader project of sustainable development? That question continues to go unanswered – and 
even, arguably, unasked. 
The absence of an analytical framework connecting modern slavery to sustainable development fuels the 
development sector’s ongoing disregard for these issues. And it prevents those development actors that 
are inclined to use the tools of global development to seek slavery reductions from identifying, assessing 
and explaining the development impacts of these efforts. That prevents slavery reduction outcomes 
from shaping lending and investment decisions in any serious way. Seen from the development sector’s 
perspective, these efforts lack policy coherence; they instead seem to resemble a disjointed mosaic 
of unilateral interventions across different programming domains: criminal justice, labour markets, 
migration policy, financial inclusion, gender empowerment, skills development and more. 
The central questions remain those posed by Roger Plant, the then-top anti-forced labour official at the 
ILO, at an FCO and DfID-hosted convening in 2007: 
For development actors such as the Banks and the bilateral donors, there is an 
immediate practical question. When and under what circumstances do problems like 
forced and bonded labour merit a specific strategy or operational intervention? Or 
are they best dealt with through a safeguards approach, which tries to ensure that 
other interventions do not cause or contribute to forced labour? Is forced labour best 
considered a sub-set of other mainstream approaches, such as migration policy, labour 
market governance, measures against discrimination, strengthening microcredit for 
vulnerable groups, and others? How should forced labour be dealt with in the main 
poverty reduction and development frameworks at the country level…?225 
Thirteen years later, and despite hundreds of millions of dollars, pounds and euros being spent to 
Achieve SDG 8.7, there has been no coherent effort to answer these questions, no effort to address this 
blind-spot. Four years after the establishment of Alliance 8.7, the major development actors are largely 
absent from its deliberations, and the Alliance has no overall narrative explaining how fighting slavery 
contributes to the larger shared project of sustainable development. The story is similar in ICAT, and the 
UN General Assembly’s Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons226 that guides ICAT’s work.
It is to that need – for a policy narrative that explains why and how fighting slavery will promote 
sustainable development – that we now turn.
58 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
CHAPTER 2: RETHINKING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SLAVERY  
AND DEVELOPMENT
Global development discourse and practice are rooted in economic thinking. Perhaps for that reason, 
attempts to encourage the global development system to address social phenomena frequently involve 
first, demonstrating the economic burden created by the phenomenon, and then showing how that 
burden can be reduced through effective interventions. This is reflected, for example, in analyses of 
the global burden of disease,1 armed violence,2 and violence against women.3 Yet, strikingly, despite the 
development sector’s perception (discussed in Chapter 2) of modern slavery as a ‘social problem’, there 
is no authoritative estimate of the economic or development burden imposed by modern slavery, nor of 
the cost of preventing it.
The International Labour Organization has published two seminal papers, The costs of coercion and Profits 
and Poverty5 that estimate the underpaid wages connected to forced labour and the profits generated 
by forced labour, respectively. Neither assesses the overall economic burden imposed by slavery. Some 
authors have suggested there is a correlation between incidence of forms of exploitation addressed by 
SDG 8.7 and reduced GDP.6 In a recent paper, IMF staff estimated the potential gains to GDP from the 
eradication of child marriage at around 1.05 per cent in emerging and developing countries.7 And an 
unpublished paper by economic researchers in Australia suggests that a 50 percent reduction in forced 
labour could boost GDP by as much as 3.6 percent.8 These studies have pointed to the potential size of the 
impact of modern slavery on economic growth, but also leave open questions about the causal vectors 
by which coercion at the worksite or household level aggregates into macroeconomic effects. A steadily 
growing base of evidence about the microeconomic foundations and drivers of modern slavery may 
help.9 That evidence base addresses factors including: relative poverty10 and multidimensional poverty;11 
unemployment and informality; access to education; access to safe credit;12 physical, social and cultural 
isolation, and broader discrimination;13 and migration.14 
Despite this growing evidence base, there is no clear and accessible account explaining the connections 
between modern slavery and sustainable development. Indeed, some commentators argue that global 
anti-slavery efforts simply assume that development (in the sense of modernization) will ‘solve’ slavery.15 
That assumption appears empirically unsound, for reasons we elaborate later in this chapter, and 
as demonstrated in the case studies in Chapters 3 to 8. The closest we come to such an account of 
the development impacts of slavery is the political economy analysis of Robert E. Wright in his 2017 
volume The Poverty of Slavery: How Unfree Labor Pollutes the Economy. Wright’s sweeping analysis of the 
connections between slavery and development concludes that “[m]ore enslavement means less output 
or… less development.”16 In this chapter, we first build on Wright’s analysis and, delving deep into the 
research literature, identify ten causal pathways through which slavery creates a drag on development. 
Understanding these vectors throws light on the opportunities for and obstacles to effective development 
interventions to reduce slavery. In the second section, we draw on these insights to reconsider how 
current approaches to development – especially the emphasis on incorporation into global value chains 
(GVCs) – connect to modern slavery risks, and what this means for conceptions of the developmental 
role of the State. Finally, drawing on these insights, we offer a new, systems-oriented framework for 
understanding the role that development can play in fighting modern slavery, forced and child labour, 
and human trafficking.
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Ten ways slavery impedes sustainable 
development
1. Slavery reduces productivity
An abundant literature using economic, cliometric and econometric analytical methods makes clear that 
the use of coercion in labour markets creates an overall drag on productivity.17 As both Adam Smith and 
Amartya Sen have argued, coercion demotivates workers.18 This analysis has been borne out empirically, 
including by research showing that use of positive incentives within slavery can improve productivity.19
Workers will take outside employment options where they can to escape coercion so, unsurprisingly, 
coercion is more prevalent in labour markets where external options are constrained. That includes 
markets where there is an over-supply of labour, where there are constraints on labour mobility (such 
as legal arrangements tying visas to specific sponsors (like the kafala system discussed in Chapter 8), or 
physical isolation, or removal of identity documents), or where outside options require skills education, 
training or investment.20 All of this points to the importance of labour market regulation in reducing the 
utility of coercion as an exploitation strategy. 
A piece commissioned by the World Bank in 2009 explains how individual worker demotivation arising 
from coercion in the employment context snowballs up to the economy-wide level to depress overall 
productivity. It is a question of economic efficiency. Where employers can combine coercion with 
institutional conditions or worker vulnerabilities in a way that allows them to attain monopsony power 
– that is, to prevent workers selling their labour in a market – the result is that wages are set below 
the marginal value product of labour. This generates an inefficient allocation of labour at the whole-
of-economy level.21 Tolerating coercion leads to price distortions in the labour market, driving capital 
towards inefficient parts of the economy, where exploiters capture rents. This is particularly likely in 
sectors with commodity characteristics – that is, where markets set the price – because of the incentive 
for producers and sellers to pocket, as a rent, any labour cost savings they can generate.22
The key point here is that slavery reduces wages not only for slaves, but for free workers, too. Slavery 
depresses the equilibrium wage rate: free labourers have to drop their rates because they are being 
undercut by slave labour.23 Indeed, it has been argued that it was the recognition of the impact of slavery 
on their own wage prospects that drove the British working class to support the abolition of both 
slavery and convict labour.24 Popular support for abolition was driven by a recognition that slavery gave 
exploiters so much power that it would reduce not only slaves’ economic agency, but also that of other 
workers.
Slaves become, as Monti Datta and Kevin Bales have memorably put it, the “unwilling agents of economic 
stagnation”.25 Nowhere has this been made more clear than in the United States, where slavery was 
intertwined with economic development in complex ways.26 For a period in the 1970s, some economists 
argued that the economic development of the American South was due to the system of slavery being 
more productive than the use of free labour in the North.27 That view has now been fairly systematically 
debunked. What gains there were in productivity in slavery-based enterprises appear to have come from 
other innovations, in management (specifically the introduction of Taylorian and Fordist divisions of 
labour), technology (seed crop innovation) and financialization.28 Instead, it is now clear that slavery was 
in fact a major impediment to overall economic development across the South.29 
Slavery clearly played a major and important role in capital transfer and formation in Western Europe, 
and thus in its industrialization – an idea first systematically explored in his doctoral dissertation by 
Eric Williams, subsequently Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.30 But that was not the whole story.31 
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Slavery was a major source of capital transfer to and capital formation in Western Europe, but the 
rents from that trade were frequently captured by small elites.32 If the correlation between slavery and 
economic development during the colonial and imperial era were clear and simple, Portugal, which had 
the largest economic dependence (as a portion of its source of revenue) on the slave trade, would have 
been the biggest winner from the trans-Atlantic trade. Similarly, the Netherlands’ spectacular growth 
prior to the institutionalization of the trade, and British growth after its abolition, cannot be explained 
by slavery.
Instead, Daron Acemoglu and others have argued, what determined whether a country captured the 
extraordinary productivity gains and overall economic growth that many Western European countries 
experienced between 1500 and 1900 was not participation in the slave trade per se, but rather how capital 
generated from abroad – from both trade and coercion, often intertwined was harnessed. Countries 
with stronger merchant classes tended to fare better, as they secured reforms to political institutions 
that fostered innovation and growth,33 as well as urbanization and the growth of domestic wage labour 
markets.34 Countries that connected metropolitan economies to settler markets – moving from a rentier 
or predatory strategy to a more developmental path – saw their economies expand.35 To be sure, unfree 
labour was frequently a part of that expansion; but slavery itself was not necessarily the sole or even the 
key to industrialization and growth. Instead, what mattered was how the profits and rents derived from 
overseas trades (including slavery) connected through forward and backward linkages to other value 
chains (a topic to which we will return later) – and whether they were used to create a larger population 
of economic agents participating in the colonial economy. It was not just slavery, but the connections 
to finance, insurance, shipbuilding, infrastructure (ports) and agriculture that generated overall gains, 
including in productivity.36
Coercion may create efficiencies in the short term, especially in relatively unskilled labour markets, but 
these are usually geographically and temporally limited, and firm-level efficiencies do not translate to 
economy-wide productivity gains.37 On the contrary, the evidence suggests that “slavery is objectively 
harmful for total economic output and social development”.38 As World Bank researcher Johannes 
Koettl argued, non-consensual exploitation has adverse effects on both equity and efficiency posing 
obstacles to development.39 Slavery adds less to enslavers than it takes from the enslaved, and, indirectly, 
everybody else.40 As a result, “wherever and whenever people enslave other people the entire economy 
suffers on net, and pretty much to the extent that enslavement occurs”, summarizes Robert E. Wright. 
“More enslavement means less output or… less development.”41 
2. Slavery creates inter-generational poverty
There is a growing scientific literature on the health impacts of slavery and forced labour, including 
the impacts of the entailed physical, sexual and psychological abuse, occupational hazards, disease and 
injury, poor working conditions, malnutrition, increased mental illness and addiction and increased 
morbidity.42 Slavery deprives its victims of education, training and other human capital formation 
possibilities, with impacts on economic outcomes that endure for the rest of their lives.43 This has 
particular impact for girls and women.44 And, alas, for children. Victims’ children are frequently separated 
from their parents, and there is some evidence that children of forced labourers are at increased risk 
of becoming forced labourers. Where enslavement is large scale, this can lead to demographic skewing, 
with implications for agricultural production and reproduction rates,45 polygyny, gender discrimination 
and violence, and incidence of sexually transmitted disease.46
This impact is so great, it turns out, that it echoes down through subsequent generations. Harvard scholar 
Nathan Nunn has calculated that transatlantic slavery accounts today for 72 per cent of income disparity 
between African nations and the rest of the world – and 99 per cent of the disparity between these nations 
and other developing countries.47 Acemoglu and others have found that the historic presence of forced 
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labour in Colombian districts increases contemporary poverty rates by 13.1 percent.48 Another analysis, 
relating to Peru, finds that historical forced labour reduces contemporary household consumption by 25 
percent and increases the incidence of child stunting by 6 percent.49 And in Central and Eastern Europe, 
labour coercion under serfdom reduced labour productivity, human capital investment, innovation, and 
living standards so much that is a major explanator of the diverging economic performance of Western 
and European communities between 1350 and 1864.50
3. Slavery institutionalizes inequality 
Slavery may be disadvantageous overall, but it is clearly preferred by some employers and exploiters.51 
Why? Because slavers privatize profits by reducing others’ economic agency, while socializing the costs 
of doing so.52 This deeply unequal system can quickly become institutionalized.
Slavery is the “systemized theft of human labor, and little is more lucrative than robbery, especially when 
the theft has the de facto sanction of legal authorities”.53 It is a sort of parasitism,54 an extractive institution 
that enriches exploiters, their financiers and their corrupt patrons, at the expense of both victims and 
net social welfare.55 As anti-slavery scholar Siddharth Kara has noted of bonded labour contracts in 
South Asia, these “labour agreements are highly inefficient for all parties involved, including society at 
large – except the exploiter”.56 Or as Robert E. Wright has summed up in his important overview, The 
Poverty of Slavery: “Enslaving others is about profiting the enslaver, be the enslaver an individual, a 
corporation, or a government.”57
The institution is sustained in part by coercion; in part by the distribution of the benefits of coercive 
extraction to consumers (in the form of lower prices on consumer goods); and in part by rentiers’ 
political power. As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have explained, “[e]xtractive institutions 
concentrate power in the hands of a few who exploit and deplete resources, with the unfortunate effect 
of generating large inequalities and preventing growth.”58 Where slavery is legal, exploiters use the law 
to enforce coercion and prevent workers from selling their labour to others.59 Where slavery has been 
formally abolished, exploiters instead rely on informal institutions – an array of aspects of contract 
law, debt, immigration law and social norms that give them de facto immunity to effectively constrain 
workers’ ability to access outside employment. Thus, where slavery is not formally legal, political and 
social power become even more important to the maintenance of the institution of slavery. As Daron 
Acemoglu and Alexander Wolitzky have argued, 
[u]ltimately, the economic logic of forced labour needs to be understood in the context 
of the politics of forced labour; forced labour is an extreme form of inequality, the result 
of severe power imbalances perpetuated through a specific extractive institution.60
It should be no surprise, then, that the incidence of slavery seems to correlate to the absence of political 
and economic freedoms. In an important recent cross-national comparative analysis of the relationship 
between modern slavery and different dimensions of globalization, Todd Landman and Sir Bernard 
Silverman suggest that it is not integration into the global economy per se that drives modern slavery, 
but the nature of that integration. Countries with freer markets and politics are less likely to be the sites 
of modern slavery.61 Nor should it surprise us that, as Thomas Piketty has recently argued, societies 
whose economies rely significantly on slavery have historically been the most vertically unequal, in 
formal economic terms.62 Thus, in the United States in 1860, two thirds of all those estates worth USD 
100,000 or more were in the South; yet the South’s per capita income paled in comparison to the North63 
As Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff have shown, there can be a close connection between initial 
factor endowments, economies of scale from use of slave labour, entrenchment of extreme inequality 
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in political institutions, and subsequent economic performance.64 And as Travis Wiseman has shown, 
these institutional effects are enduring: African countries that were involved in the transatlantic 
slave trade today show less “economic freedom” – and have lower incomes.65 In short: once slavery 
is institutionalized, slavers tend to use the profits it generates to entrench their power, perpetuating 
inequality and the reductions of some groups’ economic and political agency. 
This has important development policy implications. As Juliette Faure argued in a United Nations 
University Working Paper in 2015:
the realization that forced labour is a manifestation of exclusion and inequality [has] 
significant implications for policymaking. It suggests that it is not sufficient to fight 
forced labour as an economic practice alone, but rather policy efforts need to address 
forced labour as an extractive political institution. 
Ending slavery typically requires a transition away from a politico-economic system based on slave 
rents. As we shall see further in Chapters 3 to 8, this often encounters resistance, can generate conflict,66 
and may come with a hefty price-tag. Former rentiers must be defeated by some combination of political 
power and, if necessary, financial compensation. To end slavery in the British Empire in the 1830s, the 
British Government had to buy off the powerful slave-owning ‘West Indies’ lobby. It was just 3,000 or so 
in number, but its wealth and presence in the UK Parliament in Westminster gave it outsized influence. 
The price it demanded for the abolition of slavery was compensation worth 5 per cent of British GDP at 
the time, and around 20 per cent of the British Government’s budget. This was financed by the largest 
syndicated loan in history, which was paid off by the British public for 180 years thereafter. Former slaves 
were also required to work as unpaid ‘apprentices’ for several years before gaining their full freedom.67 
France took a different course: the price of French acknowledgment of the independent sovereignty 
of its former slave colony, Haiti, was the imposition of foreign debt on that country worth 300 per cent 
of its GDP. Where Britain had passed the costs of compensation onto current and future taxpayers as 
well as freed slaves, France’s taxpayers were spared the bill. It was borne by its former colony alone. 
Haiti’s interest payments on that debt lasted until World War Two, initially being paid out to former 
Haitian slaveowners.68 There is little doubt that these payments are a central factor in Haiti’s historical 
development challenges.69 Russia took a somewhat similar approach: when it abolished serfdom in 1861, 
it required former serfs to pay a fee for access to communal lands for 49 years.70 And in its Civil War, 
the US ostensibly took another path to solving the problem of manumission – use of force. However, 
the collapse of the post-War Reconstruction project arguably undid some of the resulting gains, forcing 
freed slaves and their descendants to pay a price for freedom that redounds to this day – and continues 
to depress the development of those States and communities most affected by slavery.71 We return to the 
legacy of African-American slavery in Chapter 9. 
4. Slavery weakens multiplier effects
The treatment of a victim as though they are owned is a central feature of slavery. To be treated as 
though owned by another is to be denied not simply physical freedom, but also agency – political, social, 
and economic. Amongst other freedoms they are denied, victims of human trafficking, forced labour 
and modern slavery are intentionally denied the freedom to make their own consumption, savings and 
investment choices. Some of those who are forced to labour do receive some wages, and may be permitted 
to consume and save, but these options are frequently constrained and controlled by their exploiter – for 
example through forcing individuals to buy goods and services at inflated prices from their employer 
or a ‘company store’, or by charging mandatory ‘fees’ or extortionate interest rates.72 Those enslaved 
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generally cannot use their (unpaid) wages to improve their nutrition or access healthcare, to invest 
in education or household enterprise, or to improve their own welfare as they see fit in other ways. 
The result is not only that slaves and their descendants are impoverished,73 but also that they cannot 
contribute efficiently to economic multiplier effects, or to financial markets.74
It should follow that when slaves are freed, their increased ability to participate in the broader economy 
leads to economic growth.75 Empirical analysis has shown that this is the case in historical studies 
covering situations from the Caribbean to Russia.76 One such study, for example, suggests that the 
abolition of serfdom increased Russian GDP by 17.7% between 1861 and 1900. 77
5. Slavery discourages innovation in production
Is it any surprise that people who are forced to work are not typically sources of industrial creativity 
and innovation? Both economic and anthropological accounts have demonstrated that those who are 
enslaved are demotivated to innovate.78 Innovation and entrepreneurialism rise as slaves are given 
access to wages and the right to save and invest. But the impacts of slavery on economic innovation turn 
out to be even more pervasive and pernicious: slavery also reduces the incentive of exploiters to invest in 
innovation and entrepreneurship.79 It is simply too easy to sit back and enjoy the rents. 
The system of slavery in which exploiters participate provides a ready source of rents, captured from 
payments to what is, functionally, capital – slave labour. And the rents from slavery are easier to capture 
in low-skill production, so there is little incentive to invest in working methods requiring higher-
skilled workforce. As the skill-level required of a production task rises, the agency and bargaining 
power of the worker increases. In both the American South and Imperial Russia, addiction to cheap, 
coerced labour held back innovation around labour productivity, capital investment and technological 
entrepreneurialism. The availability of artificially cheap labour, and the reduced returns from coercion 
in high-skill environments led to extensive rather than intensive agriculture, and to economies falling 
behind their peers.80 As we shall see in Chapter 5, a similar pattern may be discernible in recent years in 
the Uzbek cotton industry.
6. Slavery produces a capital market failure
Only in the area of financialization does slave-holding seem to drive innovation. Here it depends on 
the ability of slaves to be formally or informally collateralized.81 As we explore more in Chapter 9, 
securitization of mortgages which had slaves and slave labour as their underpinning collateral was a 
central component of the economic development of the American south-west during the 1830s – and 
produced disastrous results. As former IMF Director Peter Doyle has pointed out, slaves served a role 
during that process somewhat analogous to residential houses in the 20th Century, as stores of capital that 
served basic wealth-creating and financial multiplier effects.82 That might seem to hold little relevance 
today since slaves can no longer serve as legal stores of capital or as collateral. While technically true 
– it is not legal to hold a slave as a capital asset in your accounts, or to mortgage them, for example – 
it is not functionally true. The enslavement of workers continues to underpin the financial valuation 
of companies that rely on that slavery in their value chains. To understand why and how, we have to 
understand the almost magical process by which enslavement creates capital, or access to income, for 
slavers. 
Slavery continues today, despite its formal prohibition, because slavery, as a management practice, 
is a winning proposition: the costs of enslavement are less than the expected present value of slaves’ 
future earnings less expenses.83 Workers become low-to-zero cost factors for capital formation and 
accumulation, through externalization of risk onto the worker or through risk socialization. When the 
rent slavers extract is sufficiently lucrative, even dispersed actors – such as the various firms involved in 
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financing and running global value chains (GVCs), to which we return later in this chapter – may overcome 
coordination problems to generate the practice, technologies and norms legitimizing enslavement.84 
The vehicle through which exploiters’ extract that value has shifted from property law to contract law – 
employment contracts, debt contracts, and marriage contracts.85 Sometimes, entry into those contracts 
is coerced. Often, however, the contract is undertaken voluntarily, even if only as a result of economic 
or structural pressures. Only after the contract has been sealed is force, fraud or coercion introduced. 
It may not be used to force entry, but it is frequently used to deny exit. This is why much contemporary 
slavery is described as “contract slavery”, “neo-bondage” and debt bondage,86 and why some scholars 
argue that the focus of research and policy intervention should not be the fact or manner of workers’ 
incorporation into the global economy, but rather the terms of their participation once incorporated.87 
The result is that while enslaved people are no longer able to be treated as an asset on the books, the 
revenues (and rents) generated by enslaved people can play a similar financial and functional role. This 
is nowhere clearer than in debt bondage, the most prevalent form of modern slavery. In that case, credit 
market imperfections prevent people accessing the financial system to smooth their incomes by saving 
for bad times, or borrowing when they have a temporary cashflow problem. This leads people to accept 
debt repaid through their labour, on terms that effectively prevent them regaining their liberty. In this 
situation, victims are not only mortgaging their bodies to generate an income – they are collateralizing 
their freedom.88 As Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick’s work on bonded labour in India makes clear, lacking 
outside employment opportunities, those in debt bondage trade something they value relatively lowly – 
freedom in poverty – for something they value more highly: “enslavement in sustenance”.89
Even without the formal transformation of labour into capital that chattel slavery provides, we today 
see entire global value chains spun out of revenues generated by, and capital raised against, workers 
who have collateralized their freedom in this way. Financial valuations typically depend on the market’s 
expectations of companies’ future revenue streams. Those revenue streams in turn depend on modes 
of production that separate capital accumulation at the top of complex, often global, value chains and 
networks, from the risky, marginal labour at the bottom of those chains and the outside edge of those 
networks (as we explore in more depth below). Numerous studies have shown how the structure of 
particular global value chains and production networks incentivize use of coercion to reduce labour 
costs at the bottom, through outsize power for lead firms, high levels of subcontracting, and marginality 
of lowest-tier producers.90 
As Andrew Crane has explained, modern slavery emerges as a liminal management practice whereby 
managers exploit effective impunity at the ends and edges of these chains, networks and systems.91 
Contemporary slavery is the product of the commercial logic of exploitation,92 played out in the 
contemporary institutional environment of the global economy: “[M]icroorganization-level capabilities 
enable enterprises that deploy slavery to take advantage of the macro-institutional conditions that permit 
the practice to flourish in the face of widespread illegality and illegitimacy.”93 Despite the dominance 
of anti-slavery norms at the supranational level, firms at the margins of global production networks 
are able to use local economic, social, cultural and physical power differentials to organize slavery.94 
Deliberate underpayment, impoverishment and debt bondage emerge as recurring management 
practices by which labour brokers at the bottom of a variety of global supply chains extract marginal 
profit. This model is adaptable across a range of industrial and economic sectors, exploiting whatever 
vulnerabilities are to hand at the edge of the production network.95 As Aidan McQuade has put it, “slavery 
occurs to those deliberately or unthinkingly excluded from social and economic development, justice 
and rule of law.”96 Slavery emerges not as a bug in the global economic system, but as a recurring feature 
at sites of production, the result of the interaction of local, household and even individual vulnerabilities 
with global institutions that shape the circulation of capital, labour and goods.97
65 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
What happens to the value that is extracted from these coerced workers’ labour? It is not, typically, 
captured by their immediate managers, or indeed returned fully to consumers at the end of the value 
chain, though lower commodity prices – such as cheap t-shirts – are clearly one result. Instead, this seed 
of value tends to be rolled over, through multiple tiers of mark-ups, capitalization, financial leveraging 
and even securitization, to emerge as a rent captured higher up the value chain, often numerous 
multiples larger than the original germ: the collateralized labour of the exploited worker.98 
Capital markets reward firms that operate on this model, since they seem to have low costs. Yet the truth 
is that the social costs of this model are high. Capital markets are simply failing to price this in, in the 
same way they have largely failed to price in the true costs of carbon emissions and other environmental 
impacts of business. This is a classic market failure, distorting our capital markets.99 Enterprises relying 
on unlawful forced labour have an unfair advantage on cost over those that do not. Firms that take the 
steps required to accurately price the costs of the labour on which they rely, deep in value chains, are 
seen as having higher labour costs – and marked down by the market, with their costs of capital rising. 
Firms that instead do not seek to price in those true labour costs are rewarded by capital markets. In 
effect, capital markets are subsidizing illegality. They do not offer a level playing-field, but rather a tilted 
one, that not only tolerates but rewards those firms that rely, at many arms’ length, on illegal labour 
practices to gain a competitive advantage. As a result, we are all worse off. 
7. Slavery hits the public purse 
Slavery hits both the revenue and expenses side of public accounts.
First, it reduces tax revenues, by preventing the State collecting income tax from the wages that enslaved 
workers should fairly have been paid, and consumption taxes from their foregone consumption.100 In 
2009 the ILO calculated underpaid wages connected to forced labour at around USD 21 billion p.a.101 More 
detailed economic estimates have also begun to emerge at the national level. Several researchers have 
looked at the wages foregone by victims of economic impacts of sex trafficking, including in Canada102 
and the US103. All of these foregone wages represent foregone taxes. 
Second, slavery forces expenditure by the State, whether to enforce slavery or the system that can 
underpin it – such as enforcement of tied visa schemes – or to respond to it.104 In the UK, Home Office 
researchers recently estimated that in 2016-17, each victim of the estimated 10,000 to 13,000 modern 
slavery victims in the UK cost the public purse GBP 910 for health services, GBP 1,650 for victim services 
and GBP 7,730 in law enforcement costs.105 Even excluding criminal justice system costs and indirect 
economic costs – such as foregone taxes – this would make modern slavery the second most expensive 
crime to the UK, on a unit cost basis, after homicide.106 Once these unit costs are multiplied by the 
number of suspected cases in each category, the researchers concluded that the total costs were GBP 
599.5 million for detected victims, and between GBP 3.3 billion and GBP 4.3 billion for all suspected 
victims (not only those detected).107 As the UK research notes, 
The high unit cost also demonstrates the potential benefit from preventing this crime 
type and can be used to make the case for more ‘upstream’ preventative activity…. 
Interventions to prevent modern slavery occurring in the first place are likely to be 
particularly cost-beneficial.108
8. Slavery weakens governance 
Slavery is an institution in which one private group – exploiters – use the power of the State, or its 
forbearance, to capture rents from labour coerced out of another private group. The victim group is not 
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only deprived of its economic agency, but also, frequently, excluded from political power or even political 
participation. The impacts on governance are profound and long-lasting, with important implications 
for how we understand the relationship between efforts to address modern slavery under SDG 8.7 and 
efforts to achieve SDG 16, which deals with peace, justice and strong institutions.
Countries in Africa that participated in the transatlantic slave today trade suffer increased social 
stratification and violence, most likely because involvement in slavery impeded State formation and 
increased ethnic fractionalization.109 Slavery degraded the strength of domestic legal institutions and 
political entities already in place in Africa.110 And throughout the Americas, the institutionalization of 
slavery tended to reduce State investment in public goods and institutions, such as roads and schools.111 
One study, of Peru, suggests that communities that had been subjected in the past to forced labour had 
legacies of low education and high land ownership concentration, leading to low provision of public 
goods, poor integration into road networks and higher levels of subsistence agriculture.112
One reason that involvement in slavery may have such long-lasting effects on governance is that it 
appears to destroy social capital – trust. Trust is increasingly recognized as a prerequisite for economic 
development.113 In Africa, one study found that individuals’ trust in their relatives, neighbours, co-
ethnics, and local government were all lower if their ancestors were heavily affected by the slave trade. 
This seems to be because slavery so corrodes other institutions and governance that it generates new 
social norms, beliefs and values based on mistrust, which are transmitted inter-generationally.114 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, past involvement in large-scale slave trade also seems to correlate to involvement in 
contemporary conflict.115 
Seeing slavery through a governance lens has important implications for the anti-slavery agenda. 
Markevich and Zhuravskaya found that the economic outcomes of the abolition of serfdom in Russia 
depended significantly on the local institutional context.116 Studies of the economic performance 
of Caribbean islands after the abolition of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century similarly point to 
differing policies on access to land and to labour market policies as key determinants of outcomes.117 
This suggests that to succeed, development interventions intended to reduce slavery should focus not 
only on reforming employment relationships – i.e. SDG 8, Decent Work – but also on strengthening 
the broader institutional context in which these reforms are occurring – i.e. SDG 16, Peace, Justice and 
Strong Institutions. 
This also has significant implications for how we think about development interventions aiming to 
reduce slavery. Should the State be the delivery vehicle for such interventions, where State power and 
State officials are implicated in the system of slavery? In cases where slavery has become a feature of 
government policy – as we explore in several of the Chapters in Part Two – it may be necessary to look 
for other approaches, either to influence that policy, or to circumvent it.
9. Slavery fuels corruption and illicit financial flows
Slavery is a form of illicit wealth transfer, from the victim to the exploiter. Because it is illegal, it is often 
closely linked to corruption.118 Corruption is both a means by which illegal movement and exploitation of 
people is organized,119 and a part of what Andrew Crane calls slavers’ “domain maintenance strategy”120– 
their method for ensuring their autonomy from the State or other anti-slavery forces. Corruption is, in 
that sense, a strategic tool, which works to enlarge the sphere of slavers’ normative influence by making 
corrupted officials complicit in the system of slavery.121 This is why bribery is a significant factor in 
trafficking organizations’ overhead costs.122
Where there is systemic corruption, there are often illicit financial flows. As UNODC’s Fabrizio Sarrica 
has pointed out, the proceeds of slavery may constitute illicit transnational financial flows wherever the 
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value from exploitation is captured in a jurisdiction that is different from the source of the labour.123 For 
example, where migrant workers have been illegally exploited, underpaid and kept in debt bondage, the 
profits accrued by their exploiters are, in effect, stolen remittances that would otherwise have been sent 
back to the host country to fuel economic development.124
The financial sector has recently begun to pay increased attention to these connections between modern 
slavery and proceeds of crime, especially as anti-money laundering regulators’ awareness grows.125 In 
the US, Western Union reached a USD 60 million settlement in 2018 arising out of allegations of money-
laundering relating to human trafficking.126 In Australia, attention has been heightened by the impending 
levelling of the largest-ever AML fine in Australian history – likely around USD 600-700 million – against 
one of the major banks, after it was discovered to have failed to prevent AML violations relating to child 
sexual exploitation in the Philippines. 
Yet development actors have not yet focused in any meaningful way on how modern slavery connects 
to the burgeoning practice around illicit financial flows and stolen asset recovery. Migrant worker host 
countries that fail to prevent such exploitation and theft, or to remedy it, may be enabling illicit transfers 
of value from the sending country to their own economy. This points to an intersection of the modern 
slavery agenda with discussions on illicit financial flows that has not yet been adequately explored in 
empirical or policy terms. We return to this in Chapter 10. 
10. Slavery harms the environment
The last way in which modern slavery impacts development is through environmental well-being. The 
relationship between environmental harm and modern slavery runs in both directions.127 
First, environmental change can create conditions conducive to modern slavery. Climate change and 
its impacts on rural production increase labour exploitation,128 as well as the risky migration practices 
often connected to human trafficking.129 Water stress may increase the vulnerability to forced labour of 
some agrarian smallholders.130 Climate shocks seem to raise the risks of child labour in some contexts.131 
And as we explore further in Chapter 6, declining fish stocks generate economic pressures on fishers, 
which may be encouraging cost reductions through use of forced labour.132 
Second, slavery can in turn harm the environment.133 In agriculture, slavery skews production 
towards extensive rather than intensive agriculture, and disincentivizes innovation in environmental 
management.134 As we explore further in Chapter 3, illegal deforestation in Brazil is closely tied to slavery-
like practices in the cattle, soy, sugarcane and charcoal industries. As well as reducing space for carbon 
sequestration, the charcoal camps and cattle ranches that make use of slave labour increase greenhouse 
gas and pollutant emissions.135 The palm oil industry, which we look at in Chapter 5, is also connected to 
both deforestation and forced labour. One estimate suggests half of all illegal deforestation globally may 
be tied to slavery, forced labour or debt bondage.136 In 2016, Kevin Bales estimated that this may generate 
2.54 billion tons of CO2 each year – following only China and the US in terms of aggregate emissions.137 In 
Chapter 4 we look at the turn away from systematic forced labour in the Uzbek cotton industry, arguing 
that this was partly a result of declining yields brought on by unsustainable agricultural practices in the 
industry, entwined with the forced labour system. In the fisheries and aquaculture sector, which we 
consider in Chapter 6, illegal fishing powered by forced labour increases fish stock decline and may be 
contributing to ecosystem decline in South East Asia, including illegal deforestation of the Bangladeshi 
Sundarbans Reserve Forest.138 And in the area of construction, which we consider in Chapter 8, brick 
kilns, in which forced labour and debt bondage are often rife, contribute significantly to environmental 
degradation, primarily through localized air pollution, black carbon and greenhouse gas emissions, and 
deforestation.139 
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These emerging insights suggest a strong need to consider how development interventions can promote 
outcomes that both reduce modern slavery and reduce environmental harm. Agricultural development 
interventions, for example, could be assessed to determine the risks of promoting exploitative labour 
practices. And infrastructure development initiatives could be assessed to determine whether they 
are likely to drive, directly or indirectly, a rise in informal brick production.140 More broadly, there 
is a need to recognize that environmental risks and modern slavery risks are both intertwined, and 
both connected to unsustainable production and consumption practices, addressed in SDG 12.141 Both 
environmental harm and the harms arising from modern slavery are externalities that our current 
economic development models fail effectively to factor in.
Rethinking global value chains and the role of the 
State
The picture of slavery that emerges in the previous section reveals it as an extractive system with both 
political and economic contours. In a globalized world, those contours have both local and transnational 
dimensions. The informal and social norms that render people vulnerable to exploitation are often local 
and embedded in specific cultural practices, including those relating to caste, gender, race and class. But 
exploitation is also a result of the interaction of these vulnerabilities with transnational and global trade, 
and the global circulation of capital. It is certainly the case, as a recent study by the OECD, ILO and IOM 
suggests, that much slavery occurs within purely domestic industry, such as subsistence agriculture, 
domestic work and construction.142 Yet the dynamics of these industries are often shaped by the shape 
and operation of foreign markets, the penetration of foreign capital and ideas (on consumption, gender 
roles, or business management practices), the willingness or forbearance of the state to enforce global 
norms – and the engagement, or otherwise, of the global development sector.
The previous section points to the key role that States play as gatekeepers between external forces, outside 
the State, and people inside State borders. In particular, States shape the institutional environment in 
which cross-border trade, labour and capital movements take place, and the rules by which employers 
interact with workers. They have a key role to play in ensuring these interactions respect international 
norms relating to modern slavery. In some cases, States and State officials choose to abdicate that 
responsibility, and instead use their position and power to participate in stealing people’s economic 
agency and turning it into rents for private or factional gain. 
All of this raises important questions about how we understand the role of development interventions 
in shaping these interactions – between people, the States that actually govern and notionally represent 
them, and global economic forces. One set of questions relates to where development interventions 
should occur: at the local level? At the level of the State, which may be wittingly or unwittingly complicit 
in creating conditions conducive to modern slavery? At the level of the regulation of global capital 
flows, market competition, trade regimes and labour migration? At some intermediary level? Or in 
some combination? And a second set of questions arise around development pathways. Do development 
interventions that encourage States to incorporate local workforces and industries into global economic 
circuits serve to reduce modern slavery? Or is there a risk that, in some circumstances, they may facilitate 
modern slavery? And if so, what are the implications for how we think about the relationship between 
contemporary slavery and contemporary development practice?
These are the questions we grapple with in this section. We first consider whether and how a development 
model predicated on encouraging low-skill, low-wage labour forces to incorporate into global value 
chains promotes modern slavery. Drawing on that analysis, second, we reflect on how we may need to 
reconsider the developmental role of the State. 
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Do global value chains promote modern slavery? 
THE SUPPLY-LINES OF A GLOBAL ECONOMY
Value chains are the sequence of productive (i.e. value added) activities leading to and supporting end 
use.143 Over the last several decades, significant reductions in transport and communications costs and 
barriers to FDI have led to the vertical fragmentation and geographic dispersal of these value chains, to 
the point that they have become globalized – and hence are referred to as ‘global value chains’ (GVCs).144 
By 2013, between 50 and 80 per cent of world trade and 20 per cent of global employment was directly 
tied to these GVCs.145 Although described as linear ‘chains’, they often manifest more as networks, and so 
GVCs are closely related to what some academics call global production networks (GPNs).146 
GVCs are, in a sense, the sinews of a truly globalized market – the supply-lines of a global economy. They 
represent a shift from goods (and increasingly services) being ‘made in’ one country, to being ‘made in 
the world’.147 Put another way, they represent a shift from trade in finished goods to trade in intermediate 
tasks.148 They are the result of many developing countries’ successful industrialization, accompanied by 
State policies promoting increased international capital mobility. The resulting business environment 
has enabled producers to reduce costs and streamline production through outsourcing and off-shoring 
labour-intensive, lower value-add operations. This has meant unbundling innovation, design and 
development, at one end of the value chain, from production tasks in the middle of the chain, and then 
again from distribution and marketing at the other end of the value chain. Neither the initial innovation, 
design and development, nor the terminal distribution and marketing tasks have been off-shored to 
the same extent as production. Neither the skills required for product design nor the local knowledge 
required for effective marketing lend themselves to off-shoring.149 The unbundling of value-creation 
has led to a corresponding shift in industrial organization, from multinational enterprises (in which 
transnational value chains were kept in-house), to ‘global network flagship’ or ‘lead’ firms that integrate 
dispersed supply, knowledge and customer bases into global production networks, platforms and 
economic ecosystems – GVCs.150 
One driver of this shift has been the rise of household income and consumption in emerging markets, 
especially in Asia. The largest export market for iPhones from their manufacturing point in China, for 
example, is South Korea. Indeed, there is significant regionalization within GVCs. But value-add in these 
GVCs is often captured elsewhere. For the iPhone value chain, for example, the largest share of the value 
add from the value chain is captured not in China or South Korea but by a US company, Apple. 
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Competitive dynamics and hyper-specialization have also played a part in the rise of GVCs, which are 
typically characterized by a small number of lead firms supplied by a large number of highly competitive 
suppliers. GVCs provide these flagship or lead firms access to specialized suppliers at low cost, excelling 
in quick and flexible response to flagship firms’ requirements. Comparative advantage is now determined 
with reference to intermediate goods and services, and not only final products and services.151 One result 
has been a concentration of market power at the point of distribution and marketing, with a small 
number of lead firms enjoying oligopsony power. Another result is that the geography of GVCs is highly 
responsive to labour costs, because specialized producers in the middle of the value chain compete on 
cost. Access to a large pool of low-wage labour is one of the best predictors of a country’s place in GVCs 
– it puts them in the middle.152 
It is important to recognize that incorporation into a GVC can be a powerful motor for poverty eradication 
in countries with large pools of low-skill labour. This has been demonstrated in many countries in 
recent years, for example in export-led booms in the garments and apparel industries in Bangladesh 
and Vietnam, after they were given preferential market access by the EU and US respectively. The World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2020 (‘WDR 2020’) suggests that the net impact of GVCs is positive: 
incorporation into GVCs reduces poverty, increases formal employment and creates jobs for women.153 
Yet as the collapse in demand for apparel production from those countries during the COVID-19 lockdown 
has made clear, along with that growth and development comes precarity. Suppliers at the lowest tiers 
of manufacturing and production compete on cost, speed and flexibility of delivery. They frequently 
serve as ‘price breakers’ and ‘capacity buffers’. This is code. These producers – often informal, artisanal 
and home-based in nature – have very limited bargaining power. They have little security of income, are 
often unorganized, and are highly vulnerable to coercion and abuse. They are price-takers, including on 
the price of labour. Since there are many firms competing to supply to the few lead firms, competition 
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is often undertaken on that terrain: labour costs. Lead firms squeeze their middlemen suppliers “by 
shifting every imaginable cost, risk, and penalty onto their books”.154 Those suppliers and managers 
in turn respond by pushing costs down onto, and extracting value from, workers – including through 
forced labour. As an important study from the OECD, ILO, IOM and UNICEF recently acknowledged, “in 
the absence of strong law enforcement, the socio-economic vulnerability of individuals and workers, 
along with economic and commercial pressures facing suppliers within global supply chains, can in 
combination lead to abuses”.155
OECD, ILO, IOM and UNICEF indicate that a variety of economic and commercial pressures within GVCs 
can incentivize suppliers to use forced labour, including: short term supplier relationships and a rise 
in outsourcing; downward wage pressures; volatility in order volumes, timing and specifications; late 
payments and lack of access to supply chain financing; labour subcontracting; and production quotas.156 
Suppliers need access to a flexible workforce. In plain language, this means that risk is habitually displaced 
onto bottom-level producers and suppliers, who have to deal with rapid changes in order specifications 
and turn-around times. Risk is displaced, ultimately, onto workers, who are forced to deal with highly 
flexible working conditions, and to compete for low-wage jobs – even by paying to secure them. Poor and 
vulnerable workers, explains political economist Nicola Phillips, are in these circumstances “obliged to 
prioritize the short-term goals of survival, which renders them vulnerable to insecure and exploitative 
conditions of work, including forced labour”. This forces them to trade off their own long-term growth 
and human development in favour of short-term survival. And this creates a circular dynamic: “poverty 
generates a range of vulnerabilities among workers, which facilitate their exploitation, including in the 
form of forced labour; their exploitation in turn serves as the key mechanism of impoverishment.”157 In 
some contexts it is thus a short hop from ‘flexibility’ to ‘disposability’158 – that is to contractors treating 
people as if they are owned and can be thrown away. It is that condition that led Kevin Bales to famously 
characterize modern slavery as being treated like “disposable people”.159 
As we explore further in Chapters 3 to 8, the propensity of specific GVCs to operate in this way – that 
is, to not just contribute to but sometimes also exacerbate modern slavery risks – seems to depend on 
a range of factors, including industry structure, skills-intensiveness and the conditions of production. 
The variation of supply chain arrangements – and the variability of vulnerabilities of the workers within 
them – means the managerial challenge to eradicate modern slavery from supply chains also varies 
strongly between them, and even at different locations within the same GVC.160 Pressures on labour 
seem to be especially great in industries characterized by GVCs in which a few major upper-tier firms 
are fed by a highly competitive market of lower-tier suppliers in weakly regulated jurisdictions. These 
asymmetrical market conditions allow upper-tier firms — big global buyers like the major supermarket 
or garment retail chains — to displace production and market condition risks down the value chain, and 
capture profits (and rents) at the top.161 The skills-intensiveness of production in the GVC also seems 
to be a factor in modern slavery risk. Higher-skilled workers generally have greater bargaining power, 
both due to their relative scarcity and due to their greater ability to impact productivity if dissatisfied.162 
Working conditions during production also seem relevant: conditions of physical, cultural and social 
isolation, for example, increase the opportunities for exploitation. Lead firms tend to focus on their 
primary tier of larger, strategic, suppliers, whereas much modern slavery risk arises much further 
upstream in the supply chain, often at the edge where informal labour markets and formal production 
interact. This is the case, for example, in artisanal extraction and manufacturing, at the interface 
between small-holder agriculture and more formal purchasing and distribution networks, and where 
informal labour brokers supply workers into construction sites or domestic service.163 We return to these 
patterns in the case studies in Chapters 3 to 8. 
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WHAT IS THERE TO SMILE ABOUT?
As the WDR 2020 explores in detail, incorporation into GVCs puts a country on a particular developmental 
trajectory. When a government adopts policies that incorporate the local workforce into GVCs it can offer 
a powerful boost to economic growth, increase formal employment, and create jobs for women.164 But 
there is also growing concern that it can sometimes create a two-speed economy, entrench inequality, 
and even, in some cases, foster modern slavery. 
Concerns are greatest for those groups whose incorporation into GVCs is most ‘adverse’, as political 
economists put it.165 As Nicola Phillips explains, the conditions under which many low-wage workers 
participate in GVC-oriented production are “characterized by pronounced precarity, a lack of basic 
protections and high levels of exploitation and abuse, with few possibilities for accumulation or longer-
term socio-economic security.”166 The competition for demand from GVCs pits workers – and even 
States and local authorities, as agents of local workforces intermediating their exposure to global 
markets – against each other. It encourages competition on labour cost, and may lead to production 
moving to wherever those costs are lowest and labour markets are most ‘flexible’ – as we see particularly 
in Chapter 7 on garments and apparel. The danger here is that ‘flexibility’ is also code for tolerance, or 
even promotion, of illegal labour practices.167
The result is that the economic unbundling logic of GVCs seems to be accompanied by a kind of 
unintended social unbundling, in both ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ economies. Even within a single 
country, higher-skill workers and communities are drawn into the higher value-add sections of the 
supply chain, while lower-skill, and less powerful, workers and communities find themselves under 
growing downward wage and labour cost pressures. Whatever the sector, those with education and skills 
attract growing wage premiums, while lower-skill workers risk getting left behind, especially as their jobs 
are offshored to lower-wage labour markets and, increasingly, robots. Women “are generally employed 
in lower-value-added segments” of the GVC, “and women owners and managers are largely missing”. 
Concentrated in urban agglomerations and in border regions of countries neighbouring GVC partners, 
GVCs also unbundle countries’ economic geography. They draw city-dwellers, living where capital is 
located and accumulated, closer to each other, and unbundle them from their rural co-nationals.168 In 
fact, the unbundling effect seems to apply not just to global chains supplying goods, but also transnational 
“labour supply chains”.169 Even in high income countries, migrant workers are especially vulnerable to 
downward wage pressures and labour exploitation.170 Recent reports of forced labour in Leicester in the 
apparel supply chain of British brand boohoo provide one high-profile example (which we explore in 
more depth in Chapter 7),171 while the treatment of migrant workers in Gulf countries provide another 
(which we explore in Chapter 8). 
The result is a distinct pattern of wealth creation and value-capture, sometimes called ‘smile curve 
economics’.172 (See Figure 20 below.) Value-capture is high at the beginning of the production process, 
where the good or service is innovated, designed and developed, and where product strategy is controlled. 
Value-capture dips in the middle, where the good or service is produced or manufactured. Then it rises 
again near the end, where sales, marketing and after-sales occur.173 Typically, lead or flagship firms 
control the two ends of this process – and outsource everything in the middle. 
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This pattern represents a significant change in how risk and reward are organized in the global 
economy, and consequently of commercial organization. It represents a shift from intra-firm cross-
border trade by multinational enterprises, during the period of export-led industrialization, to lead 
firm subcontracting during the GVC period. To use a notion introduced by Harvard political economist 
John Ruggie, it represents a system that has ‘disembedded’ commercial capital from the communities 
that participate in generating the value-add that commercial capital captures.174 This system allows risk 
to be externalized, off lead firms’ books and balance sheets, onto workers and communities that have 
been physically, legally and socially distanced from lead firms, investors and consumers. And because 
risk has been externalized, the costs of capital fall and returns rise. The shift to GVCs thus seems tied 
up with the financialization of the global economy that Thomas Piketty has convincingly tied to rising 
global inequality.175
GVCs are the structural manifestation of a significant shift in power that has emerged as a result of 
globalization.176 It is not so much a shift in the balance of power between States, as a shift in power 
within and across States. And the resulting structures seem to mimic those in which slavery flourishes: 
a limited number of labour-purchasers using their concentrated buying power to steadily control the 
economic agency of those at the bottom. Technology has been one driver of this, but not the sole one; 
States’ policy choices have also been central. Yet GVCs represent a significant and important change in 
the relationship between domestic economies and global markets. If states are now coming to terms 
with the unintended consequences of this approach – including the ways in which it may sometimes 
serve to reproduce the risks of modern slavery, with all the negative impacts on development identified 
in the previous section – then it is to States, and their role in shaping development, that we should turn 
for solutions.
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BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN177
GVCs are not natural, but created by humans. They arise from market dynamics, certainly, and changes in 
underlying cost and incentive structures deriving from the introduction of new technologies (especially 
around digital communications, shipping and infrastructure). But markets are designed and maintained 
by states. GVCs are, in that sense, the products of states’ choices – about tariffs and trade, about taxation 
of value-capture, about competition policy, about investment – and about development policy.178
As Frederick Mayer and Nicola Phillips have argued: 
[T]he essential characteristic of a GVC is a fragmented production process in which, 
typically, some or all of the stages of production are outsourced by lead firms to 
geographically dispersed suppliers and sub-suppliers. GVCs, therefore, require 
low barriers to trade, secure property rights, including investment and intellectual 
property protections, and tolerance for concentrations of market power. This is 
precisely the environment that states have created.179
States are, in that sense, the “architects of the GVC world.180 Phillips further argues that this system 
reproduces inequality,181 and is premised on corporate strategies that “harness significant global 
asymmetries of market power in the interests of generating and capturing profit”.182 That power is itself 
a product of the unequal, oligopsonistic structures that States have fostered: “Inequality is not a ‘bug’ in 
the system of the GVC world, but rather an intrinsic feature of it”, she claims, because
these market asymmetries require a structure in which lead firms occupy oligopolistic 
positions – that is, positions of market dominance occupied by a small number of very 
large firms. In the lower tiers of production, it rests on creating densely populated 
and intensely competitive markets … Such market structures enable lead firms to 
transmit intense commercial pressures on conditions of price and supply along the 
length of their supply chains. They maximise the process of value capture by varying 
these conditions to their commercial advantage.183 
GVCs are thus not just the sinews of a globalized market, as we suggested earlier. They trace the contours 
of power in a globalized economy. They are the result of collective political choices, by States and by 
other development actors such as the MDBs and IFIs, about how we should organize our economies 
and societies, about how value should be created and wealth distributed. Mayer and Phillips argue 
that the current approach shrinks social protection, scales back worker protections in the name of 
competitiveness and reduces corporate tax in the name of an improved “business climate”.184 Even if one 
disagrees with that conclusion, their argument is important because it exposes the extent to which our 
willingness not only to embrace the positive impacts of GVCs – especially economic growth, increased 
incomes and female job growth – but also to tolerate these negative characteristics of GVCs – the low-
skill, labour-intensive nature of the jobs created, their restructuring of socio-economic geography, 
as well as their tendency to subject workers to precarity and create conditions facilitating labour 
exploitation – is a political choice.
In Part Three of the study, we consider whether a different regulatory and policy mix might be compatible 
with GVC-based development while putting it on a more sustainable footing. For now, however, it suffices 
to point out three implications of this analysis for the global development sector. 
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The first is that slavery is not simply an extractive economic system, but, as we saw in the earlier part 
of this chapter, a political system. To address it, we must think politically. Understanding slavery in 
these terms helps makes sense of the powerful, long-standing narrative that slavery can be a driver of 
development, rather than a drag on it. That is a narrative offered by those with political and economic 
power. It takes hold when those who benefit from slavery control the narrative, shape our account of 
how the economy works and, literally, control national accounts. It is an account that externalizes the 
costs of slavery onto future generations and out-groups. That narrative takes hold where those that 
benefit from exploitation – especially the rentier exploiter class – manage to elide their interests with 
those of the nation, and write the costs on the enslaved and the broader economy out of the account. 
As we see in several of the case studies in Chapters 3 to 8, where slavery is State policy – or the policy 
of a rentier elite that has captured the State – the privatization of slavery rents may even be dressed up 
as national development. Slavery’s costs are sloughed onto others – other States, colonies, or othered 
groups within the State’s territory (such as excluded castes or ‘extremist’ minorities). This is why colonial 
powers relied for so long on coerced labour – slavery, indentured servitude, and the corvée. Forced labour 
was a central – and often literally unaccounted – form of income for colonial states.185 These countries’ 
‘national’ growth was powered in part by capital formed out of coerced labour, representing a parasitic 
transfer of wealth from the colonies to the colonial states. And this is why, as the Irish economist John 
Elliott Cairnes recognized as early as 1862, “[t]he [apparent] economic success of slavery” in boosting the 
fortunes of communities that rely on it “is perfectly consistent with the supposition that it is [in fact] 
prejudicial to the material well-being of the country where it is established”.186
What this makes clear is that an excessive focus on national growth and national accounts can just as 
easily mistake slavery-primed GDP growth for ‘development’ as it can mistake carbon-primed GDP 
growth for ‘development’. In both cases, that growth is something of a chimera, an accounting sleight of 
hand, made possible only by excluding from our account the harms done to entities ruled to be outside 
our narrative frame – whether slaves or the environment.Only when a more global and long-term 
framing is adopted do the true social costs of such a parasitic or extractive economy come into focus.187 
If our aim is not simply economic growth, but sustainable development, we must factor those broader 
and longer-term costs in. We must account for the social costs of modern slavery. 
Second, the alternative account offered here of how States have, in promoting GVCs, created a system that 
may in some cases foster modern slavery points us to the nature of the transformation in development 
thinking that is needed. It is a question of building a sufficiently broad and powerful coalition to 
generate system change. We must, first, frame the medium to long-term benefits of transformation for 
all as being worth the short-term costs to some. And we must, second, assemble a coalition of actors 
with sufficient power to sustain those costs and generate systems change. In the case of child labour, 
the global community has quantified exactly how long it takes for a government’s up-front investments 
in transformation (including in education, cash transfers and other policy interventions) to bear fruit: 
around 16 to 18 years.188 Notably, no such analysis or framing is available in relation to forced labour, 
modern slavery and human trafficking. So we cannot say just what are the costs to be incurred. 
What we can recognize, however, is that for systemic change to take hold, it must occur at multiple 
levels. Development interventions seeking to reduce modern slavery may need to take aim not just 
at vulnerabilities occurring at the household or community level, or indeed the national conditions – 
such as weak enforcement capacity – that are conducive to exploitation, but also operate at the level of 
the global governance of the GVC itself. No individual State can alone escape the commercial logic of 
GVCs that we have embedded in the global trade, investment, property and tax regimes we have built. 
Development interventions may need to address the regulatory structures – the rules on FDI, labour 
migration, trade, and corporate tax law – that are “endogenous to the formation and governance of some 
GVCs”.189 Interventions may need to promote responsible business conduct not just by responsibilizing 
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the firms involved, but by addressing the incentive structures and international market rules to which 
their strategies respond. 
Third, and finally, this analysis highlights just how central will be the role of the State in re-shaping this 
institutional context. States may not be able to remake GVCs alone, but their involvement is a necessary 
precondition to addressing the characteristics of the GVC system that seem to promote inequality and 
even, in some cases, foster modern slavery. Fighting modern slavery through development interventions 
requires going beyond safeguarding against forced labour and trafficking risks during the delivery of 
development interventions. It requires thinking about how States’ development and economic policy 
choices increase or reduce their people’s exposure to modern slavery risks. It requires thinking about 
the developmental role of the State in protecting and maximizing people’s economic agency. 
Is it the state’s role to beggar not only its neighbours, but its citizens’ children and grandchildren, by 
wishing away the social costs of slavery (or carbon emissions, for that matter)? Stealing someone’s 
economic agency by enslaving them may create windfall profits for exploiters in the here and now. And 
that may engender a strong and enduring allegiance between the in-group, an in-group that may be 
defined and aligned with a national State – as is clear from the continued appeal of the Confederacy, in 
the America. But such a growth strategy comes at the expense of the out-group – the enslaved, other 
nations, even our own descendants. And, as the analysis earlier in the chapter indicates, it arguably 
leaves us all worse off in the long-run. So a development discourse that pretends that slavery can fuel 
economic growth is not only not a ‘sustainable’ development discourse, but also a narrowly nationalist 
and parochial one, that fails to offer a convincing account of the role of States in a globalized world.190
GVCs can be a powerful force for economic development, knowledge transfer and local capability 
development. But they can also leave people behind. Avoiding the ‘two-speed economy’ outcome depends 
on states adopting the right policy mix, and creating the right institutional environment, to ensure 
the empowerment and human development of all people.191 How can we assess whether a country’s 
development pathway is likely to produce such a slavery-reducing outcome or whether, instead, it is 
likely to increase modern slavery risks? Such an assessment will require an analytical framework that 
allows us to understand the relationship between development interventions operating at multiple 
levels – individual, household, community, national and supply chain – and through a variety of causal 
vectors – impacting the regulatory and governance environment, addressing the characteristics and 
capabilities of victims, and seeking to disrupt slavers and exploitative suppliers. It is to the provision of 
such a framework that we now turn.
Developing Freedom: a systems-based approach 
to fighting modern slavery 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, the research literature makes clear that slavery is an extractive 
institution. Institutions are, as Samuel Huntington famously described “stable, valued, recurring 
patterns of behavior”.192 As Geoffrey M. Hodgson has clarified, however, the behaviour in question is 
not unilateral, but rather social; and the valuing of stable patterns in that social behaviour is also of a 
particular kind – it is normative. Institutions thus emerge as “integrated systems of rules that structure 
social interactions”.193 If we recognize that modern slavery emerges out of the interaction of many such 
institutions, then we are recognizing that modern slavery itself is as a system, or a set of systems that 
emerge in different times and places in different ways. What these systems share is that they all involve 
one exploiter using rules, norms or institutions to treat another person as if they owned them or aspects 
of their agency, and, in so doing coercively extract value from the control and intentional denial of 
that person’s agency. It is not ‘ownership’ as a matter of property law that matters; it is the control of 
agency.194 
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Understanding modern slavery from this ‘systems thinking’ perspective opens up a new analytical 
framework for understanding how a range of governmental interventions – including development 
interventions – might address it. This approach highlights that there are no singular ‘root causes’ of 
modern slavery, but rather that it arises as an equilibrium pattern in the dynamic interaction of three 
components – the environment, the victim, and the exploiter.195 In this section, we first present an 
analytical framework for understanding modern slavery in these terms, then go on to show how this can 
help us think about the different strategies involved in different anti-slavery interventions. This analysis 
is schematically represented in Figure 21 below. 
After Sen: the ‘Developing Freedom’ framework 
Drawing on epidemiological models and systems thinking, we can understand modern slavery as systems 
that emerge out of the interaction of three components: the institutional environment; vulnerable 
people; and exploiter strategies. We call this system-oriented framework for analyzing modern slavery 
‘Developing Freedom’ because it has, as its objective, the identification of the factors that work to restrict 
enslaved people’s freedom – and thus the identification of the types of interventions that will allow 
that freedom to be developed. It is a framework intended to help development actors understand what 
interventions will help to protect, restore and maximize the economic agency of those who have been 
deprived of it.196 And in freeing these people from slavery, the aim is also to free countries from the ten 
ways that slavery creates a drag on development. 
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Our approach is grounded in the theory of human development pioneered in Amartya Sen’s seminal 
Development as Freedom. Sen’s concept of human development argues that the objective of development 
should be the enlargement of people’s ‘capabilities’ – what they are able to do and be. For Sen, poverty 
is not just about deprivation of income or wealth, but more broadly about capability deprivation. 
Development is thus not just about increasing wealth and income, but about increasing peoples’ 
capabilities, their freedom to live the lives they value and have reason to value.197 This deliberately 
contrasts with an approach focused on happiness or desire-fulfilment, on income, or on consumption 
or needs.198 As the UN Development Programme explained in the 2000 Human Development Report, 
Human Development is a development paradigm that is about much more than the 
rise or fall of national incomes. It is about creating an environment in which people 
can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their 
needs and interests. People are the real wealth of nations. Development is thus about 
expanding the choices people have to lead lives that they value.199 
By enlarging peoples’ capabilities, we give them greater choice how to live and how to be. We are 
enlarging their freedom.200 Sustainable development thus emerges not just as a question of meeting 
the “needs” of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs – as it was famously framed by the 1987 Brundtland Report,201 but, as Sen himself has explicitly 
stated, “development that prompts the capabilities of present people without compromising capabilities 
of future generations” (emphases added).202 It is a question of aiming at the achievement of the greatest 
possible level of freedom without restricting the access of future generations to these same freedoms,203 
or, indeed, one might point out, the freedoms of others already alive today. 
Yet, as the former IMF Director Peter Doyle has recently pointed out, the human development approach 
tends to assume that even if people’s capabilities are limited, they are at least endowed with the most 
fundamental attribute assumed by economic theory: economic agency. Yet slavery denies people that 
agency.204 They cannot make decisions for themselves and this, as we saw earlier in this chapter, creates 
ripple effects throughout the economy: reduced productivity, inefficiency, inequality, institutional 
weakness, even environmental harms. So a ‘human development’ perspective on modern slavery cannot 
simply aim at enlarging freedom through developing capabilities. It must go beyond that and protect the 
basis of such capability-development: economic agency.205 
The fact that the anti-slavery community has not previously connected with or tapped into the rich vein 
of scholarship and practice on human development in any significant way is indicative of just how far 
apart the anti-slavery and development epistemic communities are. Tapping into that scholarship makes 
clear that the objectives of anti-slavery efforts – to achieve the sustained freedom of those enslaved and 
prevent the loss of freedom of those vulnerable to slavery – are very clearly and squarely central objectives 
of the global development community. Conversely, it begs the question: how can development actors be 
serious about human development and enlarging freedom if they continue to ignore the more than 40 
million people the ILO estimates to be enslaved around the world? The ‘Developing Freedom’ model 
seeks to address this significant lacuna, by encouraging interventions transforming the environmental 
factors that may be conducive to exploitation; disrupting exploiters’ strategies for exploitation; and 
directly empowering people. 
First, the environment provides the exogenous rules that structure social interaction between the 
victim and the exploiter. As we have seen, some social, physical and regulatory environments are 
more conducive to certain forms of exploitation than others. Changes in the physical environment, 
such as climate change, natural disaster or the onset of an epidemic or pandemic can, by altering 
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the institutional setting, precipitate new opportunities for exploitation. Different environments are 
formally and informally governed by a diverse array of rules, ranging from formal anti-slavery norms 
to debt, employment and marriage contracts, for example, or the market rules that structure supplier-
producer relations, as well as rules around mobility. Informal rules – such as cultural norms defining 
caste behaviour or gender-differentiated treatment – are also often crucially important in defining 
expectations of labour (im)mobility, economic opportunity, dependency and social obligation.206 As 
Ethan Nadelmann has pointed out, “slavery can only persist where nonlegal social norms supporting 
slavery are strong, where the State is sufficiently disinterested in eradicating slavery that it ignores the 
efforts of slave owners to retain their slaves, or where slaves acquiesce, in one way or another, to their 
enslavement”.207 These norms and institutions serve as the organizing principle that means some have 
economic agency, while others do not; some make the decisions, while others have decisions made for 
them.208 
This brings us to the second, ‘victim’ component. Even where an environment is conducive to exploitation, 
different potential victims exhibit different levels of vulnerability to exploitation, depending on their 
characteristics, capabilities and indeed their choices. In this framework, the question is how those traits 
affect a person’s economic agency – their freedom to make economic decisions for themselves.209
Third, exploiters adopt different strategies to harness the resources available to them in the institutional 
environment, and with which they themselves are endowed, to exploit victims’ vulnerability. In the 
business context, these are what Andrew Crane calls the ‘management practices’ that firms use to 
exploit workers.210 But we also see exploiters in non-business settings developing such strategies, using 
resources found in the institutional setting in which they operate – for example the way that ISIS has used 
ideological resources to justify and organize sexual slavery.211 In some settings – from traditional slavery 
in West Africa, to caste-based debt bondage in South Asia, to apartheid South Africa, to the American 
South during the period of segregation – a broad swathe of society participate in the reproduction of 
discriminatory social norms that achieve, legitimize and stabilize the intentional restriction or denial of 
one group’s economic agency.212
The system emerges out of the dynamic interaction of these three components, some of which is 
purposive. Not only exploiters but also victims can use rules and institutions. Victims can use rightsto 
resist exploitation, but their doing so often depends on their capabilities (a term to which we return 
further below). Exploiters, victims – and third parties, such as States or development actors – can seek 
to change the rules, to restructure the institutional environment in which these exploitative interactions 
occur.
Figure 21 above provides a schematic for understanding how the different components of the modern 
slavery system interact. Understanding modern slavery in this way helps us to recognize that modern 
slavery and forced labour are not always and necessarily, as as the ILO characterized them in 2018, a 
“non-systemic aberration”, but rather may be emergent features of the way different global market, 
migration, investment and trade rules intersect with local vulnerabilities.213 As the Global Fund to End 
Modern Slavery (GFEMS) recently put it: 
A coherent global strategy … needs to effectively identify and take account of the 
structural drivers that create a permissive environment for the modern slavery 
industry to operate with impunity, and of the individual and community level 
vulnerabilities that create a supply of susceptible individuals for traffickers to exploit 
with minimal cost and risk.214
80 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Figure 21 provides a conceptual framework for understanding those interactions, and how they give rise 
to different intervention pathways. It draws on the ‘Modern Slavery conceptual framework’ recently set 
out by DfID and reproduced in Figure 16 above. It differs, however, in several small but significant ways. 
First, the DfID framework describes the environment as ‘permissive’. This suggests the environment may 
allow modern slavery to occur, but does not consider that it may actually contribute to its occurrence. 
Given the analysis earlier in this chapter, which suggests that certain institutional environments – 
including GVCs – may be ‘conducive’ rather than ‘permissive’, while others may be ‘preventive’, we adopt 
a neutral framing of the environmental component. 
Second, where the DfID framework speaks of a ‘Modern Slavery Industry’, our focus is more broadly on 
Exploiter Strategies – some of which, such as exploiters of domestic servants – may not be industrial, 
and others of which – such as armed groups – may not be commercial in the traditional sense. In Chapter 
8, for example, we look at how the logic of forced labour in Myanmar has shifted between commercial 
and political logics over time, as Myanmar’s system of government and exposure to global markets has 
changed. The Developing Freedom framework focuses specifically on exploiters’ strategies, since it is 
the strategy that turns the resources available in the environment into the means of exploitation to 
achieve the intended goal: the exploitation of vulnerable people. 
Third, where the DfiD framework in Figure 16 represents the permissive environment acting only on the 
‘Modern Slavery Industry’, the Developing Freedom framework represented in Figure 21 postulates that 
the institutional environment interacts with both exploiters and vulnerable people. In certain cases, as 
we saw in the discussion of GVCs in the previous section, certain environments may actually heighten 
people’s vulnerability to exploitation, even by changing their material – and indeed, in time, physical – 
circumstances, for example through impoverishment. A conceptual framework that omits this feedback 
between the environment and people’s vulnerability risks missing a key aspect of how the contemporary 
system of slavery works – and a key potential pathway for intervention. 
The other key feature of Figure 21 is precisely that: the identification of three distinct intervention 
pathways through which third parties can seek to disrupt the interplay of institutional environment, 
vulnerable people, and exploiter strategies. We set each of these out in turn now.
Three intervention pathways
TRANSFORMATION
The first pathway through which interveners can seek to impact systemic outcomes is transformation of 
the institutional environment to make it less conducive to exploitation of vulnerable groups. 
The ‘environment’ component of the modern slavery system is a product of both rules and physical 
characteristics. Typically, intervention strategies targeting the regulatory environment have focused 
on encouraging States to sign up to international anti-slavery norms and adopt formal action plans and 
targets, creating a complex bureaucratic machinery to oversee the enlargement of the reach of the State. 
Yet forthcoming analysis by Katarina Schwarz and Jean Allain suggests treaty ratification has little if any 
impact on slavery prevalence.215 The orthodox assumption that “[t]he prospects for effective action … are 
best, where there is some policy framework and implementation mechanism in place”216 may or may not 
be correct; but it does not necessarily require treaty ratification. Ratification may be a first step towards 
strengthened state regulatory capacity. But slavery may persist in those industries where exploitation 
simply occurs beyond the reach of the State. This may be due to limited State resources. But it may 
also be due to the fact that some domains are not effectively governed by formal (i.e. State-backed) 
norms and institutions, but rather by informal norms and institutions. These may permit and reproduce 
exploitation even after formal treaty ratification and policy reform.
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This seems to be especially the case in those industries that Andrew Crane describes as “low legitimacy” 
– whether because they involve trades that are formally illegal, or because they are associated with 
stigmatized groups. These informal and ‘renegade’ activities are governed not by formal norms but “by 
the institutional norms of their fellow renegades”.217 This helps us understand why modern slavery often 
clusters in ‘hotspots’ or along specific routes. As Crane has explained, precisely because slavery is formally 
illegal and thus broadly illegitimate, the success of slavery as a management innovation is more likely 
to spread through personal relationships where trust and influence can overcome institutional barriers 
to adoption.218 This is why many forms of labour exploitation in illegal industries, such as commercial 
sexual exploitation, often involve kinship and community networks, or spread through pre-existing 
organized crime networks. Yet this also points to an important insight for development interventions: 
these hotspots and networks may be key sites and vectors for ‘transformation’ interventions, as recent 
programming evaluations of community-transformation work led by Freedom Fund seems to attest.219
‘Transformation’, in the sense in which we mean it in this systems-thinking approach is thus less about 
formal written rules, and more about how formal and informal rules interact and operate to shape the 
extractive, rentier systems we know as modern slavery. Transformative development interventions will 
need to consider and address multiple and intersectional forms of exclusion – on gender, race, caste, 
sexuality and other dimensions. They will aim to strengthen the protections and rights of vulnerable 
groups. Where the originating factors contributing to a conducive environment are physical or 
climatic, this might also include efforts to transform those factors. Examples of such programming 
include strengthening social protection mechanisms,220 labour law and worker rights, GVC governance 
(for example through adoption of global framework agreements or multi-stakeholder initiatives), or 
responsible recruitment efforts. We consider several such interventions in Chapters 3 to 8. 
Understanding these interventions not as efforts to address ‘structural drivers’ or ‘root causes’, per 
se, but rather to alter how structural and environmental factors interact with people’s vulnerability also 
allows us to get past some of the binary thinking that complicates programming in this field, especially 
when it comes to the question of whether structural factors or individual choices ‘cause’ exploitation. 
This is particularly important when it comes to questions of coercion. Many victims of modern slavery 
choose to voluntarily enter the relationships in which exploitation occurs – whether that is a credit/
debt, an employment contract or a marriage. The fraud, force and coercion characteristic of modern 
slavery may not take place at the point of entry, but rather at the point of exit – or rather, in denying the 
victim exit.221 Exploitation is a result of the abuser’s harnessing of the institutional setting – the debt, 
employment or marriage contract – to misuse the victim’s vulnerability. 
Another benefit of this approach is that it draws our attention to the multi-level nature of the ‘rules’ and 
institutions that contribute to modern slavery systems. Exploiter strategies respond to the governance 
arrangements arising in GVCs – the “authority and power relationships that determine how financial, 
material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain”.222 Effective interventions may 
need to address the interplay of global market forces (such as the role of lead or flagship firms in 
GVCs), national-level forces (such as the role of the State and government officials in shaping both the 
formal and informal rules of the environment, including corruption) and local level forces (such as local 
cultural norms). The incentives and opportunities for exploitation arise out of the interaction of people’s 
vulnerability with these multi-level rules, so effective governance (to remove those incentives and that 
exploitation) must also operate at multiple levels.223 
Top-down, brand-based auditing has a role, but may not be effective if it does not factor in local 
norms and environmental factors that allow exploiters to work around audits – a point we explore 
at some length in Chapters 4 (palm oil), 5 (cotton), 6 (fisheries) and 7 (garments and apparel). It may 
need to be combined with bottom up approaches that empower workers,224 such as ‘worker-led social 
responsibility’.225 Alice Evans has identified at least four different strategies that have emerged in recent 
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years for strengthening the governance of GVCs: 1) private regulation; 2) civil society capacity building; 
3) international economic incentives (export market access and from lead buyers); and 4) international 
socialization.226 As we will see in Chapters 3 to 8, different strategies for transforming GVC governance 
may be more or less effective in different contexts. 
In the modern slavery field, the greatest focus, to date, has been on private governance of GVCs, through 
industry-led initiatives such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (see Chapter 4), the Clean 
Clothes Campaign (Chapter 5) or the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (Chapter 7).227 
Recent research suggests a need to focus not just on intra-chain governance dynamics – that is, the 
different ways in which firms organize their cross-border production arrangements – but also the role 
that external institutional forces play in structuring chain dynamics.228 Both domestic and international 
institutional environments structure firms’ investment and employment decisions and shape their 
commercial strategies. GVCs are inherently both economic and political phenomena, involving 
contestation over the construction of economic relationships, governance structures, institutional rules 
and norms, and discursive frames.229 
As we shall see further in Part Two, to be effective, private governance frequently rely on State or public 
support or enforcement. It is hard to overstate the role that States play in shaping the outcomes of private 
and partnership-based efforts.230 To date much of the focus on States’ role in contemporary slavery has 
focused either on States that impose forced labour, or on States’ role in enforcing anti-slavery norms. 
There has been much less attention to the role that States play in “shaping the global conditions that 
facilitate the emergence and persistence of unfree labour”,231 including through structuring, supporting 
and purchasing from GVCs. Yet, as the COVID-19 crisis has reminded us, States are uniquely powerful 
actors in global governance, including as it relates to modern slavery. They have unique powers not only 
to set and enforce the terms of cross-border passage of capital and labour,232 but also to adopt domestic 
and industrial and market regulatory policies that encourage or discourage off-shoring.233
It is up to States to figure out what industrial policies will allow them to both upgrade firm and worker 
capabilities (allowing the country to move up the value chain), and ensure worker protection and no 
one being left behind – that is, to figure out how to avoid the benefits of global trade generating massive 
inequality not only between but also within States. In the post-COVID19 era, states will have a freer hand 
to insist on firm responsibility for not only workers but also other stakeholders, providing a unique 
opportunity to transform value chains to achieve sustainable development. We are already seeing some 
States, for example, move to use public procurement to encourage firms to re-shore key portions of 
GVCs. Given the commitments some States – including the US, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 
and some in the OSCE – have already made to remove modern slavery risks from public procurement, 
there may be synergies here in aligning anti-slavery efforts with domestic industrial policy. And 
there may also be utility in looking beyond public procurement to public investment. The OECD Policy 
Framework for Investment recognizes the important role of the government as an economic actor (e.g. 
as an employer, procurer and through state-owned enterprises) and sets out that governments expected 
to behave responsibly when performing a commercial role. There may be scope here to consider how 
public investors – such as State-controlled sovereign wealth and pension funds, development banks, 
export credit agencies, and commercial banks – use their leverage during the post-COVID19 period to 
alter the management practices of their borrowers and beneficiaries, to reduce modern slavery risk.
We return to these options in Chapter 10, where we consider options for ‘Building Back Better’ at more 
length.
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EMPOWERMENT
A second intervention pathway revealed by the Developing Freedom framework is empowerment. This 
involves working to increase the ability of vulnerable people, when confronted by potential exploitation, 
to use the resources with which they are endowed and that are available in the environment, to resist 
that exploitation – and indeed to flourish. This approach treats empowerment not just as a question 
of structural factors and drivers, but as a question of people’s own agency: how they react to and even 
harness their environment. It works against the restriction of their agency by seeking to maximize their 
agency. It works against their denial of power by empowering them. 
This reflects the lived experience of those in slavery that express their desire for freedom in terms not 
just of a desire for reduced poverty, or improved health or education but, quite specifically, a desire 
for agency, choice and autonomy.234 Developing freedom is not simply a question of removing drivers 
that push people towards slavery, or disrupting the pull strategies deployed by exploiters. It is also 
a question of actively empowering vulnerable people by maximizing their agency: through education, 
skills-training, financial inclusion, gender empowerment initiatives, anti-discrimination training, and 
mobilization.235 And investments in these people’s capabilities and, specifically, their agency will not only 
benefit them, but also helps lift the whole economy, moving it away from economic contexts in which 
modern slavery is more prevalent.
Another aspect of this intervention pathway that deserves specific mention is the need to think 
about ‘empowerment’ not only in terms of prevention (of vulnerability being exploited), or indeed 
of empowering victims, but also in terms of empowering survivors. While there is a strong and 
growing literature in the anti-slavery movement that emphasizes the need for ‘sustained freedom’ 
or – as Frederick Douglass described it, ‘full freedom’236 – and for effective rehabilitation and after-
care to ensure that survivors are not drawn back into enslavement,237 there is also a clear economic 
development rationale to take this approach. As we saw in an earlier section, where emancipation or 
manumission occur, development gains are only locked in through ongoing efforts to effectively and 
sustainably integrate those who have been liberated into the larger economic system. Freedom is not 
a one-time event. The rescue and liberation of those enslaved, or the broader implementation of free 
labour contracts through institutional change, is just the beginning of developing freedom, not the end 
of it, as the continuing struggles with human development in manumitted populations show. Where 
political will wanes too quickly and integration stalls, the ‘freedom dividend’239 is not fully harvested. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the American South, where the collapse of Reconstruction and the rise 
of the Jim Crow system represented ‘botched emancipation’ which has depressed human and economic 
development in southern States ever since.240 Thus programming that deals with the rehabilitation of 
survivors should not be seen as charity, but rather as a sound public investment in the community’s 
capabilities and longer-term sustainable development. 
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Currently, however, there are only limited development efforts focused on this aspect of empowerment. 
According to a recent ILO study, for example, while many States provide basic immediate assistance 
to people released from modern slavery covering shelter (179 countries) and healthcare (121), far fewer 
provide vocational training (71) or financial assistance (31). (These figures and regional breakdown are 
represented in Figure 22 above).241 Restoring and sustaining the economic agency of survivors is simply 
not seen as a priority. And reliable evidence on the impacts of specific interventions in this area is 
scarce. One exception is a ten-year research project launched by Chab Dai in 2010 to better understand 
reintegration for survivors of sex trafficking in Cambodia.242
DISRUPTION
The third intervention pathway for reducing modern slavery is through disruption of business practice 
and exploiter strategies. Slavery persists because it costs less to exploiters than the expected present 
value of the resulting future earnings generated by the exploitation, less the expenses for carrying out 
that exploitation on an ongoing basis. Only by changing that calculus will we remove the incentive to 
exploit. That depends on making slavery “economically unprofitable”, as the GFEMS mission statement 
puts it.243 
As the ‘Developing Freedom’ framework makes clear, such a strategy – focused on exploiter incentives – 
may work most effectively if it is deployed alongside transformation strategies (altering the rules of the 
game) and empowerment strategies (addressing people’s vulnerabilities). Together, they may have the 
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effect not only of making slavery unattractive to exploiters, but also of making people and communities 
resilient to those practices even when exploiters continue to find them attractive. 
The ‘disruption’ approach aims to change the strategic calculus of exploitation, either by making it too 
costly (for example by enforcing criminal penalties, or penalizing firms that tolerate modern slavery 
risks in their supply chains by raising their costs of capital), or by making other practices, that do not 
require modern slavery, cheaper. As Juliette Faure has explained, seen from an economic perspective, 
the objective here is to “apply economic pressure on coercive institutions by increasing the inefficiencies 
of exploitative labour practices.”244 This is not just a question, therefore, of individual investigations and 
enforcements, but of changing the systematic interaction of firms and criminal organizations with their 
strategic environment. 
There are two different ways to achieve this. The first is, in economic terms, an income effect strategy, 
which seeks to reduce income from forced labour, relying on strengthened inspection, enforcement 
and broader labour market formalization initiatives. The second, much less remarked upon to date, is 
a substitution effect strategy, which does not necessarily aim to make forced labour more costly, but 
rather to make free labour cheaper. This approach entails programming focused on strengthening the 
supply and reducing the cost of free labour, especially through skills development, improved labour 
market mobility and reduction of recruitment fees. A related strategy is the provision of credit and 
working capital – not only to workers, but also, for example to small enterprise employers, and to labour 
brokers to improve their carrying capacity.245 Development actors may have opportunities here for 
example through subsidizing the cost of working capital, making access to cheaper capital conditional 
on changes in labour brokers’ management practices. We return to this strategy in the discussion of the 
construction sector in Chapter 8. 
The characterization of this pathway in terms of ‘disruption’ also helps bring into focus that it will be 
just that: disruptive. Such interventions will be deeply political – and will almost certainly meet with 
active resistance.246 Exploiters are not passive. They can shape their own environments, including the 
legal and political environment, to create and maintain space for their preferred management practices 
and organized criminal activity.247 Indeed, Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick’s research on slaveholder responses 
to pressures to desist makes clear the range of different ways in which they can respond – pre-empting 
interventions, counter-mobilization against them or co-option of them, repression of them, resignation 
in the face of them, and persistence despite them.248 We see how some of these strategies have played 
out in the case studies in Part Two. Choi-Fitzpatrick argues that what determines exploiters’ response 
is primarily the resources and opportunities to which they have access – in other words, aspects of the 
institutional environment. Emancipation is frequently not a complete break from the past, but rather 
creates a new game with new rules for both the exploiter and the victim.249 All too often, exploiters succeed 
in adapting the underlying power relationship to the forms and structures of the new environment.250
This points to a key difference between development interventions that aim at slavery reduction and 
some other development work focused more on structural phenomena. Like efforts to disrupt child 
labour, gender violence or conflict, development interventions addressing modern slavery require not 
just passive programming but actively outwitting human opponents that will seek to resist and disrupt 
the intervention itself. This is an inherently competitive – and thus strategic – endeavour, a process of 
action and reaction, of cat and mouse. 
That begins with the fact that the victims of modern slavery – and even the fact of modern slavery – are 
deliberately hidden from view. Discussions of the difficulty of measuring incidence of modern slavery 
often treat that difficulty as though it were a purely technical challenge, like hunting for some elusive 
subatomic particle, or dark matter. In fact, the primary difficulty in finding and counting victims of 
modern slavery arises from the fact that the slavery occurs within a social relationship – between the 
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exploiter and victim – and it is in the nature of that relationship that the exploiter aims to keep the true 
nature of the relationship secret or hidden. Modern slavery, after all, by definition involves force, fraud 
and coercion – it is not a structural inevitability but depends on an individual or organization actively 
enslaving victims. In that sense, finding and measuring slavery is more like finding and measuring 
mafia membership than it is like finding and measuring shy fish (the basis of the most sophisticated 
current approach to statistical estimation of victim populations).251 Development actors may need to 
learn from existing work on organized crime and spoiler theory about how to overcome such potential 
resistance. One key factor will clearly be leverage: both within business relations, and in mobilizing, 
sustaining and deploying the political will needed to sustain disruption, achieve transformation and 
enable empowerment. In Part Two, we look at numerous examples of efforts to assemble and sustain the 
leverage required to achieve disruption. 
Finally, thinking about reducing slavery in terms of disrupting exploiter strategies also highlights that 
in some cases States themselves may be sources of resistance to systemic change, where they have been 
captured by slavery rentiers.252 This was obviously the case historically, in the American South, where 
the political and economic elite openly advocated slavery’s continuation and western expansion. But it 
also remains the case today. In Pakistan in 2011, for example, an ILO-backed union effort to organize 
informal workers in the brick kiln industry was actively resisted by a campaign of intimidation initiated 
by corrupt government officials and employers.253 Again, in Part Two we explore a number of campaigns 
of resistance to slavery disruption efforts that point to similar patterns of collaboration between 
government actors and slavery interests.
The Developing Freedom framework aims to offer a simple, flexible heuristic device for explaining how 
the interplay of environmental, victim and exploiter characteristics and choices, across multiple levels, 
generates and sustains systems of modern slavery. It can be used to understand the intended impact 
pathways of programming across a range of contexts, levels and modalities, improving comparability 
and programming design. 
To understand how it can assist with programming design, consider the two conflict-affected cases of 
slavery in Libya and Syria. There is quite detailed guidance available from international organizations 
such as the ILO on ‘what works’ to end modern slavery.254 Yet such guidance can tend at times towards 
the general and one-size-fits-all. Current approaches to anti-slavery interventions do not offer a clear 
way of understanding how interventions in contexts as similar and dissimilar as Libya and Syria should 
be tailored. The Developing Freedom framework arguably offers a way in. Conflict analysis suggests 
that the slavery in Syria was the result of strategies developed and deployed by a specific exploiter – the 
Islamic State.255 There are few reported instances of anything similar from other armed groups involved 
in Syria’s conflict. In Libya, the story is quite different: there are multiple organizations involved in the 
human trafficking marketplace – some operating like armed groups, others more like mafias, and others 
still as State auxiliaries.256 In Syria, where Islamic State’s influence has waned, slavery has disappeared, 
suggesting a disruption strategy is effective to reduce slavery in that context. In Libya, in contrast, 
disruption of one group’s strategy and business seems unlikely to generate major reductions, as its place 
can quickly be taken by one of the many other groups operating in the human trafficking market. This 
suggests a transformational strategy will be needed, altering the institutional environment that makes 
such strategies profitable for a wide range of actors. 
This is just one example of how the distinction between the institutional, victim and exploiter 
components of slavery systems offered by the Developing Freedom framework may help development 
actors tailor interventions to context. Despite SDG 8.7 committing States to take “effective measures” 
to end modern slavery, knowledge of what is ‘effective’ in anti-slavery interventions is surprisingly 
underdeveloped. This may be in part because donors, programmers, researchers and evaluators have 
lacked a shared analytical framework to organize their investigation of programming impacts across 
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different forms of exploitation and programming contexts – a point to which we return in Chapter 10. 
The Developing Freedom framework may provide a basis for beginning to address that gap, and allow 
us to better understand how the different elements of programming that can potentially contribute to 
slavery reduction, can be compared and assembled. 
It also provides a framework for understanding how past efforts to intervene in modern slavery systems 
have played out, and what those histories can teach us about where there may be other opportunities for 
effective intervention in those systems. It is to that analysis that we turn in Part Two. 





89 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Introduction
In Part Two of the study, we use the Developing Freedom framework from Part One to discuss 
development interventions to address slavery in six economic sectors: three agricultural sectors – cattle, 
palm oil, cotton; fisheries and aquaculture; garments and apparel; and construction and infrastructure. 
These sectors were selected in consultation with the project donor to provide diversity on various 
dimensions: geography, country income levels, forms of exploitation, market structure, and different 
development interventions. UNU-CPR commissioned deep dive mixed-method sectoral case studies 
from several different external research teams. Research for the palm oil section was undertaken by 
The Purpose Business (Patricia Dwyer, Rebecca Walker Chan and Thomas Tang). Research on fisheries 
and aquaculture was undertaken by the University of Nottingham Rights Lab (Dr Jessica Sparks, Dr 
Bethany Jackson). Research on apparel was undertaken by Partnership for International Development 
(Anna Bryher, Jim Cranshaw and Frances Hill). Research in these areas was extended and supplemented 
by James Cockayne, and research on cotton, cattle and construction was also added, with input from 
Angharad Smith and Nesrien Hamid. 
Researchers used a variety of methods, including desk review and in-country engagement with 
representatives of different stakeholder groups (including those representing survivor and worker 
organizations),1 to address a set of common research questions. In each case, we identify the aspects 
of institutional environments (both local and transnational), people’s vulnerabilities and exploiter 
strategies that interact to generate modern slavery systems. We show how these differ by context, and 
how they are similar. We explore how past intervention efforts have attempted to change or end these 
systems of modern slavery, and consider the results of those interventions – including, frequently, 
resistance by those enriched and empowered by modern slavery. In each case, we also point to insights 
and possible new entry points for development interventions. 
Explaining the focus on agriculture
Three of our six case studies focus on agricultural sectors: Brazilian cattle production; palm oil (with 
a particular focus on Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria); and Uzbek cotton. A fourth, fisheries and 
aquaculture, encompasses both wild capture and aquaculture, which shares many similarities with 
agriculture. (That chapter focuses on States in the Bay of Bengal and South East Asia: India, Bangladesh, 
Thailand and the Philippines.) Agriculture is a central site of modern slavery, world-wide, and will thus 
be a central domain for development interventions aiming to address modern slavery. 
In the last two decades, the estimated share of total global employment taken by agriculture has fallen 
from 40 to 27 per cent.2 Yet 65 per cent of poor working adults make a living through agriculture.3 Around 
60 per cent of adults in low-income countries are employed in agriculture, which still accounts for 
two-thirds of GDP in many of those countries. The agrifood sector employs the majority of those in 
self- and wage employment in developing countries.4 Agriculture is a particularly significant source 
of employment in Africa (49 per cent of employment) and Asia (31 per cent).5 For all these reasons, 
agriculture is a central focus of much development activity. And that can be very effective: growth in the 
agriculture sector is two to four times more effective in raising incomes among the poorest compared 
to other sectors.6
Agricultural sectors are replete with conditions conducive to modern slavery. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
agricultural workers experience the highest incidence of working poverty, with a quarter in extreme 
poverty.7 11 per cent of all forced labour worldwide is in agriculture,8 and 71 per cent of all child labourers 
(aged 5 to 17) work in agriculture, fishing, forestry and livestock.9 Prevalence is highly gendered: amongst 
adults, women appear to be especially vulnerable, whether amongst migrant worker populations in the 
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EU,10 or in global cocoa supply chains.11 In contrast, amongst children, it is boys who are more likely to 
be forced to work in agriculture, no doubt due to the physically demanding nature of the work, and 
gender norms.12 And as we shall see, some sub-sectors – such as cattle raising – may skew male for 
forced labour. 
Agricultural sectors are also frequently characterized by weak labour market institutions (law 
enforcement, inspection and compliance), weak enterprise development arrangements (including limited 
access to capital, human development and education systems, limited social protection and healthcare), 
low productivity, vulnerability to climate change, prevalent informality and poor infrastructure. This is 
not limited to developing countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, most intelligence on forced 
labour relates to abuses in the agriculture sector.13 There is likewise significant evidence of trafficking 
for exploitation in the agricultural sectors of US,14 Australia,15 and European States.16 There are particular 
risks in the agrifood sector where wholesalers and suppliers rely on labour recruiting agents to contract 
seasonal workers, especially for short-term, time-sensitive harvesting activities.17 As Crane, LeBaron, 
Allain and Beyahani have pointed out, for many of these workers, vulnerability is not intrinsic, but 
the product of the institutional environment – such as restrictions on labour mobility which amplify 
employers’ power, or loss of control over assets and income.18 
What this suggests is that the causal vector linking agriculture to modern slavery is not poverty per se, 
nor ‘lack of development’. As we shall see in some of the case studies that follow, it is often not the poorest 
of the poor that are most susceptible to modern slavery, but rather the working poor. Their options are 
shaped by policy choices and institutional environments that funnel them into risky migration, labour 
market and debt decisions that render them vulnerable to exploitation. As Phillips and Mieres have 
pointed out, this means that is not enough to simply see poverty and forced labour as failures of markets 
to reach and incorporate certain populations. In some cases, forced labour seems in fact precisely to be 
the product of workers’ incorporation into agricultural production and markets, because of the adverse 
manner in which that incorporation occurs.19 This has important development policy implications. It 
means that we cannot simply expect modern slavery to disappear from agriculture by incorporating 
workers into global agribusiness. It means the quality of development matters. 
It also suggests that we need to understand how modern slavery arises out of the interaction of global 
flows of capital and labour and local conditions, moderated by States’ policy choices and regulatory 
arrangements. This may differ by context. Different modern slavery patterns may emerge even within 
the same sector, depending on local institutional conditions, the vulnerabilities of different populations, 
and simply the exploiter strategies that emerge in response to incentives at different points in value 
chains. Child labour is relatively prevalent in subsistence agriculture, operating inside household 
enterprise. In contrast, adult forced labour in agriculture is often linked to internal and cross-border 
migration, and to incorporation of informal small-holder cash crop producers into export-oriented 
production.20 
One recurring aspect of modern slavery in contemporary agricultural sectors relates to the changing 
global institutional context – and especially the rise of global agribusiness. Most agricultural producers 
in the developing world remain small-holders: as of 2008, up to 85 per cent of farms were smaller 
than 2 ha.21 Yet there has been a growing concentration of purchasing and distribution power in global 
agriculture in recent decades, as the result of the global liberalization of both trade and investment 
regimes.22 There has been a shift over the last forty years from parastatal export monopolies and 
cooperatives selling into global spot markets, to global value chains characterized by vertical inter-
firm coordination, outsourcing, contracting, and quality control. Supermarkets and other distributors 
have emerged as lead firms imposing quality standards and delivery requirements and creating global 
platforms into which producers sell. In many parts of agricultural markets, a small group of lead firms 
exert oligopsonistic power.The top 10 food and beverage firms command nearly 40 per cent of market 
share of the top 100.23 The commodity trading sector is also highly concentrated, with the four ‘ABCD’ 
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firms (Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) holding around 70 to 90 per cent 
of market share.24 And concentration has further increased in the last decade, through blockbuster 
mergers such as those involving Kraft–Heinz, Dow–Dupont, Anheuser Busch InBev–SAB Miller, Bayer–
Monsanto and Syngenta–ChemChina. Horizontal concentration is as a general rule greater at the ends 
of value chains (i.e. in branding and design, processing and distribution, and retail) than in production 
(i.e. the middle of the value chain).25 Yet the entities at the more concentrated ends of the value chain 
increasingly exercise control over producers through contract, not equity ownership. 
These transformations have generated significant growth in many parts of the world, especially in 
Asia. Incorporation of agricultural producers into global markets can drive up national income and 
lead to important technology and knowledge transfers to the Global South. The larger a portion of a 
country’s agriculture is incorporated into global agribusiness, the higher its national income is.26 Yet this 
concentration of buying power has also been accompanied by growing concerns about the structural 
imbalances between unorganized small-scale farmers at the bottom end of the supply chain (the middle 
of the smile curve) and large powerful agribusiness buyers. Structurally, these conditions look very 
similar to the oligopsony and monopsony arrangements in labour markets that – as we saw in Chapter 
2 – can give rise to modern slavery. In 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food warned that 
concentration of power in both production and distribution was “giving buyers considerable bargaining 
strength over their suppliers, with potentially severe implications for the welfare both of producers 
and consumers”.27 Oligopsonistic buyers and lead firms rely on multiple suppliers competing on costs 
– which often means competing on labour costs and conditions, and pushing risks down to workers. 
Social and economic marginalization – poverty, gender norms, caste norms, illiteracy, migration status 
– leave workers in those contexts vulnerable to exploitation. 
Informality is also a key marker of modern slavery risk in these markets. A 2013 review of 49 studies 
related to the commodities and horticulture value chains concluded that “informality is the norm 
rather than the exception: informal workers make up the majority of the workforce, even in formal 
enterprises.”28 Workers in highly informalized agricultural sectors are often poor, socially vulnerable, 
and financially or economically dependent. Small, informal agricultural enterprises are less capitalized 
and thus operate on less capital-intensive lines, and lower levels of technology, than their larger peers. 
They are frequently therefore less productive and rely more on labour-intensive methods. They tend to 
compete with their larger competitors by reducing labour costs – making these enterprises a major site 
for labour coercion. In some value chains, where land ownership is even more concentrated, workers 
become so dependent on owners that they effectively have no ‘outside’ option in the labour market. This 
is particularly the case in industries where land ownership bears the hallmarks of colonial plantation 
legacies – such as tea, coffee, cocoa29 and, as we shall see, palm oil. These sectors are now structured 
as buyer-driven supply chains30 and continue to suffer from high exposure to forced and child labour.31
Pressures on agricultural workers have deepened in recent years. Markets have experienced low prices 
associated with global over-supply of key agricultural commodities. At the same time, there has been 
a growing financialization of commodity markets, with speculation creating increased price volatility.32 
Financialization has also contributed to market concentration, as managers use mergers during period of 
low growth as a means to reduce costs and shore up profits, in a hunt for value to return to shareholders. 
And COVID-19 has also placed pressures on agricultural workers, as we return to in Chapter 4. 
In the next three chapters, we look at three different agricultural sub-sectors stretching from Latin 
America to Africa to Central, South and South-East Asia. We look at cases involving subsistence 
agriculture and global agribusiness, State-managed production and private-sector led markets, and a 
variety of forms of exploitation. And we consider how different development strategies and interventions 
have impacted modern slavery risks. Our cases cover: Brazil’s cattle sector; the palm oil sector, with 
particular attention to Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria; and finally, the transformation of Uzbek cotton 
production. 
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CHAPTER 3: BRAZIL’S CATTLE SLAVERY: 
“I GOT A NEW SOUL”
In September 1989 two rural workers who had been enslaved with 60 others on the Espírito Santo 
estate in the state of Pará, Brazil, escaped. As they fled, they were ambushed by armed employees of 
the landowner, seeking to prevent them escaping and exercising their right to pursue outside work. 
One worker, Paraná, was killed. The second, José (Zé) Pereira, just 17 years old, was wounded in the 
hand and face and played dead. Both ‘corpses’ were dumped 20 kilometres from the crime scene. Zé 
Pereira not only survived but, bravely, denounced the estate to the Federal Police. They raided the farm 
and freed the workers. Pereira, not satisfied, worked with the Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão 
Pastoral da Terra – CPT), the Centre for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) and Human Rights Watch 
to lodge a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization 
of American States (OAS).1 
93 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
By 2003 and the election of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the Zé Pereira case had produced a sea-
change in the Brazilian State’s efforts to address modern slavery. The State settled the case and Brazil’s 
National Congress awarded Pereira R$ 52,000 in compensation. The Brazilian Government put in place 
labour inspection, inter-ministerial coordination and regulatory initiatives that have turned Brazil into 
a world leader in the fight against modern slavery. These efforts have received important support from 
external development partners, including the ILO, US and Norway. And they have borne important 
fruit: as Figure 23 (below) shows, between 1995 and 2018, Brazil rescued 53,896 people from slavery and 
slavery-like conditions. As of July 2020, that number has risen to over 55,000.2 
Figure 23 also shows a decline in rescues over the last ten years. There is little reason to think this is a 
result of an overall decline in enslavement. It is more likely indicative of continuing challenges for and 
resistance to anti-slavery efforts in Brazil. Those have been highlighted by another case brought by 
CPT and CEJIL in the Inter-American system. In its 2016 judgment in the Brasil Verde case, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights found that, despite conducting inspections of the Brasil Verde cattle 
ranch (fazenda) since 1989, the Brazilian Government had failed to prevent use of slave labour there. It 
ordered payment of USD 5 million in compensation to 128 workers enslaved on the farm and rescued 
between 1997 and 2000.3
The Brasil Verde case points not only to ongoing challenges for the Brazilian State in effectively enforcing 
its anti-slavery laws, but also to one of the major sources of modern slavery in Brazil: the cattle industry.4 
As Figures 24 and 25 show, 32 per cent of those rescued from slavery in Brazil between 1995 and 2018 
were found in the cattle industry.5 Slavery is found in other agricultural sectors too, notably coffee and 
sugarcane.6 Yet cattle ranches account for around 60 per cent of worksites on which modern slavery 
was found.7 In this section, we explore the modern slavery ‘system’ that has emerged in Brazil’s cattle 
industry, the interventions that have attempted to disrupt that system, and the resistance those 
interventions have met.
Unsplash/Filipe Coimbra
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FIGURE 23: ACTIVITIES FROM WHICH ENSLAVED PEOPLE  
WERE RESCUED IN BRAZIL, 1995-2018 
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FIGURE 24: SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF THOSE RESCUED  
FROM SLAVERY IN BRAZIL 1995-2018 (TOTAL) 
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The slavery system in the Brazilian cattle industry
Slavery in Brazil’s cattle industry is a product of several interacting factors: 
• Institutional environment: a development model that encourages meat production in areas where 
the State’s enforcement power is weak, and that has invested State (and international) development 
funds in firms that have tolerated workplace illegalities;
• People’s vulnerabilities: a pool of marginalized, poor rural labourers susceptible to discrimination 
and exploitation;
• Exploiter strategies: use of coercion and fraud by recruiters, contractors and producers to compete 
on labour costs, while harnessing traditional norms of social obligation and market norms of 
financial debt to control workers. 
Institutional environment 
The Brazilian cattle market is a significant slice of the entire global market, which continues to grow. 
Global demand for meat (including pork, poultry and seafood) has quadrupled since the 1960s.8 Demand 
for beef, in particular, has risen, as household incomes rise, particularly in Asia, and beef displaces 
pork and poultry in diets.9 Beef production and consumption are concentrated: together, Brazil, India, 
Australia, the US and New Zealand account for over 73 percent of beef sold on the world market. Brazil is 
the second largest producer of meat worldwide (after the US, and before China).10 It is also consistently 
the largest or second largest exporter of beef, with around USD 6 to 7 billion worth of exports.11 Around 
38 per cent of that goes to China and Hong Kong, and around 10 per cent to Egypt, Chile, UAE, Russia, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia.12 Brazil was the source of 44 per cent of beef imported into China in 2019, making 
up 20 per cent of all Chinese beef consumption.13 This bilateral trade has grown 62 per cent in the last 5 
years.14 However, imports to the EU are also rising, and seem likely to rise further after the conclusion 
of an EU-Mercosur free trade agreement in June 2019 which includes a commitment to increase beef 
imports by more than one third. Yet most Brazilian beef is consumed domestically – some 80 per cent.15 
The Brazilian cattle herd is the largest in the world: there are roughly the same number of cattle as 
people in Brazil.16 Beef production rose from around 3 million tonnes in 1990 to 7.5 million tonnes in 
2012.17
That surge has been the result of deliberate efforts by the Brazilian Government to exploit Brazil’s natural 
resource endowments, which give it comparative advantages in extensive agriculture and extractive 
industry. By 2010, the country was the world’s foremost producer of sugar, coffee, orange juice and 
poultry, the second largest producer of soybeans, the third largest producer of corn and the fourth 
largest producer of pork. The meat industry, in particular has benefited from policies and endowments 
that help keep the costs of land, feed – and labour – low.18 Brazilian cattle production is relatively low-
cost, extensive and non-capital intensive when compared to other countries. Only around 2 per cent of 
the total Brazilian cattle herd are in feedlots; the rest are pastured.19 And Brazil has a very large number 
of small producers. In the 2006 Agricultural Census, 2.7 million farms – or roughly two thirds of all farms 
– owned at least one head of cattle.20
Brazil’s beef production complex is highly heterogeneous. It mixes large, highly-capitalized facilities with 
small-scale, informal producers. Producers often sell calves to other farms that specialize in fattening 
before slaughter. They then sell onto spot markets, from which slaughterhouses and processing facilities 
purchase. Again, there is heterogeneity: some processing facilities are large-scale, highly capitalized and 
deeply integrated into export-oriented production networks; others are small-scale, local-facing and 
often informal or illegal, with very limited capitalization.21 They sell to a variety of buyers: local retailers, 
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national retailers, wholesalers, and global agrifood businesses. But there is little vertical integration 
from the production level up to export or domestic consumption: producers feed into spot markets 
and supply chains oriented towards both domestic and export markets.22 Roughly 90 per cent of sales 
are made on the spot market – only 10 per cent through futures contracts.23 Buyers consequently have 
limited visibility into the labour practices of their ‘indirect suppliers’ – that is, beyond the first tier of 
supply. This is notably different to the chicken and pork sectors, where there is less reliance on extensive 
agricultural methods and greater reliance on smallholder production, with less use of contracted (and 
enslaved) workers. 
The heterogeneity of beef production is partly a result of the relative ease of acquiring land – especially 
in the Amazon. This is a product of government policies over many generations which have extended 
the agro-industrial frontier into the Amazon, often with serious environmental externalities, including 
deforestation of the Amazon and Cerrado regions for cattle pasture.24 That development model has deep 
roots in Brazil’s imperial past, including its use of enslaved indigenous and African labour to extract 
wealth from the Brazilian interior. Brazil received more slaves during the transatlantic period than any 
other country, and also saw mass enslavement of indigenous people. Slavery was formally abolished 
in 1888, but the liberation of a large, unskilled impoverished workforce was not accompanied by land 
reform or other efforts to increase former slaves’ economic agency. In fact, the democratization of 
labour was offset by a commoditization of land in the mid-nineteenth century, which restricted former 
slaves’ access to land and turned them into a large pool of working poor. Brazil’s development pathway 
since then has drawn on this foundation of deep wealth inequality, racial hierarchy and rent extraction 
through control of land and other capital assets. It is no accident that the highest rates of modern slavery 
in Brazil are in those States with the most unequal agricultural landholdings, and the highest rates of 
violence.25
Enslavement often occurs on illegally occupied Amazon and Cerrado land (so called grilagens (land grabs), 
frequently located many hours by private road from highways, with no facilities in between. There is a 
tight connection down to the worksite level between deforestation, use of exploitative and unregulated 
labour practices including slave labour, and dangerous levels of carbon emissions (including through 
use of slave labour to burn cleared timber as charcoal).26 The correlation is endogenous: all of these 
dangerous and illegal practices flourish because of the same interaction of underlying factors such as 
institutional weakness, worker vulnerabilities, and commercial practices. Illegal possession is relatively 
easily converted into title through forged titles, corruption, and the absence of effective centralized land 
registers27 But it is also supported by state policies: encouraging leasing and possession of indigenous 
land; investment in roads, infrastructure and integration of Amazonian territories into the Brazilian 
economy and global commodity markets, but limited investment in social infrastructure (including 
schools, hospitalsand law enforcement). Land acquisition rules have also created a large pool of landless 
rural poor with few livelihood options and limited access to education, credit and infrastructure. 
These policies also hit smallholder ranchers, whose own access to credit is also limited by absence of 
recognition of title to land.28 This pushes them away from capital-intensive production towards labour-
intensive development pathways. 
The beef value chain has been significantly reshaped, however, by a major shift in Brazilian economic 
development policy around 2008, which led to a significant concentration of the slaughtering, 
processing and export stages of the value chain. This ‘National Champions Policy’, which lasted until 
2013, saw the State invest significant resources in various leading Brazilian firms in an effort to help 
them grow internationally. The Brazilian National Economic and Development Bank (Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – BNDES) – the second largest domestic development bank after the 
China Development Bank – provided concessional investments to and took minority equity positions in 
several national champions, seeking to make them successful multinational corporations. This included 
significant investments in the Brazilian meat industry, including the leading meat-processing firm JBS, 
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which received around USD 2.5 billion. As a result of these State investments, the three largest Brazilian 
meat processing firms – JBS, Marfrig and Minerva – consolidated their position within Brazil, acquiring 
numerous smaller players. Together, the top three went from a combined 14.3 per cent share of Brazilian 
slaughtered cattle in 2006 to a 48.3 per cent share in 2013.29 BNDES ended up owing around a third 
of Marfrig, and at one point was JBS’ single largest shareholder, with the Brazilian public bank Caixa 
Econômica Federal owning another 10 percent.30 (As of March 2020, BNDES was reported to be looking 
to divest part of its stake.31)
This growth was not limited to Brazil, however. By 2013, through overseas acquisitions, JBS – still a 
family-run private firm – had become the largest meat-processing firm in the world. JBS slaughters 
77,000 cows every day, has annual revenues of USD 50 to 65 billion and employs over 900,000 people 
globally, with customers in over 150 countries.32 What is more, JBS and Marfrig are two of the top four 
meatpacking companies in the US, which, between them, supply 74 per cent of all US beef. This move 
up the value chain onto the international stage gives these firms flexibilities they would not otherwise 
have. For example, when the EU restricted imports of Brazilian meat on phytosanitary grounds in 2008, 
JBS was able to switch exports from its Brazilian arm to its Australian subsidiary. JBS has similarly coped 
with US market access restrictions by relying on US production.33
Some of this has been helped along by multilateral development actors. MDBs invested in several of 
these firms within Brazil. And in 2013, the IFC acquired a 3 percent share of Minerva for USD 19.65 million 
and approved financing for an additional USD 60 million. Yet IFC has had difficulty ensuring compliance 
with its environmental and social safeguards by clients in Brazilian agribusiness – so much so that 
clients in the meat sector repaid loans early.34
That early repayment in fact points to a larger pattern of difficulty ensuring compliance with workplace 
labour, safety and sanitary standards that has emerged around these meat giants. The National 
Champions Policy appears to have facilitated important structural changes in the Brazilian economy 
that might not otherwise have occurred,35 and helped prevent the transfer of profits outside Brazil that 
would have occurred if foreign firms had acquired the market position that these firms did. But some 
commentators also argue that the policy generated inefficiencies, inequality and complications in Brazil’s 
political economy, including the significant political corruption that is often associated with rentier 
economies.36 JBS senior executives have been linked to allegations of systematic bribery of more than 
1,800 Brazilian politicians,37 as well as bribing officials to circumvent and bend food sanitation rules. In 
2017, JBS reached a USD 3.2 billion settlement of these claims, selling assets across South America to pay 
up.38 Yet JBS has also been at the centre of concerns around protection of workers from COVID-19. Meat 
processing plants have been tied to the spread of COVID-19 in Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, 
Spain, US, UK – and Brazil.39 At one JBS plant in Brazil tested in June 2020, around a quarter of workers 
had COVID-19.40 Such concerns recently led to the suspension of exports to China, a key profit centre 
for the firm. 41 And JBS workers have tested positive for COVID-19 in its offshore processing plants, too, 
including in Australia.42 Critics suggest that all of this is indicative of an organizational culture that 
tolerates a lax approach to worker protections in the meat giants’ own workplaces and supply chains.
People’s vulnerabilities
It is true that most victims of modern slavery in Brazil come from its poorest States.43 Yet it is not accurate 
to say that income poverty is the key determinant of vulnerability to modern slavery in Brazil. In fact, 
several studies have concluded that those enslaved are not the poorest of the poor, who may be seen 
by employers, contractors and recruiters as not up to the physical demands of the work, and who may 
also be eligible for various forms of State income protection. Instead, it is the working poor one step 
up who lack such access and rely on earned income to survive, but lack alternative livelihood options, 
who are often drawn into a web of debt bondage.44 As we saw in Chapter 2, as Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick 
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has explained, victims of enslavement may prefer “enslavement in sustenance” to symbolic freedom in 
abject poverty.45 Phillips and Sakamoto describe this as a pronounced loss of control: 
a person is either deprived entirely of control over the conditions in which s/he sells his 
or her labour in the marketplace (in those cases where extreme coercion is present), or 
else is obliged to sell it in conditions characterized by the worst forms of exploitation.46 
It is not only income poverty, but other dimensions of poverty – notably access to education, credit, 
capital and outside employment options – that also emerge as key components of this vulnerability.47 As 
we explore further in the next sub-section, race and discrimination are also key elements of exploiter’s 
psychological coercion strategies.48 Yet in Brazil race is closely intertwined with economic exclusion and 
poverty, with a marked geographic distribution. Nearly all of those recruited into slavery in the cattle 
industry are from the poor, north-eastern regions with high Afro-Brazilian populations, as shown in 
Figures 26 and 27 below.
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FIGURE 27: LOCATION, SIZE OF RESCUES, BIRTHPLACES  
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Most of those enslaved in the cattle industry are poor, landless workers from Brazil’s north-eastern 
States. They are known as peões (literally ‘peons’) – unskilled, rural manual labourers working on short-
term contracts.49 Around 90 per cent seem to be male. They are recruited by labour contractors – gatos – 
who are hired to pull together a set number of peões to work on an estate for a defined period, often to clear 
a defined area of land in that time.50 The gatos rely on social ties and oral contracts, and lure vulnerable, 
economically desperate men (and some women) with inaccurate and fraudulent promises of income. 
This can involve a period of extended grooming.51 Once the peão is hired, they are moved hundreds of 
kilometres to the west and southwest to work on haciendas (fazendas) on grilagens in the ‘Legal Amazon’ 
States.52 The physical isolation of the estates makes them even more vulnerable to exploitation, making 
escape difficult or impossible and granting gatos and site foremen effective impunity.53 Most landowners 
are absentee. 
During the process of recruitment, transportation, and then during work, workers are slowly drowned 
in debt. They may be given ‘credit’ to pay for their own transport, accommodation, equipment, and 
to buy food from the company or estate store (barracão) at hugely inflated prices. Once they arrive at 
the worksite, they are employed in dangerous work including land-clearing, charcoal burning, fencing, 
cattle husbandry, applying pesticides and, where women are recruited, domestic duties around worker 
camps. Accommodation and sanitation are frequently abominable, and safety equipment and medical 
support rudimentary.54 Their personal documents are removed ‘for safekeeping’. Often they are guarded 
by armed guards or private militias, who frequently work with corrupt local police to identify and return 
escaped workers. Since many of these estates are on land of questionable legal title, disputes are frequent, 
often quite violent, and contribute to local corruption. Homicide rates are high, and prosecution rates 
low.55
The work is often for a limited period, after which workers may be released – often with significant 
under-payment, due to the ‘debts’ they incur while working. If the ‘debt’ is not repaid, they may be 
detained and forced to labour until it is.56 Once released, they may return to the north-eastern States – 
often only to be recruited back to Amazon and southwest, in a ‘pendular’ pattern. Others – the so-called 
peões de trecho, literally ‘stretch peons’ – do not return home, but continue on, circulating continuously 
in search of such contract work. They become highly dependent on gatos to broker their access to work 
and income, and sometimes have their ‘debts’ sold on from one gato to another.57 
Exploiter strategies
Who are the exploiters of these vulnerable cattle ranch workers? And how and why do they exploit them? 
Although large estates and wealthy farmers have been connected to many slavery cases, a considerable 
portion of those rescued come from mid-sized ranches, often owned by wealthy individuals and 
independent entrepreneurs who may be invested in several estates. This is the point at which 
competition on labour costs is fiercest. There are a large number of these small, under-capitalized 
producers, competing on price for sales to slaughterhouses and processing facilities, which, having 
become significantly fewer through the process of consolidation since 2008, are now price-makers. 
Here is small ‘Landowner A’, interviewed by Nicola Phillips and Leonardo Sakamoto:
In fact, what happens is monopoly [by meat-packing companies]. They don’t really 
give our product the value it has. They pay little [...] they end up making a lot of money 
on the backs of producers. … There are always companies that shut down and leave 
debts to producers. Then we don’t know if they are not paying on purpose or if they 
really paid a high price for the producer’s meat and now they can’t sell it for a price 
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that is enough to remain in business….The best meat-packing company is the one that 
steals less from you … All producers, all colleagues tell the same story. “Well, the guy 
exploited me. I sent it to such and such a buyer and they exploited me”. 
Since they rely on labour-intensive methods, labour cost is the main site of competition for these 
smaller and mid-size producers.58 Some resort to coercion to reduce these costs, blaming it on their 
own ‘exploitation’ by the larger meat-packing companies. They capture the resulting savings as profits. 
As Phillips and Sakamoto explain: “The money that would have been made in wages and other benefits 
to workers under non-exploitative labour relations flows instead to rural producers and/or into … the 
value chain to which the ranch is connected.”59 The competitive dynamics are similar to those in the 
Brazilian coffee sector:
Small farms rely primarily on family labor for harvest and other key farming activities. 
Many large estates, by contrast, have the capability to mechanize many of the key 
coffee farming functions, reducing their labor demand significantly. Furthermore, 
large estates participate in international markets more than smaller ones and are 
increasingly seizing opportunities created by voluntary sustainability standards and 
other third-party certifications that create incentives for compliance with national 
labor laws. Mid-sized farms are caught in the middle: they are big enough to generate 
significant demand for unskilled labor beyond what the family can provide, especially 
during harvest, but may not be big enough to justify the capital investment necessary 
for the kinds of mechanized operations that reduce labor demand.60
Purchasers – slaughterhouses, meat-packing plants and retailers – can safely turn a blind eye to coercive 
labour practices in their supply chains for several reasons. First, their numerous, highly dispersed 
processing facilities are often far from inspectors’ eyes. (This is partly a product of poor infrastructure, 
which prevents centralization of processing facilities due to high freight costs and long transport times.61) 
Brazil is a world leader in labour inspections – though the resulting fines, despite being relatively low, 
often go unpaid. Even where they are paid, their small size means they can effectively be treated as a 
cost of doing business by large processing firms.62 Second, purchasers can claim, reasonably, not to have 
visibility beyond the first tier of their suppliers – and often these are ranchers that specialize in fattening 
steers for slaughter, having bought the cattle from primary producers operating on or closer to the 
agricultural frontier. It is on those estates, lower in the supply chain, that the clearing and pastoral work 
that employs much of the slave labour in the industry occurs. And third, it is not the owners of those 
estates, but the gatos and foremen to whom they outsource workforce recruitment and management 
that execute this strategy.63 Confronted with evidence of slavery on their estates, landowners frequently 
point the finger of blame at gatos, disavowing knowledge of their methods. 
Estate owners do not leave their ability to rely on labour coercion to chance, however. They work hard 
on what Andrew Crane describes (see Chapter 2 above) as ‘domain maintenance’,65 protecting their 
own autonomy by corrupting local police. There are numerous reports of rural police forces returning 
fugitive slaves to estates.66 Slavers also intimidate local communities into silence, a technique common 
in organized crime. As a labour inspector described:
In one particular municipality we could only reach estates by boat, but the owners 
of the boats refused to transport us, out of fear of retaliation… Even the fact that the 
Federal Police were present did not make it certain that we would not have problems. 
At times it became difficult even to get accommodation, because the hotel owners 
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were also frightened of reprisals. There… even the judge himself was involved with an 
air taxi enterprise that was used to transport forced labourers to estates… 67
Gatos and employers also keep workers subjugated by drawing on traditional social norms around 
honour and obligation to create moral dependency. Rescued slaves describe a paternalistic hierarchy 
of labour relations that an important ILO study in 2009 described as “simultaneously affectionate and 
hierarchical. The ambiguity that exists here can also be attributed to a cultural model of exploitation 
originating in the colonial period.”68 This is a system of non-State governmentality that endows employers 
with paternalistic authority and treats workers as quasi-family members. As Patricia Trindade explains: 
Friendship and intimacy were possible between both parties but this did not prevent 
mistreatment from occurring, nor did it result in more participation by slaves in the 
social order that they had created and helped to maintain. The expression ‘they were 
like family”, used by masters in the region to describe relations with slaves in the past, 
was typical of this. Captivity was in fact twofold, with slaves being kept in their place 
by a sense of gratitude at their apparent inclusion in the family circle, as well as by 
the physical domination exercised over them. This double captivity, which originally 
served to subordinate enslaved Africans, continued to exist after the abolition of 
slavery and remains a characteristic of today’s labour relations, in terms of both 
domestic service and the instances of modern-day slave labour that have occurred in 
the region in the recent past.69
One aspect of this tradition is the concept of the criado – literally, ‘created’, in the archaic sense of one 
person being another’s ‘creature’. The criado is not a cativo (‘captive’, the term used for chattel slaves), 
but rather an individual informally adopted in childhood by a rich family to perform tasks linked to 
childcare and domestic work, without pay:
The criado looks after the household and its children, and feels looked after by the 
employer’s family. The affection inherent in this situation is transformed into a feeling 
of debt and gratitude that morally imprisons the worker in the relationship, time after 
time preventing him or her from asking for wages or better working conditions.70
Today’s slavers often describe their role in similar paternalistic and protective terms, and slaves as 
dependents – not agents in their own right. This domestic, highly exploitative governmentality serves 
to construct a psychological and moral cage that helps keep workers trapped. As Trindade explains: 
“Running away is to refuse to recognize the ‘moral debt’ owed to the employer, who took in and helped 
(or promised to help) the worker at a time of need.”71 
This sense of inter-personal obligation may be weaker in work situations where there is no intimate 
relationship between the worker and the employer/landowner, but still seems to linger in the accounts 
of rescued Brazilian slaves as a strong ethical sense of duty to repay debts to the gato and the fazenda.72 
Indeed, peões appear to undergo a process of acculturation and normalization to these arrangements 
over time, leading to the ‘pendular’ pattern of labour migration and exploitation amongst older workers.73 
Younger workers may be less psychologically dependent and more likely to defect and escape. Zé Pereira 
himself has pointed out that it was the fact that he was unaccustomed to the coercion he experienced 
at Espírito Santo that made it thinkable for him to attempt to escape. The central lesson, however, is 
that the system renders workers so psychologically dependent that they lose all sense of agency, they 
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undergo a sort of social death, in Orlando Patterson’s term.74 When they are liberated, they speak in 
terms of new life, new agency. As one enslaved man on the Brasil Verde farm said: “When the police 
arrived, I got courage. I got a new soul.”75
Disruption and resistance 
The Pereira case unleashed a series of efforts in Brazil to disrupt slavery. These were led by its 
government, but also involved civil society actors, the private sector, and key development partners, 
notably the ILO, US and Norway.76 The efforts ranged from strengthening law enforcement, to restricting 
access of firms connected to slavery to government finance, to awareness raising, data analysis and 
technical assistance. This effort, over 25 years, is arguably the most sustained, sophisticated domestic 
anti-slavery effort by any country in recent times. Between 1995 and 2000, it has rescued over 55,000 
people from conditions of slavery. 
It is important to understand why this effort has been so successful. Yet it is also important to understand 
the limits of that success. First, it is important to recognize that those rescued are just a small fraction of 
all those who have likely been enslaved in Brazil during that period. The Global Slavery Index estimates 
there are around 369,000 people enslaved in Brazil in any given year.77 So even if there has been minimal 
turnover in that population in the last 25 years, those rescued represent only around 15 in every 100 
people enslaved. And since some of these rescues have been the same person being rescued more than 
once, while there are also reasons to believe that the population of those affected changes over time, it 
is likely that these 55,000 rescues represent significantly less than one third of the affected population. 
Second, it is important to recognize that these disruption efforts have lost some momentum in recent 
years. Figure 23, above, shows a clear growth of rescues from 1995 to around 2007, followed by a 
decline. Our research interviews suggest this is not a result of a decline in the affected population, but 
rather a function of steadily declining support (financial and political) for mobile labour inspections. 
As the disruption strategy successfully raised the costs of association with slave labour, it engendered 
resistance. This took the form of a counter-mobilization (using Choi-Fitzpatrick’s typology of resistance) 
by those who benefited from the political economy of slavery, through judicial, political and extra-judicial 
channels. Changing political dynamics have affected the State’s appetite for continued disruption. As 
a result, there appears to be growing emphasis in Brazil on the need for business actors, including 
off-shore lead firms and investors, to drive transformation of the governance of value chains in which 
modern slavery arises – rather than for the State to drive disruption. 
In this sub-section we explain how these dynamics of intervention and resistance have played out, and 
what insights they offer for development actors going forward. 
Mobilizing to disrupt slavery
The Catholic Church has played a long, complex but important role in challenging exploitative political 
economies in Latin America. In the 1970s and 1980s, Brazilian civil society, the Catholic Church and the 
CPT, led by Brother Xavier Plassat, a Dominican friar, were at the forefront of anti-slavery advocacy 
both within Brazil and internationally. In the early 1990s, these efforts, also involving Anti-Slavery 
International, led to the first National Programme to Eradicate Forced Labour (Programa Nacional de 
Erradicação do Trabalho Forçado). 
It was the lodging of the Pereira complaint in the OAS system in 1994, however, that arguably jolted the 
executive into meaningful action. In 1995, the Brazilian Government acknowledged before the UN Human 
Rights Committee that there was forced labour in Brazil,78 and moved to establish an Executive Group 
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to Combat Slave Labour (Grupo Executivo de Combate ao Trabalho Escravo, GERTRAF). This brought 
together the Ministries of Justice, Environment, Water Resources and the Legal Amazon, Agriculture 
and Supply, Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Agrarian Policy, and Welfare and Social Assistance, 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MTE). GERTRAF strengthened 
labour inspections, particularly through the creation of the Special Inspection Mobile Group (Grupo 
Especial de Fiscalização Móvel), based in the Ministry of Labour, comprising labour inspectors, federal 
police officers, labour prosecutors and, occasionally, federal highway police officers.79 These teams carry 
out surprise inspections, usually on the basis of information provided by workers, unions or labour 
rights organizations, reporters and civil society bodies. When inspectors determine there are workers 
suffering conditions of slavery, they ‘rescue’ them (see Figure 23, above), discharging them from service 
and often requiring employers to provide back-pay. In some cases rescued workers are also eligible for 
training or other services to support reintegration into the legal economy.80 
Lessons learned from several years of mobile inspections led to the creation of mobile courts in 2002. 
This transformed how inspections played out. Orders could be issued on the spot, with landowners’ 
assets frozen or even confiscated and used to pay enslaved workers stolen wages on the spot.81 A labour 
prosecutor describes what happened in one rescue of enslaved workers:
I filed the petition, requested blocking of funds and, on the spot, the judge granted the 
request, connected to the Internet and blocked R$ 110,000 in the landowner’s account. 
The same day, around 6 p.m., a small plane arrived at the estate bringing R$ 110,000 
in cash, duly converted, and payment of the 92 workers began. Starting at around 7 
p.m. and carrying on all through the night, until about 5 a.m., when the final payments 
were made.82
This represents a powerful disruption of the slavers’ ‘domain’, bringing the State’s protection and 
governmentality directly to workers.
In 2003 a new approach emerged, which sought to go further. President Lula settled the Pereira case, with 
the Brazilian State accepting responsibility, and coordinated the Congressional pay-out described at the 
beginning of this section. The settlement agreement also committed the States to a variety of preventive 
measures, including programmes to monitor and repress forced labour in Brazil, and to raise awareness. 
Following that settlement, with the support of the ILO and development partners including the U.S. and 
Norway, the government rolled out a series of measures aimed at institutionalizing cooperation between 
civil society, Government ministries and business to promote awareness of slavery and anti-slavery 
efforts, and to raise the reputational costs of association with slavery.83 
Two initiatives proved particularly significant. The first was the institutionalization of multi-stakeholder 
dialogue and action to promote responsible business conduct. In September 2002 the Brazilian 
Government had established a multi-sectoral Commission for the Eradication of Slave Labour (Comissão 
Nacional de Erradicação do Trabalho Escravo – CONATRAE).84 In 2003, with technical support from the 
ILO, CONATRAE developed and published a National Plan to Eradicate Slave Labour (Plano Nacional 
de Erradicação do Trabalho Escravo). This committed both government and civil society actors to 76 
different actions, ranging from strengthening mobile inspections to training, awareness-raising, and 
legal reforms. In 2005 this was formalized as a National Pact, signed by a range of 100 government, civil 
society and, crucially, business entities, who committed to modernize labour relations in production 
chains, avoid doing business with firms found to have used slave labour, monitor and report on progress, 
and work to prevent and address modern slavery.85 That number later swelled to more than 400 entities, 
representing a third of Brazil’s GDP.86 Signatories included large firms exposed to Brazilian value chains, 
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including Cargill, Carrefour, Dow, McDonald’s and Walmart. Supporters argued that the Pact led to 
numerous divestment actions where signatories found commercial partners represented an excessive 
modern slavery risk.87 
The second key piece of this approach grew out of this plan. It was a register of employers found 
through inspections to have used slave labour, established by Decree No. 1.234 on 17 November 2003.88 
This blacklist came to be known as the lista suja, or ‘dirty list’. The inspectors’ findings trigger a review 
process during which employers have a right of response. The list is updated every six months. Names 
stay on the list for two years, during which time the firm is expected to undertake certain remedial 
actions identified by the labour inspectors (relating to labour management practices), after which they 
are removed from the list. 
The consequences of inclusion in this list were initially limited to reputational damage. Inclusion does 
not constitute a legal ‘conviction’. But over subsequent years, the list has been used in increasingly 
creative ways to restrict the participation of listed entities in capital markets and commerce. Many 
slaughterhouses refused to purchase from producers included on the list. And from as early as 2003, 
the federal authorities required that disbursement of certain development finances within Brazil 
be restricted for those on the list.89 Private lenders were not obliged to refrain from financing those 
on the list, but increasingly began to do so, to avoid reputational damage and complications in their 
own commercial relationships with government financing entities.90 The Banco do Brasil, Banco da 
Amazônia, Banco do Nordeste and BNDES all took this approach. Given the significant role that these 
entities played at the time in the Brazilian financial sector, this began to have significant implications for 
entities connected to the dirty list.91 Some observers believe that these measures began to translate into 
measurable impacts on company stock prices, with inclusion on the lista suja corresponding to drops 
in stock price.92 
This disruption has slowly taken on added legal force. The Federal Labor Prosecution service has sued 
several private banks that appear to have violated a stipulation not to extend government-subsidized 
credit to clients on the dirty list. And in 2013 the Brazilian state of São Paulo adopted a law (the ‘Lei 
Bezerra’) that suspends for 10 years the sales tax collection authority of any business convicted on 
grounds of using forced labour.93 Since that is a necessary factor for doing business in the state, this has 
the effect of barring these enterprises from doing business in Brazil’s most populous state and financial 
centre. And it also effectively makes it illegal for financial institutions to support those operations’ 
activities in that marketplace during that period. In 2018, a major Brazilian fashion brand, M. Officer, 
was found guilty of using slave-like labour and faced potential expulsion from the state for 10 years.94
The organizations involved in the Pact also used the lista suja as a basis for more detailed risk analysis 
and campaigning, with a particular focus on the cattle industry. In 2004, with the support of the National 
Secretariat of Human Rights, the ILO and Repórter Brasil, a leading anti-slavery NGO, carried out a study 
to identify the specific production chains exposed to the entities on the dirty list. Another study was 
carried out in 2007, with a particular focus on the cattle production chain. In the same year, the Brazilian 
Roundtable on Sustainable livestock (Grupo de Trabalho da Pecuaria Sustentavel) was established as a 
voluntary multi-stakeholder initiative to bring together financial institutions, restaurants, retailers, 
NGOs and universities, industry producers and service providers.95 Greenpeace also drew attention to 
the environmental impacts and labour rights violations in the cattle industry in its 2009 report A Farra 
do Boi na Amazônia (‘Slaughtering the Amazon’).96 These initiatives brought increased international 
attention to these issues and started to attract the attention of major investors. In June 2009, the IFC 
withdrew a USD 90 million loan to Bertin, one of the top Brazilian meatpacking businesses.97 In October 
2009, Brazil’s four largest meatpacking companies, JBS, Marfrig, Minerva and Bertin signed a zero 
deforestation agreement with Greenpeace that also included a commitment to divest from suppliers on 
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the lista suja, or ‘dirty list’.98 In 2010, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s office (MPF) led a ‘Legal Beef’ (Carne 
Legal) awareness-raising campaign directed at consumers, in an effort to raise the reputational cost of 
exposure to the dirty list.
Counter-mobilizing resistance
Brazil’s mobilization against slavery was resisted from early on through counter-mobilization. This 
has taken two forms: both uncoordinated subversion by business actors seeking to avoid inspection 
and executive disruption of their coercive business models; and, increasingly through more concerted 
counter-mobilization in judicial, legislative and executive channels. 
Subversion can take more or less coercive forms. It has proven relatively easy for ranchers to work 
around the dirty list through front companies.99 One rancher found to have used slave labour bypassed 
the list by selling the ranch in question and buying a new one in his daughter’s name.100 In the early 
days, inspection plans were frequently leaked by corrupted officials, though that has abated over time.101 
The ILO has documented various instances of cover-ups and subversion to avoid enforcement of anti-
slavery norms.102 And there have been repeated intimidation and even attacks on officials and civil 
society actors involved in anti-slavery efforts, including assassinations.103 Some of this may have ties 
to the cattle industry: in 2015, false advertisements maligning the founder of Repórter Brasil, Leonardo 
Sakamoto, were placed online – and later reported to be linked to JBS, though JBS denied it.104
This pattern of subversion has not only undermined accountability for slave labour in Brazil, but also 
normalized organized contestation of enforcement efforts through judicial channels. In 2002, the 
Labour Court issued the first conviction for slave labour.105 In 2004, another court set a crucial precedent 
by requesting the seizure of an estate on which slave labour had been used. But relatively few slave 
labour cases lead to convictions. And Brazil lacks a unified database to track allegations. Only one in 
three violations identified by the Special Mobile Inspection Group seems to lead to prosecution.106 Even 
in the celebrated Pereira case, the landowner who owned the estate and whose employees murdered 
Paraná was never punished – instead transferring blame to the gatos that had recruited the workers.107 
Once the dirty list was enacted, the National Farming Confederation filed suit at the Supreme Court 
to contest its constitutionality. While this suit was unsuccessful, the tactic was repeated with more 
success in 2014 by the Civil Construction Association. That case succeeded in obtaining the suspension 
of the official publication of the list on due process grounds. As a result, the Labour Ministry stopped 
updating the list until 2016 when another Supreme Court decision authorised the list to be published 
again. (In the meantime, a multi-stakeholder group that had emerged from the National Pact, including 
Repórter Brasil, bravely used freedom of information laws to obtain the results of labour inspections 
and publish these itself as an unofficial ‘Transparency List’.) The Civil Construction took the list back to 
court in 2019, but in September 2020 the Supreme Court once again – and unanimously – affirmed the 
constitutionality of the lista suja. 
The period from 2008 also saw the growth of the “political attacks and public criticism” of anti-slavery 
efforts noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Gulnara Shahinian, back 
in 2011.108 The Special Rapporteur noted the significant political power of agrarian interests at multiple 
levels of government in Brazil. Local government officials, she wrote, were reported to be “one of the 
biggest obstacles to combating forced labour”, finding that “some senior government officials were 
themselves sometimes involved in the practice of slave labour”.109 A 2009 ILO study likewise found that:
The roots of the situation regarding impunity for the use of slave labour, deforestation 
and other crimes lie in the links between landowners and the federal, State and 
municipal authorities. Many landowners exercise power and influence within various 
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national bodies, either directly, by holding political office in prefectures, municipal 
legislative chambers, State governments and the National Congress, or indirectly, 
through close links with individuals in public office who represent their interests.110 
Political counter-mobilization has manifested in particular through opposition to an effort at 
constitutional reform. In 1995, anti-slavery actors proposed a constitutional amendment in federal 
Congress (PEC 438/01) to allow the expropriation of estates, without compensation, where slave labour 
is used. The land was to be redistributed, with former slaves receiving priority access to the land. Rural 
interests mobilized in the Federal Senate to delay the bill, and it was not until 2014, after significant 
popular mobilization and advocacy, plus negotiation and compromise on the text, that the amendment 
was adopted.111 Yet as of the time of writing, no implementing regulations have been approved, and 
debate over those regulations has become the site of contestation between pro-business and pro-
worker forces.112 
The cattle industry has become deeply entwined in Brazilian federal politics over the last two decades. 
JBS was reportedly the largest political donor in the 2014 elections – to parties on different sides of 
politics. Some elements of the administration of President Lula fought to strengthen anti-slavery efforts, 
while others sought to protect agribusiness from those efforts.113 Starting under President Rousseff, 
successive administrations have reduced the budgets for labour inspections and prosecution related 
to slave labour.114 President Temer made a member of the beef lobby his minister of justice, and both 
Presidents Temer and Bolsonaro drew political support from hundreds of Congressional deputies with 
ties to agribusiness and agrarian interests.115 Even the downfall of President Temer served to underline 
the power of the cattle industry in Brazilian politics: he fell as a result of the release of a secret recording, 
made by a senior JBS executive, in which President Temer could be heard agreeing to JBS bribing 
another, earlier Brazilian President. His successor, President Bolsonaro, took direct aim at PEC 438/01 in 
his election manifesto,116 and has criticized the amendment, suggesting that it was part of a larger effort 
to turn Brazil into a ‘communist’ state and arguing that labour standards should, if anything, be made 
more flexible to ensure Brazil’s commercial competitiveness.117 The Bolsonaro Government has also 
supported counter-legislation seeking to redefine the conduct considered to amount to ‘slave labour’ 
under Brazilian law, specifically questioning the reliability of definitions in relevant ILO Conventions.118 
From disruption to transformation
The organized opposition to anti-slavery efforts that has emerged in Brazil over the last decade has in 
turn induced a subtle but important shift from anti-slavery actors. The focus of efforts between 1995 
and 2010 was on increasing the reputational, legal and financial costs of the use of slave labour – what 
we term, in Chapter 2, a ‘disruption’ strategy. Since around 2014, efforts have arguably shifted to put 
more emphasis on what we term, in Chapter 2, ‘transformation’: strengthening governance of settings 
in which exploitation occurs – in this case, in the context of supply chains. 
This approach places more emphasis on business leadership, and less on State intervention. In 2014, 
the National Pact to Eradicate Slave Labour was institutionalized by the creation of the Institute for the 
National Pact to Eradicate Slave Labour, or InPACTO. This is a trade-oriented partnership focused on 
collaborative efforts amongst its dues-paying members committed to the terms and objectives of the 
National Pact. Where the National Pact was governed by a steering committee that included the ILO, 
InPACTO is governed by a Board of Directors from different parts of the Brazilian economy. InPACTO 
creates sector-specific working groups to foster pre-competitive collaboration to improve sustainability, 
undertakes data collection and analysis, and provides performance measurement and benchmarking. It 
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has worked with JBS to develop a social vulnerability risk-monitoring tool which has been rolled out in 
JBS’ value chain to identify hot spots where there is heightened risk of modern slavery.119 This combines 
JBS’ own risk data with socio-economic, demographic and case data from InPACTO and public sources. 
The system generates publicly available municipal-level data and, for JBS, higher definition data that 
allows it to place its processing facilities and supplier farms in different risk categories, to guide its own 
internal social audits and supply chain management.120 Yet there are also risks that such approaches 
have a limited preventive effect.121
Lessons and opportunities 
Brazil’s efforts to address modern slavery over the last 25 years are world-leading. The successes, 
limitations and dynamics of those efforts, reviewed above, point to several important lessons, and to 
opportunities for development actors in the years ahead. 
First, the Brazilian Governments’ efforts to tackle modern slavery in the last quarter-century are 
marked by a clear strategic tension: between a commitment to reduce modern slavery and promotion 
of a development model that has created conditions in some ways conducive to modern slavery. This 
is particularly the result of promotion of extensive, often informal, agriculture at the Amazonian 
frontier. But it is also arguably the result of investment of such large volumes of development funds in 
meatpacking sector ‘national champions’ that they have not only become oligopsonistic but, at times, 
seemed to operate with effective impunity. The Brazilian State has thus both sought to curtail the 
worst impulses of the market while also promoting a development pathway that reproduces the risks 
associated with the market.122 
The lesson here is that this is not necessarily something that should surprise us. States are not monolithic, 
and democratically governed States’ development pathways may well run in more of a zigzag than a 
straight line. Actors that have grown rich and powerful from systems based in part on modern slavery 
will use those riches and that power to resist efforts by the State, and by its foreign partners, to intervene 
in the system. Development actors must expect interventions to address modern slavery to become 
politicized and, at times, to be dangerous for those involved. 
Second, however, this also points us to opportunities for economic upgrading to a more intensive 
agriculture-based development pathway. Slavery risks in the Brazilian cattle industry are often 
connected to the extensive agriculture model. Investments in upgrading production to more intensive 
methods, rationalizing the use of raw materials and productivity of land could go hand in hand with both 
environmental gains and improved workforce management and human capital development. It would 
likely also bring production closer to small and medium size urban centres, reducing the isolation of 
workers, facilitating inspection and thereby reducing modern slavery risks.123
Third, the Brazilian experience points to the importance of the involvement of international norms and 
actors to reframe domestic debates. The Pereira and Brasil Verde cases in the IACtHR have both provided 
important jolts to the framing of debates on modern slavery within Brazil, reminding local actors that 
what is at stake is not only a question of domestic labour market regulation, but also the country’s good 
standing as a responsible member of international society.124 UN actors – including the Human Rights 
Committee, UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, and especially the ILO – have 
played key roles as sources of insight, technical know-how and support to the Brazilian Government and 
other actors throughout this period, especially through support to the National Pact.
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Fourth, the experience points to the central role that multi-stakeholder dialogue and action plays to build 
support for and sustain momentum around the kinds of interventions involved in addressing modern 
slavery. Yet the Brazilian experience also arguably suffers a particular limitation here: that dialogue has 
been distinctly national. It has not sought to engage foreign actors or to work along global value chains 
in any significant way. This may have worked against Brazilian actors’ interests, since it puts them at 
the mercy of foreign buyers and investors, as China’s recent decision to exclude JBS and the decision 
of Europe’ largest financial services group, Nordea Asset Management, to divest from JBS both show.125 
In several of the case studies in the Chapters that follow – notably on palm oil, cotton and apparel – we 
explore what more transnational approaches to transformation of supply chain governance look like – 
and the challenges they encounter.
Fifth, those experiences may offer ideas for a different approach to responsible business conduct that 
development actors could promote in Brazil, including in the cattle industry,with a particular focus on 
data-driven supply chain risk analysis. Brazil arguably has an unrecognized first-mover advantage in 
this area: its unique combination of 25 years of detailed data from rescues and State service provision 
to rescued populations, combined with its strong computational and data analysis capabilities. It is 
uniquely placed to develop effective big data solutions to effective social risk management in complex 
supply chains. 
The groundwork for such an approach has arguably already been laid, first through Repórter Brasil’s 
detailed work on supply chains, then through the ILO’s support to the Ministry of Labour (MPT) for 
the development of the SmartLab (smartlabbr.org) and other related initiatives. The SmartLab has 
developed an Observatory (smartlabbr.org/trabalhoescravo) that draws together much of this public 
data to generate powerful data insights. Other actors are also developing initiatives in this space: United 
Nations University, the University of Nottingham and Stanford University are all using Brazilian data 
for data-oriented research on modern slavery. Brazilian civil society organizations have called for 
greater use of supply chain sanitation documents (GTAs – Guia de Trânsito Animal) to track bovine meat 
supply. Trase, a research partnership between the Stockholm Environment Institute and Global Canopy 
analyses public data to trace modern slavery risk in the cattle industry down to the municipal level, 
allowing it to identify which purchasers (Brazilian buyers, Hong Kong and Russia) have the highest risk 
exposure in their value chains.126 
Sixth, there may be an opportunity here for Brazil to show leadership in sustainable finance, as a developer 
of insights into effective social risk identification and management, particularly in fragmented supply 
chains where lead firms rely on complex indirect supply. Stoked by efforts such as the Liechtenstein 
Initiative for Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking, ESG investors have a growing appetite to 
understand the indicators (whether leading or lagging) of modern slavery risk exposure, and to 
understand what works to manage those risks in their portfolios, loan books and deal making. The Dirty 
List and the ecosystem of financial exclusion practices that have grown up around it, in both public 
and private financial entities, provide unique opportunities for understanding these dynamics, and for 
moving beyond consumer-oriented advocacy – which tends to work best for brand-exposed firms such 
as retailers, and less well for middlemen such as meatpacking firms.127
Seventh and finally, it is also noticeable what is largely absent from the Brazilian anti-slavery approach 
over the last 25 years: empowerment. The central thrust of anti-slavery interventions has arguably been a 
strategy of disruption: raising the costs of use of forced and slave labour. More recently there has been 
greater emphasis on transformation of supply chain governance. All of this takes place in the context 
of larger initiatives, especially from the ILO and other development agencies, to promote decent work, 
empower and protect workers and empower the rural poor. Notable gains have been made, for example, 
through the Government’s Bolsa Familia income support strategy. But these empowerment-oriented 
initiatives have complemented anti-slavery efforts, rather than being central to them or shaping targeting 
of interventions at the municipal or even household level. 
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This may be a missed opportunity. It is notable, for example, that the single factor that seems to be 
the strongest predictor of being rescued from slavery in Brazil is access to education and literacy. As 
Phillips notes, a full 68.13 per cent of workers released between 2003 and 2009 were either illiterate or 
had no more than four years of schooling, and overall adult illiteracy levels in key source towns were 
substantially above national average.128 Reduced economic agency has many facets. It may be worth 
investigating the dimensions of multidimensional poverty that render people vulnerable to enslavement 
to Brazil – such as exclusion from education, land and credit, and outside livelihood options – and 
targeting interventions narrowly to address those deficiencies in niche populations, rather than to 
address broad structural deficiencies such as general income poverty. This may offer a more efficient 
approach to use of development resources. 
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CHAPTER 4: PALM OIL: “SO FREE IT IS 
VICIOUS”
There are notable similarities between the modern slavery system embedded in the Brazilian cattle 
supply chain and the forced labour, human trafficking and child labour that has been identified in recent 
years in the global palm oil value chain. Both sectors have seen spectacular growth in recent decades with 
positive impacts on economic growth for producing countries. Both sectors are connected to harmful 
deforestation, as well as labour exploitation. Both value chains have seen a growing concentration of 
buying power generating incentives for producers to compete on costs, and since both agricultural 
commodities – beef and oil palm – involve labour-intensive production, labour management is a central 
site of cost competition. Both sectors rely on vulnerable populations to provide that labour. And both 
sectors have, as we shall see in this Chapter, witnessed first a mobilization of a multi-stakeholder 
coalition to promote sustainability goals, followed by the counter-mobilization of producers and their 
political allies to protect the rents they extract from the existing system. 
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Yet risks in the palm oil value chain differ significantly across production contexts. In this chapter we 
look at three: Indonesia, the largest producer of palm oil in the world, where risks relate primarily to 
forced and child labour amongst the casual labour force on plantations and smallholdings, especially 
amongst indigenous people and internal migrants; Malaysia, where risks are connected in particular to 
foreign migrant workers and ‘Stateless’ children; and Nigeria, where risks relate to adverse incorporation 
of smallholders into export-oriented plantation systems. There are also differences between the beef 
and oil palm sectors in the dynamics of intervention and resistance. Whereas those dynamics in Brazil 
have played out largely in a domestic context, the struggle over governance of palm oil value chains 
has been a much more transnational process. This has brought State actors more squarely into the 
‘domain maintenance’ process, with the debate over the sustainability of palm oil becoming an inter-
State struggle over the sustainability narrative, sovereignty and regulatory authority.
This sub-section presents the results of mixed-methods research including both in-depth desk 
research and interviews with 54 stakeholders from the development sector, civil society, academia, and 
the private sector. In the interest of safeguarding, the identity of interview subjects is not disclosed. We 
explore how the modern slavery system embedded in the global palm oil sector manifests in different 
ways depending on different institutional contexts, the differences in people’s vulnerabilities, and 
different exploiter strategies. We then look at how efforts to address these risks and related sustainable 
development concerns have played out in the last two decades, how they have been resisted and how they 
are now evolving. We close with a discussion of the insights from this case for the broader discussion of 
the sustainable development case for fighting modern slavery. This calls for a coordinated public policy 
approach to managing modern slavery risks across governance forums and finance, aiming not only 
to promote labour market freedom, but to develop that freedom through empowerment of vulnerable 
people. 
Fuel for growth or unsustainable scourge? 
The African oil palm, Elaeis guineensis, is adaptable to a range of soils, growing methods and uses, and 
is relatively aseasonal.1 Oil palm has numerous commercial advantages when compared to other vegetal 
oils (soy, rapeseed, sunflower, cotton, groundnuts, olives). It produces a relatively high volume of oil and 
both the fruit flesh and the kernel can be processed and marketed. Oil palms can produce year-round, 
with mature trees yielding three or four harvests annually. It is a relatively low-maintenance crop which 
bears fruit from around the third year of growth, for 20 years. All of this makes palm oil relatively low 
cost when compared to other oils. And palm oil products have a high smoke point and are semi-solid at 
room temperature, making them useful in a range of products. So long as it can be quickly milled after 
harvest, oil palm is an exceptionally profitable crop.
For these reasons, palm oil was identified over 50 years ago as a potentially powerful source of economic 
growth, especially for tropical developing countries where wages are low and labour is abundant. Oil 
palm production employs large numbers of rural workers, supports livelihoods for those who own the 
oil palms (including smallholders), and can contribute important tax and foreign exchange revenue for 
producing countries.2 Since the 1960s, global development actors including the World Bank have worked 
to promote palm oil production in suitable equatorial conditions worldwide, especially South East Asia, 
West and Central Africa and, more recently, Latin America.3 In 1965, the World Bank injected nearly USD 2 
billion into over 45 projects in Southeast Asia, Africa, and parts of Latin America to support the growth of 
the palm oil industry. Indonesia received USD 618.8 million, Nigeria received USD 451.5 million followed 
by Malaysia with USD 383.5 million.4 Development actors have also subsequently invested further down 
the value chain, including IFC support for trade finance5 and refining.6
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The results of public and private sector investment have been significant. Palm oil production has grown 
more than 500 per cent in the last thirty years.7 Today, oil palm plantations cover over 27 million hectares 
worldwide, an area approximately the size of New Zealand. The industry is estimated to be worth USD 
60 billion and employs six million people, with an additional 11 million people indirectly dependent on 
it, particularly in rural areas where jobs can be scarce.8 Palm oil has permeated our food, cosmetics, 
and household products – and is now found in perhaps 50 per cent of consumer products.9 Demand 
grew significantly after food manufacturers began substituting palm oil for other vegetal oils over health 
concerns related to high trans-fat content. It grew again after the EU adopted a biofuel policy in 2009 
that promoted substitution of vegetal oils for fossil fuels, leaping 500 per cent in Europe between 2011 
and 2014.10 And production is expected to double again by 2050,11 as low- and middle-income countries 
increasingly move from eating fresh, minimally processed foods to ultra-processed products.12
Along the way, palm oil has proven to be, as the World Bank put it in 2011, a “major driver of development”.13 
One recent study found that growth in the palm oil sector has lifted up to 2.6 million rural Indonesians 
from poverty this century.14 Another study found that, again in Indonesia, for every 10 per cent increase 
in land devoted to plantation-based oil palm agriculture, there is a 10 per cent reduction in the poverty 
rate, and a narrowing of the poverty gap.15 Oil palm expansion has also been found to boost the value of 
surrounding land, agricultural output, manufacturing output and district GDP, suggesting positive spill-
over effects through local production or consumption linkages.16 
Yet a closer look reveals that the benefits of oil palm development are highly variable. Community 
benefits from the development of industrial-scale oil palm appear less pronounced,17 with communities 
that are already well embedded in the market economy benefitting, but previously forest-dependent 
communities becoming worse off than they would have otherwise.18 Since oil palm is produced for the 
most part in large plantations or by wealthy smallholders using migrant labour, oil palm agriculture may 
lead to increased income disparities and inequality within a region.19
This variability is closely related to the economic geography of oil palm production.20 Maintaining 
the plantation requires a large manual workforce to tend trees, harvest fruit, cultivate and plant new 
seedlings, and replant. It is here, amongst the plantation workforce, that modern slavery, forced and 
child labour tends to occur (as we explore further below). These jobs are dirty, difficult, and dangerous 
(so-called ‘3D work’). Trees are up to twenty metres tall. Each fresh fruit bunch contains 1,000 to 3,000 
fruit – each the size of a small plum – with a bunch weighing 10 to 25 kgs. Workers use long steel poles 
with a sickle (egrek) or with a chisel (dodos) attached, weighing around 12 kg, to cut down the fruit 
bunches, then haul them to collection points.21
Plantations come in various forms, with different risk profiles. Private estates are typically large – 
between 10,000 and 25,000 hectare – owned and operated by one commercial owner. They are usually 
highly industrialized, and generate high yields and profitability. But this approach requires access 
to and control of large amounts of land. So some plantations incorporate outgrowers, smallholders 
who own or lease to buy their own plots, adjacent to a plantation and operating under a long-term 
commercial relationship. This often involves the plantation providing investment, operating capital and 
management guidance to the smallholder in return for single-purchaser arrangements for product, 
not tied to market prices. In a third approach, plantations or mills may simply purchase product in 
the market from independent smallholders. These smallholdings, often family owned and operated, are 
usually less capitalized and generate lower, more seasonal, yields. They are also more exposed to price 
fluctuations and the down-stream influence of processors and mills. In West Africa, there is also a fourth 
tradition, of cooperative production and wild harvest from traditional, pre-industrial groves.
Once harvested, fresh fruit bunches are transported from plantations to mills where they are pressed to 
produce both crude palm oil and crude palm kernel oil. The oil quickly builds up problematic fatty acids 
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if not milled soon after harvesting. The result is that plantations are located as close as possible to mills, 
leading to concentration of feedstock, producing a landscape of palm oil mills surrounded by large-
scale monoculture plantations. 22 This has numerous positive economic spill-overs for the surrounding 
region. It speeds up infrastructure development, including road construction and provision of health 
and educational facilities. It leads to a rise in urbanization, employment, local consumption, and may 
lead to economic diversification.23 It also comes, as we explore further below, with real downsides. 
Some mills are owned by plantations, but other mills operate independently and buy from small-holders 
or on spot markets – introducing some of the same supply chain management challenges for processes 
that we saw in the Brazil cattle industry case study. Mills sell crude palm oil and crude palm kernel oil 
to refineries – large, capital-intensive industrial plants usually located near shipping facilities. Refiners 
typically trade to consumer goods manufacturers who then incorporate palm oil and palm kernel oil 
into a range of products: soaps, cosmetics, foodstuffs and biofuels. Sales and consumption are highly 
fragmented. For example, Unilever, often said to be one of the largest purchasers in the world, buys only 
around 2 per cent of global market supply.24 There are also distinct regional patterns: the bulk of imports 
into Europe were, until recently, for use in biofuels, whereas India and China (the largest single-country 
importers) use palm oil primarily in food products.25 
Processing and refining capabilities are capital-intensive, and like the beef value chain, the palm oil value 
chain is particularly concentrated at this point.26 Between 70 and 90 percent of global refining capacity, 
and trade in refined products, is controlled by just eight companies based in Asia27 The largest of these 
is Wilmar, a Malaysian-origin firm now based in Singapore, which is the world’s largest processor and 
merchandiser of palm and palm kernel oils. It controlled over 43 per cent of the global palm oil trade 
as of 2016.28 Global sales from palm oil exports totalled an estimated USD 23.2 billion in 2019. As Figure 
28 below shows, Asian countries generated the largest palm oil exports during 2019 with shipments 
valued at USD 19.3 billion (83 per cent of the global total). The industry is for this reason seen as an 
example of successful economic upgrading by developing countries.29 It is this development pathway 
that governments in Brazil, Colombia, Liberia, Nigeria and Mexico are now seeking to copy through 
investments in palm oil production.
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This is a convincing narrative associating palm oil economic growth and development. Yet there 
has been a growing recognition over the last two decades that oil palm production also generates 
significant environmental and social costs. Compared to fossil fuels, palm oil offers a radical reduction 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and has for that reason been a key component of global efforts to 
promote biofuels. But there has been a growing recognition of the massive carbon emissions resulting 
from deforestation of land as it is converted to oil palm, and of associated biodiversity loss.30 And 
clearing land for plantations by slash-and-burn practices has led to recurring episodes of harmful haze 
in South-East Asia.31 In addition to the dangers GHG emissions from burning, this comes with significant 
public health costs. South East Asian haze in 2015 led to an estimated 100,000 premature deaths in the 
region from pollutants and documented increases in respiratory, eye and skin diseases.32 The expansion 
of oil palm cultivation can also be associated with land-grabs and adverse incorporation,33 especially 
of indigenous groups and traditional landholders whose land is often appropriated without free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC).34 Finally, as we shall see, there has been a growing recognition in the 
last decade of the modern slavery risks in palm oil value chains – forced labour of plantation workers, 
child labour on plantations and smallholdings, and debt bondage associated with partnerships between 
smallholders and larger plantations. 
As a result, a polarized debate has emerged around palm oil’s contribution to sustainable development, 
with competing narratives alternatively characterizing it as “a gift from god or a crime against humanity”.35 
Palm oil raises difficult questions about how to achieve the SDGs without sacrificing environmental 
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sustainability or human rights in the hunt for economic growth. In the next sub-sections we focus on 
how modern slavery risks emerge in this value chain, before later turning to consideration of how efforts 
to address those risks have contributed to, and been affected, by this larger narrative struggle over palm 
oil’s contribution to sustainable development.
Modern slavery risks in the palm oil industry
The global palm oil industry manifests different modern slavery risks in different places, the result of 
different combinations of institutional environments, people’s vulnerabilities and exploiter strategies.36 
In this section we look at each of these factors in three different countries – the three main targets for 
World Bank investment in palm oil fifty years ago: Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria. 
Institutional environment
The institutional environment in which palm oil production has played out over the last fifty years has 
varied significantly in Malaysia, Indonesia and Nigeria. In each country, both national and sub-national 
authorities have recognized the development potential of the commodity, and worked with private 
sector and development partners to invest in growth. But the results have varied significantly. Where, 
in the 1960s, Nigeria was the largest producer in the world, with Indonesia and Malaysia trailing far 
behind, now the situation is reversed. Indonesia is now the largest producer, with over 50 per cent of 
world supply. Malaysia produces around one third of world supply. And Nigeria is far behind, with less 
than 2 per cent of world supply. One key reason for these different outcomes is the different approach 
that governments have taken, with varying approaches to production incentives, land use, taxation and 
tariffs, and labour market regulation.37 
MALAYSIA
Malaysia is seen as a pioneer of palm oil development. Palm oil is today Malaysia’s most valuable 
agricultural crop and a major contributor to the country’s economy. It accounts for a staggering 70 per 
cent of agricultural land use.38 As Oliver Pye explains, “the relative affluence of Malaysian smallholders 
and the financial success of its modern, agribusiness corporations are envied by many other countries 
from the South.”39 This success is the result of deliberate efforts by government over several decades, 
with close cooperation between the State and private plantation owners to expand plantation production 
and forge a cooperative relationship between plantations and smallholders.40 
Many of the largest holdings in Malaysia, such as those that now belong to Sime Darby, were established 
under British rule and ‘Malaysianized’ in the 1970s, following independence. Plantation workers had 
agitated unsuccessfully for access to land in the 1950s and 1960s.41 Instead, in the 1960s and 1970s the 
Government nationalized the holdings then sold them to local owners,with the Government retaining 
a formal ownership stake in or strong informal ties to the resulting corporations.42 During this 
‘developmental state’ phase, the Government used the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) 
and other initiatives to resettle the poor and landless on smallholdings tied to the major producers 
and diversify agricultural sectoral activities to palm oil and away from rubber, which was declining in 
demand worldwide.43 Under FELDA, smallholders operate estates under a mortgage-like arrangement 
involving scheduled payments before taking full possession. In the meantime, they may be partnered 
with a larger plantation to create economies of scale, giving plantation owners greater market power. 
Similar schemes have been developed both at the federal and state levels. Today, around 60 per cent of 
Malaysia’s estates are private, 18 per cent are on federal land, 6 per cent on state land and 14 per cent are 
independent smallholders.44
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One legacy of this strategy has been close cooperation between the government and the sector to regulate 
the major inputs to the industry, notably land and labour.45 By the 1990s, this pattern of cross-sectoral 
post-Fordist development partnership had been branded the ‘Malaysia Incorporated’ policy’.46 A close 
collaboration between the Ministry of Plantations and Commodities, the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (a 
governmental regulatory body), the Malaysian Palm Oil Association (an alliance of industrialists) and 
the Malaysian Palm Oil Council (a public relations body) formed what some described as a “palm oil 
industrial complex”.47 Ostensibly regulated through light-touch, market-based neoliberal institutions, 
the close informal and patronage ties between the State and large commercial capital interests allowed 
coordination of public and private interests to support capital investment, manage risk, reduce yield 
gaps between plantations and smallholders, and move plantation owners upstream into processing, 
refining and trade.48 Palm companies with strong ties to government have assisted its development 
initiatives undertaking economically risky but strategically attractive projects.49 For example when the 
Sarawak Land Development Board, the government agency in charge of plantation development in 
Sarawak was making substantial losses in 1987, Sime Darby stepped in to assist the State government by 
buying out the management of SLDB and all its plantation assets, including over 24,000 hectares of oil 
palm in 13 estates.50
INDONESIA
This close relationship between the Malaysian Government and palm oil capital has also shaped 
the Indonesian palm oil sector. At the formal level, the Malaysian Government concluded a bilateral 
investment treaty with Indonesia in 1997, in which the Indonesian Government pledged to specially 
allocate 1.5 million hectares of land to Malaysian developers for oil palm development.51 Through 
single investments and joint ventures with local companies, Malaysian and Singaporean groups would 
control more than two-thirds of the total production of Indonesia’s palm oil.52 Malaysian investors 
have sought to replicate in Indonesia the patronage ties they enjoy in Malaysia, hiring local strongmen, 
their relatives, retired three-or four-star Generals, police chiefs or relevant ministry staff as managers, 
special ‘community relations officers’ or ‘government relations officers’.53 The Malaysian Government 
has also facilitated the expansion of private Malaysian interests into Indonesia: it helped establish a 
Jakarta-based lobby group, the Association of Palm Oil Plantation Investors of Malaysia in Indonesia 
(APIMI), which is one of the few private sector bodies permitted to attend yearly bilateral economic talks 
between Malaysia and Indonesia.54 Today, Malaysian firms such as Sime Darby, and Malaysian-origin 
firms such as Wilmar (now relocated to Singapore) have expanded their interests not only to Indonesia, 
but also around the world, with holdings in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, Liberia and 
West Africa, as well as Brazil, Colombia and Peru. 
Indonesia’s palm oil development pathway, while similar to Malaysia’s, has on the whole seen less active 
and directive involvement of State authorities.55 Yet palm oil is now a significant strategic asset for the 
country,56 providing 17 million jobs upstream and downstream, contributing around 12 per cent to the 
country’s total export earnings.57 Palm oil exports were valued at USD 23 billion in 2017 and USD 21 billion 
in 2018.58 Domestically, the price of palm oil for cooking has been a dominant factor in determining the 
inflation rate of Indonesia’s economy.59 And the Indonesian Government derives around USD 2 billion in 
annual tax revenue from the industry.60 
This is the result of deliberate efforts by the government, with encouragement from external development 
partners, including the World Bank.61 The institutional environment in which palm oil production occurs 
in Indonesia has, however, shifted over time, with fluctuating prioritization of economic growth, social 
equity and environmental sustainability goals as different political forces have waxed and waned.62 
Plantation workers started unionizing in the 1930s, but began losing influence from 1957, when Sukarno 
brought the military into plantation management. Plantation workers were amongst those targeted 
in the widespread anti-communist massacres of 1965.63 The New Order (1966–1998) favoured large-
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scale plantation agriculture with a focus on national ownership. Under Reformasi in the late 1990s the 
State began to facilitate selective foreign investment in local plantations. The move to decentralized 
governance in the 2000s transformed investment dynamics, since it gave power over land use to local 
regency governors (bupatis). This created strong incentives for local governments to compete for foreign 
investment, which helped reduce barriers to access to land and probably accelerated deforestation. Each 
year, an area the size of Bali is converted from forest to palm plantations. This has, however, had complex 
impacts, potentially fostering corruption (as we explore further below), and giving rise to recurring 
land disputes, since local authorities have tended to favour larger borrowers over smallholders and 
traditional owners. The Plantations Law No 18 of 2004 gives the plantation owner – not the regency 
government – the responsibility of obtaining consent from existing landowners for surrender of land, 
and permits plantations to use the local security apparatus to maintain security on the estates. A 2007 
Agriculture Ministerial Regulation further extended estates’ power by altering the split of landowning 
between estates and surrounding communities from 70/30 to 80/20, and allowing them to manage those 
smallholder estates themselves (simply paying a rent to smallholders).64
Today, around 53 per cent of Indonesian production takes place on large commercial plantations. Another 
7 per cent occurs on large State plantations. Most Indonesian oil palm plantations (around 66 per cent 
in 2010) are largely concentrated on the island of Sumatra, 30 per cent are located in Kalimantan, 3 per 
cent in Sulawesi and the rest spread across other parts of Indonesia including Java and Papua.65 Of the 
commercial plantation area, about 2.6 million hectares (44 per cent) is owned by the top 20, publicly-
listed companies.66
NIGERIA
Nigeria presents a marked contrast to both Indonesia and Malaysia. African oil palm is endemic. Wild 
palms grow in village groves and secondary regrowth forest in the south of the country, and were 
probably first cultivated around 700 years ago. Cultivation expanded in the mid-nineteenth century 
following the abolition of the slave trade, earning export revenue from soap and candles, tin plating, 
margarine and chocolate, and in explosives. Oil palm expansion was central to colonial economic policy 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, but was based not on plantations but promotion of small-
scale production and export.67 Both social norms around land tenure and government policy resisted 
the plantation model.68 It was only in the 1930s that two foreign oil palm plantations were developed, 
and then on a leasehold arrangement, by a precursor company to Unilever. In 1952 the Eastern region 
reversed this anti-plantation policy, also investing in a shift from traditional milling to higher-yield 
plantation milling. By the early 1960s, Nigeria was the leading exporter of both palm oil and palm kernels, 
with around 45 per cent of the trade.69 From 1975 to 2009, Nigeria remained the second largest recipient 
of funding from the World Bank for palm oil investments with six projects.70 However, only one project 
survived. The rest went bankrupt.71 The European Union also made several significant investments.72 Yet 
today, Nigeria has a tiny fraction of the global trade. Why? 
The World Bank has put Nigeria’s divergence from Indonesia and Malaysia partly down to geological 
and hydrological conditions, but there is little question that it is also due to the divergent institutional 
contexts in the three countries in the intervening half century.73 After independence Nigeria used a 
marketing board for export, but the low prices it demanded discouraged foreign investment in 
processing. The few estates that remained were run by United Africa Company (UAC, now Unilever) and 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation (now CDC, the UK’s development finance institution).74 
Governments promoted some village level palm-oriented settlements, but the strategic environment 
was radically transformed first by the discovery of petroleum in the southeast, which sucked away many 
economic resources, and then by the Nigerian Civil War. Private plantations, except those of UAC, were 
abandoned.
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Mismanagement over the subsequent decades saw the collapse of Nigerian production and exports.75 
During military rule (1970-1999), there were periodic attempts to revive the oil palm plantations, following 
different patterns of private, public or partnership-based ownership as preferences of the day dictated. 
The Palm Oil Marketing Board was abolished in 1986 and import bans were placed on many agricultural 
commodities, stimulating some smallholder production. Structural adjustment policies devalued the 
Naira but promoted food prices and crop production, leading to hybrid production and intercropping 
of palm with food crops, for domestic consumption.76 After the return to civilian rule in 1999, the State 
has targeted the private sector as a strategic partner in driving poverty alleviation through revival of 
the agricultural sector.77 This included a public-private partnership focused on vegetal oil production, 
including significant investments in rehabilitation of abandoned plantations and large mills. To support 
this, the Government banned importation of certain oils and fats, subsidized inputs such as fertilizer 
and provided a 10-year tax holiday on investments. Infrastructural obstacles including fluctuating 
electricity supply and poor road networks hampered these efforts.78 Meanwhile plantations were 
steadily privatized, though attempts to turn some plantations over to smallholders were undermined by 
corruption which siphoned off landholdings to local politicians’ patronage networks.79
By 2010 the result was a mixture of traditional wild and semi-cultivated groves, smallholders, and 
larger farms. In contrast to both Indonesia and Malaysia, smallholdings accounted for over 80 per 
cent of local production, while established plantations accounted for less than 20 per cent of the total 
market.80 Over the last decade, however, as Nigeria has become a net importer of palm oil, government 
attention has turned once again to the question of the low productivity of the existing estate sector and 
traditional groves. It has adopted a series of policy reforms which have fostered foreign investment, but 
also promoted consolidation of landholdings. Wilmar arrived in Cross River State in 2011 and has since 
bought up a number of defunct estates, ramping up production. In 2015, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
made palm oil products ineligible for access to foreign exchange through the Nigerian interbank market, 
and the Government imposed a 35 per cent duty on crude palm oil while also extending reduced-interest 
loans to farmers through banking intermediaries. These were all measures designed to promote local 
production. In 2018 Wilmar entered a joint venture with PZ Cussons International UK to invest over USD 
650 million in palm oil plantations and processing facilities in Nigeria, part of a larger shift by local food 
producers towards backwards integration. In 2019, the Nigerian federal Government announced plans 
to invest USD 500 million to grow production eight-fold in eight years.
This move towards larger-scale, industrialized production in Nigeria has begun to give rise to some 
of the same concerns around dispossession, adverse incorporation, labour force management and 
smallholder economic dependency that have emerged around large monoculture plantations in South 
East Asia.81 To understand those concerns, we turn now to the question of how palm oil production 
intersects with people’s vulnerabilities and exploiter strategies in each of the three countries under 
study. 
People’s vulnerability and exploiter strategies 
There is a growing literature describing the exploitation of workers in the palm oil supply chain, much 
of which focuses on technical and operational level indicia of vulnerability, such as physical isolation, 
removal of identity documents, and lack of access to written contracts. These are important markets 
of vulnerability in the workplace, yet our research suggests they describe symptoms of vulnerability 
within exploitation, rather than explaining the sources of that vulnerability. Our research suggests 
the vulnerability to exploitation of workers involved in the palm oil value chain varies on two main 
dimensions: first, what we might call political agency; and second, perhaps surprisingly given the focus 
on labour exploitation to date, control of land. 
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There are several populations exposed to the global palm oil industry that lack access to the State, to the 
protections it affords or to the means to influence its policies. These are populations that suffer reduced 
political agency or power and, as a result, are vulnerable to economic fraud and coercion. They include 
indigenous populations dispossessed of their lands through plantation expansion conducted without 
obtaining free, prior and informed consent. They include populations living in palm oil production 
zones controlled by non-State armed groups – for example in Colombia.82 And they include migrant 
worker populations. These vulnerabilities play out differently in different institutional contexts. 
Low-cost labour is central to the profitability of palm oil.83 Producers compete on price by reducing 
labour costs, and do this by exploiting vulnerable people.84 Plantations rely on a mix of ‘permanent’ and 
temporary workers, and it is amongst the temporary workforce, often hired through labour recruitment 
intermediaries, that reduced political agency particularly manifests as vulnerability to exploitation.85 
In the colonial period, a steady supply of low-cost labour was assured to many plantations through 
importation of ‘coolie’ labour from China, India and other neighbouring countries.86 Today, in both 
Malaysia and Indonesia, labour regulation has ensured a steady supply of cheap labour: in Indonesia 
through internal relocation and transmigration of poor rural populations; in Malaysia through labour 
immigration, often facilitated by labour migration companies with close ties to political elites.87 Both 
approaches have, however, led to workers being vulnerable to forced labour. A 2018 study by the Fair 
Labor Association (FLA), commissioned by the Consumer Goods Forum, found indicators of forced 
labour in both Indonesia and Malaysia’s palm oil production, including 
coercive practices including threats, violence and lack of clarity of employment terms 
and conditions, dependency on the employer (vulnerability), lack of protection by 
State/police, debt bondage, high recruitment fees, and involuntary overtime at the 
palm oil estates and in the supply chain were widely cited in both countries.88
Yet perceptions of how this exploitation plays out differ significantly across these two institutional 
contexts, pointing to different vulnerabilities, different exploiter strategies – and different solutions. 
Figure 29 below represents the number of mentions of different forced labour risks by stakeholders 
surveyed by FLA in relation to the palm oil sector in both Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia, the 
nominated risks relate significantly to the migrant worker experience. Around 70 to 80 per cent of this 
workforce is made up of migrant workers from neighbouring countries, many of whom have arrived 
through irregular means.89 There are at least 450,000 migrant workers, largely from Indonesia, Bangladesh 
and the Philippines, in the palm oil industry in Malaysia.90 These workers often fear engagement with 
State authorities, concerned that they will be criminalized or deported and lose the ability to remit 
income home. This fear exposes them to potential exploitation, both while they are being recruited, and 
once they arrive on isolated plantations.91 Labour recruiters have historically been weakly regulated, 
and some have allegedly enjoyed ties to organized crime92 and/or to political actors. Recruiters groom 
and recruit workers through social networks in source countries, with community leaders often heavily 
involved.93 There may be several layers of subcontracted recruiting along the migration pathway,94 and 
some migrant workers reports being bought and sold “like cattle”.95 Here is one worker’s description of 
his journey to a Malaysian palm plantation:
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Armed men operating the boat rationed food and water so the packed-in migrants 
would make fewer trips to the toilet, and beat them when they asked for more. The 
heat and stench were overpowering, he said, and he saw dozens die. At one point, he 
said, he watched as the traffickers threw migrants’ bodies into the sea, after slitting 
open their abdomens so they would sink... the traffickers, demanding money... would 
put them on the phone to their parents and beat them so the parents could hear their 
screams and pay up.96
Another group of migrant workers described the experience thus:
a transnational network of labour subcontractors based out of Bulukumba, an area in 
Southern Sulawesi, lured workers from that area to work in the palm-sector. Once in 
Sabah, the workers were then told that they had a debt that they had to pay off, and 
were given no wages for the first months of work. Meanwhile, the credit that they are 
given at the local store in order to buy food was added to their debt, creating an ever-
increasing amount. The subcontractors used violence and physical control to prevent 
workers from escaping.97
Recruiters frequently overcharge migrant workers for travel costs, charge them recruitment fees and 
place them in debt before they even arrive at their Malaysian workplace.98 This debt is then repaid 
through wage deductions over several months or longer, with debts sometimes escalating to the point 
that migrant workers find themselves in debt bondage.99 (We return in more depth to the topic of 
recruitment fees in Chapter 8, in the context of construction in Qatar.)
Once arrived at plantations, migrant workers are often forced to submit work permits, visas and 
passports to employers. This ties them to the plantation, preventing them exercising outside work 
options. If they do leave the premises, they are vulnerable to extortion – including by police, who may 
simply return the worker to the plantation unless bribed. As Accenture concluded in a 2013 study:
Those migrants that successfully escape a plantation are unable to find legal 
employment in Malaysia. If they do find employment elsewhere, it is often at small, 
independent plantations that draw few visits from industry and government regulatory 
groups, making these migrants susceptible to further exploitative labor practices.100
As Gottwald concludes, “[t]hese forms of coercion can be used to prevent migrant workers from 
leaving abusive working situations, including wages below the statutory minimum and poor housing 
conditions.”101 Women face particular hazards. Women are usually relegated to lower paying positions 
such as palm maintenance (rather than harvesting), which can expose them to harmful pesticides. 
Malaysian law prevents migrant workers from marrying and provides for deportation of pregnant migrant 
workers. This makes female migrant workers especially vulnerable to harassment and intimidation.102 
And child migrants are also very vulnerable. There are a reported 72,000 ‘Stateless’ children in Malaysia 
– those born to irregular migrants. The Stateless children are especially vulnerable to child labour, since 
they are largely excluded from State protection and services.103
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Returning to Figure 29, we see quite a different pattern of risks identified by surveyed stakeholders in 
relation to labour management concerns in the Indonesian palm oil sector. In Indonesia, the plantation 
workforce is primarily Indonesian, but often recruited from far-off provinces and lacks local social ties. 
Others are descendants of groups who were relocated under colonial and in some cases early post-
colonial rule, who have suffered long-term poverty, and had their own smallholdings converted into 
plantation holdings.104 These workers are hired by the plantations as casual, day workers without any 
guaranteed working schedule and lack access to the benefits provided to permanent workers such as 
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health care and pensions. This is highly precarious work.105 This practice also occurs in Nigeria, and 
appears to be growing more common in that country as the plantation model eats into the currently 
dominant smallholding model.106 
What often tips this otherwise legal casual work into an area of questionable legality, however, is the 
particular pattern of management practices used to manage this workforce, especially the use of ‘piece 
rates’ – where workers are paid based on tasks completed rather than hours worked – and the use of 
a complex system of financial and other penalties where piece rate quotas are not met.107 This system 
often seems to meet the definition of forced labour in the ILO Forced Labour Convention: “all work 
or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said 
person has not offered himself voluntarily”. Harvesters (usually men) are typically set weight quotas for 
fresh fruit bunch collection, based on the age and expected productivity of trees. Plant maintenance 
units (usually women) are given quotas relating to the amount of fertilizer spread, chemicals sprayed, 
rows of plants weeded, and so on. Failure to hit the target results in a financial penalty, while fruit in 
excess of the quota may generate a bonus payment. Casual labourers that fail to meet quotas may be 
‘scorched’ (suspended from work for one or more days).108 Labour management practices, including 
production quotas, frequently also do not take into account ceilings on working hours or provide for 
mandatory time off or time off to deal with injuries and illness, despite considerable workplace risks. 
Female maintenance workers are often exposed to dangerous chemicals such as the fertilizer paraquat 
dichloride, and workers are given limited training, health and safety guidance, or protective equipment. 
And to meet production quotas, some workers enlist family members, including children, as unpaid 
ancillary workers (in Indonesia this is known as kernet labour).109 Some children work after school, but 
others drop out of school to work alongside family members on plantations.110 
On smallholdings, whether those of plantation outholders or independent smallholders, the dynamics of 
vulnerability have an added dimension.111 Here, the central question is the extent to which smallholders 
exercise economic control over their own land. Some smallholders are simply shareholders (rent-
takers) while the plantation manages and works their land; other smallholders work their own land, with 
management inputs from the plantation; and other smallholders are effectively part of the plantation’s 
own workforce. Under these outholder arrangements, however, smallholders are usually price-takers 
with plantations and mills controlling the price of palm fruit, free to set monopsony prices. In addition, 
some smallholders are constrained by debts to the plantation, or to government agencies, for initial 
capital outlays – for example to establish the palm. In some cases these debts can so far outstrip the 
resulting salary, sales or leasehold income that the result amounts to a form of bonded labour or even 
modern serfdom. 112 
The key factor seems not to be smallholder’s formal ownership of land, but rather their de facto control 
of their own labour on that land.113 Partnership arrangements can go so far as to exclude owners from 
their own land, impose armed guards that control access to the land, and tie all labour extracting value 
from the land to the plantation. Smallholders in different countries use remarkably similar language to 
describe the resulting loss of agency. One group of South East Asian smallholders described themselves 
as “ghosts on our own land”,114 while a group of Nigerian smallholders independently described 
themselves “slaves on our own land”.115 In some cases, smallholder relationships with plantations can be 
empowering; in other cases, the result is adverse incorporation.116 
The danger is that State support for the plantation sector may risk enlarging plantation profits through 
the immiseration of workers and villagers.117 As an IFC published study found in 2013, industrialization 
of palm can lead to socio-economic stratification and a “growing socioeconomic gap among oil palm 
smallholders”.118 Not only that: it may also lead to ongoing human rights harms arising from forced 
labour, with direct financial implications for development actors. It is just such claims that are now 
at the heart of a complaint being considered by a joint complaints mechanism for the German, Dutch 
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and French development banks. This relates to a large plantation in Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
site of forced labour over the last 100 years. Development entities in Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US have all been involved in providing over USD 180 million to a 
Canadian firm that now controls the plantation.119 
Domain maintenance: corruption and plantation autonomy
In an in-depth multi-year study of a private plantation in West Kalimantan, scholar Tanya Li describes 
“a thoroughly entrenched, somewhat hidden, overwhelmingly predatory system for channelling and 
capturing plantation wealth”, built on “pervasive rent-seeking” underpinned by “coercion, manipulation 
and threat”. The result was a system that served to “entrench violence into the underlying material, 
social and political framework, the ‘infra’ structure, of plantation life.”120 Li describes this as a ‘mafia 
system’, 
an extended, densely networked, predatory system in which everyone in a plantation 
zone must participate in order to get somewhere, or simply to survive. Predation 
means plunder; it also means consuming weaker animals. Hence anyone who does not 
become mafia – become both defensive and predatory – is simply prey. In this vein, 
plantation managers and supervisors plunder the wages due to their subordinates; 
workers, government officials, and many others also attempt to plunder plantation 
wealth.121
What Li is describing is a form of corrupt governmentality characteristic of mafia systems. As I have 
described in a previous book, Hidden Power, mafias operate separate, subversive normative systems in 
which all participants seek to extract illicit rents, bound by a shared understanding of the transgressive 
nature of their conduct – and the need to keep it hidden and secret from the larger world. This normative 
system is hidden inside official structures and regimes, but leaves those official structures in place, 
while system leaders carefully protect their own autonomy to operate within them.122 The maintenance 
of this hidden governmental system and the autonomy it affords takes time and resources. It is a specific 
strategic practice, akin to what Andrew Crane describes as the ‘domain maintenance’ undertaken by 
slavers and traffickers (see Chapter 2 above).
Palm plantations seem to exhibit many of the practices associated with such domain maintenance. These 
practices are aimed at maintaining the plantation as an autonomous zone in which conduct that would 
otherwise be transgressive or illegal – such as labour exploitation – is normalized. Domain maintenance 
is integral to sustaining what Liberty Asia describes as an “environment of criminality surrounding the 
palm oil industry”.123 The first aspect of domain maintenance is literal: physical protection of palm oil 
plantations as sites separate from the communities around them, but with governance power over them. 
Plantation isolation facilitates this. Plantations are typically located in remote, rural communities far 
away from labour inspectors and labour markets. As Li notes, these 
rural communities often lack the basic infrastructure that is required to support 
worker communities, such as housing, markets, schools, hospitals, commercial 
businesses, utilities, and security. It therefore often falls to plantations to create 
worker communities, providing the entire infrastructure. 124
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This means that the entire social infrastructure – barracks, shops, schools, health clinics – are 
embedded in plantation governmentality, even if they are not formally located within a plantation’s legal 
boundaries. And this extends to policing and judicial infrastructure – to the State itself. As Li explains, 
“[i]n these zones, it is not just crucial livelihood resources that are monopolized by plantations, law and 
government are also colonized by, and folded into, the plantation system.” She explicitly draws colonial 
and slave-era parallels: 
[T]he point is not new. In colonial Sumatra where plantations expanded between 
1870 and 1942 to cover a million hectares of almost-continuous space, colonial land, 
labour and criminal law, policing, and government were officially subordinated to, 
and/or effectively subverted by, plantation logics. Similarly, slave plantations in the 
Americas were buttressed by modes of racial rule that pervaded all social and political 
institutions. As Edgar Thompson observed, a plantation does not standalone; it 
“survives only by generating and controlling a system of institutions around itself”.125 
[footnote omitted]
Domain maintenance is particularly important for palm oil producers, because of the sunk cost in palm 
oil stock. Cattle can, if necessary, be moved. So, too, can piecework apparel sweatshops, and even large-
scale apparel factories, if necessary (see Chapter 7). Oil palms cannot; they are literally rooted to the 
spot. Once they are, the future profits to be derived must be protected by reducing labour costs as far as 
possible. Domain maintenance makes that possible, and makes it possible to reduce costs even below the 
legal minimum. To achieve that, “corporations buy protection”.126 ‘Protection’ here means enlisting the 
State in the system of plantation governmentality, removing any ‘outside’ economic, political or judicial 
option for people in that domain.127 In a 2018 study of palm plantations, the Fair Labor Association found
a lack of penalties for violations of laws or ethical standards [which] leave[s] employers 
and recruiters without impetus to take corrective actions… Workers are rarely 
represented by unions or similar organizations and therefore cannot benefit from 
collective bargaining. The systems that exist to protect workers’ interests, such as 
judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms, are weak or non-existent, and 
oversight mechanisms, such as company audits and certification visits, do not function 
in a way that identifies issues or addresses the underlying causes.128
This frequently involves collusion between plantation owners and State actors. In Indonesia, for 
example, the process of decentralization in the early 2000s gave local regency governors, bupatis, 
decision-making power over use of land. This quickly led to plantation owners emerging as major 
election financiers,129 funding the give-aways and retail bribery that are typical in local elections in the 
country.130 The plantation-politician axis also spells trouble for traditional smallholders, since planters, 
government actors, army and police can work together to criminalize villager resistance to plantation 
expansion, or worker mobilization inside the plantation, while protecting them from prosecution for 
land misuse, forest fires, waterway pollution, or labour infractions.131 In 2019 the Indonesian State 
Auditor found that perhaps 19 per cent of the country’s palm plantations – over 3 million hectares – were 
located in non-compliance with national conservation laws, customary land tenure rights and industry 
standards.132 
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Transformation, resistance – and convergence? 
In this section we consider a variety of efforts over the last two decades to assure the sustainability of 
palm oil-based development. These efforts focused initially on environmental sustainability, but have 
increasingly also considered labour exploitation and human trafficking. At the centre of these efforts is 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a multi-stakeholder supply chain governance initiative, 
and the reactions of the Indonesian and Malaysian Governments to the RSPO. The RSPO is just one of 
an array of State regulations, voluntary sustainability standards (VSS), and public-private value chain 
governance initiatives that shape the space in which palm oil-led development occurs. Some of these 
are represented in Figure 30 below. 
Attempt at the social regulation of the palm oil value chain over the last two decades have unfolded in 
three stages.133 First, from around 2004, private value chain governance initiatives, notably the RSPO, 
sought to transform the space in which palm oil is produced, from above and outside the spaces of 
production, to reduce its negative environmental impact.134 At first, key producing countries played 
along with, and even learned from, this process. Second, however, around 2009, as public authorities 
and private producers in Indonesia and Malaysia began to perceive these initiatives as intruding on 
what was properly their regulatory domain, they defected, establishing rival national initiatives. This 
contributed to fragmentation of governance in the palm oil value chain, which in turn prompted further 
normative entrepreneurialism from a range of public and private actors. It was in this period that labour 
conditions rose to greater prominence in regulatory debates. In a third period, starting around 2014, we 
see attempts to draw different regulatory approaches back together, through collaborations between 
public and private actors across this regime complex. Yet questions of normative hierarchy remain 
unresolved. Increasingly, palm oil governance is a focus for both narrative and regulatory competition 
on the international stage, reflecting different understandings of the role of States and private actors in 
governing global value chains for sustainable development. 
Transforming palm oil governance: the RSPO
In 2002, the Swiss arm of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) gathered a group of European consumer goods 
retailers, food manufacturers, palm oil processors, traders and financiers for a discussion in London 
about how to reduce the environmental impact and improve the sustainability of palm oil. The result 
was the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a voluntary multi-stakeholder initiative bringing 
together business and civil society, but not, initially, governments. The Malaysian Palm Oil Association 
(MPOA) joined in early 2003, and in turn convinced Gabungan Asosiasi Pengusaha Kelapa sawit Indonesia 
(GAPKI), the Indonesian Palm Oil Association, to join in 2004. By 2005, the RSPO had developed a 
standard for sustainable palm oil production, a verification and certification process for growers, and 
mechanisms for tracing supply chain products. The first certified sustainable palm oil became available 
in November 2008. Today, the RSPO counts 4,000 firms from along the value chain as members, with 
3.16 million hectares and around 19 per cent of global palm oil production RSPO certified.135
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To become RSPO certified, palm oil growers must undergo an initial certification audit, followed 
by annual audits to demonstrate continued compliance with the organization’s standards. Among 
the Principles & Criteria to which palm oil growers must submit to become certified is respect for 
fundamental labour rights – including freedom of association, collective bargaining, and a prohibition 
on the use of child and forced labour.136 Yet RSPO has been criticized, at times, for the lack of organized 
labour voice within its own governance structures.137 Analyses have also found limited evidence that 
certification correlates to reduced deforestation,138 and there have been repeated claims of involvement 
of RSPO-certified companies with deforestation and (as we shall see) labour and human rights violations. 
Nonetheless, the RSPO has emerged as a key forum for discussions on the sustainability of palm oil, with 
IFC and various Equator Principles banks including RSPO certification in their lending and investing 
policies, partnerships with a variety of UN entities, and major retailers such as Unilever, Mars, Nestlé, 
Carrefour and Ferrero all using RSPO certification as a benchmark for palm oil sustainability.
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The palm oil sector transnational regime complex. A Dec, Amsterdam Declaration; CGF, Consumer Goods Forum; CPO, Crude Palm Oil; CPOPC, Council 
of Palm Oil Producing Countries; EP, Equator Principles; ESPO, European Sustainable Palm Oil; EU-RED, European Union Renewable Energy Directive; IPOP, 
Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge; ISCC, International Sustainability and Carbon Certification; ISPO, Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil; MSPO, Malaysian Sustainable 
Palm Oil; NDPE, No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation policy; NYDF, New York Declaration on Forests; OJK, Indonesian Financial Services Authority; RSPO, 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil; SCC, Soft Commodities Compact; SPOM, Sustainable Palm Oil Manifesto.
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Resistance: contestation and convergence
By 2008 there were growing concerns in some quarters regarding the efficacy of the RSPO. More than 
250 NGOs released an ‘International Declaration Against the Greenwashing of Palm Oil by the RSPO’, 
concerned that it was normalizing palm oil expansion without fundamentally reducing its negative 
impact on forests and biodiversity.139 In 2009 the World Bank and IFC suspended palm oil financing 
following the release of an audit by the Compliance Advisor Ombudsperson (CAO) which found Wilmar, 
an RSPO-certified member at the time, in violation of Indonesian law and IFC environmental and 
social standards. These conclusions from IFC’s own accountability mechanism prompted a financing 
moratorium during which it reviewed its lending practices to “ensure that the problems identified in 
the CAO audit are not repeated,” and develop a strategy to guide IFC’s future palm oil investments.140
All of this suggested that there might be growing reputational and possibly even capital costs for 
producers that did not meet the market’s evolving sustainability expectations, and there were growing 
signs that markets would treat RSPO certification not as a voluntary process by which growers could 
differentiate their products, but as a de facto expectation. This caused growing concern amongst 
producer Governments which, until that point, had treated certification and VSS as a business-to-
business matter. The Indonesian and Malaysian governments, for example, which maintained strong 
ties with their own national palm oil associations (MPOA and GAPKI), were happy to leave participation 
in RSPO to them.141 
By 2009 some growers were arguing that buyers’ shifting sustainability expectations were imposing 
increasingly unfair, unpredictable and unrealistic burdens on producers in the global South, while 
allowing manufacturers and retailers in the global North to capture price premia from sustainability 
certification.142 The RSPO and other private supply chain schemes were increasingly characterized in 
producer countries as “external pressures for change” from private regulators seeking to “fulfill functions 
that are commonly thought to be the domain of the State”.143 In 2011, GAPKI withdrew from the RSPO and 
announced that it would support a new, national Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) standard being 
developed by the Indonesian Government.144 In 2015, Malaysia followed suit, establishing the Malaysian 
Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard.145 In 2015, Indonesia and Malaysia set up the Council of Palm Oil 
Producing Countries to coordinate their approach. Brazil has also introduced its own national scheme, 
the Sustainable Palm Oil Production Program (SPOPP).146
These national standards mimic RSPO in many ways, including third-party auditing of certified growers. 
But they also differ in important respects.147 A UNDP study found the ISPO’s differences included rules 
around deforestation and use of peatland, as well as rules around social issues, notably including the 
free, prior, informed consent of local communities before a land-use change.148 The MSPO standard also 
differs on sustainability criteria.149 The offering of national standards was however not justified purely 
on substantive or technical grounds, but also in political terms: through appeals to national authority, 
legitimacy and solidarity. As one ISPO representative explained to two researchers: “We do not listen to 
pressure from the European market. This is our palm oil and this is what we do. We are sovereign.”150 
Another stated bluntly: “It is mainly downstream actors [i.e. retailers and consumers] that are involved 
in RSPO. Downstream actors are dictating up-stream actors and undermine the legitimate development 
of producing countries.”151 Expressing similar concerns in 2015, Indonesia’s Environment and Forestry 
Minister, argued that with the RSPO the Government’s “authority is being taken over by the private 
sector”.152 
Critics of RSPO often pointed to the difficulties that smallholders faced in obtaining certification.153 In 
Indonesia, around 40 per cent of palm is held by smallholders on plantations smaller than 25 hectares.154 
With initial audit costs of around USD 25 per hectare, RSPO certification was often out of reach for many 
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smallholders. In each case, the national standard was presented as a lower-cost option, better tailored 
to local conditions and national development priorities. As a Malaysian government official explained 
to one interviewer: 
The RSPO is more focused on environmental issues than anything else. There is a 
lack of balance between the three aspects of sustainable development: people, planet, 
profit. People and profit need to be included. Poor people also have to benefit. They 
have to be able to improve their living.155 
These national schemes have, however, struggled to reach scale. As of April 2016 the ISPO commission 
had certified 266 palm oil business actors covering 1.67 million hectares of plantation land or around 
13 per cent of the total palm plantation area and less than 25 per cent of crude palm oil by volume in 
the country.156 At the time, only two smallholder schemes were covered. A2017 study found numerous 
barriers for smallholders to achieving ISPO certification.157 As of November 2019, an estimated 58.5 
per cent of total oil palm area in Malaysia had been certified under the MSPO.158 The ISPO standard 
is now mandatory for Indonesian plantation companies and will become mandatory for Indonesian 
smallholders in 2022, with the Government moving to provide financial assistance to smallholders to 
facilitate ISPO certification.159 The MSPO has also transitioned from a voluntary to a mandatory scheme. 
Yet MSPO and ISPO certifications are recognized by only a small share of global demand, in part due 
to lingering concerns around respect for FPIC standards and the absence of independent monitoring 
arrangements.160
As Schouten and Blitzer point out, the RSPO and national standards are essentially appealing to different 
audiences and different sources of legitimacy. While the RSPO enjoys widespread acceptance among 
retailers and consumers in the global North, the national standards are focused on national audiences, 
particularly local producers.161 Yet the palm oil value chain has stakeholders in both these audiences. 
Effective sustainability governance will require the emergence of norms and regimes with legitimacy 
among both audiences. Instead, palm oil sector governance is characterized by regime complexity,162 
with multiple normative regimes and domains overlapping, interpenetrating and actively competing.163 
(A “regime complex” is a set of “partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a 
particular issue-area”.164) Figure 30, above, is illustrative of that complexity. 
The ISPO and MSPO defections from RSPO in fact led to a deepening of that complexity, by opening 
the door to further normative entrepreneurialism, initiating a period of contestation between different 
private and public players promoting different governance frameworks. In 2013, a group of civil society 
activists began promoting the ‘No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation’ standard, targeting major oil 
palm traders such as Wilmar, GAR, Musim Mas, Cargill, Asian Agri and Astra Agro. This spawned the 
December 2014 New York Declaration on Forests, bringing together civil society, business actors and 
Indonesian Governmental actors, committing them to halve the rate of deforestation by the end of 2020. 
Around the same time, Malaysian producers led a regional initiative called the Sustainable Palm Oil 
Manifesto, while Indonesian producers formed the Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP). The Indonesian 
Government pushed back strongly against IPOP, branding it a cartel, and opening a competition law 
investigation. IPOP disbanded in June 2016.165 
Yet in recent years there have also been signs of possible normative convergence across some of these 
initiatives. The RSPO has moved to create space for participation by public authorities, first by allowing 
for a series of ‘national interpretations’ of its Principles & Criteria. Not only Indonesia and Malaysia, 
but also India, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Mexico and Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands have lodged 
such interpretations. Second, in March 2018 the RSPO created a Jurisdictional Working Group, aimed 
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at scaling up certification by making public authorities partners in the certification of whole legal 
jurisdictions (i.e. districts, States, provinces, even countries), rather than relying on plantation-by-
plantation certification. The approach requires government leadership, support, and collaboration to 
set up overall governance, regulations and frameworks to apply RSPO standards progressively across an 
entire jurisdiction.166 This approach is now being rolled out in the state of Sabah, Malaysia; the District 
of Seruyan, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia; and for the entire country of Ecuador.
This approach may begin to address the challenge of seeking to achieve governance through plantation-
level interventions. Tanya Li explains:
proponents of good governance, certification, standards, and corporate social 
responsibility imagine plantations as distinct and bounded spaces that can, in fact, 
stand alone. According to this vision, plantations are integrated in the surrounding 
economic system, but politically and legally they are distinct. Hence model plantations 
can be law-abiding, rule bound, and immune from incursion by the predatory 
political environment that surrounds them. Conversely, in this imagined world, law 
and governance stand firmly outside plantations to manage and monitor them, and 
correct them should they err. Together, righteous corporations, governments and 
other stakeholders can replace “bad” palm oil with “good.” I cannot generalize for 
all plantation contexts but in relation to Indonesia, these imaginings are based on a 
flawed understanding of how plantations work.167 
Oliver Pye makes a similar point about the level at which governance interventions are likely to be 
effective:
the big questions of sustainability, the continuing conversion of rainforests, the raging 
forest fires and the immense human cost of haze, the regulation of the labour regime, 
the impact on climate change, land rights and land reform etc. are not decided at the 
mill-estate scale, and as such (as the RSPO repeatedly reminds us), are not within its 
mandate.168
RSPO’s move to a jurisdictional certification approach is an attempt to address this weakness of 
plantation-level governance interventions, by enlisting public authorities in a partnership to solve these 
big questions of sustainability. Yet, as we shall see, if public authorities cannot agree on the answers, the 
governance system still risks breaking down. 
The emergence of labour exploitation as a sustainability concern
It was during the last decade of contestation of sustainability governance that some civil society actors 
began pressing the case for greater attention to labour conditions in palm oil production.169 This had 
been an issue for RSPO since 2005, when one of its own Executive Board Member companies, Musim 
Mas, became embroiled in a bitter dispute with striking Sumatran palm plantation workers attempting 
to unionize. Musim Mas fired more than 700 union members, laid off 300 more casual workers, and 
evicted all of them and their families from estate accommodation and schools. Local police were brought 
in to break the strike and worker leaders were sentenced to prison for terms ranging from fourteen to 
24 months. In response, the International Union of Food Workers (IUF) and Building and Wood Workers 
International (BWI) filed a formal complaint with the RSPO – which declined to take a position or order 
an independent investigation.170 
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By 2013 RSPO’s unwillingness to take serious action on labour conditions in its members’ operations 
had become a reputational problem. An exposé by Ben Skinner for Bloomberg revealed the depth of 
labour rights abuses in the Indonesian palm oil sector.171 Further studies followed over the next five 
years, identifying similar abuses at IOI group,172 Indofood,173 Wilmar,174 Nestlé175 and across the industry.176 
Motivated in part by these concerns, in 2013 a group of producers, processors and traders that wanted 
to move faster than the rest of the RSPO membership set up their own complementary Palm Oil 
Innovation Group (POIG).177 This group continues to argue that even after a review of the RSPO Principles 
& Criteria in 2018, the RSPO system shows weaknesses on labour protections, including “the lack of 
strict standards on working hours and overtime, a cap on precarious labour, and a clear methodology to 
define a decent living wage.”178 POIG members commit to require that “palm oil producers shall respect 
worker’s rights including the ILO requirements for ‘decent work’ and core conventions on child labour, 
forced or compulsory labour, freedom of association, and elimination of discrimination.” It further 
spells out indicators on the terms and contracts of employment, remuneration, work hours, leave, and 
clear policies on child labour, against which members’ performance is to be assessed.
Meanwhile, in 2015 the anti-slavery group Humanity United convened experts from civil society, 
workers’ organizations, representatives of unions, investors and philanthropic organizations from the 
United States, Europe, Malaysia, and Indonesia to develop “Principles and Implementation Guidance 
for Free and Fair Labor in Palm Oil Production.” These were intended to serve as a “resource to provide 
concrete and practical guidance on implementing responsible palm oil production”.179 The principles 
aimed, amongst other things, to address operational guidance gaps in the RSPO framework around 
passport retention, precarious work and recruitment fees. While not enforceable, they have proven 
influential in the POIG and, later, in the RSPO, whose Principles & Criteria were revised in 2018 to 
include strengthened human and labour rights and grievance components (Criteria 4 and 6).180 In 
addition, the Principles may have influenced the January 2016 Consumer Goods Forum (CGF) adoption 
of three Priority Industry Principles on Forced Labor, covering freedom of movement, non-coercion 
and non-indebtedness, and not charging recruitment fees. CGF has selected palm oil production as a 
focus area for implementing these Priority Industry Principles and is now mobilizing its members to 
advocate collectively with governments for more effective regulation. 
These developments seem to have encouraged the RSPO to take a stronger stance on respect for labour 
rights among its members. In 2018 an RSPO complaints panel found that FGV Holdings (one of Malaysia’s 
biggest palm oil producers) was linked to exploitative labour practices, following a 2015 investigation by 
The Wall Street Journal, and suspended some of its certifications.181 In a parallel complaint, the RSPO 
found PepsiCo’s joint venture partner in Indonesia, Indofood, to have violated RSPO standards relating 
to labour rights.182 This led to Indofood’s ouster from the RSPO, and the cancellation of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of financing by Citi and Rabobank.183 
Lessons and opportunities
Competing efforts over the last two decades to govern the relationship between the palm oil value 
chain and sustainable development provide important lessons for our broader study. These relate to 
the impacts of different approaches to sustainability on the economic agency of those vulnerable to 
labour exploitation; and the global political and financial dynamics of promoting labour rights in global 
commodity markets.
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From transformation to disruption – the global politics of palm 
oil sustainability
In the previous case study we saw how efforts to promote labour rights in Brazil’s cattle industry have 
moved from a focus on disruption – changing the strategic calculus of exploitation – to transformation 
– strengthening the governance of the value chains in which the exploitation takes place. In this case the 
direction of travel seems to have been in the opposite direction. 
The RSPO aims at the multi-stakeholder transformation of supply chain governance through certification 
of production against environmental and labour standards. This strategy ran into resistance from 
producers in Indonesia and Malaysia who used their strong established relationships with national 
governments to contest the legitimacy of such an approach to social regulation. Until recently, the 
RSPO strategy has had little effect on producers’ labour management practices. Plantations, on whom 
the RSPO strategy focuses, enjoy significant autonomy in how they manage their workforces, protected 
by alliances with local political and security actors. And the profits that political and capital elites in 
producing countries make arguably depend on access to a cheap, even precarious, labour force. So 
they have strong incentives to resist interventions that may disrupt that system and the rents they can 
extract from it. While there have been moves to address labour recruitment and migration practices 
in some relevant jurisdictions in recent years (notably Malaysia), it has only been through journalistic 
exposés and civil society advocacy that these issues have found their way into larger discussions of 
palm oil sustainability. And to date they have been limited to ‘techno-managerial’ discussions of labour 
management practices, without addressing larger regional development questions of access to land, 
workforce management, corruption and structural inequality. 
Discussions of labour management in the palm oil industry have not yet acknowledged that it is not 
just the physical production of palm oil but also the social production of palm oil that needs to be made 
more sustainable. Sustainability is not, as Oliver Pye puts it, a commodity that can be bought, but a 
social and political question. That question cannot be addressed at the plantation level – a premise 
baked into all of the certification-based regimes (RSPO, ISPO, MSPO, SPOPP). It can only be addressed 
at the level of ecosystems and entire value chains, since it is a question about how States manage the 
interaction of both localized inputs (land and labour) with transnational flows (capital and labour). It is 
also a question about how States manage transnational externalities, such as remittances, smoke haze 
and climate change.184
This is why debates around the RSPO and other VSS are increasingly framed in terms of ‘sovereignty’ – 
because they are debates not only over regulatory authority but also over political power. Sovereignty 
is an adaptable, instrumental concept that States wield to pursue different policy goals through 
engagement with foreign entities and processes. In a longitudinal study of how States engage the RSPO, 
Greetje Schouten and Otto Hospes found that 
States strategically use different and changing notions of sovereignty to control 
the policy and debate regarding sustainable palm oil. When interactions between 
public and private governance are coordinative in nature, notions of interdependent 
sovereignty are used. However, when interactions are competitive, domestic and 
Westphalian notions of sovereignty are used.185
As different States form economic alliances with different actors in global value chains, this economic 
competition is increasingly morphing into inter-State political and normative competition. And this 
in turn leads to an organic shift in the approach underpinning palm oil sustainability interventions, 
moving from privately led transformation of value chain governance to State-led disruption of the 
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logic of exploitation by changing costs and incentives, especially through market exclusion. In recent 
years, access to both capital and export markets has begun to become conditional on eschewing forced 
labour. As we discuss further below, several financial institutions have taken steps to divest from palm 
oil holdings credibly linked to labour rights abuses. And United States Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) is currently considering petitions to place withhold release orders that bar access to the US market 
on palm oil allegedly made with forced labour by FGV and Sime Darby.186 
Several challenges arise from the emergence of these disruption strategies. For one thing, they are 
not systematic or coordinated. Producers and their government allies favour value chain governance 
and public policies that promote palm oil expansion and competition on cost. Some consumer and 
importing companies and countries, notably in the US and EU, place greater emphasis on environmental 
sustainability and respect for labour standards. But other consumer and importing countries – notably 
India and China, the two largest importers – do not.187 This poses important commercial and political 
questions for the palm oil sector, about which voices will shape the palm oil regime complex in future. 
Where, for example, do rising powers such as India and China fit in these regime complexes?188 
RSPO has made limited headway in both countries. Both Indian and Chinese consumers and retailers 
demonstrate little willingness to pay a higher premium to fund supply chain segregation and 
sustainability practices when there is a ready supply of cheaper, unsustainable oil on the market. There 
are some signs of divergence here, with Chinese firms, possibly responding to signals from the Chinese 
Government, increasingly engaging.189 In July 2019 RSPO launched a China Sustainable Palm Oil Alliance 
together with WWF China and various brands (including AAK, Cargill China, HSBC, L’Oréal China, Mars 
and MingFai Group). Yet this group’s initial goal – ensuring that 10 per cent of all palm oil imports into 
China are sustainably sourced – demonstrates how marginal sustainability concerns remain in Chinese 
purchasing. And in India, consumer markets are less brand driven, distribution is more fragmented, and 
cost is the over-riding driver of purchasing decisions, making it difficult for the RSPO to get traction.190 
Indian Government engagement has to date focused less on promoting a sustainability agenda and more 
on promoting growth in domestic palm oil production. 
This all suggests a danger of the governance of palm oil sustainability becoming a geopolitical and 
geoeconomic football. The latter point is clear from the Indonesian and Malaysian Governments’ 
reactions to the recent decision by the EU to phase out permission for use of palm oil as an approved 
biofuel, on the grounds that it promotes deforestation.191 The move poses a major threat to Indonesian 
exports to Europe. With President Joko Widodo characterizing the move as an “act of trade war”,192 
Indonesia filed a complaint at the WTO, arguing that the policy is an illegal non-tariff barrier designed 
to exclude palm oil and promote use of EU-grown rapeseed. Malaysia adopted a similar line. 
Towards an approach focused on maximizing economic agency
Yet there are also signs that we may see a more coordinated and systemic approach emerging, across 
the regime complex. This is an approach that abandons the wishful post-political conception of palm 
oil governance embodied by plantation-level certification,193 and acknowledges the need to address 
political questions such land ownership and use, access to finance and labour market management. It is 
arguably an approach that is more congruent with the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
This approach works towards a coordinated public policy approach across different segments of the 
regime complex, with consistent frameworks and effective incentives and enforcement.194 At the heart 
of this approach is arguably an implicit recognition of the need to maximize economic agency, including 
the agency of indigenous peoples and smallholders, as well as wage and casual labourers. In that sense 
it is an approach that combines all three components of a Developing Freedom agenda: transformation 
(here, through multi-stakeholder governance), disruption (here, through alignment of incentives and 
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enforcement), and empowerment – strengthening the capabilities of people who are vulnerable to 
exploitation in the palm oil production context. 
Elements of this approach were arguably already embedded in the 2011 World Bank Group Framework 
and IFC Strategy,195 which set out a whole-of-sector framework for engagement, after the financing 
moratorium initiated in 2009. This specifically recognized the development challenge as one of 
coordinating sectoral governance:
Problems arise when strong economic incentives for [palm oil] expansion are 
superimposed on a governance framework that has weak capacity for guiding the 
development of new oil palm plantations onto areas where the environmental and 
social impacts are minimized.196
The World Bank Framework recognizes that the sector works through a network of business, working 
within a complex patchwork of governmental policies, laws, and regulatory systems. It characterizes the 
RSPO as a forum in which certain actors can establish principles and criteria to underpin collaboration 
and partnership. And this agenda has steadily become more influential in RSPO circles over the last 
decade. The efforts by the RSPO to find space for governmental actors through national interpretations 
of the Principles & Criteria, and through the jurisdictional certification arrangements, work towards this 
sector-wide governance approach. The RSPO’s establishment, in May 2020, of a ‘Shared Responsibility’ 
Working Group arguably takes this even further. It gives banks and investors, supply chain actors and 
civil society a stronger role in delivering RSPO outcomes. 
The World Bank Framework is also notably for championing, relatively early, “initiatives that support 
smallholders and foster benefit sharing with rural communities.”197 One lesson from this case study is 
that modern slavery risks in the palm oil sector are not limited to wage labourers, whether permanent 
or casual, as some narratives may suggest. Many smallholders exhibit signs of economic dependency 
on and indebtedness to monopsonistic plantation owners – signs that are potentially indicative of debt 
bondage and involuntary servitude. That demands increased attention to how the terms of smallholder 
partnerships limit – or could be made to promote – their economic agency. 
To date the need for capital investment and the economic geography of palm production have tilted the 
playing-field towards large scale monoculture plantations. This is partly because larger-scale tropical 
agriculture concentrates power, fosters corruption and promotes rent-seeking. As Edward Barbier 
explains:
Corruption appears to be an important factor in effecting tropical land conversion, both 
directly and through interaction with the terms of trade. An increase in agricultural 
land expansion in the long run is also associated with a lower level of per capita income 
across developing economies. Those economies who have expanded agricultural land 
area have not achieved greater economy-wide gains compared to economies with 
little agricultural land expansion. Rent-seeking and corruption, reinforced by policies, 
contribute both to excessive land conversion and the concentration of the poor in low-
productive, marginal lands. The result is the tendency for the gains from converting 
highly valuable land resources to benefit mainly wealthy elites, thus exacerbating 
problems of inequality and rural poverty while at the same time impeding economy-
wide development.198
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But there are arguments that small-scale palm production makes more sense from a broader economic 
perspective, with some studies finding it provides income for many more people per hectare and is thus 
a more sound basis for development interventions that seek to promote palm oil-based livelihoods.199 
Smallholders also tend to favour intercropping. This may deliver lower yields than monoculture, but it 
also reduces risk for the smallholder, including food security risk.
It might be thought that this requires folding small-scale producers into more consolidated value 
chains, since they tend to exercise more market power and are associated with improved technologies 
and innovation. But that is not necessarily the case. The literature suggests that size of land asset or 
scale of production, by itself, is not determinative of involvement in consolidated value chains. What 
matters is the policy environment, since there are institutional arrangements, including contract 
growing, cooperatives and farmer associations, that can empower producers effectively while reducing 
dependency.200 These are policies designed to maximize the economic agency of even small-scale 
producers, empowering them through coordination and cooperation.
Elements of a smallholder-oriented approach are increasingly central to UN development programming 
on palm oil. One important example is UNDP’s Sustainable Commodities Program, which works across 
governance platforms and, inter alia, fosters the representation of typically marginalized stakeholders 
such as smallholder farmers. Working with the Indonesian Government, in 2014 the program created the 
Forum Kelapa Sawit Berkelanjutan Indonesia (FoKSBI), operating at district, provincial and national levels 
to coordinate sustainability efforts, including smallholder capacity building. This provides training, 
access to seeds, finances and other service, and support for ISPO certification of smallholders. A similar 
approach has been explored in Peru. FoKSBI is also supported by the Good Growth Partnership, which 
brings together UNDP, UN Environment, the IFC, WWF and other partners, working across production, 
financing and demand, to promote sustainable development in beef, palm and soy in Indonesia, Liberia, 
Brazil and Paraguay.201 
We also arguably see a turn towards an economic agency agenda in the sector’s understanding of the 
challenges faced by casual workers. The central question here is not simply what managerial practices 
are needed at the plantation level to protect workers from exploitation, but rather what role the sector’s 
stakeholders – including employers, purchasers and investors – will take in the social reproduction 
of the sector’s workforce. The growth and profitability of the sector in the last fifty years owes a great 
deal to the public policies that have allowed plantations to access a steady supply of cheap, relatively 
disposable labour. These policies have suppressed worker organization and unionization, so remedies 
obviously lie in part in policies that now foster the underdeveloped organizational capabilities of the 
workforce.202 This requires an acknowledgement of the interdependence of capital and labour in the 
sustainable generation of profit from palm oil, and a re-evaluation of what it means for labour to be 
‘free’. As Tanya Li explains, the labour regime on Indonesia’s oil palm plantations is 
…so free it is vicious. People who sell their labor power “freely” to the point of 
exhaustion pay a high price in damaged bodies, fractured families, and a desperate 
struggle to meet quotas, find work, or simply to survive.203
‘Developing Freedom’ in the global palm oil sector is thus about more than just access to labour markets 
and their formal regulation. It is also about their informal regulation, and how their operation is shaped 
by power. Developing Freedom requires not just creating free labour markets and enforcing formal 
labour laws, but also strengthening the capabilities of vulnerable people to make them more resilient 
in the face of exploiter strategies. It requires not just transformation of supply chain governance and 
disruption of the calculus of exploitation, but empowerment of vulnerable people. 
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Again, there are hints of a recognition of this in some current initiatives. The Decent Rural Living 
Initiative, for example, convened by international sustainability non-profit Forum for the Future, brings 
together palm oil companies Cargill, Musim Mas, Sime Darby, Wilmar and Golden Agri-Resources. 
Wilmar and Sime Darby are focused on developing contracts that minimise the uncertainty of casual and 
flexible work, through a pilot project focused on part-time workers. The aim is “not making these casual 
positions permanent but making sure the overall quality of life, for both permanent and temporary 
workers is better,” including through standardization of contracts and collective bargaining.204
The central role of finance
The final lesson from this case study concerns the central role of finance in shaping sustainable 
development outcomes. 
Friends of the Earth calculates that every 10,000 acres of new palm oil plantations require roughly 
USD 100 million in capital investments, and that in the 5 years after 2008, more than USD 20 billion in 
financing was extended to the industry, including more than USD 14 billion in loans.205 Underwriting of 
palm oil sector bond and share issuances is dominated by Malaysian investment banks (CIMB, Malayan 
Banking, and RHB) and American investment banks (Citi, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and the 
American subsidiaries of Credit Suisse and Deutsche).206 This gives the financial sector, including ECAs, 
DFIs and MDBs, huge power to change the way the sector does business. There are several aspects to 
this. 
First, financiers that invest in or lend to companies that rely on forced labour are in effect subsidizing 
illegality and may face unrealized liabilities or reputational costs.207 The scale of the resulting financial 
risks is beginning to come into focus as some financial institutions face criticism for supporting 
companies found to be linked to forced labour.208 Some financial institutions have begun to review 
and divest from these relationships, including HSBC209 and BNP Paribas.210 It is worth noting, too the 
cancellation of hundreds of millions of dollars of financing for Indofood by Citi and Rabobank, following 
adverse findings by RSPO on Indofood’s labour and environmental practices.211 Yet there is clearly more 
work to be done here, including relating to the role of development finance institutions. One 2018 study 
found that only 1 in 7 of the top 105 financiers of the industry explicitly prohibits clients’ use of forced and 
child labour, and that the three top financiers have no policies relating to ILO standards on maximum 
working hours or living wage.212
Second, we see growing efforts by financial actors to work together to identify these risks, for example 
through collective value chain mapping.213 We also see growing efforts by financial actors to mobilize their 
collective leverage to promote reforms in palm oil labour management and value chain governance.214 
Such efforts by upstream actors can work. In 2016, the world’s largest palm oil buyers, including Unilever, 
Kellogg, Mars, Hershey’s, Colgate-Palmolive, Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble, SC Johnson, Yum 
Brands and Nestlé all suspended purchases from the Malaysian palm oil company IOI after the company 
was suspended by the RSPO. Its share price dropped almost 15 per cent in the month following the 
suspension, representing a USD 4 billion decline in value. IOI responded by pushing the government 
toward action on a number of critical labour standards in the Malaysian palm oil industry, including 
changes to wage arrangements to provide a statutory monthly minimum with productivity incentives 
(but no penalties), and commitments relating to recruitment fees and union access to estates.215
Third, financiers have choices about which kinds of palm oil production to invest in. To date, private 
finance has tended to favour large-scale monoculture plantation-based production. Development 
actors have a longer, though patchy, history of supporting smallholder based palm production, which 
is less attractive to private capital markets.216 We now see a renewed push in governance initiatives to 
promote joint investment in smallholder capacity building and certification.217 As yet, though, we do not 
138 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
see the emergence of boutique ‘fair-trade’ production of palm oil as we have in some other agricultural 
commodities (such as coffee and cocoa), in part because of the continued emphasis on high volume and 
low cost from producers and consumers alike. Access to (non-land) capital – both financial and human 
– seems to be central here. Capital investment is crucial to allow smallholders to compete with larger 
plantations on plantation planning, development and maintenance and to access processing capacity 
and export markets. Yet smallholders are not attractive investments in part because banks struggle to 
accurately price lending risks,218 not least because of limited information about smallholdings, unreliable 
land tenure registries, and exposure to local political risk (and corruption). Financing schemes tend to 
demand high interest rates and impose tough commercial conditions. Development actors have a role 
to play here not just in assuming risk and offering concessional financing, but in investing to address 
obstacles to accurate risk assessment (such as inaccurate land registries) and fostering workarounds, 
such as uptake of behavioural modelling and fintech to establish smallholder creditworthiness.219 
Fourth, development finance actors can play a key role in addressing the political environment and 
government policy preferences that constrain lending behaviours, especially in South East Asia, location 
of an estimated 90 per cent of total palm oil market capitalization. As one bank officer explained, in the 
region 
banks have to follow implicit national government policy. Palm oil revenues continue 
to be a cornerstone of economic development policy in Malaysia and Indonesia. [B]
anks based in these countries have no other incentive to restrict capital from palm oil 
companies or challenge the sustainability of their operations.220
Development actors have an important role to play in working with governments to develop a shared 
understanding of how sustainable development can support smallholders and workers as well as large 
commercial interests. This could include co-financing initiatives. 
Ultimately, as one scholar concludes, in many countries “oil palm is a rich man’s crop”.221 If that 
conclusion is not challenged through development interventions aimed at empowering smallholders 
and poor rural workers, palm oil may continue to contribute not only to economic growth, but also to 
structural inequality and modern slavery. Without targeted development interventions, palm oil risks 
restricting the freedom of many, rather than developing it.
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CHAPTER 5: UZBEK COTTON: “IT IS 
IMPOSSIBLE TO REFUSE” TO “WORK 
LIKE A SLAVE”
In Chapter 3 we explored how Brazil’s Government has rescued over 55,000 people from modern slavery 
in the last 25 years, calling it “arguably the most sustained, sophisticated domestic anti-slavery effort by 
any country in recent times”. Yet in terms of the overall reduction in the number of people victimized, 
Brazil’s quarter century of rescues arguably pales in comparison to another recent anti-slavery effort 
– that of Uzbekistan. According to the ILO, in the last five years, the number of people in forced labour 
in the annual Uzbek cotton harvest has fallen from an estimated 448,000 to 102,000, as Figure 31 below 
shows.
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As recently as 2015, this transformation was not foreseen. At the time, the now-President of Uzbekistan, 
H.E. Shavkat Mirziyoyev – who has, as we shall see, been central to the transformation of Uzbekistan 
and is now compared by some analysts to China’s reformist leader, Deng Xiaoping – was Prime Minister 
of Uzbekistan. In that role, over the previous decade he had overseen the annual mass mobilization of 
one fifth of the country’s adult population to undertake the cotton harvest in the late summer. Two to 
three million people, annually, were forced into labour as involuntary pickers. Farmers, too, were forced 
to work, losing any real agency over the management of their land as they were forced to grow cotton 
under a centralized production system left over from the Soviet era. Prime Minister Mirziyoyev (as he 
then was) was known as a strong enforcer of this system.1 Yet in September 2017, President Mirziyoyev 
stood before the UN General Assembly and committed to end forced labour in his country. After a series 
of reforms, in March 2020, he decreed the end to centralized planning, State control of farm-gate cotton 
prices, and production quotas – all central to the enforced cotton production system prior to that point.2 
Today, international actors from the ILO to the Fair Labor Association and the global Cotton Campaign 
all acknowledge genuine and sustained commitment from the Uzbek Government and tangible progress 
to end forced labour.3
FIGURE 31: ILO ESTIMATES OF UZBEK COTTON  
PRODUCTION AND LABOUR FORCE (2015-2019)
Number of pickers in forced labour (RH axis) Total number of pickers (LH axis)
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How has this U-turn in Uzbek Government policy come about? This is the question we explore in this 
sub-section. As we shall see, the answer lies in a changed perception of the benefits and sustainability 
of a cotton production system built on forced labour. By May 2020, the Uzbek Government was openly 
proclaiming that “the use of any form of forced labour during the cotton campaign has a very negative 
impact on the development of our cotton and textile industries and undermines the reputation of our 
country.”4 Cotton production powered by forced labour is, in other words, now seen as more trouble 
than it is worth. 
As we shall see, there are two central reasons for this. 
First, while the system fuelled rampant corruption and rent-taking by Uzbek elites, it also proved 
disastrous for the Uzbek cotton industry, leading to significant reductions in output, yields and income. 
Figure 32 below shows indexed growth of Uzbek and world cotton production between 2002 and 2018, 
showing how Uzbek cotton production growth has fallen behind the rest of the world over the last 
decade. In 1992 cotton accounted for 90 per cent of Uzbekistan’s total exports; in 2016 just 3.4 per cent. 
Cotton revenue dropped from 10 per cent to 1.8 per cent of Uzbekistan’s GDP in that time.5 Once the third 
or fourth largest producer of cotton in the world, Uzbekistan is now the tenth. 
FIGURE 32: INDEXED GROWTH IN COTTON EXPORTS  
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Second, even as the Uzbek cotton industry was becoming more inefficient, the costs involved in for the 
Uzbek leadership in maintaining the system based on forced labour were becoming higher and higher, 
as access to capital, export markets and good international standing closed off. That reduced access 
was the result of sustained advocacy and boycott efforts by Uzbek human rights activists, international 
campaigners, international brands and, to some extent, governments. 
The confluence of these two factors created an opportunity for change. Yet that opportunity had to 
be grasped. In this sub-section, drawing on extensive desk research and limited interviews with key 
informants, we explore what was involved to make that happen. We begin by considering how the 
cotton slavery system worked in Uzbekistan until around 2017: the institutional environment, people’s 
vulnerabilities and exploiter strategies. Then we explore the process by which this system has begun to 
be dismantled. Development actors – notably the World Bank, IFC, bilateral donors and ILO – have played 
an important role in supporting Uzbek Government efforts to realize and sustain that shift, especially 
since 2013. And since 2015, the ILO has conducted third party monitoring (TPM) for World Bank projects 
in Uzbekistan, giving us a unique account of the dynamics of such a systematic anti-slavery initiative. 
In the final section we consider some of the insights from this process for the development sector, 
FIGURE 33: ILO ESTIMATES OF UZBEK COTTON  
INDUSTRY FORCED LABOUR VS. PAY RATE (2015-2019)
Pickers' pay rate (soums/kg (median across 3 harvest passes)) (LH axis)
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including the political challenges involved in dismantling a slavery-based rentier economy, and the need 
to begin a more serious discussion on enabling remedy for the widespread and systematic human rights 
violations in the cotton industry over the last thirty years. 
Forced and child labour in the Uzbek cotton 
industry, 1992-2017
For twenty-five years after the end of the Soviet era, forced labour in the cotton industry was central to 
Uzbekistan’s political economy. The ruling elite used political repression to mobilize millions of workers 
at less than market cost, with the proceeds from this work siphoned off to the State or ruling elites.6 
In this section, we explain how this system worked, combining a Soviet legacy of centralized planning, 
corruption of the State’s enforcement and administrative apparatus, and State ideological control, to 
force over two million people to work for little or no reward in the cotton harvest. 
Institutional environment
Cotton has been central to Uzbekistan’s political economy since the Soviet era.7 The USSR’s central 
planners focused Uzbek production on raw cotton, subsidizing it heavily through input discounts and 
concessional lending. By the 1970s, Uzbekistan was producing two thirds of Soviet cotton. Around a 
third of the country’s agricultural land was devoted to cotton production, which also consumed most 
of its water (and contributed to the disappearance of the Aral Sea). This system lent itself to corruption 
and rent-taking. An official investigation in the 1980s found roughly 20 per cent of cotton production 
revenue leaked through corruption.8
During the post-Soviet transition, the Uzbek Government settled on a notably slower and more gradual 
process of transformation than some of its peers, emphasizing import-substitution and self-reliance 
for energy. This gradualist approach was notionally modelled on the Chinese agricultural transition 
at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, but arguably did less to empower farmers than the Chinese 
reform programme had, retaining more central control. While land title was notionally privatized, 
the State maintained a monopoly on agricultural inputs and a monopsony on purchasing cotton. The 
result was that even as the Uzbek Government became dependent on cotton revenues from unreformed 
cotton farms, those cotton farms were in turn dependent on the State for access to key inputs, notably 
irrigation.9 As the sector stagnated and foreign machinery became too costly to purchase and maintain, 
it underwent a rare de-mechanization, with mechanized harvesting being abandoned in favour of hand 
picking, dramatically increasing the demand for forced labour between 1992 and 2017.10
The State’s monopoly and monopsony powers were underpinned by a legacy apparatus of repression 
left from the Soviet era, repurposed to empower and enrich Uzbek elites.11 The President appointed 
local district governors – hokims – who habitually operated their district as a fiefdom, using State 
administration and enforcement apparatus to enrich themselves. Centralized cotton production was 
central to this system; as the Environmental Justice Foundation put it in 2005, so “long as the farmers” 
in a region delivered adequate cotton to the State, “Tashkent ignore[d] the myriad of corrupt schemes 
that centre on each regional administration.”12 Annually, the central government set cotton production 
quotas, delegating power to the hokims to meet those quotas.13 The hokimiyat in turn used all the 
administrative, enforcement and social authority at their disposal to enlist actors in their district to 
meet this quota. The State then served as the sole purchaser of raw cotton, selling it into international 
markets, with many of these transactions kept out of public accounts and reportedly used to siphon off 
funds – perhaps as much as USD 641 million in 2012.14 
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The profitability of this system for the State and ruling elites rested on buying cotton at a low price from 
domestic producers and selling it at a higher price to world markets. And that in turn required keeping 
labour costs as low as possible. This was achieved through forced production and forced labour. While 
agricultural land was privatized in 2002, the result was a leasehold system that conditioned access to 
land on farmers’ agreement to buy agricultural inputs from the State (at inflated prices), grow cotton 
when so directed by the State, and sell it to the State (at artificially low prices, estimated to be around 
one third of market value).15 These arrangements were enforced not only through confiscation of land, 
but also criminal charges and physical violence, up to and including killings.16 De jure, farmers were 
entrepreneurs enjoying meaningful economic agency. De facto, they were indentured servants.17 As one 
cotton farmer put it to Reuters in 2005: 
Being a cotton farmer here is like hanging between life and death. The government 
controls our lives very tightly. If we don’t obey, we’ll end up in trouble. All we want is 
freedom. And the State is punishing us for wanting freedom.18
People’s vulnerabilities and exploiter strategies
The annual harvest was organized as a kind of corvée labour – a limited-duration labour tax. Each year, 
at least three million people19 were mobilized to pick cotton for between two and eight weeks, each given 
a daily harvest quotas.20 This was the world’s “largest recruitment event” outside the internet, as the ILO 
recently put it.21 Around one fifth to one eighth of the adult population was mobilized.22 Mobilization 
was organized through all institutions of society: local mahalla neighbourhood committees, universities 
and colleges, hospitals and clinics, public and private sector employers, and through mosques. As 
Uzbekistan urbanized, city workers were increasingly bussed to the countryside for the harvest, with 
the State demanding in-kind contributions from transportation companies.23 And until at least 2012, 
this included not only forced work by adults, but also systematic use of child labour. Schools were shut 
down, children transported to makeshift camps by the fields, and set to picking from the age of seven.24 
Most adult pickers were paid. Yet wages were habitually set so low – USD 0.03 to 0.07 per kilogram 
picked, or around USD 1.50 to 3.50 on a daily quota of 50 kilograms – that they did not cover workers’ 
transportation, accommodation and food input costs.25 Farmers, operating in constant debt to State-
run creditors and frequently at the brink of bankruptcy,26 had incentives to withhold even the low 
wages mandated by the State.27 The work was hard: long hours in the fields, usually without protective 
equipment of any kind, and miserable accommodation. Deaths were not uncommon. Unsurprisingly, 
one student interviewed by Uzbek human rights activists in 2016 described it as working “like a slave”.28 
Equally unsurprisingly, there were never enough volunteer pickers to bring in the harvest and meet 
State production quotas. 
Coercion made up the gap.29 As a whistle-blowing former State official explained in 2014, the State 
used all levers of power to force selected people to work: intimidation, extraordinary taxes, threats of 
prosecution, social pressure, and even physical abuse.30 This was often dressed up in legal form. Article 
95 of the Labour Code established the right of authorities to transfer employees work without their 
consent, and labour contracts also habitually provided for such non-consensual secondments.31 Yet the 
face of coercion was only thinly veiled. Human rights activists documented extensive use of threats 
and intimidation, including threats of loss of employment, suspension or expulsion from educational 
institutions, loss of State welfare payments, fines, social ostracization, verbal abuse and public 
humiliation, loss of livelihood, and physical violence.32 The State security apparatus and police relocated 
in large numbers to cotton production districts during the harvest.33 As Uzbek human rights activists 
pointed out, “[t]o a population with a deep and well-founded fear of law enforcement, law enforcement 
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presence reinforces the message that cotton picking is mandatory.’34 Throughout the harvest daily 
“cotton meetings” were conducted by hokims and community leaders, flanked by security personnel, 
often late into the night, to harangue subordinates to meet production quotas.35
The State and its representatives portrayed the duty to pick cotton as a collective one – and threatened 
collective punishment where people refused. Human Rights Watch quoted a hokim in September 2015:
Cotton! You have to go and pick cotton and fulfill the norm. Is it clear!?.... This policy 
applies to everyone! If even one person does not go out, it will be bad for you! I’ll shut 
down your organizations! … What’s this? You delivered only 1,286 kilograms? Why is 
that? I’ll tear your head off!36 
Workers perceived themselves as powerless to resist. A school director reported the situation in 2017 in 
these terms:
We receive orders at meetings, sometimes from the governor, sometimes from the 
head of the education department. Based on these orders we send teachers to the 
fields. Orders are issued verbally. Once the big bosses have given us the order, we 
cannot say anything against it.37
Like the system of governmentality on palm oil plantations discussed in the previous sub-section, the 
system worked to recruit all power-holders into its own social reproduction. It became governmental, in 
Foucaultian terms: the system by which they conducted their own conduct. Since everyone is confronted 
with meeting quotas, everyone must delegate part of that quota to those within their power – and use 
whatever leverage they can, whatever threat of penalty they can muster, to exact performance. It is, as 
Tanya Li described the ‘mafia system’ on palm oil plantations in Chapter 4, a question of survival. Here 
a nurse, forced to pick cotton, interviewed in 2015, explains her understanding and acceptance of how 
coercion becomes normalized in this way:
People who work in public institutions are those who are prepared to tolerate [forced 
work]. Of course no one wants to lose his job. The chief doctor tells us ‘I don’t send 
you to the fields of my own accord. I am also only carrying out orders.’ You need to 
understand him. He says he is required to fire any employee who refuses to work. 
There are a lot of unemployed people. Especially those who have completed medical 
training, with diplomas in hand, looking for jobs. He warned us, if any of us don’t like 
to pick cotton, he’ll hire one of them.38
Human Rights Watch reports schoolteachers threatening to fail students if they would not work, and an 
October 2016 text message from a college administration to students: 
Respected masters students! You must resolve your participation in the cotton harvest 
within one hour. Today we are compiling information and you are at risk of expulsion. 
Immediately resolve this issue.39
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The system made teachers complicit in the social production of forced labour. As the Uzbek Forum for 
Human Rights (UGF) explained:
… the teachers are taken hostage by the cotton campaign. They take on the main 
responsibility of organizing the children to go work in the fields. Teachers have to 
take care of the students during working hours. They also have to go to their students’ 
homes and convince parents to let their children go to the fields in cases where parents 
resist sending their children to pick cotton. Teachers are personally held responsible 
for the health and the lives of the schoolchildren by the parents. At the same time, 
they are held responsible by the administration, for meeting the quotas set for the 
cotton harvest. As a result, teachers during the time of the cotton season turn into 
taskmasters over the schoolchildren, and become complicit in their exploitation.40 
As Patricia Jurewicz explains, the “layered quota system makes it so that it is in each individual’s best 
interest to extract the most out of those who are one step closer to the field than themselves.”41 Each 
person, as they are recruited into the governmental system, reproduces it and expands its reach to the 
next layer down; it becomes the system by which they conduct their own conduct. And in this way, the 
system becomes an axis of power. One school director explicitly recognized this: 
Cotton – this is not a plant, it is politics, and if I persecute a teacher because of cotton, 
the State is on my side. Who can the poor teacher complain to?!42
There was no way out of this governing logic. As one farmer put it: “If you don’t lie – you won’t survive.”43 
And as a college teacher explained: “No one asks us. They only order us. And it is impossible to refuse.”44 
Yet the coercive nature of this system was hidden by cloaking it in legitimizing justifications through 
reference to norms other than survival. Civil society and independent research accounts are full of 
victim statements explaining how social norms, backed by implicit social and legal penalties, were used 
to recruit them to perform work they did not want to do. 
Patriotism was one key norm often instrumentalized to legitimize forced labour. One ten-year-old 
cotton picker was quoted in 2005 as saying: “We serve the State when we pick cotton.”45 According to a 
high school teacher twelve years later, “If you refuse to work in the cotton fields, it is almost as if you 
are a traitor”.46 And here is an official communication from a mahalla neighbourhood committee to its 
residents in message to its residents in 2011: 
We hope for your understanding of the situation and sense of responsibility before 
the Motherland. You know it very well, for every citizen of Uzbekistan cotton – is 
everything: it is the bread and it is the salt on your table, it is the clothes you wear. And 
for these reasons, we urge you to take an active part in gathering the cotton harvest.47
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Yet, as recently as 2016, the line between social pressure and official expectation was so blurred as to be 
indecipherable for most people. This is captured in this exchange reported by Radio Ozodolik between a 
member of an official cotton mobilization team (‘Member of cotton HQ’) and an entrepreneur the official 
was attempting to force to work:
Member of cotton HQ: When will you be picking cotton?
Entrepreneur: Oh… I cannot participate in the cotton picking. Who would work in the shop 
then?
Member of cotton HQ: Oh… Shops will be suspended starting from tomorrow.
Entrepreneur: But I pay my taxes. Entrepreneurs don’t have anything to do with cotton, 
do they?
Member of cotton HQ: Why would you think that you have nothing to do with it?
Entrepreneur: For instance, who would pay my taxes when I am away, picking cotton?
Member of cotton HQ: You will be exempted from paying taxes during this time, too.
Entrepreneur: But entrepreneurs have absolutely nothing to do with the cotton production. 
Entrepreneurs and their businesses should not be interrupted, should they?
Member of cotton HQ: Pardon me, but cotton is a part of the State policy. What are you 
talking about? You opened your business just yesterday, while the cotton production has 
been here for 25 years. It is a part of our State policy since the independence. Cotton plays 
a strategic role.
Entrepreneur: But, there is a Labor Code.
Member of cotton HQ: How much tax money have you paid to the country for running your 
business? Cotton is feeding the whole State.
Entrepreneur: But it is my own decision whether I want to work or not, isn’t it? I am free to 
choose. So, I am not obligated to do this job.
Member of cotton HQ: You are obligated.
Entrepreneur: But we do not live in the Soviet Union anymore?!
Member of cotton HQ: Pardon me… You are obligated. And you will be mobilized on a 
compulsory basis. You live in this Makhalla, you breath the air here. So, you will go and 
pick cotton!
Entrepreneur: I am not obligated.
Member of cotton HQ: You are obligated and you will go to pick cotton. You live in this 
State, don’t you? You wear clothes made of cotton. These clothes that you wear are cotton-
based. And they are made out of the cotton which is being picked at the moment.
Entrepreneur: Is this determined in the Uzbek Constitution?
Member of cotton HQ: This order was given by the acting president. You have to obey it. 
You have no right to refuse it. So, you will go to pick cotton. Tell me that you won’t…
Entrepreneur: I won’t… That is just an oral order which is not based on any law.
Member of cotton HQ: Oral orders are still orders. What are you talking about?!
Entrepreneur: It has to be stated in a written form. It has to be legitimate.
Member of cotton HQ: Pardon… Then you will also sign a letter stating that you refuse to 
go to the cotton harvest. Understood?
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Entrepreneur: Yes, indeed, I will sign it.
Member of cotton HQ: Agreed. I will bring the letter and you will sign it. Let’s see. Your 
provocation is not acceptable. You are obligated to pick cotton.
Entrepreneur: I am not. I live in a free State and I am free to choose.
Member of cotton HQ: Stop your agitation! Instead join Uzbekistan! Tell the people to rather 
pick cotton. You can do this kind of agitation! But, if you don’t pick cotton, stop telling 
people to do the same! Just shut the … off. I am following the orders of the government!
Entrepreneur: Can I see your ID?
Member of cotton HQ: What are you saying? I have badges on my shoulders and my ID! It 
is written here: Laziz Fayziqulov. You can write it down, too. We will also pick cotton! If 
needed, I will be picking it too! Even 70-year-old women are picking. You are still young…48
The entrepreneur has no outside option, no possibility to avoid work. Even raising that possibility is 
framed by the official as “agitation”. To refuse to pick cotton was to be seen as anti-government: a very 
dangerous proposition in what was, at the time, a highly repressive and authoritarian country.49 As that 
exchange also shows us, picking cotton was framed not just as question of citizenship, but also as a 
question of solidarity. It was often linked to the Uzbek tradition of khashar50 – mutual, unpaid labour by 
community members, similar to the Australia/New Zealand tradition of a “working bee”. And religious 
norms and authorities were also enlisted to promote and normalize forced cotton picking.51 The State 
leaned on social actors, whatever the source of their legitimacy, to use that legitimacy as leverage to 
encourage forced work. 
A drag on Uzbek development
Over time, it became increasingly clear that the centralized cotton production system based on forced 
labour was acting as a brake on Uzbekistan’s development. This brake operated through many of the 
mechanisms identified in Chapter 2, including impacts on productivity, multiplier effects, innovation, 
revenues, corruption and environmental harm. 
Because the formal system rested on the normalization of conduct recognized broadly, if implicitly, 
as coerced, it created incentives for hiding that conduct and paying people not to require it. It gave 
rise to a shadow system of informal norms – a system of corruption. Farmers, pickers, businesses and 
public entities all became enmeshed in tangled webs of bribery and extortion as they sought to buy 
their way out of mandatory work and production.52 Power-holders used their discretion over forced 
work to extract rents, ranging from outright bribes to ‘donations’ to favoured causes and events.53 A 
secondary market of substitute workers – mardikors – also emerged. Workers would pay substitutes 
to go to the fields and pick on their behalf. To induce mardikors to work, mandated pickers had to pay 
them at rates higher than the government was offering. Citizens were, in other words, subsidizing the 
State production system through either their own labour or through side payments to other labourers.54 
These subsidies came to represent a significant drag on the economy, since they deprived the economy 
of consumption and investment, and the state of resulting revenue. One study calculated the indirect 
damage to the population and private business in the form of lost services or profits because of forced 
labour at USD 211 million to 291 million each year55
The system also created other serious drags on development. For one thing, it undermined trust, 
which, as we have seen in Chapter 2, creates long-term negative economic impacts.56 It may also have 
contributed to inflation, by forcing farmers to inflate prices for other goods to make up for underpayment 
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for cotton. And it also directly disrupted human capital development. In 2000, UNICEF estimated that 
22.6 per cent of children aged 5 to 14 worked part-time, primarily in cotton harvesting.57 It was routine 
for kindergartens, schools and clinics to close, simply posting a sign on the door: “Everyone went to the 
cotton harvest.”58 The annual disruption to education imposed a serious drag on educational attainment 
and human capital development, with knock-on consequences for the entire economy.59 
Yet it was not just the country’s human capital, but also its physical capital, that was depleted. To make 
up for losses from enforced cotton production, farmers would grow other crops on the same land 
immediately following cotton harvest, reducing its fertility.60 Yields trended down over time, leading to 
Uzbekistan having some of the lowest-yield cotton production in the world.61 Uzbekistan’s cotton exports 
have gone backwards over the last twenty years when measured both against the rest of the cotton 
market, and against other Uzbek exports.62 So have its cotton farmers, who have become steadily poorer 
in real terms, and increasingly were trapped in a chronic credit-debt cycle.63 All of this contributed to a 
lack of investment in innovation and value-added manufacturing. Production, processing and marketing 
were costly compared to other countries.64 Uzbekistan was increasingly slipping down the smile curve, 
into the role of raw material supplier, as other countries passed it by to become textile manufacturers.
All of this pointed to an urgent need for reform of Uzbekistan’s cotton sector – a case that the World Bank 
and other development actors put repeatedly to the government from the early 1990s onwards.65 Yet the 
government resisted, pointing to experiences with over-rapid liberalization in other Soviet States, and 
arguing that moving liberalization too fast would create opportunities for corruption and criminality.66 
This was a convenient argument for an elite whose power was tied up with cotton rents padded by 
forced labour. A 2014 analysis, drawing on information from insider stakeholders, suggested significant 
cotton revenues may be being siphoned off from public budgets to private rent-takers,67 consistent with 
patterns of grand corruption alleged by others and today at the root of efforts in the US and elsewhere 
to recover as much as USD 850 million in assets allegedly stolen by senior officials during that period.68
The World Bank was blunt about these risks, stating as early as 1998 that 
Government’s decision to retain a number of controls, including direct coordination 
of output decisions… have created rent-seeking opportunities for certain vested 
interest groups and raise concerns about the overall environment for private sector 
development, public sector accountability and governance structure. There is also 
a sharp disconnect between Government statements and the actual functioning of 
policies… which undermines confidence.69 
The Bank continued to press the case for reform in subsequent years, even as it continued to provide 
Uzbekistan both country-level policy assistance70 and project financing – including funding directed 
towards the cotton sector.71 As the Bank’s own 1998 analysis reflects, there was little sign at the time that 
this was leading to real behavioural or policy change. On the contrary, there was clearly a risk that the 
Bank was financing projects connected to forced and child labour. So what changed? Why, in 2020, is the 
Uzbek Government in the process of dismantling its forced labour system and giving its cotton farmers 
the economic agency it has deprived them of for 25 years? 
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Dismantling Uzbekistan’s forced and child labour 
system
Success has many parents. It is not possible to point to a unique cause for the changes in Uzbekistan’s 
cotton production system since 2015 (detailed further below). Instead, we can identify several converging 
structural factors, harnessed through courageous action by Uzbek leaders in government and civil 
society, and their external partners. 
The drag on development created by the rentier-based cotton production system described above 
created growing liabilities for Uzbekistan’s ruling elite. Yet while the World Bank and other partners 
continued to partner with the Government in the late 1990s and early 2000s (likely driven in part by 
geostrategic and counter-terrorism concerns72), those were paper liabilities, not realized costs. It took 
an exogenous intervention by human rights activists and, later, cotton buyers and financiers, to turn 
these into real costs – reduced access to demand, increased capital costs and growing reputational 
costs. This was essentially a disruption strategy, aimed at changing the strategic calculus of forced and 
child labour in Uzbekistan. And it arguably worked. As those costs mounted and the value of Uzbek 
cotton declined, Uzbekistan’s elite increasingly looked for a way out. 
At that point, the continued engagement by the World Bank emerged as an asset for both Uzbekistan 
and its international partners, providing the basis for creative action by a range of actors to begin to 
transform Uzbekistan’s forced labour system. This has involved a mixture of transformation-oriented 
interventions addressing the formal and informal institutions in Uzbekistan that are conducive to forced 
labour, and empowerment-oriented interventions, increasing Uzbek people’s resilience to exploitation, 
especially through awareness-raising, civil society capacity building, and support for independent 
media. ILO engagement has been key on both fronts. 
There are good reasons to perceive these interventions, especially over the last five years, as spectacularly 
successful. After five years of in-country monitoring, the ILO has concluded that systematic forced 
labour and child labour are a thing of the past. And independent human rights and civil society actors 
also acknowledge sustained progress. Yet the process has not been without controversy and setbacks. In 
the process, it has delivered multiple lessons for the broader development sector about how to deliver 
the Developing Freedom agenda. 
Disrupting demand for Uzbek cotton
International critics of Uzbekistan’s approach to cotton production, from the World Bank to International 
Crisis Group, recognized from the mid-1990s that forced labour would only end in the context of a 
broader liberalization of the sector and, most likely, of Uzbek governance more broadly. As Crisis Group 
argued in 2005
The exploitative nature of cotton economics makes the repressive political [system] 
almost inevitable. Since the State and cotton elites are unwilling to pay farmers a fair 
price, the system can only continue through the use of coercion. States that depend on 
the present structure of the cotton monoculture must retain an authoritarian political 
system, in which the rights of individuals are suppressed, theoretically in favour of the 
collective good, but in practice in favour of narrow ruling elites.73
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What could be done, however, while there was no political will for liberalization? The answer offered 
by International Crisis Group and others was simple: increase the costs for the elite through demand 
disruption. As the Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights (UGF) – one of the main advocates of change 
– put it in 2012, the disruption strategy was driven by a belief that 
the authorities will only genuinely approach structural reforms in the cotton sector 
and the agricultural sector at large, when they themselves feel the danger of losing 
income from the export of cotton to world markets.74
Civil society efforts to raise international awareness of labour abuses was key. Starting in 2004, ahead 
of international mobilization, Uzbek journalists including Umida Niyazova and Galima Burkharbaeva, 
the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Ferghana.ru and others, began gathering and disseminating 
evidence of those abuses. In 2005, International Crisis Group published a major report, The Curse of 
Cotton, incorporating this evidence and calling for international action by governments, development 
actors (including the World Bank), and cotton markets.75 The Environmental Justice Foundation added 
its voice soon after with White Gold, which connected these abuses to serious environmental harms 
caused by the region’s cotton industry, including the disappearance of the Aral Sea.76 The ILO Committee 
of Experts commented on forced and child labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector in a 2005 report. A 
2007 story on the BBC also increased concern and attention.77 In 2007 Uzbek activist Mutabar Tajibayeva 
released a petition against forced child labour, calling for a boycott of Uzbek cotton.78 She was joined 
in the following years by a growing number of Uzbek activists, including UGF. Campaigners soon after 
organized the Cotton Pledge, which commits a company to not knowingly source Uzbek cotton “until 
the Government of Uzbekistan ends the practice of forced labor in its cotton sector.” Today, the Cotton 
Pledge has over 300 companies signed up.79
In May 2008, an international coalition of human rights, labour, responsible investor and business 
organizations formed the Cotton Campaign, to coordinate their actions. From early on, it adopted a 
strategy seeking to influence policymakers in Uzbekistan through diplomatic and inter-governmental 
channels. In 2007, the International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) had formally requested a review of 
the Generalized System of Preferences Program (GSP) for Uzbekistan with the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative.80 In 2008, the US Department of Labor investigated forced child labour in cotton 
production in Uzbekistan and added cotton from Uzbekistan to the list of goods made by forced child 
labour in 2009. In 2010, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) brought 
complaints against seven cotton traders through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) national contact point system.81 In 2011, the European Parliament voted to defer 
a textile protocol with Uzbekistan over labour concerns.82 In October 2012, the French OECD National 
Contact Point issued guidance to multinational enterprises not to trade Uzbek cotton. In 2013, the UN 
Committee Against Torture (CAT) made mention of forced and child labour as one of the “principle 
subjects of concern” in Uzbekistan.83 Also in 2013 the National Human Rights Commission of Korea 
undertook an investigative mission to observe the human rights impacts of South Korean companies 
in Uzbekistan,84 after campaigners successfully pressured Nike, H&M, Ikea, C&A and others to exclude 
a Korean firm, Daewoo International, from their supply chain, because Daewoo bought cotton from 
Uzbekistan. And after submissions from the Cotton Campaign the U.S. State Department moved 
Uzbekistan in its 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report to a “Tier 3” ranking, the lowest category a country 
can be placed in, and directly impacting its access to US bilateral assistance. Around the same time, the 
US Government detained shipments of cotton from Uzbekistan at points of entry into the US market, on 
the ground that they were produced with forced and child labour, under section 307 of the US Tariff Act 
of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1307). 
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According to one key player in this campaign, it was the combination of pressure from governments, 
labour rights actors and capital (buyers and investors) that led to a breakthrough around 2013. In 2012, 
the International Organization of Employers (IOE) and International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
submitted coordinated comments to the ILO regarding Uzbekistan’s position on ILO ConventionC182 
– the Worst Forms of Child Labour – which led to the ILO Tripartite Conference Committee on the 
Application of Standards recommending tripartite monitoring of forced child labour in Uzbekistan’s 
2013 cotton harvest.85 Confronted by a united front, the Uzbek Government agreed.
Monitoring took place in September and October 2013. It found and addressed a number of instances 
of child labour, but suggested there had been no systematic use of child labour.86 Civil society actors 
remained sceptical, arguing that the involvement of government actors in the monitoring teams raised 
questions about the reliability of responses, and undermined the usefulness of its findings.87 Yet the 
episode proved important, both for demonstrating the feasibility of ILO involvement with monitoring, 
and setting the stage for further cooperation between the Uzbek Government and the ILO to address 
child labour, crystallized in April 2014 as a country assistance programme,88 which has to date been 
funded largely by US Department of Labor.89
World Bank and ILO engagement
What appeared to be a victory soon, however, took on a more ambiguous slant, as it became apparent 
that there might be some co-option of international efforts under way. Reductions in use of child labour 
in the Uzbek cotton harvest had apparently been offset by increased forced labour of adults. In 2012 
and 2013 the Uzbek Government placed increased focus on mobilization of adult workers, through both 
public and private institutions, even private companies such as General Motors (GM) Uzbekistan.90 So 
even as international efforts to reduce child labour continued, forced (adult) labour increasingly became 
the central focus of disruption efforts. 
A 2013 complaint by the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, Ezgulik, and UGF to the World Bank 
Inspection Panel proved pivotal.91 The World Bank had been financing Uzbek agricultural development 
and education since 1995.92 The complaint focused on the Bank’s Rural Enterprise Support Program 
Phase II and its additional financing (RESP-II), about which Ezgulik had been raising concerns since 
2010. The complainants argued that the Bank had not fully recognized and analysed the problem of 
forced and child labour in designing its project and had not put in place adequate measures to prevent 
Bank funding from being used on agricultural lands on which forced and child labour were practiced.
The response from Bank Management to the complaint contains a number of passages presaging the 
course of Bank engagement in the years since. After recognizing the seriousness of the issue and the 
importance of project-level safeguards, Management wrote that “project-level measures alone cannot 
completely prevent coercion.” Instead, it argued, the solution was for the country to move away from 
State-controlled cotton. The basis for that should be both the Bank’s multi-year engagement strategy, 
and coordinated action by multiple international development partners including the Bank, ILO and 
UNICEF.93 To assure progress, Management proposed to implement third-party monitoring (TPM) of 
child and forced labour across the bank’s projects in the country.
In deferring a decision on the need for investigation, the Inspection Panel leaned into this commitment 
from Bank Management, and the signs of political will for reform in Uzbekistan. While acknowledging 
that “a plausible link does exist between the project and the alleged harms” of forced and child labour,
the Panel recognizes and appreciates that significant positive trends have emerged 
with respect to the critical issue of child labor. These include important actions 
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already taken and further commitments and intentions on the part of Government 
and its partners, as indicated in the Management Response to the Request, and in 
discussions during the Panel’s eligibility visit with a wide range of stakeholders, to take 
additional actions, including the implementation of effective third-party monitoring 
on both child and forced labor, and to continue the constructive dialogue with the ILO 
and other development partners on these key issues and concerns. … In light of the 
foregoing, and the important potential for further positive developments, the Panel 
has determined that it should defer its recommendation on whether to investigate 
the matters raised by the Request in order to provide a sufficient opportunity for 
these developments and actions to evolve. The Panel notes that Management’s efforts 
are focused both at project level, but also at the higher level of providing adequate 
support to the Government in addressing many of the concerns related to the system 
of cotton production, more generally. The Panel notes the importance of these efforts 
by Management in addressing the concerns raised in the Request.94
This was a key moment not only in the international development community’s engagement with the 
Uzbek Government, but also, arguably, in its broader approach to addressing forced labour. It represented 
a fundamental shift from a project-level safeguards approach to an approach focused more explicitly on 
system-level change – a central premise of the Developing Freedom approach articulated in Chapter 2. 
In October 2014 the World Bank and the ILO signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding 
cooperation on efforts to address forced and child labour in Uzbek cotton production, which included 
the ILO playing the role of TPM. The World Bank set up a multi-donor trust fund specifically for the TPM 
work, which has since received contributions from the EU, US, Swiss development agency SIDA, German 
development agency GIZ, and the EBRD. 
In late 2014 the matter returned to the Inspection Panel, after its one-year deferral of an investigation 
decision. Bank Management noted the ILO TPM process had commenced and noted “very intense” 
dialogue with the Government that “is sowing results”, with the “tenor of this dialogue [having] 
shifted significantly, from initial rejection, to acceptance of TPM and covenants in legal agreement, 
to encouraging trilateral cooperation between the Government of Uzbekistan, ILO and the Bank, and 
proactive dissemination of workers’ rights and employers’ responsibilities.” Labour issues had “become 
an integral part of the Bank’s dialogue with the Government on agriculture sector reforms that aim to 
help the country diversify out of cotton production in the long term”.95 
Management was explicit in recognizing the need for a systemic approach:
Management recognizes that the concerns … are deeply entrenched in the cotton 
production system of the country. The course of action by the Bank is supporting 
introduction of measures aimed at bringing systemic changes to the sector.96
Its strategy was laid out even more clearly in a second progress report, in July 2016:
The World Bank Group is pursuing a three-pronged strategic response to [child and 
forced labour]. This consists of (a) risk mitigation in partnership with the ILO in at-
risk operations through TPM, [the Feedback Mechanism] and awareness raising …; 
(b) support to the [Government of Uzbekistan’s]agricultural modernization agenda; 
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and (c) promotion of private sector demand for sustainably produced cotton. In 
doing so, the World Bank Group aims to alter the underlying incentives for the forced 
mobilization of labor.97
Based on inputs from Bank Management, and in “meetings with UNICEF, ILO and potential donors to 
the [TPM multi-donor trust fund] (i.e., USA, UK, Switzerland, and the European Union)”, in late 2014 the 
Panel concluded that there was a 
clear trajectory and specific medium-term efforts which the Bank and other 
development partners have established to support the diversification and 
modernization of the cotton sector so that child and forced labor can be firmly 
eradicated.98
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With these TPM arrangements in place, the Bank approved over USD 500 million in financing to Uzbekistan 
in 2014, relating to education and agricultural development. All of the loan contracts included covenants 
stipulating that funding was subject to cancellation and repayment if the Bank “received evidence, that 
it considers credible, of the use of child or forced labor in connection with the Project activities or within 
the Project Area.”99 
Around the same time, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) agreed a USD 146 million loan to the Uzbek 
Government, with additional financing from the Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), to 
support cotton irrigation. Despite commitments to work towards the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour in designing and implementing all its projects, the ADB’s project design considered 
labour standards only in the context of water sector employees, not in the cotton industry the irrigation 
project was intended to boost.100 The loan did, however, include a condition requiring respect for labour 
standards, and envisaged the ILO’s involvement in monitoring. But the ADB approach stands in contrast 
to the approach taken by the Bank, with its clear, if quiet, indications of a growing commitment to 
system-level analysis and change.
Still, the ADB was not the only multilateral lender apparently still hewing to a more traditional, project 
safeguards approach. In late 2015 the Bank’s private sector lending arm, the IFC, invested USD 40 million 
in a leading cotton yarn producer in Uzbekistan, Indorama Kokand Textile, to expand its textile plant, 
which has also subsequently attracted investment from EBRD.101 The social impact assessment connected 
to the project found that there was a moderate risk of child labour and forced labour, but that the project 
“will be able to address the issue” in the project area through mitigation measures.102 With the IFC, 
Indorama has developed a system for rating the risk level of cotton-producing districts based on data 
from ILO monitoring, publicly available reports, and data on the labour supply in the area. Indorama has 
committed not to source from districts it classifies as “red” or high-risk based on this index. 
This IFC investment would, however, ultimately prove important as part of a larger effort to induce the 
Uzbek Government to undertake structural reform of the cotton industry to allow economic upgrading 
(discussed further below). In the meantime, the lack of a systemic approach created risks for the IFC. 
On 30 June 2016, an alleged victim of forced labour and Uzbek human rights defenders who had faced 
reprisals for monitoring and reporting on forced labour filed a complaint with the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (CAO), the IFC’s accountability mechanism, raising their concerns that the IFC had not 
undertaken adequate due diligence in these investments and was in violation of the IFC Performance 
Standards. At time of writing complaint appears still to be under assessment.103
ILO third party monitoring 
Perhaps the most significant result of the Inspection Panel’s involvement in 2013 was the agreement 
by the World Bank to hire a third-party monitor (TPM) for its projects in Uzbekistan. The ILO has, as 
a result, monitored every cotton harvest since 2015, as well as some spring weeding seasons, issuing 
an annual report.104 While its TPM methodology has developed over time, it has involved a mix of visits 
to cotton fields, medical facilities, educational institutions, businesses, local administrations, mahalla 
committees, undertaking interviews and surveys, reviewing records, and conducting telephone surveys. 
Each year, typically, hundreds (or more) such visits are undertaken. The monitoring results have proven 
both contentious and irreplaceable as a basis for evidence-based policy dialogue and coordination 
amongst diverse stakeholders, both inside Uzbekistan and beyond. And they laid the groundwork for an 
acceleration of transformation efforts when a crucial political window opened in late 2017.
ILO TPM kicked off in 2015. The ILO’s assessment was mixed. It found that after two years of efforts 
to reduce child labour, “use of children” in cotton picking “has become rare, sporadic and socially 
unacceptable”.105 As for adults, while it noted that “certain indicators of forced labour have been observed”, 
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it also concluded that “[l]arge numbers of citizens seem to be willing recruits”. “[T]he risks of forced 
labour linked to organized recruitment are real,” the ILO monitors wrote.106 Nevertheless, “Monitoring 
has not provided conclusive information that beneficiaries of World Bank projects used child or forced 
labour during the cotton harvest.”107
The report also raised subtle questions about the monitoring methods used, and the utility of a Feedback 
Mechanism that had been set up as part of the Bank’s mitigation measures package. “[T]he confidence 
of the public” in the Feedback Mechanism is low, wrote the ILO. “Worrying reports were received … of 
harassment and threats to people conducting their own monitoring. The impression thus given is that 
those in authority do not want to prevent labour abuses.” What is more, “[c]oncerns arise with respect to 
the candidness of interviewees, to the real degree of voluntarism [of students] and to the veracity of staff 
attendance registers”. The report noted that 
getting beyond what monitors were supposed to hear was sometimes difficult. 
Interviewees were circumspect talking to an official-looking group of monitors. Some 
retracted their words when justifications were unconvincing.108
The next year, the ILO TPM report on the 2016 harvest suggested further progress, but also continuing 
challenges. “No incidences of child and forced labour were identified with regards to World Bank-
supported agriculture, water and education projects”, wrote the ILO monitors, though “[p]roject sites 
operate in a similar context and share similar risks of child or forced labour to that of others”.109 The risks 
of child labour had reduced, the monitors argued: “Uzbekistan has phased-out organized child labour”, 
wrote the monitors, concluding that it “has become socially unacceptable”. Yet “forced labour remains a 
risk for some categories of people”, they noted. However, “these groups … are a minority of all pickers”. 
There were continuing challenges for monitors during the 2016 harvest, the report noted. As in 2015, 
the 2016 TPM report noted that “concerns arose over the candidness of interviewees, the accuracy of 
staff attendance registers and the real degree of voluntarism of pickers from World Bank-supported 
institutions or working on World Bank supported project sites”. The monitors explained that “getting 
beyond what ILO experts were given to hear was at times difficult. Many interviewees appeared to have 
been briefed in advance.” The monitors indicated that they were unable to verify information and had to 
record “what they observe and are told”, including “some contradictions or anomalies”.110 The monitors 
also noted that some interview subjects might not be truly voluntary: 
Declarations made by vulnerable people of their willingness to pick may be unreliable 
if their recruitment is effectively carried out by those on whom they depend for their 
primary income or education.111
Those concerns again raised questions about the confidence that should be placed in the ILO’s findings. 
Unsurprisingly, civil society responded to the 2015 and 2016 reports with considerable scepticism. 
One major concern was the fact that, despite the World Bank’s commitment to the Inspection Panel 
to undertake independent TPM, three factors linked the ILO to the Uzbek Government. First, in ILO 
governance: Uzbekistan is a member of the ILO and thus a partial governor of it.112 Second, the ILO’s 
ongoing programming in Uzbekistan, the welfare of its personnel in Uzbekistan, and continued external 
funding for its work in Uzbekistan all depended on the Government’s cooperation.113 And third, while 
the monitoring teams deployed were led by an ILO official, they also included representatives of the 
Uzbek Government and Uzbek non-State entities that were controlled by the Government, notably the 
157 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
local trade union body.114 (Indeed, in 2017, even as it was participating in this monitoring, the trade union 
involved was allegedly sponsoring local newspaper ads calling on people to participate in the cotton 
harvest.115)
The last factor, in particular, generated considerable critique, since it raised questions about 
whether victims of forced labour were being interviewed not only in the presence of, but actually by, 
representatives of the institutions that were coercing them to work in the first place. This raised serious 
ethical, methodological and human rights questions, which became the focus of an extended public 
exchange between the ILO, human rights groups and researchers.116 UGF argued that the Government 
had “doubled down on coercion”, forcing more than a million people to pick cotton under threat of 
penalty, and that a climate of fear undermined the ILO’s monitoring efforts.117 Following detailed field 
investigations, Human Rights Watch and UGF both alleged government actors had instructed people 
to lie to the ILO monitoring teams, and that other steps were taken to present a false image to the 
monitors.118 Both raised concerns about the Feedback Mechanism created to receive forced labour 
complaints, specifically around its inability to protect complainants from reprisals. One schoolteacher 
explained: 
I know that you cannot force people to work. But I won’t call the complaint line number 
we were given. There is no use. These posters are put up for the benefit of the ILO. All 
these calls [to the hotlines] will result in simple teachers and medical workers losing 
their jobs.110
Based on such testimony, UGF and HRW suggested Uzbeks viewed the Feedback Mechanism as ‘for 
show’, amounting to “fairy tales”, and would not use it out of fear of reprisal.120 UGF suggested that 
the Uzbek Government had gamed the TPM system so extensively through intimidation of interview 
subjects and harassment of independent civil society researchers that the result was a “cover-up”.121 In 
2015, one human rights monitor, Dmitry Tikhonov, had to flee the country and another, Uktam Pardaev, 
was imprisoned for two months and released on a suspended sentence. In 2016, only one UGF monitor, 
Elena Urlaeva, continued to work openly, and she was subjected to surveillance, harassment, arbitrary 
detention, assault, and involuntary stays in a psychiatric hospital. And where the ILO described some 
workers as seeing cotton picking jobs as an ‘opportunity’, the UGF monitors suggested that, like mafia 
offers, these opportunities were “impossible to refuse”.122
The criticism led to methodological changes in TPM in subsequent years. In 2017 the ILO introduced 
changes to questionnaires and “additional safeguards … to ensure that the interviews were conducted 
by the ILO experts in an unaccompanied and confidential manner”, including recusal of the trade union 
representative from the interview process after initially helping the monitoring team gain site access.123 
For both 2018 and 2019, the monitoring methodology was submitted to an independent review board 
for ethics approval, and moved to an “independent, unaccompanied, unannounced” field inspection 
strategy, exclusion of government officials and documentation of interview subjects’ informed consent.124
Neither the questions raised about the TPM methodology, nor the ILO’s findings of ongoing signs of 
forced labour led the World Bank to suspend it loans, however, since the ILO had not reported any link 
between its loans and actual cases of forced or child labour. In private, Bank officials told human rights 
activists that suspending a project would be the last resort, arguing that the Bank was having a positive 
influence on the sector and making progress in its reform dialogue with the Government.125 At the time, 
many in civil society dismissed this as rhetorical posturing. Yet events were quickly to suggest otherwise. 
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Perestroika?
On 2 September 2016, President Islam Karimov, the only President Uzbekistan had known since 
independence, died. By December 2016, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who as Prime Minister had overseen the 
centralized system of cotton production, had been elected President. President Mirziyoyev immediately 
set Uzbekistan on a path towards political and economic liberalization. Western commentators began to 
suggest this was, belatedly, Uzbekistan’s own perestroika, and speculated whether President Mirziyoyev 
would be the country’s equivalent of China’s reformist leader, Deng Xiaoping.126 
In his first appearance before the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2017, President 
Mirziyoyev laid out a raft of measures his Government was undertaking to liberalize governance 
and protect rights, leading off with his commitment to “cooperation with the International Labour 
Organization [for] effective measures to eradicate child labour and forced labour.”127 Three days later 
high-risk groups, including students, were recalled by government order from the cotton fields, where 
they were participating in the annual harvest.128 Cabinet-level decisions and Presidential Decrees during 
the course of 2018 initiated additional measures to discourage use of forced labour, including increasing 
liability for use of forced labour, strengthening of labour inspections, awareness-raising projects in 
the media and with civil society, and dialogue with civil society both inside and outside Uzbekistan. 
President Mirziyoyev welcomed the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, to 
Uzbekistan in 2017, and Human Rights Watch and the Cotton Campaign also visited that year. 
These measures quickly began to show positive results in both ILO TPM and in the assessment of civil 
society actors. The ILO TPM report for the 2017 harvest found that there was “no systematic use of 
child labour in the cotton harvest in Uzbekistan and significant measures to end forced labour are 
being implemented”,129 with a “clear political commitment at central level to completely end the use of 
forced labour.”130 The 2017 report likewise documented a seven-fold increase since 2015 in the number of 
submissions to the Feedback Mechanism created to receive complaints about forced labour in the cotton 
harvest.131 The UGF also reported reduced involvement of public sector entities in forced picking, and 
an environment more conducive to independent civil society reporting on forced labour.132 Significantly, 
the ILO also found that voluntary pickers were more productive than involuntary pickers, supporting 
the central premise that a reduction in forced labour would unleash economic gains for the whole Uzbek 
economy.133 
More positive results were reported in 2018 and 2019. In 2018 the ILO TPM suggested a 48 per cent drop in 
forced labour year on year, and an 85 per cent increase in pickers’ wages.134 The report also documented 
improvements in public awareness-raising, labour inspection, civil society reporting, government 
investigation and sanctioning of violations – documenting over 200 instances of punishment of officials 
for forced labour. And the report is also notable for making explicit the case that people forced to pick 
cotton could be more productively used elsewhere, and that centralized control of cotton productive had 
“led to reduced productivity and resource efficiency”.135
Uzbek human rights activists told VOA that they “felt free” to conduct their monitoring during the 2018 
harvest season.136 Meanwhile, the UGF, while finding documentary evidence of continued forced picking 
in State-owned enterprises including banks, utility companies, the youth union, tax authority, tourism 
department and a labour union, also acknowledged signs of positive change in government policy, 
and signals from the highest levels that public entities should not be involved in cotton picking. It also 
concluded that the increased cotton price offered by government increasingly empowered farmers to 
pay a decent wage, attracting voluntary labour.137 
Going further, the ILO TPM report for the 2019 harvest concluded that “systematic forced labour did not 
occur” and “systemic child labour is no longer used during the cotton harvest in Uzbekistan.” For the 
first time, the TPM was carried out by independent Uzbek civil society activists trained by the ILO. The 
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TPM report estimated another 40 per cent drop, year on year, in the number of people in forced labour, 
including military conscripts and others mobilized through public institutions and private companies.138 
The ILO also reported strengthening of penalties, increased media reporting on forced labour, and 
improved trust for the feedback mechanism.139 The number of labour inspectors doubled from 200 to 
400, and 1,282 forced labour cases were investigated. 259 government officials, heads of organizations 
and managers were punished for forced labour violations during the 2019 harvest, mostly with fines, 
which also rose 10-fold compared to 2018.140 Uzbekistan also ratified several key ILO Conventions in late 
2019, including the 2014 Protocol to the 1930 Forced Labour Convention. 
Once again, civil society actors reported they were free to monitor the 2019 harvest without interference; 
they were also invited to join a new National Commission on Forced Labour and Human Trafficking.141 
Despite noting forced picking of government employees that year, such as firefighters, police and some 
mid-level civil servants,142 the UGF acknowledged Uzbekistan’s “significant, rapid progress toward the 
elimination of adult forced labor in the cotton harvest, following the elimination of child labor”, with 
President Shavkat Mirziyoyev making “dismantling forced labor in the cotton sector the centerpiece of 
his effort to modernize and reform Uzbekistan”.143 All of these reforms, the ILO concluded, were set not 
only to reduce forced labour but also to increase employment and growth, unlocking potential gains 
in education, health, infrastructure and other area.144 Reducing forced labour, it seemed, was a key to 
unlocking broader sustainable development gains across the Uzbek political economy. 
Creating an outside option for Uzbek elites
Nevertheless, forced labour did not disappear overnight. The ILO has continued to identify forced labour 
in Uzbekistan, estimating the involuntary workforce in the cotton harvest at 364,000 in 2017, 170,000 
in 2018 and 102,000 in 2019. In 2018, at least 6.8 per cent of pickers were “made to participate” in the 
harvest, though 15 percent of those asked to participate declined.145
The ILO suggests that while there is central Government commitment to dismantling forced labour, 
“the degree of implementation varies in the country between provinces and districts.”146 While, by 2018, 
the ILO had concluded that the Uzbek Government had turned away from “systematic” forced labour, 
it argued that there were still systems in place, notably the centralized quota system, that created “an 
environment conducive to forced labour”.147 As the ILO said in 2018, “legacy systems conducive to the 
exaction of forced labour in agriculture have not yet been fully dismantled”.148
The centralized system of production, operationalized through production quotas, was at the heart of 
this legacy.149 In a watershed moment, on 6 March 2020, President Mirziyoyev announced the abolition 
of the State monopsony on cotton purchasing, and the quota system altogether. Yet this is not the only 
“legacy system” that contributes to the “environment conducive to forced labour”. As the UGF noted 
in 2019, other structural challenges include “structural labor shortages in some regions and at some 
harvest stages and a lack of effective and ethical mechanisms for voluntary recruitment that do not 
involve government actors or government pressure”, as well as the absence of “a culture of prevention, 
accountability for perpetrators, and protection for victims.”150
The analysis of the ILO TPM mechanism, on which the World Bank relies, is that while the Uzbek State 
has turned fairly definitively away from a policy of systematic forced labour, there are still legal and 
social systems in place that allow actors other than the central Government to impose forced labour. 
This distinction, which the ILO has drawn explicitly in its last couple of reports on the Uzbek cotton 
harvest, builds on an earlier, controversial distinction it had made between ‘forced’ workers and 
‘reluctant’ workers – who are not included in its forced labour counts in its TPM reporting since 2015. 
Reluctant workers, it argued, worked not because of coercion, but because of “social pressure”.151 Social 
pressure, the 2018 ILO TPM report explains, involves “the dynamics of a community, [in which] despite 
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[an individual’s personal preference], people may agree to pick cotton although they are not subject 
to tangible reprisals or an actual penalty if they refuse to do so.” The 2018 and 2019 ILO TPM reports 
provide examples of ‘social pressure’: worrying what neighbours will think, not wanting to ‘let the team 
down’, not wanting to disobey family authorities, and patriotic duty. Social pressure “refers to situations 
where people want to maintain positive relationships with their families or communities, based on past 
experience that communities or certain categories of people are being mobilized to pick cotton”.152 The 
ILO characterizes succumbing to this pressure not as coercion, but as “[n]ormative conformity”.153 As a 
result, picking based on social pressure has been excluded from the ILO’s count of forced labour since 
2015.154
The problem here is not simply categorical but empirical. In an authoritarian State such as Uzbekistan 
was until at least 2017, social pressure cannot be neatly decoupled from the State or from threat of 
penalty. As we saw earlier, State authorities went out of their way to recruit, enlist and even corrupt 
sources of social authority – imams, teachers, doctors, nurses, local neighbourhood committees – and 
align their conduct with the State’s labour preferences. Neighbourly disapproval was implicitly backed by 
the threat of penalty by the State. “Past experience” would precisely tell the average Uzbek that to refuse 
the “patriotic duty” of picking was not simply to risk social disapproval, but to risk one’s livelihood and 
physical safety. Indeed, as the 2016 ILO TPM report noted “picking [was] variously justified as a national 
duty, a community obligation, a temporary transfer of work tasks, or frequently an opportunity to earn 
additional income”.155 In other words, the distinction between State coercion and social pressure breaks 
down in the field. 
This has important implications for how we understand the situation in Uzbekistan today. On the one 
hand, this may mean that the number of people picking cotton in Uzbekistan involuntarily is actually 
higher than the ILO TPM reports announce. It is notable that the ILO does not publish the number of 
people it identifies as “reluctant workers” or those succumbing to “social pressure”. Including those 
estimates might give a more accurate picture of just how many workers in Uzbekistan are working against 
their own economic preference. On the other hand, however, as the ILO points out, coercion is not a 
simple binary, but rather works more like a spectrum. By distinguishing between “systematic” forced 
labour imposed deliberately by the State and “systemic” forced labour arising not through deliberate 
State policy but out of social pressure and “legacy systems”, the ILO has created strategic space for the 
Uzbek State to be recruited as an ally in the anti-slavery effort, and rewarded for progress, even before 
forced labour is entirely eradicated. 
Rewards have indeed been steadily forthcoming. In 2015, the US State Department moved Uzbekistan 
from Tier 3 to Tier 2 on its Trafficking in Persons Report watchlist, referencing the Government’s 
cooperation with the ILO and World Bank. In 2017, the EU moved forward with the textile trade 
protocol it had refused in 2011, over the objections of several human rights organizations.156 In 2018 
Uzbekistan hosted the ILO Director-General for the first time. And in March 2019, following an inter-
agency review, the US Department of Labor removed Uzbek cotton from a list of products that might 
have been produced with forced labour.157 Other like-minded diplomatic partners – including France, 
Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the UK; the EU, OSCE and other UN entities; and the EBRD – all sent 
reinforcing signals.158 All of this suggests a deliberate and carefully coordinated effort to reward the 
Uzbek Government’s engagements and reforms, a hypothesis confirmed by several people interviewed 
for this study.159
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Lessons and opportunities
The process of disruption, reform and transformation in Uzbekistan holds numerous lessons for 
the implementation of the Developing Freedom agenda. These may be particularly relevant, also, to 
discussions of how to address cotton production in other countries that relies on apparently State-
sponsored forced labour, such as in Xinjiang, which produces around 20 per cent of the world’s cotton. 
(Chinese Government development policies towards Xinjiang are discussed in Chapter 1.)
From boycott to certification? 
In April 2020, with COVID-19 hitting apparel and cotton sales worldwide, the Uzbek Government called 
for an end to the Cotton Pledge boycott.160 The Cotton Campaign, which has emerged as the main 
coordination forum for international activists, buyers and investors, responded by welcoming the 
progress made in the fight against forced labour in Uzbekistan, but highlighting that, according to the 
ILO, forced labour is in fact still occurring.161 The Cotton Pledge commits companies not to buy Uzbek 
cotton “until the Government of Uzbekistan ends the practice of forced labor in its cotton sector.” What 
is more, section 307 of the US Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1307) prohibits the importation into the US of 
merchandise produced wholly or in part, by forced or indentured labour. Such merchandise is subject 
to exclusion and/or seizure, and may lead to criminal investigation of the importer. Accordingly, some 
argue, US buyers will not be ready to return to Uzbek cotton until they have additional assurances and 
evidence that the cotton they are purchasing was not, in fact, manufactured by forced labour.162 
Achieving this essentially requires certification. Since 2016, IFC has been working with the Uzbek 
Government and other partners on sustainable cotton supply chain development in Uzbekistan. One 
key partner is the UGF, which IFC hired to serve as a monitor of its projects.163 Another key partner is 
the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), a global initiative somewhat analogous to RSPO in the palm oil sector, 
founded in 2009 to address both the environmental and the social impact of cotton, through supply 
chain certification, segregation and traceability.164 In 2018-2019 certified Better Cotton accounted for 
22 per cent of global production. IFC’s project in Uzbekistan aims to improve collaboration with the 
private sector by building the foundation for credible and scalable system for Better Cotton that meets 
the requirement of the BCI principles and criteria.165 
Whether it is through boycott or certification, one lesson here is the power of decisions by trade and 
investment partners in global value chains to alter the incentive structures that shape local production.166 
Development interventions that aim to reduce modern slavery risks should more often be conceived on 
a more transnational basis – a point to which we return in Chapter 10.
Upgrading the Uzbek cotton industry 
Stakeholders increasingly acknowledge that certification of Uzbek cotton as forced labour-free cannot 
be achieved through farm-level interventions, but also requires transformation of country-wide 
institutions and empowerment of stakeholders, especially workers and civil society, to ensure there is 
accountability for deviations from norms against forced labour.167 This strategy – combining all three 
Developing Freedom approaches, of disruption, transformation and empowerment – is set out clearly 
in the Roadmap of Reforms proposed by the Cotton Campaign in June 2019.168 The Roadmap articulates 
three mutually reinforcing core objectives: 
• “end systemic forced labour”, through disruption of the incentives for compelled labour. The 
Roadmap explains this will involve reducing compelled picking, stronger accountability, improved 
protections against reprisals, better access to effective remedies, and strengthening a fair, 
transparent agricultural work recruitment scheme as an alternative to forced labour.
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• “enact structural reforms”, a transformation agenda. This is an agenda for altering the institutional 
environment, by removing coercive practices against farmers, increasing farmer autonomy as 
the quota system is eliminated, and improving transparency around cotton sector reforms and 
revenues.
• “empower civil society”, clearly an empowerment agenda. This part aims at promoting transparency, 
accountability and rights protection for monitors, farmers and workers. 
The Uzbek Government has responded broadly positively to this Roadmap. Increasingly, it frames 
efforts to end forced labour not as a stand-alone agenda, but in terms of larger efforts to liberalize the 
Uzbek economy and promote economic upgrading from raw cotton production to higher value-add in 
the textile value chain. The vehicle for this approach is its ‘cluster’ policy. This describes an approach 
whereby the Government allocates land to a private investor who in return commits to growing cotton 
(either by direct farming or by contracts with existing farmers) and to establishing processing and/or 
manufacturing facilities in the local area. The main objectives are to reduce the role of the Government 
in cotton production, create jobs and position Uzbekistan as an exporter of textiles and garments rather 
than raw cotton.169 Essentially, this policy aims at seeding economic upgrading in both agriculture170 and 
industrial manufacturing171.
International partners have backed the approach. The ILO has argued that the cluster system will 
potentially help to increase productivity and remove the drivers of forced labour, if transparently 
governed with responsible investors and supportive tenure arrangements for farmers.172 As the ILO’s 
position hints at – and as we might recognize from the earlier Brazil cattle industry case study – such 
an approach is not without corruption risks.173 There have been some challenges for the implementation 
of the policy arising from the continued involvement of the hokimayat.174 Yet overall initial signs appear 
to be promising. There is evidence that cluster actors enjoy improved access to credit, higher cotton 
price and profits, lower ginning expenses, increased productivity and greater capital investment.175 By 
2019, 75 clusters were operational, and accounted for 73 per cent of the cotton harvest. But there is still 
work to do: farmers growing for cluster companies still seem to have limited ability to exercise outside 
options, and until early 2020 were still subject to production quotas. At the same time, farmers now feel 
sufficiently trusting of government to complain about their treatment at the hands of clusters.176 Perhaps 
most significantly, by 2019 ILO monitors had concluded that “[t]he risk of forced labour is significantly 
lower in clusters, due to the higher wages and better working conditions provided by the clusters.”177
What has worked? 
Three major insights emerge for the Developing Freedom agenda from the transformation of the Uzbek 
cotton industry over the last 15 years: first, about the importance of consistent strategic communication; 
second, about the interlocking nature of disruption, transformation and empowerment; and third, 
about the political nature of anti-slavery efforts. 
In 2015 Devex interviewed the Chairman of the World Bank Inspection Panel, Gonzalo Castro de la 
Mata. Devex asked him whether the Inspection Panel’s decision not to investigate Uzbek cotton was 
the right one. The Chairman’s response is telling: “Thanks to the case, and the dialogue of the bank, we 
saw important policy changes,” he said. “Whereas the trajectory before was to continue using children 
to pick up the cotton, now they’re moving into a new direction, to modernize the cotton industry, to 
mechanize and to diversify.”178 
The key word here is ‘dialogue’. The Bank argues it was dialogue between the international community 
and the Government of Uzbekistan that led to a new approach. What mattered here was arguably the 
consistency of the message from international actors – that Uzbekistan must end the use of child and 
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forced labour in cotton production. This was a dialogue, not a trialogue or a conversation between 
the Uzbek Government and multiple potential partners that it could play off against each other. As 
the coalition pushing for an end to forced labour grew, the Uzbek Government faced a decreasing 
number of options. There were certainly still willing buyers of Uzbek cotton throughout this period, 
but the rapid spread of the anti-forced labour message from analysts and activists, to governments, to 
purchasers and investors, made clear the growing obstacles for Uzbek cotton to reach the global market. 
International actors differed at times on tactics, with human rights actors pushing for a total withdrawal 
of engagement, while international multilateral actors pursued a path of principled engagement.179 But 
the consistent messaging on the overall goal was telling. Deliberate coordination of messaging through 
the Cotton Campaign was an important factor in this result.
Creative Commons/Peretz Partensky
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The second insight, however, was that the anti-forced labour movement arguably benefited from tactical 
variation within the effort, even as there were gains from strategic unanimity. The Cotton Pledge and 
diplomatic and multilateral pressure all served to disrupt the modern slavery system embedded in 
Uzbek cotton production, changing the strategic calculus of Uzbek elite. But the elite still needed to find 
an acceptable way out. That might not have been possible if they were walking alone, if they had been 
dealing only with ‘bad cops’, ready to punish them for violating modern slavery norms, but unready to 
help them change. But they were not: in the World Bank and ILO, and the governments that supported 
and financed their efforts, the Uzbek Government found good cops willing to assist them, when it was 
ready to change its approach. (We return to this notion in Chapter 8, on construction.)
The World Bank’s engagement opened the door, and the ILO’s programming in Uzbekistan off the back 
of that engagement then proved critical, adding transformation and empowerment components to the 
mix. ILO engagement extended well beyond TPM, to awareness-raising on labour rights for thousands 
of cotton pickers; facilitating ongoing engagement between the Government and human rights actors; 
training enforcement actors on investigation and prosecution; strengthening feedback mechanisms, 
leading to thousands of cases being investigated and resolved; capacity-building for journalists; 
international best practice exchange; and extensive public communication to sustain momentum and 
public support for the effort.180 Without access to the know-how the ILO provided, and the financial 
support and engagement from the Bank and other donors, the Uzbek Government’s rapid turn away 
from forced labour over the last five years might well not have occurred. 
Public support was also critical. The transformation of the Uzbek cotton industry is inevitably a process 
with deep political ramifications, even if it is presented as a technical exercise of labour market and 
agricultural reform. The use of forced labour to grow and pick cotton was the result of a corrupt, 
repressive rentier system that allowed elites to steal massive profits by underpaying workers and 
farmers. Dismantling that system will create millions of winners, but also many powerful losers. And as 
the harassment and intimidation of Uzbek civil society actors reporting on forced and child labour in 
the cotton industry also shows, those who advocate for change are also often likely to be at great risk. 
It is difficult to say just what steps development actors undertook to protect activists in Uzbekistan – 
and just how persistent international development actors were in pushing their Uzbek Government 
counterparts on these issues. Whatever the answer, future development interventions that push for 
changes in slavery-based economies must take these risks of backlash and reprisal seriously. 
Finally, public support is also crucial for another reason. As the ILO’s recent narrative makes clear, even 
as the Government turns away from systematic forced labour – i.e. a policy of organized mass coercion 
– Uzbekistan continues to struggle with the “legacy systems” that make forced labour possible. The 
thirty-year normalization of forced labour is perhaps the most powerful of those legacy systems. Forced 
labour has become so normalized that it is no longer understood as involuntary work, but rather, in the 
ILO’s terms, simply “reluctant” work. “Reluctant workers” are not, the ILO says, coerced, but rather 
engaging in “normative conformity”. Penalization for refusing to pick cotton is so socialized and diffuse 
that workers do not even perceive it as a penalty, but simply “social pressure” to perform one’s social 
duties and obligations. Forced labour will not cease in Uzbekistan until the social production of this 
slavery-based governmentality ceases. That will require not only engagement with the Government, but 
continued work with the Uzbek public and social authorities to restore and maximize people’s sense of 
economic – and political – agency. 
What about remedy? 
Abandoning forced labour only became a worthwhile option for Uzbek elites once it became apparent 
that they stood to lose more from the status quo – from tarnished international reputations, from 
the costs of a cotton industry that was falling ever more rapidly behind its competitors, and from the 
165 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
opportunity costs of not investing in economic reform and upgrading – than from swallowing the pains 
of reform. The international boycott and diplomatic disruption efforts were central to that strategic 
calculus, raising the costs of business as usual. So it is in some ways all the more remarkable that remedy 
and accountability have not factored significantly into discussions of how to raise the costs for Uzbek 
elites from using forced labour. 
Development actors have, to date, largely avoided discussion of remedy for the hundreds of thousands, 
if not millions, of cases of forced and child labour that have occurred in Uzbekistan over the last thirty 
years, preferring to focus on structural reforms and prevention. Both the World bank Inspection Panel 
and the IFC CAO have taken narrow views of those institutions’ remedial obligations, arguing that it 
has not been established that Bank and IFC financing have been used for forced or child labour. Yet 
today, established international expectations on remedy – as enshrined in the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises – make clear 
that financial institutions, and indeed other actors, such as purchasing firms – linked even indirectly to 
human rights harms should seek not just to provide remedy for harms they have caused or contributed to, 
but also to enable remedy for harms to which they are connected, for example through intermediaries.181 
The Feedback Mechanism established by the World Bank in connection with its projects since 2014 
plays an important role here, but also begs the question what other steps have been undertaken by the 
development sector – and indeed by firms purchasing Uzbek cotton over the last thirty years – to meet 
victims’ right to an effective remedy?
Two factors may intervene. The first is that many in today’s Uzbek elite played important roles in 
overseeing widespread and systematic forced labour over the last thirty years, President Mirziyoyev 
apparently included. If remedy discussions give rise to questions of individual accountability, that 
may chill those people’s willingness to continue down the reform path. This may make it inadvisable 
to pursue these discussions. The second is the scale of the violations involved. How can millions of 
instances of forced and child labour be addressed? And how can they be effectively remedied? If remedy 
is understood in terms of monetary compensation, who would bear this significant burden?
Countries transitioning from authoritarianism have faced just these questions many times in facing up 
to large-scale human rights abuses over the last three decades. The field of transitional justice offers 
numerous insights, from the role powerful role of truth-telling and symbolic reparation to the key role 
that remedial processes supported by former authoritarian leaders can play in entrenching respect for 
rule of law. It may be time for Uzbekistan to consider what lessons it can learn from those processes, 
and what a process of transitional justice addressing the history of forced and child labour in its cotton 
industry would look like. International development partners have a key role to play here, not only in 
helping the Uzbek Government conceive what such a process might involve, and access the relevant 
expertise to undertake it, but also in financing it, for example through continuation of efforts by the 
World Bank-UNODC Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative to assist the Uzbek Government.182 
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CHAPTER 6: FISHERIES AND 
AQUACULTURE: “A MOUNTAIN OF BONES 
UNDER THE SEA”
In 2013, Thai authorities arrested Ko Myo, suspected of having trafficked perhaps 700 Myanmar migrants 
into slavery on Thai fishing boats over the previous decade, murdering 40 of them.1 These migrant 
workers and their debts had been sold through trafficking networks, often held in jungle prison camps 
along the way, and ended up on boats used to fish in waters far from Thai shores – throughout South 
East Asia and in the Bay of Bengal. On those boats, they were often enslaved through debt bondage, 
forcible confinement, torture and physical abuse. The fish they caught was used in raising shrimp sold 
into global markets, often ending up in the supermarket trolleys of Western consumers. 
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These were not isolated crimes. In a research report published in March 2020, the ILO concluded that 
“tens of thousands of workers in Thai fishing and seafood processing are working in forced labour 
conditions”.2 A 2012 study on the working conditions in Thailand’s fishing sector found that over 10 
per cent of the 600 fishers interviewed had been severely beaten while at sea.3 Ko Myo’s crimes were 
made possible not only by a corrupt network of Thai and Myanmar officials, but also by an industry that 
was as hungry for cheap and disposable labour as global consumers were hungry for cheap fish.4 Fish 
production has grown seven-fold since 1950,5 and demand is likely to grow further in future. Indeed, 
given the high carbon footprint of livestock, population forecasts and the prominent role that fish plays 
as a source of protein in many diets, sustainable global nutrition may depend on increased fish protein 
consumption, since fish and seafood are considered by some as more carbon efficient than terrestrial 
animal production.6 
The Thai industry is by no means unique. There have been detailed reports of forced labour and labour 
exploitation of fishers on vessels flying the flags of, and in the waters of, various countries in recent years: 
Costa Rica,7 Fiji,8 Ireland,9 New Zealand,10 South Korea,11 the UK,12 UAE and the US,13 Vietnam14 and off West 
Africa.15 Cross-border trafficking of migrant workers is not uncommon, and often involves actors from 
several countries. For example, in 2016, Norwegian authorities identified a foreign network involving a 
South Korean operator, a Seychelles recruitment agency, and Norwegian port agents involved in moving 
49 Indonesian fishers, a Spanish national and several Ukrainians to crab fisheries in the Barents Sea, 
where they were exploited. The same year, Indonesian authorities learned of 14 Indonesian victims of 
forced labour on a Chinese fishing vessel in Iran, recruited through an agency controlled from Taiwan.16
In the first three cases we have considered in Part Two, efforts to develop and exploit an agricultural 
resource – cattle, palm oil and cotton – led both to the exploitation and trafficking of people, and 
simultaneously to environmental degradation. In the next case, fisheries and aquaculture, development, 
environmental degradation, and modern slavery are once again connected. In this sector, however, the 
relationship between the three varies. It is those variations that we explore here. In some cases, such 
as competitive marine capture fisheries, firms have resorted to labour coercion as they compete for 
diminishing profits from a dwindling resource. Here, environmental degradation and declining fish-
stocks contribute directly to modern slavery risks. In artisanal and small-scale fishing, modern slavery 
risk arises from fishers’ dispossession of their rights and access to fisheries, as they are pushed into 
precarious wage-based labour. And in industrial aquaculture and processing, modern slavery risks arise 
primarily for migrant labourers, especially women and children. 
In this Chapter, we explore how one broad industry – fisheries and aquaculture – generates such a 
variety of modern slavery risks. After an initial introduction to the fisheries and aquaculture value chain 
and consideration of the development approaches embedded in fisheries governance, we focus in on 
four countries, to make the analysis manageable and meaningful. Since 84 per cent of the roughly 58 
million people employed in fishing and seafood production are in Asia,17 we draw these countries from 
those around the Bay of Bengal and in South East Asia: Thailand, Philippines, India and Bangladesh. 
We combined detailed, desk-based literature review with anonymous stakeholder interviews of 23 key 
informants. 
Our analysis identified by-now familiar patterns of international mobilization for disruption of modern 
slavery, followed by domestic counter-mobilization as rentiers seek to protect the status quo. We look 
in particular at experiences in Thailand, which bear some interesting similarities to the previous case 
studied (Uzbek cotton), but also some important differences relating to the stalling and limits of reforms. 
We briefly explore how modern slavery risks arise in Filipino, Indian and Bangladeshi fisheries and 
aquaculture. Finally, we return to the question of fisheries governance, drawing conclusions from our 
analysis about the multiple levels of fisheries governance across which the Developing Freedom agenda 
may need to be pursued, in order to be effective. 
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Modern slavery in global fishing and aquaculture 
Understanding the value chain
Global fish production is today estimated at around 179 million tonnes (2018), worth USD 401 billion. This 
includes marine and inland capture fishing, aquaculture and post-harvest processing. Of this total, less 
than half (82 million tonnes) comes from aquaculture production – but it is worth more than half the 
total value of production (USD 250 billion). 156 million tonnes were used for human consumption, and 22 
million tonnes for other uses – mainly fishmeal and fish oil.18
Fish and seafood value chains are complex. The most common stages of the global value chain include 
primary production, processing, packaging, transport, retailing, and consumption, and there may be 
additional storage nodes. The mid-chain, necessary for the preservation of a highly perishable product, 
is the most convoluted, potentially involving numerous actors such as aggregators, primary processors, 
traders, auction houses, wholesalers, dealers, secondary processors, distributors, and transporters in 
the transforming, packaging, and movement of the product. Most nodes operate on narrow margins, 
with the lowest margins at the production stage.19 As Figure 34 below suggests, supply chains typically 
become more complex with commercialization and capitalization as production moves away from 
subsistence and artisanal fishing to larger-scale, industrialized and more export-oriented production.20 
Yet it can be difficult to separate subsistence from commercial production, or farm-based from wild 
capture supply chains. Products from different sources are often aggregated mid-chain. And wild 
caught fish, such as low value marine-capture ‘trash fish’, are often used as feed in aquaculture systems. 
21 The disassembly, re-assembly and recombination of products in these supply chains poses particular 
challenges for certification.
Over the last half-century, fishing and aquaculture have been globalized. Improvements in refrigeration, 
aviation and logistics have allowed some developing countries to emerge as major exporters. As of 2017, 
38 per cent of all fish production entered an international value chain. In 2016, four of the top six fish 
and fish product exporting countries were developing countries: China, Vietnam, Thailand, and India. 
22 For developing countries, exports from the fisheries sector can total more than that of rice, tea, cocoa 
and coffee combined. Yet export-oriented production is not necessarily undertaken by developing-
country based firms. Firms from high-income, developed countries control an estimated 78 per cent of 
industrial fishing in low-income countries’ waters.23 In 2016, the top ten importing countries were the 
United States, Japan, China, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Republic of Korea, and the United 
Kingdom, with 71 per cent of all imports entering the markets of developed countries.24
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Fishing fleets, previously dominated by higher-income country owners and workforces, have steadily 
diversified, with workers increasingly drawn from populations that will accept lower wages. Lack of 
training, inadequate language skills, isolation from social networks, lack of proper documentation, 
and lack of enforcement of safety and labour standards make these fishers particularly vulnerable to 
intimidation, coercion, forced labour and human trafficking.25 Fishing and related occupations are 
among the most dangerous of all professions, with more than 32,000 people killed every year worldwide.26 
Working hours are long, and as fish-stocks decline, more hours are needed for the same catch. In 2019, 
industrial fishing was rated second most deadly profession worldwide.27
Like other agricultural markets, the sector has also seen significant centralization in recent years, with 
13 transnational corporations controlling up to 18 per cent of the global seafood production by value, 16 
per cent of marine catch, and 40 per cent of the most valuable fish stocks.28 However, all market players 
face significant pressures on profitability. Marine capture fisheries, in particular, face declining yield, 
growing competition, and, in some cases, rising fuel prices.29 This has put particular pressure on wages 
and working conditions, since direct labour costs often count for around 50 to 60 per cent of operating 
costs.30 Rising fuel prices have also led to greater use of trans-shipment, with fishers staying at sea 
for extended periods while their catches are transferred to shore by courier boats – making isolated 
workers even more vulnerable.31
Over-fishing of coastal fisheries has also forced greater reliance on distant water fishing operations, 
challenging enforcement – both due to distance, and because multiple States (coastal, flag, port, workers’ 
countries of origin) are all potentially involved in governance – and exposing vulnerable workers to 
coercion and exploitation.32 Distant-water fisheries are often exploited by more technologically 
advanced, more heavily capitalized vessels, whose owners have made use of off-shore legal structures, 
open international registers, secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens to protect profits.33 The decline of 
coastal stocks also tends to transform local small-scale, artisanal fishers into wage labouring crews for 
off-shore fleets, reducing their economic agency and rendering them vulnerable to forced labour and 
other forms of labour exploitation.34 
Declining marine fish-stocks have also, however, led to significant investment in – and growth of – 
aquaculture over the last thirty years, with annual growth around 3 to 4 per cent. It now accounts for 
roughly half of all fish production.35 This is partly the result of development strategies and interventions.36 
In 2017, top aquaculture producers (in value) were China (controlling more than half the market), 
Indonesia, India, Chile, Vietnam, Norway, Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. Aquaculture is 
growing most rapidly in Asia (at over 6 per cent p.a. between 2001 and 201537), but is also growing rapidly 
in Africa, with Egypt already the second-largest producer of farmed tilapia globally (after China).38 
Yet to date, most aquaculture development has focused on growing production, rather than upward 
integration of value chains, leaving other countries to capture value. Asian aquaculture value chains are 
relatively fragmented compared to those oriented to Western distributors, and perhaps as a result, Asia 
has only 11 per cent of sustainability certified production.39
Project research interviews suggested there were some risks of forced labour, debt bondage and labour 
exploitation in aquaculture, especially as it becomes commercialized and export-oriented, exposing 
firms to foreign competition and putting increased downward pressure on labour costs.40 This pressure 
gets transferred onto workers, many of whom are drawn from local populations, some of which may 
have previously been small-scale fishers pushed into aquaculture through stock depletion or reduced 
access to traditional fisheries. As with fishers on offshore vessels, workers in processing and aquaculture 
seem to be sometimes exposed to coercion and exploitation. This takes the form of low and with-
held wages, unsafe working conditions, extreme working hours, physical and psychological violence, 
accommodation in unsanitary housing conditions, confiscation of papers, and an inability to seek work 
elsewhere.41 
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In capture fisheries, aquaculture and processing, debt seems to be a central mechanism of bondage. 
Migrant workers are often recruited in their own villages or ports, and then forced to pay a recruitment 
fee to each agent as they pass through a network of agents to a job. Migrants are often ‘sold’ by one 
trafficker or exploiter to another, along with their debts. They thus arrive at their jobs with significant 
debts, which helps to keep them quiescent. Working conditions, which are frequently abusive, are often 
obscured or misrepresented prior to arrival – or even until the vessel reaches international waters.42 
Once arrived, they are often charged fees for ‘services’ such as food and board or travel costs, and 
inflated prices for goods they are forced to purchase from their traffickers and exploiters. Wages are often 
withheld or paid late – or only at the end of the contract period, effectively tying them to a workplace 
employer, not matter how exploitative. Identification documents are often withheld, to further reduce 
mobility and prevent workers exercising their economic agency by seeking work elsewhere.43
These risks are significantly gendered. Women make up a larger share of workforces onshore and 
especially in processing.Child labour risks are greater in processing facilities and, in some contexts 
such as Lake Volta (mentioned in the Introduction), in inland capture fisheries. Males face greater risks 
off-shore, where they predominate. 
Responses: policy action to protect fishing workers’ rights
Attention to forced and child labour in the fisheries and aquaculture sector has been growing for the 
last decade and a half,45 with a particular uptick around the time the ILO adopted the Work in Fishing 
Convention (C188) in 2007. Reporting by the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking 
(UNIAP) drew particular attention to risks in South East Asia, starting around 2007, documenting cases 
of trafficking of migrant labourers from Cambodia onto Thai fishing vessels. This was followed by a 
number of civil society reports focused on the Thai industry.46 In 2013, Humanity United partnered with 
the International Labor Rights Forum to create the Thai Seafood Working Group, a network of nearly 
60 human rights, labour, and environmental organizations from more than a dozen countries that aims 
to develop solutions to the related problems of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing and 
labour exploitation in the international seafood trade.
Civil society mobilization led to increased engagement with these issues in international forums over 
the last decade, including in the ILO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Committee 
on Fisheries (COFI). These have largely framed issues in terms of protecting the rights of fishers as 
workers, and protecting them from organized crime. In 2015, the ILO organized a conference on labour 
exploitation in the fishing sector. COFI’s Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (COFI:FT) has drawn particular 
attention to social and labour conditions in the industry since 2016.47 The ILO and UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) have repeatedly called for action on forced labour, trafficking and transnational 
crime in fisheries. In 2016, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), FAO 
and UNODC convened a conference on improving cooperation in combatting tax crime and other crimes 
in the fisheries sector, which also covered human rights violations and labour abuses in fisheries. And 
in October 2019, the FAO and IMO expanded their Ad Hoc Working Group on IUU Fishing and Related 
Matters to include the ILO.
This approach in global intergovernmental forums has been echoed in both State and regional level 
policy responses. At the State level, governments have taken a range of approaches to protecting fishing 
workers’ rights. Indonesia focused on certification of business’ respect for human rights. Senegal 
focused on promoting decent work conditions covering safety, health, recruitment, working hours, 
and training. New Zealand requested foreign fishing vessels operating in New Zealand waters to re-flag 
to New Zealand to ensure compliance with national labour regulations. Argentina focused on social 
protection of workers in processing plants, national collective agreements with fisheries trade unions, 
and a national certification scheme – Mar Argentino – that includes decent work criteria. France, 
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likewise, is pursuing certification, through the Pêche Durable label. The UK’s national authority, Seafish, 
has established a third-party certification for fishing vessels and skippers, with social standards on 
crew welfare, health and safety. And action has also occurred at the regional level, with the EU, ASEAN, 
and African Heads of State and Government all adopting regional policy frameworks aimed in part at 
improving labour conditions in fishing.48
Some countries have moved beyond policy response to active exclusion of fish and seafood products 
made with forced labour. The EU’s ‘carding’ system, introduced under its IUU Regulation in 2010, is a 
warning system that allows countries to take action to rectify shortcomings in respect for international 
standards and laws, prior to their products being excluded from EU markets. The US system provides for 
rankings of countries on a global ‘Trafficking in Persons Watch List’, and separately for goods made with 
forced or child labour to be excluded from use by the federal Government, or held by US Customs and 
Border Patrol at the point of entry into the US market. Such ‘Withhold Release Orders’ have been issued 
3 times against (Taiwanese) fishing vessels and the fish they harvest.49 
There is likewise a dizzying array of responses in the private sector. These include several business 
and multi-stakeholder coalitions working to strengthen sustainability and work protections, such 
as the Marine Stewardship Council, the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, Seafood 
Businesses for Ocean Stewardship, the Seafood Task Force, the Global Sustainable Seafood Initiative, 
the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership, and the Issara Fishery Labour Improvement Plan. A number of 
these involve certification schemes, which build on the “dolphin-safe tuna” schemes of the 1980s and 
subsequent private environmental standards in the industry.50 These have had mixed success. In 2015, 
only around 14 per cent of global fish production was certified, and of this around 80 per cent was from 
wild-capture fisheries. Developing country producers have faced barriers to participation, including 
the full value chain assessments often required by these schemes. Yet these barriers are lower for 
aquaculture, and so certification of aquaculture is growing around twice as fast as certification of wild 
caught fish production.51 Yet the proliferation of standards has also created confusion for both producers 
and consumers. 
Increasingly, the United Nations has sought to convene across these different initiatives and develop 
a unified approach. In 2014, FAO started a consultative multi-stakeholder process, the Vigo Dialogue 
on Decent Work in Fisheries and Aquaculture that includes fisheries and aquaculture representatives 
from government administrations, private sector industries, civil society organizations (including 
small-scale fishers, workers’ unions), auditing/certification schemes and international organizations. 
Emerging partly from these consultations, the FAO COFI:FT has recently developed a guidance document 
compiling and integrating relevant existing international instruments covering the stages of the fish 
and seafood value chains where social sustainability play a key role.52 This includes both cross-cutting 
(horizontal) principles and ‘vertical’ appendices addressing child labour, gender equity and equality, 
fair integration of migrant workers in six main activities of the fisheries and aquaculture value chains: 
small-scale fishing; industrial fishing; aquaculture production; processing; distribution; and retailing. 
It includes a cross-cutting commitment to labour rights including “elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour; effective abolition of child labour”.53 The document is not binding, but addressed 
as voluntary principles to all actors in the value chain to help in “creating a positive environment and 
promoting socially responsible value chains”. Appendices provide specific measures and tools that could 
be used to facilitate implementation. 
What kind of fisheries development do we seek?
The policy responses that have emerged over the last decade to address forced and child labour risks 
in global fishing and aquaculture mix different intervention approaches from the Developing Freedom 
framework. Some aim at disruption – changing the strategic calculus of exploitation (e.g. EU ‘yellow cards’ 
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and US exclusion, and certification schemes). Some aim at transformation – changing the institutional 
environment in which exploitation occurs (e.g. through new international norms aimed at clarifying 
fisheries workers’ rights, prohibiting certain IUU activities, or discouraging migrant worker recruitment 
fees. Some aim at empowerment – strengthening workers in the value chain to resist exploitation (e.g. 
some ILO and FAO initiatives aimed at on the ground capacity-building). 
Yet they all arguably take the global institutional environment in which this exploitation occurs – the 
organization of global fisheries and aquaculture value chains – as a given. Nearly all of them seek to 
protect the rights of workers and fishers within the existing production system. Few of them aim at 
promoting the agency of workers or fishers by enlarging their economic agency through, for example, 
defending access to traditional fisheries, creating cooperative property rights in fisheries, fishing vessels 
or processing facilities, or other approaches to economic upgrading.
This begs a real question: what kind of development do these interventions seek? And is the promotion 
of respect for labour rights in fisheries and aquaculture governance seen as part of a larger, integrated 
approach to achieving sustainable development, or as a niche question? Where does the right to be free 
from slavery sit within the larger question of how best to exploit fisheries resources to promote economic 
growth, reduce poverty and ensure food security, while ensuring environmental sustainability?
Answering this question requires an appreciation of the historical context of shifting approaches to 
fisheries exploitation and governance in global development. Two researchers at the University of 
Nottingham’s Rights Lab, Dr Jessica Sparks and Dr Bethany Jackson, conducted a literature review to 
help us understand these dynamics. They found a gradual shift in development discourse and practice 
on fisheries from a focus on sustainable livelihoods in the late 1990s and early 2000s, rooted in ecosystem 
management and governance, to a ‘Blue Economy’ paradigm over the last decade. In the late 1990s, 
the focus was on promoting the livelihoods of smallholders, including through more holistic ecosystem 
management, as a counter-balance to industrial marine capture fuelled by foreign investment, which 
was perceived as placing stressed fish-stocks at risk.54 This was not necessarily seen as a trade-off 
of growth against other strategic objectives, but rather as a reframing of both time-horizons and 
the socioeconomic utility of rents from effectively managed fisheries resources – rents that could be 
reinvested for other purposes such as poverty reduction.55
This approach focused largely on stock management and macro-economic impacts, with less attention 
to micro-economic implications, such as labour market regulation or household debt. As a result, the 
focus of development actors involved in fisheries management through the 1990s and early 2000s was 
not on those places where modern slavery risks crystallized in the subsequent years: labour recruitment 
chains, migration routes, personal and household debt, workplace management. Indeed, there is some 
evidence to suggest that earlier efforts by development actors to promote fishing expansion may have 
increased modern slavery risks in parts of Africa and Asia, as small-scale fishers were pushed off their 
own boats and into the wage labour force and labour purchasing power consolidated in the hands of 
better-capitalized elites.56
The counter-balance to this approach was a focus on fisheries tenure, livelihood security and human 
rights that began emerging in the late 2000s, often framed in terms of stewardship and the rights of 
small-scale fishers.57 This was around the same time as labour rights advocates began advocating for 
better protection of fishing vessel crews, but the two approaches ran along somewhat distinct tracks. 
The stewardship approach was a bottom-up agenda championed by organizations such as the World 
Forum of Fisher People and the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers, by development 
NGOs and civil society, but has taken time to be absorbed by the intergovernmental system and major 
donors.58 The labour rights approach has been championed by anti-slavery actors and labour rights 
organizations and, to some extent, global human rights organizations. In this way, advocacy for the 
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rights and economic agency of small-scale fishers became institutionally separated from advocacy for 
the rights of fisheries and agriculture workers, despite the intertwining of small-scale and industrial 
fisheries and value chains. Thus while the FAO is currently in the process of completing the guidance 
that emerged out of the Vigo Dialogues on Decent Work in Fisheries and Aquaculture, there are separate 
FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security 
and Poverty Eradication from 2014. 
The different strands have notionally been woven together over the last decade under the rubric of 
‘Blue Growth’ or the ‘Blue Economy’,59 following the Rio+20 Earth Summit in 2012 and the adoption of 
the SDGs, especially SDG 14. Yet precisely because the Blue Economy paradigm is a ‘big-tent’ approach, 
there remain competing interpretations and threads within it, some emphasizing economic growth 
through development of marine resources, others emphasizing social sustainability, decent work and 
human rights.60 The challenge now is to promote efforts to reduce modern slavery risk not simply in 
terms of one narrow, single strand of this agenda, focused on labour rights, and requiring action at the 
local or national level, but in terms of the impact of Blue Economy approaches on people’s freedom and 
economic agency more broadly. 
The cross-cutting Decent Work agenda moves significantly in this direction, encompassing not only 
labour rights in the workplace, but also certain elements of the livelihoods agenda for small-scale fishers. 
But it takes the underlying development of fisheries and aquaculture resources as a given, seeking to 
protect decent work within that model. It does not, as a general rule, ask whether or when the pro-
growth exploitation of those resources becomes incompatible with decent work and the maximization 
of economic agency. Yet recent experiences in South East Asia and the Bay of Bengal – to which we now 
turn – suggest that is a question that needs asking. 
Modern slavery risks in South and South East 
Asian fisheries
Thailand
In 1961, Thailand’s commercial fishing fleet numbered just 99 powered trawlers. In 2011, the figure stood 
at 57,000.61 Thailand is now around the fourth-largest exporter of seafood globally, the largest exporter of 
canned tuna (with roughly one quarter of global supply), and seventh among global shrimp exporters.62 
The industry was worth over USD 6.9 billion in 2018. Thailand is home to some of the largest seafood 
conglomerates including Thai Union, Charoen Phokphand (CP) and Sea Value. 
This growth has been powered by several factors: investments in industrial trawlers starting in the 
1960s; the move of powerful business interests from Bangkok into the industry; and policy support from 
government, including subsidies and tax breaks.63 Marine capture production rose from 63,711 tonnes in 
1960 to 2 million tonnes in the late 1980s, but has steadily declined since, as Thai stocks suffered over-
fishing. Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) – measured by kilograms of fish caught in one hour of fishing 
– has been in steady decline for the last fifty years, plummeting 92 per cent between 1961 and 2015 in the 
Gulf of Thailand and 75 per cent in the Andaman Sea in the same period.64
The depletion of stocks in Thai coastal waters has led fisheries development in two different, though 
complementary, directions. First, it has led investors inland, to invest in processing capabilities and 
aquaculture. This upgrading approach has succeeded in some respects, allowing Thailand to emerge as 
a leader in aquaculture certification and re-exporting of imported raw fish.65 Second, depletion of near-
water resources has led fishers further off-shore. Approximately 40 to 50 per cent of Thai fishing vessels’ 
catch now comes from outside the Thai Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).66
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At the same time, however, there has been declining participation by Thai citizens in the fisheries and 
aquaculture workforce, as economic growth, ageing, rising incomes and education allowed them to seek 
better paying, less dangerous and difficult work in other industries. Since at least the early 1980s, this led 
Thai fishing vessel owners (and, later, processing facility owners and managers) to source cheap labour 
through informal recruitment networks targeting poor workers – first in north-east Thailand and, 
later, in neighbouring countries.67 This was a direct response to competitive cost pressures.68 The rapid 
expansion of Thai fishing in the last fifty years has not always been matched by effective governance, so 
there has been significant IUU fishing, creating incentives for fishers to turn to informal, unregistered 
migrant workers. Today, the Thai Government acknowledges around 150,000 people working in the Thai 
fishing industry, of which some 80 per cent may be migrant workers, but external analysts believe the 
number may be closer to 250,000 or more.69 
Migrant workers are especially vulnerable to being trafficked into slavery.70 A rigorous 2017 survey of 
migrant workers in the sector by the Issara Institute and International Justice Mission (IJM) found that 
76 per cent of those interviewed had been in debt bondage.71 This occurs through a system of fraud 
and coercion, literally illustrated by Cambodian sculptor and survivor of Thai fisheries slavery Vannak 
Anan Prum in his graphic novel memoir, The Dead Eye and the Deep Blue Sea.72 The Thai fishing industry 
is today home to tens of thousands of poor and vulnerable Cambodian, Laotian, Thai and Myanmar 
(especially Rohingya) migrant workers.73 Labour recruiters use a “travel now, pay later” system to 
lure poor workers groomed in foreign villages and ports, who consequently arrive at their jobs with 
significant debts. This typically means they must work from one to eight months before receiving any 
payment. Labour recruiters, brokers and captains often sell migrants and their attached debts between 
themselves, detain workers and withhold their identification documents.74 Both ashore and aboard 
vessels, workers are forced to buy goods and suppliers from their traffickers at vast mark-ups, used to 
keep them indebted and tied to the workplace.75 Contracts are usually oral, and where they are written, 
they often include fraudulent information, including Thai identity details designed to cover for irregular 
migration.
At sea, fishing vessels are like floating plantations, autonomous domains, largely beyond the reach 
of the State.76 Captains are essentially laws unto themselves. They deploy violence and intimidation, 
sexual and psychological violence, detain workers aboard and incommunicado while they, monopolizing 
communication links to shore, threaten workers’ families, and control workers through punishing work 
and debt bondage.77 A 2008 report by the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking 
(UNIAP) found that 59 per cent of interviewed trafficked migrants aboard Thai fishing vessels reported 
witnessing the murder of a fellow worker.78 The 2017 Issara Institute and IJM study noted above reported 
18.1 per cent of fishermen interviewed reporting experiencing physical violence while working on the 
fishing vessels, rising to 100 per cent on vessels with trans-shipped crews.79 
Distant-water vessels can stay at sea for months or years at a time, relying on a network of supply ships 
and refrigerated cargo vessels to restock them with fresh food, water and fuel while transporting catches 
back to port. In some cases, fishing organizations set up remote, informal bases in foreign countries, 
where workers may be enslaved. One of these, on the Indonesian island of Benjina in the Arafura Sea, 
south of Papua and north of Australia, was raided in April 2015, with over 600 men from Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos and Thailand freed from iron cages in the process. They told of being beaten with the 
toxic tails of stingrays, shocked by Taser if they fell asleep, and of workers thrown overboard to drown 
when they became unproductive. One of those enslaved, Tun Lin Maung, later told the AP that some of 
the enslaved who died on Benjina were buried in the jungle. “I always thought if there was an entrance 
there had to be an exit”, he said. “Now I know that’s not true.”80 These enslaved fishers had literally 
been denied the basis of their economic agency – their ability to leave and seek an outside option. The 
only route out was death. Another of those enslaved, Hlaing Min, was quoted as saying: “There must be 
a mountain of bones under the sea. The bones of the people could be an island.”81 Five Thai captains 
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and three Indonesians were later sentenced by an Indonesian court to three years in jail for human 
trafficking,82 and the case led the Indonesian Government to take action to strengthen protections for 
foreign workers in its fisheries. The UN migration agency, IOM, subsequently found hundreds of other 
workers enslaved in the fishing industry in other ports around the Arafura Sea.83
Workers are also recruited into informal processing jobs, which also sometimes involves child labour.84 
A UN study in 2012 found that 33 percent of seafood workers in Thailand’s principal processing region 
had been trafficked and 57 percent had experienced one or more conditions of forced labour.85 In 2015 
reports surfaced of hundreds of shrimp peeling sheds in one Thai province where migrant workers 
were handcuffed in small rooms and threatened with being shot if they ceased working.86 A 2011 ILO 
study estimated that 10,000 migrant children aged 13–15 years were working in pre-processing facilities 
in Samut Sakhorn, which hosts Thailand’s biggest shrimp processing district.87 Another study in 2015 
found between 20 and 40 per cent of children in processing facilities were involved in illegal work.88 
Child labour was officially banned from the industry in 2015.89 Moreover, these facilities often process 
aquacultured shrimp fed with trash fish caught by slaves off-shore. Those shrimp are then sold through 
global value chains to leading supermarkets around the world, including the top four global retailers: 
Walmart, Carrefour, Costco, and Tesco.90 
These reports led to a number of efforts by international buyers and governments aimed at 
disincentivizing the use of forced labour. In 2014, the US Department of State downgraded Thailand to 
Tier 3 in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report, the lowest possible status, alongside countries such 
as North Korea.91 In 2015, the European Commission issued a ‘yellow card’ to Thailand, identifying it 
as a possible non-cooperating country in fighting IUU fishing — with the threat of trade sanctions if 
key reforms were not made.92 This led to a 21 per cent drop in Thai fishing industry export revenues in 
the following year.93 Union federations and campaigners filed complaints in international forums, and 
with the US Trade Representative over access to preferential trade status under the US Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP). In 2015, the U.S warned Thailand of its failure to meet the eligibility criteria 
with respect to freedom of association, collective bargaining, acceptable conditions of work, and 
forced labour.94 This threatened further disruption of Thai exports. At the same time, warning by the 
Governments of Myanmar and Cambodia aimed at discouraging their citizens from working in the Thai 
fishing sector threatened to disrupt labour supply. Both Governments refused for several years to sign 
agreements with the Thai Government to facilitate labour migration of their nationals to work in the 
fishing sector in Thailand until the end of 2018. Some buyers also took steps to remove Thai products 
from their supply chains. 
In response, the Thai Government extended a minimum wage to fishers, undertook an extensive overhaul 
of its fishing sector monitoring and management regimes, and took steps to strengthen migration 
management and investigation and prosecution of human trafficking and child labour. This included 
ratification of key international agreements such as ILO C188, modernization of domestic fisheries 
laws, introduction of transparency initiatives, banning of trans-shipment, imposition of maximum 
voyage lengths, and an overhaul of portside and at-sea inspections of fishing vessels, including through 
the introduction of Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) and strengthening of port-in port-out (PIPO) 
labour inspections.95 There have also been some wins for victims and survivors, notably a significant 
compensation settlement in 2016 between Golden Prize Tuna Canning factory and victims of labour 
abuses.96 Many of these reforms were supported by the ILO’s 2016-2020 Ship to Shore Rights project, 
financed by the EU.97 Some Thai companies also undertook reforms. For example, starting in 2016, 
Thai Union, the largest producer of canned tuna in the world, collaborated with anti-slavery NGOs the 
Freedom Fund and Humanity United to reform their migrant recruitment policy for workers in their 
processing facilities.98 
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These reform efforts bore fruit, with the EU removing Thailand’s ‘yellow-card’ status in 2019,99 and 
the US moving Thailand up to Tier 2 in its Trafficking in Persons Watch List in 2018. The Tier 2 ranking 
demonstrates that Thailand does not meet the minimum standards to address human trafficking 
but is making efforts to do so.100 Yet there are reasons to question the impact on the ground. Some 
commentators have suggested that Thailand’s efforts to suppress IUU fishing and related labour 
violations have simply displaced problems to the waters and fleets of neighbouring countries, the so-
called ‘balloon effect’.101 Others, including Human Rights Watch, have suggested that, despite the Thai 
Government’s efforts, forced labour has persisted, as traffickers have adapted to the inspection and 
monitoring regimes introduced by the Government.102 In a mid-2019 study of the tuna supply chain, the 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre found that despite years of efforts on Thailand, the major 
Thai companies professed not to have found a single person in forced labour in their supply chain.103 
There are notable discrepancies between the data published by the Thai Government relating to the 
labour situation in the fisheries sector and civil society assessments.104 And in October 2019 the US Trade 
Representative announced that it would suspend USD 1.3 billion USD in trade preferences for Thailand 
under the GSP program based on Thailand’s “failure to adequately provide internationally-recognized 
worker rights (...) such as protections for freedom of association and collective bargaining.” This covers 
more than 500 products from Thailand, including all seafood products currently covered under the 
program – which does not include tuna – “due to longstanding worker rights issues in the seafood and 
shipping industries.”105
This move by the US Trade Representative reflects a growing recognition that progress on forced labour 
and broader worker protections issues has been mixed. One study estimated that, as of 2012, 17 per 
cent of migrant fishers had experienced forced labour, and 62 per cent had experienced coercion or 
involuntary work (but not necessarily both).106 Yet a March 2020 estimate from the ILO found that 10 
per cent of fisheries sector workers surveyed had experienced forced labour, and even larger numbers 
had experienced either coercion (12 per cent) or involuntary work (27 per cent) rather than both (which 
constitutes forced labour). (See Figure 35 below.) 14 per cent of surveyed fishers had experienced forced 
labour, and 7 per cent of surveyed workers in processing.107 (The Issara Institute and IJM study from 
2017 mentioned earlier reported 37.9 per cent of interviewed fishermen as “clearly trafficked”, with an 
additional 49.2 per cent “possibly trafficked”.108) 
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While there had been gains in some areas over the several years that the ILO was studying the industry, 
for example in salaries and employment structure, there were still continuing challenges. Two out 
of three fishers lack full control over their ATM cards and hence, pay. Nearly half (44 per cent) of all 
workers surveyed could not recall signing a work contract, and illegal wage deductions for food and 
accommodation stood at 16 per cent among fishers surveyed and 18 per cent for seafood processing 
workers. Almost half of Cambodian workers (49 per cent) reported being subjected to involuntary work. 
Figures 36 and 37 below show the ILO’s findings on involuntary work and coercion in the Thai fisheries 
sector. 
Why have there been such limited gains? How does the effort to address forced labour in Thai fisheries 
contrast to the apparently more sustained gains in Uzbek cotton, discussed in the previous chapter?
The first distinction is that forced labour is not ‘systematic’ in Thailand, in the sense that it is not the 
deliberate product of official government policy in the way it has been in Uzbek cotton production. 
This does not, however, mean that it is not ‘systemic’ (to use the distinction between systematic and 
systemic forced labour introduced by the ILO and discussed in the previous section on Uzbek cotton). 
Thailand has laws and policies against forced labour, designed to discourage its existence; but they are 
not effective to disrupt the system of modern slavery. Fishing companies routinely treat the sanctions 
and penalties involved as a mere cost of doing business.109 And some aspects of the Thai institutional 
environment arguably contribute to the modern slavery risks migrants face, notably the barriers to 
migrant worker unionization.110 
FIGURE 35: ILO ESTIMATE OF FORCED  
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FIGURE 36: THAI FISHING – INVOLUNTARY WORK
FIGURE 37: NUMBER OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ABUSES  
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FIGURE 38: THAI FISHING – COERCION
FIGURE 39: NUMBER OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ABUSES  





























Threat or actual restriction 
of movement or surveillance
Withholding identity documents 
or mobile phone
Isolated or locked in work or living place
Manipulation of debt
Threat of violence to you or family
Threat of dismissal





















181 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Nor does the absence of a government policy in favour of forced labour mean that government actors are 
absent from the modern slavery system in Thai fisheries. On the contrary, just as we have seen with the 
other modern slavery systems studied in this section to date, the alignment between government and 
business interests turns out to be crucial. In its 2020 research study, the ILO concludes that coercion 
and involuntary work are still prevalent in Thai fishing because “[o]fficials either do not see or simply 
ignore these abuses.”111 Other organizations have documented practices that call the rigour of port 
inspections into doubt.112 The ILO concludes that “the industry and government officials have apparently 
reached an accommodation – most visible in fishing at the provincial level – that causes some violations 
to go undetected or unreported.”113
This ‘accommodation’ is similar in some ways to the pattern of resistance to efforts to disrupt slavery 
systems that we have seen in the case studies earlier in this Chapter. Just as commercial interests in 
Brazilian cotton and Indonesian and Malaysian palm oil have sought to encourage their governments to 
resist international reform pressures, so have Thai fisheries business interests. The National Fisheries 
Association of Thailand (NFAT) has been a resistant force throughout the reform process, mobilizing 
against and slowing some efforts, with some of its members’ vessels suspending work to protest 
reforms at certain points.114 NFAT members have been vocal in opposition to ratification of core ILO 
conventions,115 adoption of electronic payment methods for fishers116 and the EU yellow card, even calling 
for retaliation against EU interests in other areas, such as petroleum exploration in Thai waters.117 Once 
it became clear the government would go ahead with ratification of ILO C188, NFAT worked to dilute its 
impacts by encouraging the government to restrict its application to a vessel class comprising just 5 per 
cent of Thai commercial vessels.118 NFAT also campaigned for a more lenient approach to employment 
of minors on fishing vessels, while also calling for reductions in social security protection requirements 
for migrant worker fishers.119
In some cases, particularly at what the ILO obliquely alludes to as “the provincial level”, the alignment 
of government and business interests devolves into outright corruption.120 This reflects the broader 
pattern of “domain maintenance” by traffickers identified in earlier cases. Traffickers, local politicians, 
law enforcement officials and in some cases judicial actors are joined by shared business and even 
family ties. Perhaps the most detailed study of such networks was provided by the Environmental Justice 
Foundation in its study over several years of the Kantang district in Trang province at the head of the 
Malacca Strait.121 These networks serve not only to protect traffickers from the enforcement of anti-
slavery norms, but also support the operation of the traffickers’ business, for example by returning 
escaped fishers122 – just as local law enforcement in Brazil returns workers who escape enslavement on 
cattle ranches, and local law enforcement in Malaysia returns trafficked migrant workers who escape oil 
palm plantations. In 2014, there were reports of Thai Navy officials’ involvement in selling Rohingya and 
Bangladeshi men into enslavement.123 Thai ministers have previously acknowledged the involvement of 
government officials in trafficking into Thai fishing.124
There seems to be limited will to use the tools of law enforcement to disrupt trafficking organizations. 
Thanaporn Sriyakul, an official in the prime minister’s taskforce who oversees the fishing industry, was 
reported to have acknowledged that, once the EU removed the yellow card, efforts to enforce labour 
laws had decreased “at an astonishing rate”.125 While the ILO estimates that there are tens of thousands 
of people experiencing forced labour in the Thai fisheries industry, in 2018 there were just 316 trafficking 
convictions in Thailand, and in 2019 just 304.126 There have been 1,335 compensation orders handed down 
since 2014; reportedly, only five have been paid.127 And the US State Department has noted that what 
training has occurred has been highly reliant on foreign donor support.128 This effective impunity is 
perhaps not surprising, given the history of amnesty efforts for illegal fishing practices in Thailand 
stretching back to at least 1989.129 
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The second difference in the Thai situation, compared to that in Uzbekistan, relates to the willingness 
of international actors to ‘stay the course’ on a disruption strategy. In the case of Uzbek cotton, the 
Cotton Campaign has taken a cautious approach to calls from the Uzbek Government for an end to the 
cotton boycott, and has presented a coherent and comprehensive agenda for reform of Uzbek cotton 
production. Governments have been largely supportive of that cautious approach, and that reform 
agenda. In the Thai fishing context – which, perhaps not coincidentally, lacks a centralized coordinating 
‘campaign’ body – there has been no analogous roadmap for overall reform. Governments have been 
much quicker to ‘accept’ the success of Thai reforms, and relax disruptive pressures. Again, the ILO is 
forthright about how this has played out:
…the bar for progress was set very low. Work in fishing was largely unregulated in 2014 
and 2015 and the global reporting focused on the industry’s worst abuses. As a result, 
the early pronouncements and actions of the Government and buyers – very modest 
if viewed against decent work standards – looked relatively big. Five years later, the 
sense of progress is exaggerated. This is visible in the generally reduced effort and the 
shift in authority from the Royal Thai Navy to the Department of Fisheries to oversee 
labour enforcement.
… there is a tendency to mistake tools for solutions, and activity for results.  
Phone-based apps, for example, have been touted as shortcuts for inspection  
and due diligence, prevention, grievance mechanism and even worker representation. 
Some accept the Thai Government’s inspection activity as the measure of progress 
– that is, more routinized inspections equals higher compliance – but findings and 
prosecution rates continue to lag far behind the independent estimates of violations.130 
Third, whereas in Uzbekistan international actors, including both buyers and development actors, 
have been willing to connect questions of worker voice and economic agency to larger questions of 
political power, there has been no such willingness in Thailand. A Thai civil society coalition argues that 
international buyers have been unwilling to engage to 
promote migrant workers’ structural and collective power, advocate for stronger 
labor rights protections, [or] make sure no workers and rights defenders [are] facing 
retaliation and reprisal from local companies while voicing their labor concerns and 
exercising the freedom of association.131 
The ILO’s Ship to Shore end line study reached a similar conclusion about how the absence of a political 
agenda is limiting progress. It concludes that while the issues at stake in the “complex reform efforts” 
under way in Thailand, dealing with “abuses of workers by employers, and the Thai Government and 
buyers’ abilities to protect those workers” are “problems of power and the uses of power”, they are 
instead presented “as technical problems”. The ILO report concludes that what will determine progress 
on these issues is not “improved training, risk identification and reporting tools for fishing inspections”, 
but rather “the determination of those in the highest levels of Government and industry to identify 
violations and punish them in ways that effective deter employers from abusive practices”.132
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Yet the responsibility for this does not lie only with Thai actors. On the contrary, a 2019 study of the 
efforts of actors along the global value chain to address labour issues in Thai fisheries concludes 
that the “business model” of Thai producers “remains unchanged” because buyers are not pricing in 
compliance costs.133 What is needed is a different approach to developing and sustaining value in the 
value chain, based not solely on competition on price, but also on social and environmental sustainability 
considerations, including questions of supply chain resilience and worker protection that have come 
to the fore following the COVID-19 pandemic. (We explore these themes more broadly in Chapter 9.) 
The pandemic has disrupted labour migration patterns across South East Asia, and placed workers 
at heightened medical and social risk.134 Workers face heightened risks of viral exposure in cramped 
processing facilities and accommodation, difficulties accessing social protection and services, and job 
losses. And the pandemic has also disrupted small-scale and artisanal fisheries.135 The pandemic has also 
prevented some fishermen disembarking due to government restrictions and led to some workers at 
sea operating beyond their contract terms. Fostering resilient value chains in Thai fisheries may require 
buyers to take steps to sustain the workforce, and commit to longer-term supplier contracts, treating 
associated price rises not as increased costs but as investment in resilient supply chains. It may also 
require buyers to go beyond questions of traceability and audit, to deeper questions of value chain 
governance, including worker voice and unionization. 136
Contrasting cases: The Philippines, India and Bangladesh
Any move to link fisheries development approaches to value chain governance must, however, also be 
careful not to assume that one size will fit all. Different communities engage with global fisheries and 
aquaculture value chains in different ways, and modern slavery risks crystallize in those communities 
in quite different ways. To illustrate this, we considered the situation in three countries near Thailand: 
the Philippines, India and Bangladesh. 
THE PHILIPPINES
Like Thailand, the Philippines is a major exporter of tuna, which is dominated by large-scale commercial 
operations.137 It is also a major exporter of seaweed products.138 Domestic production focuses on lower 
value small pelagic fisheries, often worked by low-income, fish-dependent communities.139 Researchers 
have found indicators of involuntary work and coercion across various segments of the Filipino industry, 
including induced indebtedness, underpayment for work, non-consensual variation of contracts, 
and forced criminal exploitation.140 There is increasing anecdotal evidence that female workers face 
heightened risks in tuna-sector jobs in export processing zones.141 Yet Filipinos face an additional risk, 
as migrant workers aboard foreign, especially Taiwanese flagged, vessels. As of June 2019, there were 
over 7,000 Filipinos working on Taiwanese distant water fishing vessels, according to the Taiwanese 
authorities. Forced labour has been documented on these vessels in a number of cases.142 
Most development interventions focused on Philippines fisheries have not addressed these risks, to date. 
Instead, there appears to have been more of a focus on small-scale fisheries and livelihood development 
in an ecosystem-oriented approach.143 A central strategy has been to encourage small-scale fishers to 
participate more in markets. This has had mixed results, in some cases pushing small-scale fishers into 
greater precarity and debt bondage.144
INDIA
To Thailand’s west, India is a major player in global aquaculture, the second largest producer in the world 
by volume after China, and the third largest fish producer overall. The sector provides employment to 
approximately 14 million workers, with 4 million of these workers being fishers.80 Yet despite such 
significant production, India’s exports have been held back by infrastructure limitations and inability 
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to meet importer standards.145 Production has trended steadily from marine capture towards inland 
aquaculture, which is often small-scale with limited vertical integration into international markets. 
Cluster farming is, however, on the rise, in part due to modernization and development efforts that have 
been supported by numerous foreign partners, including USAID and the World Bank.146 Critics argue 
that while this has led to growth in production, fish stocks have not always been well managed, and there 
have been mixed impacts on equality.147
Modern slavery risks arise both in domestic production – especially around debt bondage in aquaculture 
– and for Indian migrant workers trafficked into foreign fishing fleets.148 The rapid growth of commercial 
aquaculture has attracted significant domestic migration, often from vulnerable castes. Field research 
suggests that employed fishers have a limited understanding of their rights as workers, and may be 
vulnerable to wage exploitation.149 And there are also indications of debt bondage and involuntary work 
in seafood processing, with risks falling in particular on women.150 
India’s approach to fisheries and aquaculture development is today framed squarely within the Blue 
Economy paradigm, billed as a “Blue Revolution”. This aims at increasing income and the socioeconomic 
status of fishers and fish farmers.151 India has also endorsed a Bay of Bengal Partnership for Blue Economy 
initiated by Bangladesh, with Prime Minister Modi situating the partnership in the context of larger 
efforts to promote regional security and growth. This includes efforts to work with partners to upgrade 
trade links, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.152 
BANGLADESH
In Bangladesh, the livelihoods of around ten percent of its population are fisheries and aquaculture based 
– but that rises to almost three quarters in rural settings. Over half of the animal protein in the country’s 
diet comes from fish and derivative products.153 Most of this involves inland pond culture, often with 
small-scale suppliers, many of them operating on the margins of formality and often involving child 
labour. A highly fragmented supply chain, with numerous small suppliers and multiple, often informal, 
intermediaries, limits traceability. This, together with poor transport networks, insufficient public cold-
storage, and unreliable utilities have limited processing and exports.154 In recent years, however, there 
has been a deliberate effort to foster aquaculture, with development initiatives funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Dutch Government, the World Bank, the EU, 
NORAD, ILO, UKAid, Winrock, the Canadian International Development Agency, the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation and the private sector.
A significant portion of the workforce is female, and so it is on women – and children – that much of 
the associated modern slavery risk has traditionally fallen.155 Both forced labour of women and child 
labour has been identified in processing.156 Some women are pushed from forced labour in processing 
facilities into domestic servitude for farm owners.157 Children often work alongside mothers, and may 
be drawn into familial debt bondage. A 2010 survey of fish drying camps found that around 14 per cent 
of workers were children, around a quarter in forced child labour.158 Child labourers are reportedly 
underpaid, subjected to physical and sexual abuse, and provided inadequate medical care.159 There has 
been particular concern around the involvement of child workers in illegal fish camps in Bangladesh’s 
Sundarban forest.160 Concerns about child labour in the shrimp and seafood supply chain have impacted 
Bangladesh’s access to both the EU and the US markets. 
In recent years, following the resolution of maritime boundary disputes with Myanmar and India in its 
favour, Bangladesh has also begun to push more systematically into seafood production, including tuna 
fishing, in line with its new Blue Growth strategy.161 This will require investment in seafood processing 
infrastructure, fisheries management – and maritime enforcement capabilities, as the risks of coercion 
and forced labour on off-shore vessels arise.162 Demand for cheap labour in marine capture fishing may 
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also pose risks for some of the same communities targeted by aquaculture development initiatives. In 
the past rapid aquaculture expansion has pushed poor populations out of access to traditional resources 
and into more precarious livelihoods based on seasonal and wage labour, often after internal migration 163.
What these cases show is that modern slavery risks vary significantly across the fisheries and aquaculture 
sector, depending on a variety of factors to do with the value chain in question and the vulnerability of 
different people working in the value chain. This suggests that efforts to address modern slavery risk in 
fisheries and aquaculture need to account for local contexts. Yet they also point to risks if these efforts 
become overly fragmented, whether by product (shrimp, fry, tuna), or even, arguably, by country. The 
transnational nature of some shared fisheries resources – and, increasingly, of fisheries and aquaculture 
labour forces – points to the need for a more cooperative approach to risk management. It is to that 
objective that we now turn. 
Lessons and opportunities
In the earlier discussion of palm oil, we encountered the notion of the ‘regime complex’, with multiple 
normative regimes and domains overlapping, interpenetrating and actively competing. The fisheries 
and aquaculture regime is similarly governed by a regime complex, this one encompassing specific 
fisheries management norms and institutions, environmental regimes, maritime and law of the sea 
regimes, property regimes, migration regimes, labour rights regimes and human rights regimes.164 What 
the cases considered in this section suggest is that effective management of modern slavery risks arising 
in the context of efforts to achieve sustainable development of fisheries and agriculture requires action 
across this regime complex, and not simply within one or two strands (such as labour rights institutions 
or human rights law). 
This means thinking across the various governance forums that intersect with the value chain, from the 
local context of production to the global context of distribution, consumption – and finance (to which we 
return below).165 Value chain oriented development can foster economic agency at different nodes of value 
creation by facilitating private sector engagement, linking multiple stages of the chain to new markets 
and facilitating market linkages between producers and processors.166 The new FAO COFI:FT guidance 
on social sustainability, introduced earlier, provides an important step in this direction by providing 
a common normative framework. Yet it is a voluntary framework, and is not currently embedded in 
institutional mechanisms that would give it force. In contrast to the Uzbek cotton case considered earlier, 
there is a notable absence of strategic coordination around a shared approach to modern slavery risk 
in the fisheries and aquaculture context, even for a single country sub-context, such as Thailand. This 
may be, in part, because fisheries governance is necessarily fragmented. But it is also notable that the 
anti-slavery agenda has not yet shown up in some of the fisheries governance institutions where such 
strategies would be translated into international enforcement, notably regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMOs). These are international organizations formed by countries with fishing interests 
in an area. Some focus on geographic areas, while others focus on migratory species. Only in mid-2020, 
prompted by calls from the Indonesian Government and others (notably Spain), are RFMOs beginning to 
turn their attention to forced labour issues.
In June 2020, after deaths of Indonesian crewmembers on a Chinese tuna long-liner, the Indonesian 
Government wrote to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, calling for an independent investigation into the 
existence of forced labour on fishing vessels operating in those RFMO’s jurisdictions, and demanding 
urgent action to deal with labour abuse through the enforcement of international laws and policies. 
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Indonesia also, notably, pressed the political agency aspect of this issue, arguing for greater representation 
of crew-members in RFMO deliberations, and for the RFMOs to work to raise awareness of these issues 
publicly.167 There are also potentially other things that RFMOs could do to address forced labour under 
their jurisdiction, for example working with their members to create registers of vessels and companies 
found to be connected to forced labour – along the lines of the Brazilian lista suja (dirty list), and building 
on existing IUU registers in the RFMOs, or existing procurement exclusion lists coordinated amongst 
multilateral development banks. 
Still, a coherent approach across the regime complex must not only be directed at IUU fishing and 
industrialized value chains. To be effective, it will need to enhance the agency of producers of all sizes. 
This means, for example, not allowing certification to drive small-scale producers off their fisheries 
and into precarious wage labour, but rather protecting and sustaining their livelihoods. This could 
mean thinking about how development actors can help small-scale producers overcome barriers to 
participation in sustainability certification schemes, for example through cooperative mechanisms. 
This will help drive impact to scale; in India, for example, there are more than 230 million people in 
agricultural cooperatives. And in Thailand, small-scale fishers make up 67 per cent of the total fleet.168 
Financing will be key. Investors have played an important role in encouraging companies to exclude Thai 
produce from supply chains, over forced labour concerns. International frameworks for responsible 
investment in the sector exist, such as the Committee on Food Security’s Principles for Responsible 
Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems, supported by FAO, WFP and IFAD.169 Yet foreign investment in 
the fisheries sector is limited, in part because it is perceived as driving over-production. Many national 
fishing industries rely on local financial providers, including banks, for financing.
Yet there appears to have been little discussion by the global banking sector of what responsible and 
sustainable lending, investment and banking of fisheries enterprises looks like. Fish caught through 
forced labour are the proceeds of crime. Their sale represents conversion, and those handling the 
proceeds of such sale are arguably involved in money-laundering. Despite the growing attention to 
fisheries crime by UNODC, Interpol and other global anti-crime institutions, there has been a notable 
silence in the anti-money laundering (AML) community around the application of financial crime 
compliance norms to forced labour in the fishing industry, and there does not seem to be significant 
effort to identify, freeze or confiscate the proceeds of such crime. Likewise, another leverage point in the 
financial sector – maritime insurance – has also been largely overlooked. Vessels and companies linked 
to forced labour could be excluded from marine insurance coverage. Insurers could adopt template 
language excluding forced labour from insurance coverage, as they recently have begun to for marine 
cargo.170 This could be tied into existing work on managing IUU risks. 171
Insurers may have an important role to play in supporting compensation payouts to workers whose 
rights have been violated.172 As in the Uzbek cotton case, most investigation and prosecution to date 
has dealt with the relatively ‘small fry’, such as Ko Myo. There has been no real effort, yet, to hold to 
account the ‘big fish’ – the company owners and well-connected businessmen – behind the modern 
slavery system in Thai fisheries, or elsewhere. Until there it is, it is hard to believe the system will truly 
be disrupted.173
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CHAPTER 7: GARMENTS AND APPAREL: 
A “CAPTIVE AND VULNERABLE LABOUR 
FORCE”
Prologue: Modern slavery risks in Leicester?
In early July 2020, The Sunday Times published an undercover investigation claiming that workers in 
a factory in Leicester making garments for the British online apparel giant, boohoo, were working 
without proper COVID-19 protection, in dangerous conditions, and were being paid GBP 3.50 per hour 
– or less than half the minimum wage.1 boohoo expressed its shock, arguing that it was the contracted 
and sub-contracted suppliers that controlled production in these factories; it does not employ these 
workers. It committed to spend GBP 10 million on internal investigation and supply chain remediation 
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efforts, including an independent investigation by Alison Levitt QC, which reported in late September 
2020 as the text of this report was being finalized.2 That review found that many of the allegations of 
underpayment and unacceptable working conditions were “substantially true”, but also concluded that 
the evidence did not make out a prima facie case of modern slavery.3
Yet the mid-2020 allegations led the UK Home Secretary to request an investigation of ‘modern slavery’, 
and to the establishment of a multi-agency taskforce led by the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority 
(GLAA).4 Amazon, Next, ASOS and Zalando dropped boohoo from their online sales platforms,5 and its 
value plunged more than GBP 1.5 billion or around one third in two days. When reports emerged of 
government inspectors not initially finding ‘modern slavery’,6 much of that lost stock-price ground was 
recovered. After boohoo published and accepted the findings of the independent review by Alison Levitt 
QC, its shares rose 16 per cent.7 Government-led investigations remain ongoing, however, at the time of 
writing. And information about the conditions in these factories has continued to trickle out.8
boohoo has been one of the UK’s fastest-growing apparel retailers in recent years, with 2019 sales of 
over USD 1 billion. By January 3030 its market value was GBP 3.89 billion.9 It is an example of the move 
in the apparel industry to ‘ultra-fast-fashion’: using online sales to respond very rapidly to consumer 
trends driven by social media and celebrity endorsements. Fast fashion involved a move from one or 
two fashion ‘seasons’ per year to around twelve.10 Ultra-fast-fashion takes this to extremes: boohoo, for 
example, reportedly adds around 3,000 new styles each week.11 This trend is a result of the turn both 
to online retailing and to just-in-time systems in global manufacturing. Speed of delivery is central to 
the business model, as consumers aim to wear today what social media influencers and celebrities wore 
yesterday. But so is price: the strategy aims not just at offering clothes that are on-trend, and fast, but 
also cheap. boohoo describes its consumers as powered by “aspirational thrift”. 12 
That strategy calls for clothes to be produced close to consumers. Having spent several decades 
becoming more complex and global, garment and apparel supply chains are now shortening, moving 
to near-shore production. For example, European consumers increasingly purchase apparel made in 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa – or domestically. Suppliers in those locations can 
offer retailers quality production, and repeat business under short lead times at competitive prices.13 
boohoo produces over half its stock in the UK, much of it in and around Leicester. Leicester has around 
1,000 to 1,500 small-scale factory units, involving perhaps 10,000 workers.14 85 per cent have fewer than 
20 employees,15 many of whom work informally. Similar economic clusters have emerged elsewhere in 
the UK, notably Greater Manchester.16 In the US, brands like Fashion Nova, based in Los Angeles, use a 
similar model. And like boohoo, Fashion Nova stands accused of links to migrant and minority worker 
exploitation.17 
The reason for this link is clear: purchasing practices put enormous pressure on suppliers to provide 
super-fast, flexible turnaround, often at prices that cannot be met while meeting statutory wage 
requirements. The Financial Times described how boohoo places orders from suppliers, describing a 
scene in which the product teams play suppliers off against each other, forcing them to compete by 
offering the lowest price for orders, treating the reverse auction “like a cattle market”.18 The Levitt Review 
found that boohoo founder Mahmud Kamani explicitly pushed his buying team to “trade faster harder 
and quicker” and quoted senior managers arguing that it was up to suppliers to set limits on what they 
were willing to do to cut costs.19 Yet in such situations, suppliers often have incentives to reduce costs 
by forcing those working for them to accept lower labour prices, through wage theft, coercion, forced 
overtime and forced labour.20 The Financial Times described the Leicester garment industry in 2018 as “a 
bizarre microeconomy where larger factories using machines are outcompeted by smaller rivals using 
underpaid humans.”21
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This exploiter strategy is possible only where two other factors are present: first, the right institutional 
environment – a lack of effective enforcement of State and international norms; and second, vulnerable 
people who can be effectively coerced, defrauded or manipulated into this exploitation, and then 
prevented from exiting it. Modern slavery in the garment and apparel value chain is thus a product of the 
three factors hypothesized in the Developing Freedom framework, set out in Chapter 3. Understanding 
the problem from this perspective allows us to consider solutions from a sustainable development 
orientation: how can we promote economic growth in such an industry, while maximizing people’s 
economic agency? 
While the costs of this situation fall most obviously on the victims of labour exploitation themselves, 
there may also be significant externalities imposing a drag on development for the broader community. 
One estimate puts the lost tax revenue to the government at around GBP 1,000 per worker per year.22 
Workplace injuries may create a public health burden. And the industry has a serious environmental 
footprint: in the UK alone, 300,000 tonnes of clothing are thrown out every year, with 80 per cent 
incinerated.23 Since much fast fashion relies on petroleum-based synthetic fibres, this represents a 
significant contribution to carbon emissions – perhaps 10 per cent of global emissions.24 The industry 
also contributes to microfibre and microplastics pollution, which may place soil health, food chains and 
public health at risk. 
Yet it is not only in places like Leicester that these factors converge in the context of the garments 
and apparel value chain. The same patterns are apparent in the artisanal production by both Italian 
homeworkers25 and migrant, especially Chinese26, workers into the luxury goods chain in Italy. The 
same pattern is present in the US.27 In Brazil,28 in Pakistan,29 and in Eastern Europe and Turkey.30 As 
we saw in Chapter 1, there are also unique risks in those parts of the Chinese garment and apparel 
chain connected to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In this chapter, in addition to the UK, we 
consider three other places where modern slavery risks have arisen in the garment and apparel value 
chain: Bangladesh, India and Ethiopia. We first look at how the global value chain works, looking at the 
convergence of institutional environment, people’s vulnerabilities, and exploiter strategy. Second, we 
look at the modern slavery risks that have arisen in Bangladesh, India and Ethiopia, and consider why 
these risks have crystallized more in some of those places than others. We also consider the responses 
that have emerged in each place, focused primarily on disruption and transformation; and the ways in 
which those responses have succeeded, or been met with counter-mobilization and co-optation. This 
reveals important insights about the conditions under which garment and apparel industry growth may 
generate modern slavery risks and how different developmental strategies for managing that risk may 
play out. In the final section, we reflect on lessons from these cases for the broader Developing Freedom 
agenda – and for sustainable development efforts in garment industry clusters in the global North, such 
as Leicester. 
The garment and apparel value chain as a modern 
slavery ‘system’
The garment sector accounts for roughly 2 per cent of global GDP.31 It most probably employs 60 to 
70 million workers, two thirds or three quarters of whom are women.32 The economic geography of 
the industry has been very dynamic over the last century, with production regularly relocating to 
capture marginal gains created by the intersection of changing trade, investment and labour migration 
regimes. In the process, textile and apparel production have come to be seen as an important catalyst 
for developing countries’ industrialization and movement out of agricultural production.33 So why is the 
industry also now seen as a source of serious modern slavery risk? 
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Institutional environment
For a long time, production was concentrated in the EU, but in the 10 years to 2015 production increased 
in Asia, with China, Bangladesh, Viet Nam and India emerging as the largest sources. The Asian regional 
value chain combines raw materials, ample and price competitive labour, and increasingly design and 
development capabilities.34 Since 2015, there has been a rise in production in Africa and Latin America. 
Favourable rules of origin have allowed certain countries to become competitive exports. The Central 
America Free Trade Agreement fostered the growth of the industry in Central American countries 
such as Nicaragua, based on access to the US market. The EU’s Generalized System of Preferences and 
subsequent Everything But Arms trade system has had a similar effect. The US’ African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) has played a similar for African countries such as Lesotho. 
Production centres actively compete for investment by trying to offer investors and producers favourable 
production conditions – including low labour costs and a low regulatory burden.35 For example, 
Myanmar’s minimum wage, established in 2015, is assessed with reference to that of Bangladesh, in 
part because of the anticipated effects on garment and apparel industry investment.36 The result is that 
exporting firms at the low end of GVCs tend to oppose strong labour regulation, fearing that it will 
reduce competitiveness.37 In this way, the rules of the global trade system are an important part of the 
institutional environment that shapes the global value chain, and the risks of labour exploitation within 
it. 
This begins at raw material production. As we saw in earlier chapters, workers are sometimes at risk 
of forced labour in the production of cotton and leather (cattle). But they have also been found to be at 
risk producing other materials for garment and apparel production – such as harvesting rubber and in 
farming silk cocoons – and in spinning and garment assembly.38 Materials pass through several stages on 
their way to the consumer: manufacture of component textile products (yarn, thread, synthetic fibres, 
fabrics); production of garments and apparel – assembly of garments, cutting, sewing, knitting, often 
by contractors handling materials owned by others; export, frequently through trade intermediaries – 
wholesalers, agents, logistics firms, global apparel companies; and marketing and distribution, including 
retailers.39 
It is global buyers – global apparel companies and retailers, typically headquartered in the US, Europe or 
Japan – sitting at the ends of the smile curve, who have the widest margins and the greatest power in the 
value chain.40 They determine who produces what, where and at what price. 97 per cent of profits for the 
whole fashion industry are earned by just twenty companies, most of them in the luxury segment. Most 
of these firms have been in that position for over decade.41 The owner of Inditex, the largest garment 
and apparel company in the world, is the sixth richest person in the world, worth around USD 70 billion. 
Beneath these global buyers, the value chain is highly fragmented and disarticulated. Producers, in the 
middle of the smile curve, operate on the narrowest margins and carry most of the risk. 
Supply chain fragmentation has promoted efficiency, but impedes traceability and accountability, 
inadvertently fostering exploitative purchasing practices. These include: contract terms that are vague 
on price and financial implications of delays; unilateral changes on order specifications, without 
extending deadlines, and without reliable forecasting or order planning; unrealistic order completion 
times and unpredictable placement of orders; pricing arrangements that treat labour cost as a residue, 
not a necessary input; and late payment.42 Lead firms’ control over suppliers and supply chains thus 
mirrors the nature of contemporary slavery: it operates through both legal and extra-legal mechanisms 
of control, but never amounts to ownership.43 That serves to maximize lead buyers’ up-side, while 
minimizing costs – and liability.
In response to these power relations, suppliers survive by developing systems for employing and 
managing capital and their workforce that allow them to rapidly increase and reduce labour supply to 
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respond to buyer demand, while maintaining low prices.44 That translates to a highly casualized and 
atomized workforce, often working from home, under informal or no contractual arrangements, with 
zero-hours contracts or piece rate payment systems. Casualization helps keep the costs of benefits 
and workforce skills development down, a necessity given that buyers’ habitual late payment dries up 
working capital for suppliers.45
Workers are frequently recruited through brokers and intermediaries who demand fees from workers 
for placing them in work. Unionization and collective organization are often absent. Unauthorized 
subcontracting by suppliers is ubiquitous.46 So too is under-payment and wage theft. In Leicester, 
numerous investigations have found suppliers under-reporting the number of hours worked by 
workers.47 The Levitt Review includes detailed submissions from sources suggesting under-payment of 
wages is endemic in Leicester garment factories.48 In Myanmar, factories “steal minutes” from workers 
by recalibrating their “hourly” production targets to be targets for 45 or 50 minute increments.49 One 
estimate put underpayments in the Chinese apparel sector at around USD 275 to 300 million per month.50
This system of labour exploitation is possible, however, not only because of the institutions and 
practices of global value chains, but also because of the role that States play in shaping the institutional 
environment, by refraining from action and giving GVCs domain autonomy. As we have seen, countries 
compete for investment and export contracts by promising “low business costs” – often a cipher for lax 
enforcement of labour protections and standards. The same is true at the subnational level. One factory 
owner in Leicester described the textile industry in and around that city “a country within a country”, 
where “GBP 5 an hour is considered the top wage”. The legal minimum at the time was GBP 7.83.51 
Yet this is no mystery. Channel 4 news had conducted exposés in 2010 and 2017, and the Financial Times 
published a long article on the Leicester garments cluster in 2018, describing the ubiquitous flouting of 
labour, safety and health rules as “an open secret. Central Government knows; local government knows; 
retailers know.” Similarly, a global study of purchasing practices in the industry by Human Rights Watch 
in 2019 found that involuntary work including forced overtime “are an open industry secret.”52 
This is not for a lack of audits and inspections. Across the garment and apparel value chain, it has become 
apparent that audits – whether undertaken as part of a public or private regulation scheme – can be co-
opted.53 A study of conditions in Leicester found that while there were multiple agencies involved in 
inspections, 
managers are able to take special measures during or prior to such visits, concealing 
the gravest violations. Thus, while a large number of external actors are present in the 
workplace, and given the extent and depth of the problems encountered, they seem to 
be either: the wrong actors, use inappropriate methods, are in the wrong place, or a 
combination of the above.54
One reason for this is that regulatory models tend to assume employers ‘own’ the employment 
relationship with their workers, and develop grievance and support mechanisms based on that 
assumption of permanency. That is simply not how the global garment value chain now works. Instead, 
producers (and even more so buyers) use their power to control workers, but pass ownership of the 
employment relationship off to contractors, sub-contractors, labour brokers, or workers themselves, as 
independent contractors. Audits tend to presume workers are able to drive complaints. Yet, as the study 
of conditions in Leicester concludes “[v]ulnerable workers… are unlikely to engage with complaints 
mechanisms.”55 Workers in this sector in the UK – and other OECD countries – may in that respect have 
quite a bit in common with workers in developing countries. They are, in effect, left unprotected by the 
institutions offered by the State. The result is, as a government appointed director of labour market 
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enforcement concluded in 2018, a “perceived culture of impunity” in Leicester’s garment sector.56 This 
led to a one-year pilot scheme to test joint enforcement efforts involving multiple government bodies, 
including its Modern Slavery Action Group.57 The Levitt Review commissioned by boohoo, mentioned 
earlier, found that “[i]naction by authorities has contributed significantly to” the “unacceptable working 
conditions and underpayment of workers” she found in boohoo’s Leicester supply chain, sending “a 
clear message that the violations are not important and the people affected do not matter”.58 
Suppliers are effectively given a choice of norms and demands to obey – a choice of which institutions 
to allow to govern their behaviour: the norms imposed by buyers and the global value chain, or those 
imposed by States. As a University of Leicester study in 2015 explains, since they are dependent on buyers 
for business, this in effect means “their options are to comply [with the law] and struggle, or to create 
some space by violating corporate and employment regulations.”59 They often choose the latter, often 
because they do not trust the State to protect their business from the inexorable commercial logic of 
the value chain, for example by penalizing buyers who set prices below what is feasible while respecting 
the minimum wage. “[Leicester’s] got its own rules, its own laws, its own ways of doing things”, said one 
supplier in an interview with the Financial Times. “We’ve lost faith in the government stepping in”.60 A 
Guardian article in August 2020 reported that the UK tax authority, HMRC had issued penalties to fewer 
than ten textile firms that failed to pay the minimum wage since 2017 and claimed just over GBP 100,000 
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in arrears relating to 143 workers.61 The local MP, Conservative Andrew Bridgen, spoke to the issue in 
Parliament in January 2020, describing the situation as “the wild west… If you withdraw regulatory 
oversight and the police from everything, organised crime is going to move in,” he said. He described 
the situation as a “national shame” that risked hundreds of deaths if fire were to break out in a factory.62
Disrupting this system thus requires re-establishing the allegiance of suppliers to the norms and 
institutions of the State, over and above those promoted by GVCs. This means bringing the State back 
into the supply chain, through stronger inspection, higher penalties on suppliers – and buyers – for 
defecting from State law, or through improved commercial pay-offs for firms that do comply, such as 
access to concessional lending. As we shall see later in the chapter, this is indeed the strategy that some 
governmental actors – and actors within GVCs – have sought to adopt to improve respect for labour 
rights and conditions in garment and apparel manufacturing in developing countries. And it points to a 
need to think about the role of the State in shaping GVC outcomes through industrial policy – a point to 
which we return in the conclusion. 
People’s vulnerabilities
For exploitation strategies to succeed in this environment, they still require one more ingredient: 
vulnerable people. As we shall see in the discussion of Ethiopia later in this chapter, if workers can leave, 
if they have sufficient economic agency to exercise their outside options in the labour market, exploiters 
may not be able to exert sufficient control for any exploitation to rise to the level of forced labour or 
modern slavery. What matters is whether there is a ‘captive’ workforce.
It is no surprise, then, that it is the segments of society rendered vulnerable by larger power-structures 
and institutions that seem especially susceptible to forced labour in the sector, especially migrants, 
women and children, those facing language barriers or lacking skills that can be deployed in other jobs. 
It is no accident that the textile cluster in Leicester and the East Midlands emerged in its current form 
after the lay-offs and austerity triggered by the Global Financial Crisis, and reportedly relies heavily 
on immigrants to the UK, many with poor English language skills. The region’s share of UK apparel 
manufacturing has risen from 17 to 28 per cent.63 As a 2015 University of Leicester study explained, the 
“supply of a captive and vulnerable labour force” in the region was integral to 
the way competitive advantage is currently set up… The competitive position of 
apparel manufacturing in the East Midlands is shaped by relatively small firm sizes, 
relatively low wages and a large vulnerable workforce. These aspects constitute key 
parameters in the use of unauthorised subcontracting as well as wages and working 
conditions below statutory minimum standards.64
The Levitt Review of boohoo also explores questions of worker choice at some length, describing 
significant financial and practical limits on Leicester factory workers’ ability to opt out of exploitative 
working conditions.65
Minority groups, internal and international migrants are often central to these workforces. In Bangladesh, 
garment production is centred around Dhaka and Chittagong, attracting rural migrants, dislocated 
from their family and social networks. The pattern is similar in India, with significant migration from 
poorer regions in search of work in textile production. Up to 80 per cent of children found in child 
labour in Jaipur, including in the garment sector, are from Bihar. And while India’s formal garment 
industry workforce is thought to be around 60 per cent male, the home-based production segment is 
overwhelmingly made up of young women and girls from ‘outcastes’.66
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Refugees may also be vulnerable to such exploitation, since they often face restrictions on their mobility, 
language and literacy barriers. There appears to be a growing pattern of production investment in 
locations that are near or may attract such populations.67 650,000 Syrian refugees work in the Turkish 
garment industry in the lower tiers of supply chains, almost all undocumented.68 Reports have found 
wages below the legal minimum, child labour, sexual harassment and other abuse.69 One supplier 
interviewed in 2019 by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre said simply that “the Syrian 
workforce is what keeps the Turkish textile sector alive today”.70 Syrian refugees (and other migrants, 
including many from Bangladesh and India) are also involved in garment production in Jordan, though 
this is through more formalized arrangements in the context of Jordan’s free trade access to the US 
market.71 After initial reports of labour violations in its textile manufacturing zone around 2006,72 Jordan 
authorities have worked with ILO and IFC to improve labour standards through a Better Work Jordan 
scheme. Yet allegations of forced labour sexual misconduct, physical and verbal harassment, wage theft 
and hazardous work environments persist.73 The ILO/IFC project itself has acknowledged forced labour 
and other abuses are commonplace in these factories.74
Displaced workers lack social capital, support and safety nets, and may struggle to access government 
provided social assistance, especially if they are undocumented. In some places, these difficulties 
are further compounded by employers housing workers in specialized accommodation, keeping 
them segregated from the larger community. In other cases, work is home-based, impeding worker 
organization and unionization.75 Sometimes their access to their identity documents and ability to 
communicate with the outside world are restricted. Wages may be withheld and, in some cases, workers 
have access only to a single, company run source of goods and provisions, which can be used to discipline 
workforces through debt.
Exploiter strategies
Garment and apparel producers use several strategies to exploit the opportunities offered by the 
confluence of these two factors: a vulnerable population and a favourable institutional environment. 
One is casualization of the workforce and recruitment through agents, brokers and intermediaries, 
separating control of workers in the workplace from legal ‘ownership’ of the employment relationship. 
The Levitt Review found that boohoo management was aware of risks of exploitation in its Leicester 
supply chain, but did too little, too late, to address it, because “Boohoo did not see it as their responsibility 
and … commercial concerns were allowed to prevail”.76
Another, closely related, is use of debt to bond workers to the workplace. Workers often arrive in their 
jobs with significant debts – recruitment fees paid to multiple brokers along the labour-supply chain.77 
In other cases, such as the Sumangali scheme in southern India, discussed further below, recruiters 
offer work as a way for workers to earn income for dowry (while reducing their family’s household costs), 
but bind workers to the workplace by paying out the fee only at the end of the contract – if at all.78 In 
other places, workers and production units are tied into exclusive sales agreements, restricting their 
ability to trade with other buyers.79
Intimidation, use of physical, sexual and psychological violence, are all also relatively common. A 2019 
study by the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) and Care International interviewed 763 women in factories in 
Vietnam with 43 per cent reporting they had suffered at least one form of violence and/or harassment in 
the past year.80 Sexual harassment seems to be a recurring male management practice used to intimidate 
and discipline workers.81
Finally, as with exploiters in other sectors discussed in previous chapters, those in the garment and 
textile industry also seem to deploy deliberate “domain maintenance” strategies – engaging government 
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officials in ways intended to protect their space to govern their workplaces free of anti-slavery norms. 
Yet, as we shall see in the case studies that follow in this chapter, the different relationships between 
the State and garment and apparel manufacturers have proven pivotal in shaping efforts to disrupt 
exploitation and prevent forced labour in this sector.
Tackling risks for workers in the garment  
and apparel value chain
In this section we look at how risks for workers related to – but not necessarily rising to the level of – 
modern slavery has arisen in three specific contexts in recent years: Bangladesh, southern India, and 
Ethiopia. In each case, we consider how those risks are entwined with the growth of garment and apparel 
manufacturing. And in each case, we consider how workers, governments, and businesses involved in 
the value chain have responded to those risks. 
Bangladesh: the Rana Plaza disaster and its aftermath
Garment production makes up around 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s merchandise exports and around 20 
per cent of its GDP.82 This makes Bangladesh the second largest garment exporter after China; it supplies 
around 6 per cent of the global garments trade.83 This creates employment for around 4.5 million people, 
and has been a major driver of development, income growth and poverty reduction in Bangladesh for 
three decades, culminating in Bangladesh’s graduation to lower middle income status in 2014.84 And the 
industry has, without doubt, contributed to the development of Bangladeshi women’s economic agency, 
providing employment opportunities, and giving them greater control over marriage, education, and 
childbearing.85
The industry was an early beneficiary of the global export-quota system in place after Bangladesh 
gained its independence in the 1970s. When South Korean and Taiwanese companies filled their quotas 
under the Multi-Fibre Agreement, they began opening factories elsewhere, including in Bangladesh, 
investing in training local managers and financing local start-ups. In the 1980s the Government sought to 
capitalize on this potential through a policy regime intended to promote the industry’s growth, including 
assistance for imports of inputs, low duties, and investment in export processing zones outside Dhaka 
and Chittagong.86 The Government worked closely with the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (BGMEA), an industry coalition formed to represent suppliers. Production grew 
quickly from this point, with factories numbering only 50 or so in the early 1980s to over 3000 factories 
employing 1.8 million workers by 2000.87
The global quota system protected Bangladesh compared to competitor nations, but also guided the 
growth of the industry into low value products, supressing the incentive for the industry to diversify.88 
As the successor to the Multi-Fibre Agreement, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) ended in 
the 2000s, Bangladesh was exposed to competition from other developing countries with lower labour 
costs (including India and Ethiopia, discussed below). Wages were already relatively low: for example 
ILO research in 2015 found minimum wage workers in China had 2.6 times the purchasing power of 
those in Bangladesh.89 So suppliers were forced to compete on other workforce and production-related 
costs – which increasingly meant input costs and working conditions. The easiest place to control input 
costs was in those produced domestically, such as leather. There have been repeated reports of child 
labour in these subsidiary tiers of the garment and apparel value chain in Bangladesh.90 A UNICEF survey 
published in 2015 found in one domestic garment hub of 185,000 workers, that 59 per cent of workers 
were below the age of 18. Many did not attend school, and in some cases were found to be working up to 
17 hours per day during peak production.91
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FROM DISASTER TO DISRUPTION
Another place to reduce costs was on the production plant – and specifically, building safety. Between 
2005 and 2012, more than 500 workers died in fires and building collapses.92 The tipping point for global 
action to address these risks came in 2013. 
On 24 April 2013, an eight-story building in Dhaka, the Rana Plaza, which housed five garment factories 
supplying global brands, collapsed. 1,138 people were killed, and more than 2,000 others injured. The 
building had been inspected and ordered evacuated the previous day, after cracks appeared in its walls, 
but the owner, Mohammad Sohel Rana, insisted that workers return to work or lose their jobs. Workers 
had been coerced to work in unsafe conditions against their own better judgment, under threat of 
penalty – meeting the ILO definition of forced labour.93 
The calamity caused both a local and a global outcry. The Government of Bangladesh undertook safety 
checks that led to numerous factory closures – and the loss of exports and jobs. In 2016 it charged 38 
people with murder. (As of April 2020 those trials had not, however, commenced, with some of the 
proceedings subject to stay orders from the High Court.94) Internationally, more than one million people 
signed online petitions in the 3 weeks after the disaster. The top EU trade official also threatened to 
review Bangladesh’s access to EU markets if safety reforms were not undertaken.95 This was a powerful 
disruption of business as usual. 
The Government’s response was organized through National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety 
and Structural Integrity (NTPA), a national level strategy for improving health and safety in the industry, 
developed and endorsed by the Bangladesh Ministry of Labour and Employment, with support from 
the ILO, and signed by employers’ associations and national union representatives.96 There was, 
however, no role in the plan for international brands and buyers – whose buying practices were seen 
by many international actors as the driver of local suppliers’ cost reduction efforts, including skimping 
on building safety. With Germany being the primary export market for the country, the German 
development organization (GIZ) stepped in, bringing together Bangladeshi unions, a precursor to the 
global union federation IndustriALL, and international NGOs such as the Clean Clothes Campaign, as 
well as two international buyers, PVH and Tchibo.97 The ILO agreed to serve as an independent chair in 
these discussions, which sought to agree a plan to address the safety issues in garment factories.98 Yet 
European and US buyers were not able to agree a common approach, splitting over questions of whether 
any remediation plan would be legally enforceable.99 
As a result, not one but two different initiatives involving buyers and their suppliers went forward. 
Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), Primark, and around 220 other primarily European companies joined with 
trade union partners to create the legally binding Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. This 
included two European-based international unions—UNI Global Union and IndustriALL Global Union—
as well as two Bangladeshi labour federations. Walmart, Gap, and other North American companies 
set up the rival, non-binding Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety. This had 29 members, and did 
not include union representation in its board of directors. Yet despite this different approach to legal 
enforceability, in many other ways the Alliance and Accord were functionally similar. Both undertook 
factory inspections and promised to finance remediation efforts by local suppliers to improve physical 
arrangements and safety, including training for workers on the right to refuse unsafe work.100 Both 
involved a commitment by buyers not to work with factories that did not comply with demands under 
the respective initiative. Neither focused on forced labour questions. 
These developments also need to be understood, however, in the context of coordinated inter-State 
political pressure. The Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour Rights and Factory Safety in the 
Ready-Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh – known as the Bangladesh Sustainability 
Compact (BSC) – was signed in July 2013, bringing together the EU and the governments of Bangladesh 
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and the US, plus the ILO, with the goal of improving working conditions and respect for labour rights 
in Bangladesh’s garment industry. It includes both short and long-term commitments in three areas:1) 
respect for labour rights; 2) structural integrity of buildings and occupational safety and health; and 
3) responsible business conduct.101 Annual Technical Status reports, produced by the Government of 
Bangladesh with the assistance of the ILO are accompanied by annual high-level meetings between 
signatories on progress, providing a soft accountability mechanism.102 When Canada joined in 2016, the 
BSC included countries representing 85 per cent of Bangladesh’s garment exports. 
The BSC nested the ideas in the NTPA in the context of a larger intergovernmental framework, creating 
an important transparency framework fostering strategic coordination. It was implicitly connected to 
the possibility of withdrawal of trade preferences. In June 2013, just prior to the signing of the BSC, the 
US Government suspended Bangladesh’s access to GSP, based on its failure to meet statutory eligibility 
requirements related to worker rights. The EU did not follow suit at the time, but in January 2016 it 
announced that Bangladesh had been put on “enhanced engagement” over its GSP status “due to the 
gravity of alleged shortcomings in respecting core human rights and labour rights standards”.103 In 2017, 
the EU sent a series of letters to the Government of Bangladesh pressing for action towards BSC goals, 
and indicating that inadequate progress “could eventually lead to the launching of a formal investigation, 
which could result in temporary withdrawal of preferences.”104 (When this did not eventuate, several 
non-government groups, including the ITUC and the Clean Clothes Campaign lodged a joint complaint 
with the European Ombudsman.105) In March 2018, the US declined to restore Bangladesh’s GSP status, 
indicating that insufficient progress had been made.106
The BSC thus served as a transparency mechanism for a group of actors to communicate to Bangladesh 
shared expectations about desired transformations in the garment industry. This also created a 
framework that other influential actors could organize around, with governments, funders and 
international bodies using it as a donor coordination and programming design reference.107 
DID MODERN SLAVERY RISKS REDUCE OR INCREASE? 
Both the Alliance and the Accord found extensive problems in the factories inspected. For example, the 
Accord found that 97 per cent of factories it inspected offered workers no safe means of escape in case of 
fire. 70 per cent of the buildings had structural deficiencies.108 Where these deficiencies were identified, 
remediation plans were then put in place. As of April 2019, the Accord reported 35,000 initial and follow-
up inspections across more than 2,000 factories, where engineers identified over 140,000 fire, electrical, 
or structural hazards. 1,068 factories met 90 per cent of the required remediation.109 The statistics are 
similar for the Alliance. Their final annual report from November 2018 (when the Alliance phased out) 
shows 93 per cent of all remediation completed in their 714 factories.110 These efforts appear to have had a 
positive transformational impact, with significant reductions in fatalities, and improvement in workers’ 
ability to resist coercion to work in unsafe conditions. One independent study in 2018 found that 90 per 
cent of workers interviewed felt they could refuse to go into the factory if the building was perceived to 
be unsafe.111
Yet the schemes’ impacts have at least three limitations. 
First, the schemes were of very limited scope. The schemes dealt only with safety, not with workplace 
management practices such as sexual harassment, coercion, involuntary work or wage theft, or 
indeed with collective organization and unionization. Their empowerment of workers to resist forced 
labour risks was, in that sense, limited. What is more, perhaps 3,000 companies, who served as (often 
unauthorized) subcontractors to the ‘mother factories’ with which buyers had formal relationships, 
were excluded from the regimes.112 Many of these, as a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report in 
2013 put it, “operate in the shadows” and were “often the most dangerous” factories in which to work.113 
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The Accord and Alliance arguably contributed to the creation of a “deeply bifurcated garment sector”, 
with one segment servicing Western buyers, and another, not benefiting from safety upgrades, servicing 
other buyers.114 The NTPA was the sole oversight mechanism for these factories, and five years in had 
performed remediation for only 20 per cent of its target group.115 A New York University study estimated 
that there were safety gaps in factories not covered by the Accord or the Alliance which would cost USD 
1.2 billion to address.116
Second, although it has not been much discussed, there is important evidence that suppliers passed 
losses – from the increased costs of remediating unsafe buildings, and from reduced prices offered 
by buyers, after the disaster117 - onto workers, especially female workers. A rigorous World Bank study 
found that while the introduction of the Accord and Alliance improved access to sick leave and safety 
at work, it reduced the use of written contracts (which would make it easier to engage in wage theft, 
forced overtime and other fraudulent and coercive practices) – and it led to a reduction in average 
hourly wages for female workers. Before the Rana Plaza disaster, the garment industry offered women a 
wage premium compared to jobs in other sectors in Bangladesh; after the disaster and the subsequent 
interventions, that premium disappeared. But only for women. Notably, the World Bank explains this as 
partly due to the greater inelasticity of female labour supply. Translated: women had fewer alternative 
employment options, both inside and outside the industry, than men, so they were easier for suppliers 
to exploit.118 This finding is consonant with studies elsewhere that point to the fact that external pressure 
on working conditions can lead employers to a trade-off on wages.119 This has significant implications for 
how we understand efforts to protect workers from coercive management practices and other factors 
contributing to modern slavery risks. Such interventions should not be mounted in isolation, but instead 
need to be evaluated in terms of their holistic impact on workers’ economic agency.
And third, it is arguable that while the Accord, the Alliance, the NTPA and the BSC together disrupted 
business as usual around safety standards, they have had a less enduring or measurable transformational 
impact on the institutionalization of labour rights in Bangladesh, and on the empowerment of vulnerable 
workers. 
Both the Alliance and Accord encountered the same kind of nationalist counter-mobilization that we 
saw in Chapter 4 (palm oil). As in that case, this was often framed in terms of increased compliance costs 
for producers, since, despite promises by the Accord and Alliance, the costs of remediation fell heavily 
on suppliers. Bank facilities were created – some with IFC assistance120 – to assist suppliers to access 
capital for building renovations, but banks were frequently disinclined to finance the riskiest projects.121 
Suppliers were also unenthusiastic about taking on significant debt given the volatility of demand from 
buyers and their unwillingness to sign long-term supply contracts.122 In 2017 and 2018, unions won an 
arbitral award from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague requiring international brands 
contribute towards the remediation of factories, in one case to the tune ofUSD 2.3 million.123 But buyers’ 
and brands’ resistance to financing remediation generated growing resentment from Bangladeshi 
suppliers.124 
Push-back by the BGMEA and others against the Accord and Alliance was framed in increasingly political 
terms – as a question of independence and sovereignty.125 Rubana Huq, managing director of a major 
supplier, spouse of a local mayor, and later the first female President of BGMEA, told journalists in April 
2018 that 
The time for self-monitoring has arrived… It’s high time for the Accord and Alliance 
to leave. If we really want to address this collective and national tragedy, we have to be 
responsible for our own safety. We have to be proactive about our own corrections and 
our own tomorrow.126 
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Suppliers mobilized resources within government to help resist pressures on their management 
practices. This was an effort squarely to maintain their domain. One dispute ended up in court, with 
both the executive and the High Court siding with a factory owner who had been removed from the 
Accord’s approved supplier list over failure to remediate safety risks. This led to an extended period of 
uncertainty about the operation of the Accord in 2018, during which the government pushed to take over 
the inspection role of the Accord, and the Accord resisted, citing evidence from ILO that the government 
inspection mechanisms were not yet fit for purpose.127 Ultimately the dispute was resolved through a 
compromise, with a sunset date in 2020 set for the Accord’s departure, and greater involvement of the 
local manufacturing body in inspections in the meantime.128
Yet the departure of the Accord and the Alliance, together with the unwillingness of the EU to suspend 
Bangladesh’s GSP trade preferences, may have signalled to opponents of reform that they had ridden out 
the storm, and they could dial back on reforms. The development economic scholar Alice Evans argues 
that
Bangladeshi politicians and exporters have ceased to regard pro-labour reforms as 
conducive to export growth. They have revised their norm perceptions and perceived 
interests in response to macro-trends: soaring exports, price competition, price-
squeeze, no required labour reforms, nor financial support for buildings upgrading.129 
This is perhaps clearest in the area of worker voice. There were important reforms in 2013-2014 that 
made it easier for unions to register, with 96 new unions registering in the year after this was put in 
place, compared to 2 in the year prior.130 Yet several years later, union density remains low.131 Evans 
finds a shrinking of the space for unionization and collective worker voice since the announcement 
of the winding up of the Alliance and Accord.132 Wage protests in December 2018 and January 2019 saw 
11,600 workers lose their jobs and criminal charges brought against more than 60 workers.133 Through 
publication of inspection reports, corrective action plans, progress reports, complaints and minutes 
of governance meetings, both the Accord and Alliance temporarily provided transparency over supply 
chain governance decisions for workers – and an opportunity to influence governance processes (though 
in different ways in the two schemes).134 That opportunity for collective mobilization and worker voice – 
for exercising economic agency over their own work situations – has now ceased.
The Rana Plaza disaster led to a period of sustained and coordinated pressure by international buyers, 
foreign governments and international development partners, which succeeded in strengthening 
physical safety standards in the Bangladeshi garment industry. But that window for coordinated 
strategic engagement may now have passed. Mobilization to disrupt a system generating significant 
modern slavery risks was met by effective counter-mobilization. What are the costs for sustainable 
development? A decade ago, Bangladesh’s garment industry was expected to move up the value chain 
from low-value manufactures into woven apparel and higher-quality product.135 This has not happened. 
There may be several reasons for this, including inefficiencies in logistics and the high cost of access 
to raw materials. Yet it also seems clear that low worker productivity – itself related to the constrained 
agency workers enjoy in their workplaces – is a central part of the story.136 
India: from multi-stakeholder disruption to community-based 
Developing Freedom
Textile manufacturing is woven into India’s history. It was a world leader for the best part of two 
millennia, serving as a source of luxury imports to the Mediterranean and Europe since at least the 
Roman era. British protection of its own wool-based textile industry in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
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centuries disrupted business models and pushed the Indian industry into lower-value market segments. 
Indeed, the Raj’s disruption of Indian textile manufacturing was so central to the political economy of 
the Raj that the revival of the textile industry became a rallying point for Indian freedom fighters, a 
symbol of self-sufficiency, self-rule and swaraj. The traditional Indian spinning wheel, the charkha, was 
emblazoned on India’s pre-independence Swaraj flag (since replaced by the Ashoka Chakra). 
Following independence, the Indian Government maintained a strong orientation in favour of small-
scale production and domestic self-sufficiency.137 Starting in the 1980s, federal Government policy moved 
to encourage the industry towards greater export orientation, but there were still supports in place for 
small-scale production. These only began to be truly wound back around 2001, and the legacy remains.138 
Over the last ten years, the Indian Government has looked to upgrade manufacturing capabilities and 
increase exports. 
In 2016/2017, Indian textiles and apparel industry accounted for 14 per cent of export earnings, making 
up around 4 per cent of the global market – less than Bangladesh.139 The industry may however account 
for as perhaps 45 million jobs, the vast majority of which are in informal, home-based work, largely 
feeding into the domestic market. Perhaps only 2 million are in export-oriented garment factories.140 
One key implication is that India’s garment and apparel industry may be less susceptible to foreign buyer 
and government pressure than its more export-oriented peers and competitors, such as Bangladesh. 
Investors might have some influence, but foreign investment in the industry has also been relatively low 
to date. Moreover, Indian garments and apparel benefit from some preferential access to a number of 
countries and blocs, including GSP access to the US and the EU, but not the tariff-free access accorded to 
competitor countries that count as ‘Least Developed’.141 This means that Indian exporters are competing 
with goods operating under more favourable tariff schemes, putting downwards pressure on the prices 
they are able to charge, which in turn puts a downwards pressure on wages and working conditions.142 
What export-oriented garment production there is in India is clustered in three places: around Delhi 
(around 850,000 workers); Tirupur, Tamil Nadu (c. 500,000); and Bangalore, Karnataka (c. 500,000).
There have been some indications of labour exploitation in each of these places.144 Exploitation in the 
industry involves restrictions on freedom of movement, health and safety violations, low pay, lack of 
contracts, gender discrimination, verbal abuse, and limited opportunities for collective bargaining and 
association. There is some, but more limited, evidence of forced, bonded and child labour.145 Beyond 
these contexts, there are also thought to be particularly high rate of child labour in home-based work, 
with large numbers being paid nothing at all.146 
In recent years international actors have sought to replicate some of the ‘outside-in’ features of 
international mobilization against forced and child labour seen in previous chapters, to address forced 
labour in the Tirupur cluster. This is the location of the majority of India’s spinning units and producer 
of most of its knitted products, destined for EU and US brands and retailers such as Adidas, C&A, H&M, 
Nike, Primark and Walmart.147 The cluster is seen as an engine of local growth and development, with 
exports having grown around ten-fold in the last thirty years.148 Andrew Crane and his co-authors report 
that “A common motto among many business leaders [in the area] is some version of ‘the worker of 
yesterday is the factory owner of today’”, and that there “is some truth to this…social and economic 
mobility has been an important aspect of Tirupur’s success”.149 
The Tirupur cluster now faces stiff competition from other producers on labour costs – with wages in 
Ethiopia around a quarter of those earned in Tirupur; efficiency; and tariffs and market access.150 Over 
time, labour shortages have grown, especially as young people have found more gainful employment 
elsewhere, or chosen to stay in school longer and embark on a higher skill level employment pathway.151 
Labour shortages are particularly acute for exporters, who face quality and time constraints imposed by 
buyers, and may have to organize surge capacity to deal with resulting production pressures. Exporters 
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and buyers may prefer longer-term relationships with workers, while workers trade off job security 
against the advantages of flexibility and labour market mobility.152 
One workforce management solution that emerged around 1989 has become a particular object of 
international attention in the last ten years. It involved recruiting girls to become a captive labour force. 
This is the so-called sumangali (sometimes translated as ‘married woman’) scheme.153 It is essentially an 
indentured servitude or bonded labour scheme organized by factories in Tirupur. Their agents would 
recruit poor, unmarried, generally lower caste, rural teenage girls, from poorer States – usually in 
India’s north – to work for a three-year period. During that period they were paid only a stipend, around 
one third of the legal minimum wage; at the end, they were promised a lump-sum payment, which could 
then serve as dowry, allowing them to become the respectable married woman of the marketing title 
of the scheme. Frequently, recruiters sold the scheme through fraudulent promises about working and 
living conditions. And research suggests that most workers received only a reduced pay-out – justified 
through charging of ‘fees’ during the period of service – or none at all.154 Some factories were reported to 
workers or make them resign shortly before they finished their contractual term, to avoid the pay-out.155 
True working conditions were quite different. Girls were usually housed in company-controlled and 
surveilled compounds or camps, rarely permitted to leave, and afforded little contact with their families. 
Fees were deducted for lodging, meals and other ‘services’. 72-hour working weeks were common, as 
was being summoned to work in the middle of the night, to meet short turn-around orders from foreign 
buyers. 
In the late 2000s, a series of studies and investigations into the scheme, particularly involving local 
civil society actors, drew attention. Confronted by reputational risks, brands began to cease doing 
business with factories participating in the scheme around 2010.156 Local civil society activists worked 
effectively with foreign NGOs to campaign on the issue in both the court of public opinion, and through 
governmental adjudication, bringing actions in the High Court of Madras and with the National Human 
Rights Commission and the Tamil Nadu Women’s Commission.157 At the international level, Anti-Slavery 
International brought a complaint to the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), an alliance of retailer, brands 
and suppliers, targeting ASDA, Walmart and Sainsbury. It also pushed for a multi-stakeholder approach. 
These efforts led to roundtables pulling together industry actors, capacity building project, and focused 
auditing to identify and mitigate risks of sumangali and other forced labour schemes. As in Bangladesh, 
this multi-stakeholder approach may have run into divergent views about how far brands should go in 
supporting local trade unions and workers groups, and different levels of willingness from suppliers and 
buyers to commit to remedial plans.158 
Local suppliers now argue the scheme no longer exists.159 Other stakeholders suggest that there are still 
indicators of forced labour and deceptive recruitment arising, and that even if the scheme has ended 
per se, the same strategies are being deployed more covertly and on a smaller scale in the region around 
Tirupur.160 Despite indications of reductions in the prevalence of the worst forms of labour exploitation, 
child labour and examples of forced and bonded labour persist in the region with these practices higher 
in more rural areas.161 And there are also signs that one reason for the demise of the scheme was simply 
that better-paying jobs opened up for poor young women in other industries and locations.162
The multi-stakeholder response to the sumangali scheme echoes, in some ways, the approach taken in 
Bangladesh, in particular the focus on multi-stakeholder engagement. Yet it lacked certain key elements, 
such as the involvement of the ILO or foreign States, an overarching transparency framework, and the 
accountability achieved by the Accord and the BSC, in particular. Its diffuseness and lack of centralization 
make its impact difficult to assess. 
It does, however, serve as a useful counterpoint to a quite different approach supported recently in the 
region by the Freedom Fund, an anti-trafficking organization based in the UK. Its strategy seems to 
202 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
combine mutually reinforcing elements of disruption, transformation and empowerment – an approach 
covering the full Developing Freedom spectrum – but rooted in work at the community level. As with the 
earlier approach, disruption is sought through engagement with local businesses, seeking to identify and 
interrupt the calculus of abusive practices that exist in some parts of the sector. That is supplemented by 
efforts aimed at institutional transformation, through efforts working with government and civil society; 
and through empowerment interventions targeting vulnerable groups (on gender, caste, awareness, and 
poverty dimensions).163 Stunningly, in the 400 villages participating in this programme between 2015 
and 2018, the prevalence of households experiencing bonded labour fell on average from 56 per cent to 
just 11 per cent. That represents more than 63,000 fewer individuals in bonded labour.164 Evolving from 
an initial focus on addressing vulnerability at the community level, the program now also works with a 
broad civil society network, the Tamil Nadu Alliance, to support implementation of policies to protect 
textile workers, especially migrants, and to strengthen visibility and accountability within the textile 
supply chain.
Ethiopia: when workers vote with their feet 
In the final case in this chapter, we consider the stunning growth of Ethiopia’s garment and apparel 
manufacturing industry over the last 15 years, the labour-exploitation risks it has generated, and the 
responses to them that have arisen. While there have been some indicators of coercion and involuntary 
work in Ethiopia’s young garment industry, these do not seem to have combined into full-blown forced 
labour. We consider why this is the case, given that Ethiopian garment workers’ wages are the lowest of all 
the cases considered here (and possibly in the world), low levels of unionization, and limited engagement 
by foreign buyers and governments on these issues. The answer turns out to have everything to do with 
the ability of Ethiopian workers to exercise their basic economic agency, by voting with their feet – 
quitting workplaces they disapprove of, and moving instead into insecure, informal, but self-governed 
entrepreneurial work. Work in Ethiopia’s garment industry may be difficult and low-paid, but this is 
not a ‘captive’ workforce. The implication is that Developing Freedom requires thinking not just about 
whether people’s entry into work is voluntary, but also their exit options – and a holistic understanding 
of how people seek to govern their own economic choices and develop in freedom.
ETHIOPIA’S DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND THE GARMENT INDUSTRY 
From 2006 to 2016, Ethiopian GDP grew on average by more than 10 per cent each year – one of the 
highest growth rates in the world. This has rendered significant reductions in poverty – from 44 per 
cent in 2000 to 30 per cent in 2011 – as well as improvements in education and health outcomes.165 This 
was planned growth. Ethiopia has learned from other countries, notably China, and gives a strong role 
to the State in shaping the country’s development pathway.166 The aim is to reach lower middle-income 
country status by 2025. The textile and garment industry is seen as key to that growth.167 
Under the leadership of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), since the 1990s 
the country has sought to diversify its agriculture-focused economy, through a labour-intensive, export-
led industrialization model, based on East Asian models. Textile and garment manufacturing is seen as 
key to this process, fostering backward integration to cotton production,168 while harnessing preferential 
trade access to the EU (under the Everything but Arms scheme) and the US (under the African Growth 
and Opportunities Act) to deliver rents that can be used to invest in infrastructure, basic services and 
social programming. With a young population, low-skilled job creation is also a central imperative. 
For several years in the early 2000s, the State pump-primed the industry’s growth through subsidized 
land leases and preferential credit from the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE). From around 2008, 
there was a shift towards attracting FDI, in part to address a growing reliance on textile imports (for use in 
garment manufacturing), as backward linkages did not develop at the anticipated pace.169 Starting around 
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2015, Ethiopia began setting up specialized industrial parks, designed and built specifically to attract FDI 
in the textile and garment industry, with an accompanying policy regime designed to foster knowledge, 
capital and technology transfer to local partners.170 The Government’s strategy prioritizes higher value-
add, export-oriented investment,171 offering incentives such as lifting of investment restrictions for the 
sector, customs duty and income tax exemptions, allowances for carrying forward losses and favourable 
lease terms in industrial zones. And the significance of the effort to the Government is underlined by the 
fact that the Ethiopian Investment Board is chaired by the Prime Minister, with involvement of several 
other senior ministers. Ethiopia has been one of the top FDI recipients in Africa this decade. 
These schemes, and associated job creation schemes, have received several hundred million dollars in 
lending from the IFC. Other donors, including DfID and GIZ, have also been active.172 Domestic financial 
instruments are also used to stimulate investment in the industry. 30 per cent of long-term financing 
from the Development Bank of Ethiopia goes to the sector, which offers special deals such as covering 60 
per cent of garment factory expansion costs,173 and a revolving fund to provide working capital to finance 
imports needed for pre-shipment packaging.174 The Commercial bank of Ethiopia is also increasingly 
involved. 
The result has been strong growth for the sector: 51 per cent from 2013 to 2018 alone. The Government 
has overseen the construction of 8 industrial parks nationwide, with more than 45,000 associated jobs. 
The largest of these is the Hawassa industrial park, south of Addis Ababa, which hosts around 25,000 
textile and garment workers. The first investor was PVH. It was looking for new, low-cost countries in 
which to expand production, motivated in part by concerns about producing in Bangladesh caused by 
the Rana Plaza disaster. It canvassed several potential partners, including Kenya, before settling on 
investment in Ethiopia.175 Total textile and garment exports now represent 17 per cent of the country’s 
total manufacturing value, and 0.6 per cent of GDP, employing around 62,000 workers nationwide – 
around 17 per cent of the manufacturing labour force. A strong majority of workers in manufacturing are 
women. Germany, the US and Turkey are the primary export destinations.
ESCAPING THE LOW-WAGE TRAP
Despite this strong growth, Ethiopia’s garment manufacturing sector faces continuing challenges – 
especially escaping the low-cost model that has underpinned this growth to date. 
Ethiopia is competitive against other countries because it provides low-cost inputs including land, 
electricity, export costs and, in particular, labour. In recent years, the monthly wage of garment workers 
in Ethiopia has been around a quarter to a half that in Bangladesh, and a quarter to a seventh of that in 
China.176 This has been possible because Ethiopia has not had a statutory minimum wage. Low wages 
contribute not only to price competitiveness, but possibly also to the Ethiopian garment sector’s 
relatively low total factor productivity when compared to its peers.177 Workers may not experience forced 
labour – requiring both coercion and involuntary work, under the ILO definition – but they do appear 
to be demotivated by management practices that suggest elements of coercion or involuntary work are 
present at different times.178 These include wages that are so low they push workers into debt to pay for 
basic living expenses, forced overtime, physical and verbal abuse, wage deductions (penalties) for minor 
time management and disciplinary infractions, and, possibly sexual harassment. And in the search for 
low-cost inputs, such as textiles, suppliers may be pushing labour exploitation risks further upstream, 
contributing to the country’s already high risks of child labour and child labour in the hand-made textile 
segment.179 
Workers have limited options for expressing their unhappiness with how they are managed at the 
industrial parks. One way is through reduced performance, and indeed, garment factories typically 
operate at low efficiency levels compared to their overseas peers. Suppliers indicate that the cost of 
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labour is, seen from the firm level and factoring in productivity, lower than advertised.180 Another way to 
express their grievances would be through unions: but union density is very low in the parks. However, 
there have been reports of significant unreported and informal strike activity for several years.181 In 
Hawassa, in particular, this is also increasingly bound up with political protest and dissent, as different 
political groups seek to develop control over the rents arising from the park.182 This is a dangerous 
trend, with an authoritarian government offering limited space for civil society to mobilize around 
issues such as working conditions and wage levels, and limitations on foreign human and labour rights 
organizations’ access to the country for monitoring and advocacy work.183
The third option that workers have to express their dissatisfaction with their working conditions in 
the factories is a simple but profound one: to leave. And they do – in significant numbers.184 By some 
accounts turnover in Hawassa was 100 per cent in the first year.185 Yet turnover is reportedly high 
across all industrial sectors in Ethiopia, perhaps indicative of the high value that Ethiopian workers, 
accustomed to greater control over their own time in agricultural production, place on this aspect 
of their economic agency.186 (The same challenge has been documented elsewhere, with agricultural 
workers resisting the time-discipline imposed by factories and the process of proletarianization.187) 
Many leave to become ‘entrepreneurs’, in the informal economy, sacrificing job and income security 
for mastery of their own time and destiny. This suggests continuing challenges for suppliers in meeting 
young workers aspirations, which may lead to ongoing turnover and productivity challenges – and an 
inability for the sector to upgrade to higher value-add segments of the garment value chain. But it also, 
fundamentally, points to a key reason why modern slavery risks in Ethiopia’s garment factories have not 
crystallized as forced labour or modern slavery: because workers can leave. They are not ‘captive’, but 
instead retain the fundamental economic agency to vote with their feet. 
MISSING LINKS IN THE VALUE CHAIN
Addressing the risks arising from coercion and involuntary work in garment factories is thus important 
not only for managing risks of forced labour but also for Ethiopia’s continued economic growth and 
development. This begs the question what lessons can be learned from the experiences of other countries 
regarding how these risks can be effectively managed. 
Here, it is crucial to appreciate that in one crucial respect Ethiopia’s garment industry is more like 
China’s than Bangladesh’s or India’s: the absence of a strong domestic private sector, both commercial 
and civil society. Ethiopia remains, in quite profound ways, a developmental patrimonialist system in 
which ruling networks, particularly those with ties to the Tigrayan elite, manage rents centrally. Prime 
Minister Abiy Ahmed’s reforms can, in one sense, be seen as an effort to move Ethiopian governance 
towards a more market-based system, with more technocratic governance arrangements.188 This may 
or may not succeed in stimulating the emergence of a true ‘private’ sector, and in opening up space 
for worker voice and civil society. Until this space emerges, any effort to transform Ethiopia’s garment 
sector will be fundamentally different from Bangladesh’s, or even efforts in India, because international 
partners will not have local business partners and union partners with which to work. The conversation 
will be, essentially, with the State, and with foreign buyers. 
This offers unique opportunities – and unique risks. As we have seen in the previous chapters, resistance 
to efforts to disrupt the exploiter strategies that generate modern slavery outcomes tends to emerge out 
of close cooperation between the State and strong domestic private business interests. That is absent 
here; if the developmental State decides to undertake reforms, there is scope to move further and faster, 
without the same risks of counter-mobilization. But that also brings a risk of fragility and thin social 
legitimacy. If the State’s reforms and development choices are not matched by consultation with and 
voice for those affected – notably workers – then the enterprise may not take root domestically. Workers 
may find other ways to express dissent, as discussed above. 
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These cautions are worth bearing in mind when considering the ILO’s Siraye programme, which 
commenced in July 2019. It adopts a “shared responsibility” approach to improve respect for
workers’ rights leading to greater incomes and compensation, enhanced safety, 
equality, voice, and representation. The programme also aims to lift industrial 
productivity and competitiveness to enable a global competitive textile and garment 
sector; and encourage accountable and transparent government institutions.189 
This involves several different strands of work at multiple levels: multi-stakeholder dialogue at the 
national level to develop a common vision and strategies to make Ethiopia an African hub of socially 
responsible production of garment for both global and domestic market; consultations to fix a minimum 
wage and strengthen government labour dispute resolution institutions; empowering employer and 
worker organizations to engage in effective dialogue and negotiation; strengthening labour inspections 
and occupational health and safety protections, including compensation; and strengthening factory 
management (including by promoting female managers) to strengthen factory productivity. The project 
receives support from IFC, the G7’s Vision Zero Fund, and other sources. 
Lessons and opportunities 
What lessons can be drawn from these cases about how the garment and apparel industry can help 
promote the Developing Freedom agenda in the future? In this section we look at what COVID-19 has 
revealed about the common sustainable development challenges faced by garment and apparel workers 
worldwide. And finally we reflect on lessons for how States and development actors can harness the 
garment and apparel value chain for sustainable development, by using the tools of the State to promote 
greater transparency, inclusion, and a more systematic approach.
What COVID-19 has revealed 
The media had been reporting on possible wage theft and exploitative working conditions in Leicester’s 
garment factories for some years before the boohoo scandal blew up in July 2020. It was the additional 
risks to both workers’ and public health posed by the operation of those factories, during the COVID-19 
pandemic, without adequate safety precautions and protective equipment, that gave the story extra legs. 
Just as meat processing factories have been associated with viral spread (as discussed in Chapter 3), 
so garment factories, operating at the outer edges of the reach of the administrative State, may risk 
spreading the virus. The lean, flexible production methods that dominate the industry, which work to 
remove costs and risks from buyers and suppliers balance-sheets, and push them down on to workers, 
have the same effect on this dimension of risk as on others. Just-in-time manufacturing has deprived 
nodes all along the supply chain of resilience: they carry less inventory and lower cash reserves than 
earlier generation firms did. Factories must operate, if firms are to survive. 
Many firms have not. COVID-19 immediately led to a collapse in garment and apparel sales, as people 
stayed at home and discretionary spending fell precipitously. In early August 2020 top brand executives 
estimated US sales for 2020 could be down 50 per cent, year on year.190 Notable brand-name retailers, 
such as Debenham’s, J. Crew, and JC Penney, have gone bankrupt. Across the board, retailers and brands 
cancelled orders from suppliers’ factories, and paid even later than usual. An October 2020 study found 
that suppliers lost at least USD 16.2 billion in sales and payments due between April and June 2020. 191 
Another study found that 30 per cent of factories were reporting 100 per cent of accounts receivable past 
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due.192 Factories in China and Bangladesh were hit especially hard.193 The power of buyers was on full 
display, as they forced suppliers to absorb downside risks and dictated revised pricing even for fulfilled 
orders. Debenham’s reportedly requested 90 per cent retroactive discounts on some orders.194
Suppliers, in turn, pushed these costs on to those they could: subcontractors and workers. Detailed 
surveys suggested income drops for workers across South and Southeast Asia of over 30 per cent, and 
more than 50 per cent in some places such as India. Clean Clothes Campaign estimated that the overall 
wage gap in seven major exporting countries between March and May was USD 1.82 billion covering 
around 13 million workers.195 In Bangladesh, 72 per cent of furloughed and 80 per cent of dismissed 
workers were sent home unpaid.196 Globally, more than two million female garment workers were 
thought to have been laid off, including in Ethiopia’s industrial parks.197 In some places, it was claimed, 
unionized workers were targeted first.198 Dismissed workers faced not only impoverishment but, in 
some cases, being trapped in their host country without income or access to social protection. Others 
faced safety risks as they tried to return home.199 Some turned to protest.
International civil society quickly mobilized to draw attention to these problems. The social media 
#PayUp campaign harnessed consumer sentiment, criticizing the cancellation of orders in the apparel 
sector with the goal of getting brands to pay for the orders. It also garnered hundreds of thousands 
of signatures on a petition, and may have led to as much as USD 15 billion in order fulfilment.200 This 
confirmed the susceptibility of export-oriented suppliers to such external pressures, but also revealed 
that such pressures may be less useful for more domestic-oriented industry. 
Some suppliers rebounded, shifting production in particular into personal protective equipment (PPE).201 
This was a segment of the garment and apparel sector already nosed to pose particular modern slavery 
risks,202 especially in the manufacture of rubber gloves.203 One Malaysian manufacturer, WRP Asia Pacific, 
had been subject to a US CBP WRO since late 2019, rescinded in March 2020 after the company took 
rapid remedial action. In the UK, a June 2020 Channel 4 investigation pointed to low wages, excessive 
overtime, illegal pay deductions, and debt-inducing recruitment fees at the Malaysian factories of the 
world’s largest manufacturer of medical gloves – Top Glove.204 In July 2020 the US CBP imposed a WRO 
on Top Glove subsidiaries.205 In early August 2020, Top Glove agreed to refund foreign workers who 
had paid recruitment fees to agents, to the tune of around USD 12.65 million, and to upgrade worker 
accommodation.206 
These rapid developments have served to highlight the common challenges that vulnerable workers in 
the garment supply chain face around the world – from low-income country settings like the Hawassa 
industrial park in Ethiopia, to high income country settings like Leicester in the UK. It is the way that 
this value chain works, with institutional arrangements – including State forbearance and absence – 
that allows companies to exploit vulnerable workers, posing sustainable development challenges for 
countries around the world. Civil society, unions and researchers have offered numerous suggestions 
for how States and buyers can now work together to mitigate these acute impacts from COVID-19, 
protecting worker health and income, including through facilitating access to credit, concessional 
lending, tax abatement, fiscal stimulus and unemployment benefits; addressing working conditions 
to mitigate risks of exposure; maintaining and paying for existing orders, even if demand is down; 
providing working capital to suppliers and linking it to them supporting workers; promoting dialogue 
with suppliers before they exit contracts and buying relationships, with the aim of protecting workers 
from sudden collapse in demand.207 We explore these ideas further in Chapter 9.
Harnessing the garment value chain for sustainable development
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic – and of responses to it – in the garment and apparel industry 
have made very clear that States are, as we discussed in Chapter 2, the architects and enablers of GVCs. 
Company strategies respond to the incentives institutionalized in State trade policies, labour regulation 
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and financial policy. And workers’ vulnerabilities are also shaped by State policies and practice, even if 
social norms (relating to caste, gender, race, or other dimensions of group identity) have a life beyond the 
State (as we saw in the discussion of ‘systematic’ v. ‘systemic’ forced labour in Uzbekistan, in Chapter 5). 
GVCs emerge as stable systems out of the dynamic interaction of these three factors: vulnerable people, 
exploiter strategies, and the institutional environment. Or, as Hardy and Hauge put it in their study of 
Ethiopian textile and leather industry, “work practices and the distribution of gains between labour and 
capital are the outcome of the inter-dependent actions of workers, investors, and the State.”208
This points to a significant opportunity for States, especially in the context of the disruptions to business 
as usual created by the pandemic. States have chosen to take a hands-off approach to global garment 
and apparel value chains, favouring returns to capital over returns to labour. That is a choice; they could, 
equally, now choose to take a more interventionist path, guiding the global garment sector towards 
greater sustainability and resilience. Upgrading long-term resilience almost certainly means reducing 
short-term efficiencies – which may mean slower turn-arounds, less responsiveness to consumers, and 
possibly higher prices. But it may also lead to productivity gains, as more stable supplier relationships 
allow suppliers to save more, and to invest more in the well-being and training of their own workforce. 
Development actors, including global development actors such as the MDBs, have an enormous role to 
play here in mobilizing stakeholders around a shared vision for system transformation. This may involve 
creating incentives for improved supply chain transparency and information-sharing;209 modelling how 
adjustments to trade and investment regimes could be harnessed to foster greater supply chain resilience; 
and identifying and financing investments to promote resilience and sustainability upgrading. This is 
less about global development actors playing handmaidens to global capital in the hunt for de-risked 
returns (a theme to which we return in Chapter 9), and more about them working with States to chart 
a shared vision of how to transition the garment and apparel GVC to a more sustainable configuration. 
A simple first step may be working to develop a shared mapping of garment and apparel value chains. 
As the Accord and Alliance initiatives in Bangladesh have shown, greater transparency empowers all 
market actors, including buyers and workers, and also regulators. The Levitt Review off the boohoo 
supply chain likewise concludes that 
Boohoo has not felt any real sense of responsibility for the factory workers in Leicester 
and the reason is a very human one: it is because they are largely invisible to them. It is 
hard to empathise with the plight of those of whom they know little.210
There are some useful initiatives already afoot, for example C&A Foundation’s Open Apparel Registry211, 
and the Dutch Agreement on Sustainable Garments and Textiles, on which development actors could 
build. This could also extend to improving the transparency of labour-pricing, to help identify where 
buying practices are inconsistent with statutory requirements and living wage levels.212 Fair Wear 
Foundation has worked with knitwear suppliers in Bangladesh to develop a labour costing tool,213 and 
the same approach is now being rolled out in 10 other countries. For example HomeWorkers Worldwide 
recently carried out a study to trace the Tamil Nadu supply chain for Pentland Brands, a major footwear 
company, and to conduct a time and motion study to establish fair labour pricing.214
States will be key to developing a vision for sustainability upgrading of the garment and apparel value 
chain. Upgrading the sustainability of this GVC will require States to develop industrial policies, to help 
clusters move away from low-cost, low-productivity models, to a higher-investment, higher-return 
model. We explore such strategies further in Chapter 10. Here, it suffices to consider what this might 
look like in the context in which we started this Chapter: the precarious garment factories of Leicester 
and the East Midlands. 
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An industrial policy for Leicester and East Midlands would create incentives for both public and 
private actors to upgrade that cluster, both through refurbishment of plant (which could learn from the 
Bangladesh Accord) and through investment in the skillset of the workforce and suppliers in the cluster. 
This would require careful mapping of bottlenecks and brakes on productivity to identify investment 
opportunities. For example, there may be a shortage of machine skills holding small suppliers back 
from developing higher value-add offerings to buyers. There could be opportunities for government to 
finance training in return for buyers committing to longer-term supply relationships (to ensure there is 
demand for these skills, after government invests in them).215 Equally, there may be gains from innovation 
in business forms. Small-scale workers have long accessed economies of scale and pooled risk, without 
sacrificing their own agency, through cooperative production and marketing arrangements. There 
could be a case for encouraging Leicester’s small-scale garment workers to develop greater bargaining 
power vis-à-vis buyers, differentiating a positive brand, and facilitating production planning, through 
cooperative arrangements. Government may have a role to promote this through suitable financial or 
tax incentives, through access to concessional or development finance, or through ensuring security 
for participants with respect to application of corporate or competition law. Just as the ILO’s Siraye 
programme in Ethiopia seeks to make it a centre for sustainable garment manufacturing, so does a 
development strategy for Tirupur proposed by Andrew Crane, Genevieve LeBaron and others.216 
Investments in longer-term supply relationships and workforce skills upgrading are recurring features 
of these plans – for a reason: these investments serve to maximize economic agency of actors all along 
the value chain, not just lead firms. 
All of this requires ‘bringing the State back’ into the effectively autonomous domains of sweatshops 
and home manufactories – not only through policy and institutions, but also through inspections and 
enforcement. Here, too, States may need to get more creative, and move away from models developed 
during the era of larger factories, organized labour, and union protection. The boohoo scandal has 
led to an All-Party Parliamentary Group pushing for introduction of a statutory licensing scheme for 
garment factories in the UK – and boohoo itself has offered some support for the idea.But there may 
be other models worth contemplating, that may have greater flexibility for reaching the fragmented 
workforce of zero-hours contracts and casualized labour. For example, Australia has successfully 
extended labour protections usually limited to employees to textile, clothing and footwear industry 
outworkers (contractors) very the last decade,218 by imposing mandatory due diligence requirements on 
retailers, mandatory information-sharing requirements about outworks on suppliers,219 and creating an 
Ombudsperson empowered to engage pro-actively with outworkers. And the US Department of Labor has 
powers to object to the shipment of goods produced in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) 
minimum wage and overtime regulations.220 This legislation emerged in the 1930s from the long fight 
against sweatshops in the garment and apparel industry in the US that followed the Triangle Shirtwaist 
Company fire. Release of those goods is dependent on the lead firm and the manufacturer agreeing 
plans with the Department of Labor to ensure compliance. Evidence suggests that that the frequency 
of violations as well as the level of wage underpayments declines in the wake of such agreements.221 
This has proven a powerful tool for restitution of unpaid wages, with settlements in the hundreds of 
millions of US dollars: Walmart (USD 1.4 billion); FedEx (USD 502 million); Bank of America (USD 381 
million); Wells Fargo (USD 205 million); JP Morgan Chase (USD 160 million).222 FLSA is already used as 
a framework for calculating damages in forced labour and involuntary servitude cases brought under 
18 U.S.C. § 1595.223 There may be scope to apply this system to global garment GVCs – as is, or through 
creation of a transnational analogue through a multi-stakeholder initiative. These kinds of models could 
be adapted and applied on a regional or even a global-sectoral basis.
The State’s role here is a strategic one: not simply to react to the profit-maximizing preferences of 
buyers and investors in the global market, but to bend GVCs to the utility-maximizing needs of people, 
starting by protecting their most fundamental economic asset, their agency. A part of that role is simply 
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to develop a more positive strategic framing of the situation. The boohoo story narrative is currently a 
very negative one. That not only misses opportunities, it deters government engagement. Yet there is 
an alternative framing, representing the situation in Leicester as an opportunity for innovative public-
private collaboration, and for unleashing economic and social gains from investing in sustainable 
development. If the analysis in Chapter 2 – that modern slavery imposes numerous different drags on 
development – is accepted, then it follows that addressing modern slavery – developing freedom – will 
deliver sustainable development gains. That is as true in Leicester as it is in Dhaka, Tirupur or Hawassa.
Need for more systemic engagement
The inquiry in this chapter reveals an approach to modern slavery and forced labour risks in the garment 
and apparels sector that is much more fragmented and reactive than some of the more systemic 
approaches to sustainability in other sectors, such as the RSPO discussed in Chapter 4. The danger is 
what one person interviewed for this research described as “pilot-itis” – a pattern of donor investment 
in pilot initiatives and model factories, without resulting lessons or practices being absorbed by the 
development system or scaled up to the systemic level in garment value chains. 
Yet evidence from this sector point precisely to the need for a more systemic approach. An evaluation of 
one multi-donor initiative addressing the sumangali scheme found that while it did prevent participation 
in the scheme, and rehabilitated some who passed through it, it did not address systemic issues 
such as social norms, economic deprivation, recruiting practices or lack of alternative employment 
opportunities. It concluded that what was needed was a 
longer-term systematic [and] holistic approach… A forced labour prevention strategy 
must focus on addressing systemic issues at the individual, family, societal and 
workplace levels to eradicate exploitative conditions in the textile industry.224
Yet a 2018 DfID assessment found an absence of “research on the outcomes of structural interventions for 
[modern slavery] (such as criminal justice responses, implementation of legislative and policy changes), 
despite these interventions’ potential for having large impacts.”225 This is one reason why the rigorously-
evaluated results from the Freedom Fund’s approach (discussed above), which takes just such a systemic 
approach to tackling related forms of forced labour in Tamil Nadu, though operating at the community 
and State level, are so promising. There is clearly a need to consider how this approach can be adapted 
and replicated in other contexts. 
An inclusive approach in designing interventions and systems transformations is essential. An assessment 
of the impact of a multi-stakeholder initiative to tackle the sumangali scheme found it suffered from lack 
of involvement of affected stakeholders in project design, responding more to the interests of corporate 
participants than workers and the local NGOs that had driven response to the scheme on the ground.226 
More inclusive approaches seem more likely to succeed, in part because the very act of participation in 
programme design and implementation serves to empower participants, helping them exercise agency 
over their work and lives.227
A question for development actors is how to apply such insights at the transnational level. International 
trade unions may be an important part of the answer, helping give greater voice and agency to workers 
in sustainability efforts along GVCs.228 Some international unions have developed global framework 
agreements – non-binding agreements between trade unions and multinational companies on labour 
management and rights issues – with garment and apparel companies (e.g. Asos, DBApparel, Inditex, 
Mizuno, Recticel and Triumph).229 Global framework agreements can provide a global framework 
for dialogue and coordination, while leaving space within local contexts for worker organization and 
empowerment.230 While some GFAs do not apply to suppliers, others commit the multinational enterprise 
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to support a learning process to help suppliers meet the GFA standards. This should be understood as 
part of a firm’s exercise of its responsibility to respect human rights by building and using leverage in 
these relationships.231 Yet some of these arrangements have struggled with implementation.232 There may 
be a role for development actors to support such efforts and help them deliver results at scale.
Finally, one approach would be to use these Agreements to create a system of mutual accountability 
between global apparel brands and retailers, suppliers, unions, and government. This could be modelled 
on the arrangement pioneered in the US after the Triangle Shirtwaist Company factory fire in Greenwich 
Village, New York, in 1911, an American forerunner to the Rana Plaza tragedy. Unions were empowered 
to negotiate working conditions (including wages) with lead firms (rather than suppliers), while lead 
firms were required to disclose suppliers to unions (allowing them to ensure effective compliance).233 
This created a mutually reinforcing system of accountability which could be adapted to the garment 
and apparel GVC today. IndustriaALL’s ACT programme, which involves brands, retailers and trade 
unions working together to develop industry-level collective bargaining linked to purchasing practices, 
in multiple garment producing countries moves in this direction.234 And it is also a model that may 
be applicable in specific local contexts, such as Leicester, where greater supply chain transparency 
would empower not only workers and unions, but also customers and investors, to insist on responsible 
production practices.235
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CHAPTER 8: CONSTRUCTION AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE: WHEN DOES 
“CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT” WORK? 
There are perhaps 4.5 million people in forced labour in the construction industry worldwide, according 
to the ILO. That is 18 per cent of the global victim population, second only to domestic work.1 Modern 
slavery in the construction sector shares some characteristics with exploitation in the sectors studied 
in Chapters 3 to 7, including drawing on the same vulnerable populations. But the specific economic 
characteristics of construction and infrastructure investments also lead to some key differences. The 
central factor is that construction is not an export industry. The value generated by a new construction 
is captured, and usually consumed, in place. Capital is (quite literally) sunk in a specific place. The owner 
of a construction or of built infrastructure captures a rent from the fees paid for ownership or use of 
that asset – almost the textbook definition of ‘rent’. Because ownership and control of places is deeply 
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political, forcing people to build things in and on those places is also deeply political. This gives modern 
slavery connected to construction and infrastructure development a more obvious political aspect than 
the manifestations of modern slavery studied in previous chapters.
While the value added generated by new construction is consumed in place, some infrastructure 
development is designed to generates products that – like agricultural commodities, fish, or apparel – can 
be sold elsewhere, including into foreign markets: electricity from dams and wind-power installations, 
natural resources from mines and rigs and pipelines, or even broadcast rights for the events held in 
stadia and arenas. Yet both construction and infrastructure are, in key ways, rooted to a particular spot. 
And that over-riding characteristic helps shape the contribution that construction and infrastructure 
make to both development and modern slavery risks, and the opportunities for Developing Freedom in 
and through this sector, in several important ways. 
First, many constructed assets and infrastructure have limited rivalry – which is to say, one person’s use 
does not necessarily prevent another person’s subsequent use. They are not exactly infinite goods: there 
may be maintenance and operating costs. But once the capital has been sunk, they are often gifts that 
keep on giving. And for that reason, constructions – from residential homes to large public works – are 
frequently seen as major drivers of economy-wide, or even region-wide, development. They empower 
their users, enlarging their economic agency – by providing them shelter and health, increased 
connectivity and the benefits of networking and scaling, and access to power. Indeed, as we explore 
later in the chapter, infrastructure development is now a centrepiece of G20 sustainable development 
thinking. It is also the focus of Sustainable Development Goal 9. 
Second, while they are not rivalrous, construction and infrastructure are often excludable: there may be 
a limited number of users at a given time. The ability to control access is often the key source of the rents 
attached. This is why much infrastructure is developed on the Build Own Operate paradigm: investors 
are induced to sink the up-front capital needed to create the asset, in return for control of the rents that 
follow. Yet that ability to include or exclude people from accessing a construction or an infrastructure 
asset and the benefits it brings is an intensely political power. Over time, it can have significant impacts 
on development outcomes, and differential access to infrastructure can contribute to inequality, conflict 
and vulnerability to exploitation. As we saw in Chapter 2, reduced access to infrastructure seems closely 
tied to legacies of slavery and forced labour. For that reason, we can hypothesize that investing in inclusive 
infrastructure can help address the structural conditions that engender broad vulnerability to modern 
slavery, because upgrading infrastructure is critical to creating equitable access to productivity.2
Third, since the constructed capital asset is fixed to one spot, whoever controls that spot can capture the 
rents associated with the asset. This ties construction and infrastructure development into strategies 
for physical territorial control in a way that fundamentally differs from the apparel industry – which can 
and does relocate production to a new place when that environment will provide better returns – and, 
in some respects, from agriculture, to the extent that production can be moved. (So, more so for fishing; 
less so for palm oil which, as we saw in Chapter 4, also involves sinking capital and is thus also tied in to 
questions of territorial control.) For many contemporary industries, modern slavery risk arises out of 
the interaction of people’s vulnerability with largely non-tangible institutions and policies established 
and supported from far-off centres of power. For construction and infrastructure, exploiters or their 
agents need to be literally on the ground in question. So territorial control is essential. Where territorial 
control is contested – for example in conflict zones – this makes construction and infrastructure 
development intensely political enterprises. As we shall see in the discussion of Myanmar later in this 
chapter, exacting forced labour can become a part of a larger governmental strategy for asserting that 
control. 
213 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Fourth, since the capital asset is fixed to one spot, labour must be brought to that spot to develop it. 
That can be costly. So strategies have emerged in the industry to keep those costs down – ranging from 
forcing local workers to work, to forcing far-off workers to pay for the cost of moving to the worksite and 
the privilege of work – then using the result indebtedness to control them. 
Finally, because construction is not an export industry, or indeed a brand-based industry, the parameters 
for interventions to address sustainability risks turn out to be somewhat different than they are for the 
sectors studied in Chapters 3 to 7. Foreign consumers and trade boycotts have a more limited role. 
Instead, leverage seems to reside with investors, companies in the value chain, and, to some extent, 
foreign governmental and non-governmental partners of host governments needed to extract value – 
even if that is in domestic consumption.
In this chapter, we explore these dynamics in some detail, focusing in particular on the question of how 
efforts at ‘constructive engagement’ to address forced labour risks in construction and infrastructure 
development have played out. Our two case studies for this chapter, Qatar and Myanmar, both involve 
efforts by the international community to work together, and through the ILO, to dismantle construction 
and infrastructure-related, government-supported modern slavery systems. But those efforts have 
played out quite differently; we consider why. We also consider a number of transnational value chain 
initiatives that aim to change labour recruitment, management and procurement practices, to disrupt 
the transnational institutional environment in which forced labour in construction currently occurs, 
including the turn to infrastructure financing. We consider some challenges related to these approaches, 
and in the final section reflect on broader lessons learned about when ‘constructive engagement’ works. 
Global construction and the infrastructure of debt 
bondage
Construction and infrastructure are likely to be at the centre of global economic development in years 
ahead, making up perhaps 14.7 per cent of global GDP by 2030.3 Construction markets are expected to 
grow rapidly in countries at all income levels, especially in China, India and the US.4 The OECD has 
estimated global infrastructure needs at USD 6.3 trillion per year to 2030.5 
There is an enormous variety of suppliers in construction markets, especially at the lower end, where 
few skills are needed to secure work and there are few barriers to entry. Higher up the value chain, where 
more advanced engineering, architectural, design, logistics and project management skills are needed, 
there is greater concentration of supply. Most of the top global design and project management firms 
are based in Western Europe or the United States; they include a mix of privately-owned and publicly-
traded companies. Contracting firms that handle the physical construction are more geographically 
diverse, although most of the leading ‘prime contractor’ firms are based in Western Europe, the US, 
South Korea, or China.6 There has been some movement towards oligopolistic organization in recent 
years, as the largest builders have used buying power to organize value chains;7 but on the whole, 
because construction has to take place in place, we see less global market concentration here than in the 
sectors studied in earlier chapters. 
Figure 40 provides a schematic of a typical project value chain in a Design-Bid-Build construction or 
infrastructure project. In most markets, the bottom tier – of workers and micro- and small contractors 
– is highly fragmented. In the UK, for example 2013 figures suggest 99.9 per cent of the construction 
industry consisted of small and medium enterprises.8 This leads to intense competition and very low 
profit margins, with 2 per cent often representing a high end.9 Working capital can be scarce, and 
enterprises show a high degree of informality.10 Larger construction markets attract more competition, 
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and with large projects generally awarded on a least-cost basis, prices are under intense pressure. 
New entrants often run bids at cost or below, in order to break into big markets. This puts significant 
downward pressure on costs across the board.11 Since the prices of construction materials are relatively 
fixed by the market, much competition for market share revolves around labour cost. 
Outsourcing risk
The sector employs around seven per cent of the global workforce,12 and around five to ten per cent of 
the formal sector workforce in most countries.13 The Gulf construction sector alone employs around 10 
million people.14 In higher income countries, including those in the Gulf, there is a growing reliance on 
migrant labour, due to ageing populations and rising domestic salary expectations. With low barriers to 
entry, construction is a key source of ‘survival’ work, especially for poor rural workers, in times of stress. 
They are recruited to travel to cities and infrastructure projects in their own country, or beyond. The 
governance of those migration pathways is often weak and fragmented. So, too, can be the governance 
of the worksites to which labourers journey. Construction work is highly seasonal, prone to boom and 
busts, and projects are usually time-sensitive, requiring contractors to rapidly scale up their workforce, 
then scale back down again at the end of the project.15 All these factors create incentives for contractors 
and developers not to invest in workforce entitlements, skills development or professionalization. 
Instead, they frequently turn over workforce management to ‘manpower’ companies and third-party 
agencies. And these companies often rely on informal labour brokers and agents at the local end nodes 
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of their networks, who can tap into existing social networks and migration pathways to source labour 
when needed. 
Once workers arrive on the project site, they often encounter a complex array of contractors and sub-
contractors, labour brokers, project managers, and material suppliers, all involved in the project and 
value co-creation.16 Ambiguity on-site around who bears responsibility for different aspects of working 
conditions can help contractors and developers avoid accountability. The fragmentation of workforce 
management and the temporary nature of work also create barriers to effective worker organization and 
voice, with people working side-by-side having profoundly different wages, protections, benefits, and 
conditions of employment.17
The combination of vulnerable workers, complex and weakly governed supply chains, and downward 
pressure on labour costs leads quite frequently to labour exploitation. In 2015 an EU study identified 
construction as the industry second most prone to labour exploitation.18 In another study, one third 
of construction workers in the UK indicated that they had at some point worked for no pay.19 There 
have been numerous cases of UK construction operators holding workers in modern slavery.20 Modern 
slavery risks have been identified in the construction sector in Australia21 and New Zealand.22 One of the 
largest labour trafficking cases in US history concerned the forced labour of 500 skilled migrant workers 
from India by a marine construction company, Signal International.23 They were awarded USD 20 million 
after being found to be victims of deceptive recruitment, being paid below the statutory minimum and 
working in sub-standard conditions. The company went bankrupt as a result.24 And Latin America’s 
largest construction company, Odebrecht, was convicted of employing Brazilian workers in slave-
like conditions on a construction project in Angola.25 There are also accounts of similar exploitation in 
construction industries throughout Asia and Africa.
Recurrent exploitation is clearly a product of business practices – exploiter strategies, in the terminology 
of the Developing Freedom framework introduced in Chapter 2 – intersecting with a conducive 
institutional environment and people vulnerable to exploitation. This generates a modern slavery 
‘system’ embedded within the transnational management practices and business models of the global 
construction sector. As Chris Blythe, CEO of the Chartered Institute of Building, put it, the construction 
sector’s
business models are normalising hardship, both for individuals and companies. And, 
whilst these models do not always lead directly to modern slavery, they are creating an 
environment in which it is easier for exploitation to thrive and criminality to infiltrate 
supply chains undetected. 26
That business model is 
predicated on passing risk down the supply chain… the global trend towards 
outsourcing and cut price contracting makes it easy for main contractors to duck out 
of their responsibilities. The plight of the most vulnerable gets lost among the long and 
complex supply chains. It’s too convenient to blame the subcontractor or poor local 
legislation.27
One aspect of the industry’s practices that creates risks for workers is the custom of contractors not 
paying their own suppliers and workers, until they themselves are first paid. Each level in the supply 
chain outsources risk by waiting until they are paid to pay those at the next level down. Firms at each 
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level also customarily retain a portion of contract value until the project is completed, as a safeguard 
against non-performance or defects. This withholding of payment cumulates through the supply 
chain, constraining cashflow and reducing each level’s access to working capital.28 In the UK, a Building 
Engineering Services Association study found that around 60 per cent of the businesses surveyed had 
significant portions of turnover held in retention.29 This forces each level to minimize payroll and labour 
costs,30 and the downward pressures on wages and conditions are further exacerbated by the custom of 
late payment. Workers are paid last, putting them at most risk.31
Recruitment fees as a drag on development
As with several of the sectors studied in previous chapters, one of the sources of vulnerability that 
commonly factors into exploitation is the construction sector’s growing reliance on migrant workers to 
perform its dangerous, difficult and dirty work. According to the global union federation Building and 
Wood Workers’ International (BWI), the use of migrant workers has increased considerably in the last 
several decades and is expected to continue.32 And there is also a growing presence of refugees in some 
construction markets, notably Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon.33
Workers migrate in large numbers to construction jobs because they believe those jobs will make them 
better off. They believe construction work will increase their economic agency, by increasing their 
incomes and allowing them to remit money home – which they do, at high volume. But they are also 
motivated by a desire to maximize the social aspects of their economic agency: the desire to resist, 
escape and contest social hierarchy,34 and thereby to improve social mobility and marriage prospects.35 
In some cases, they migrate into jobs in the industry as a response to debt stress.36
Debt plays a key role in transforming migrant workers’ vulnerability into bondage. Many workers have 
to take on debt to finance their migration – both to pay for services such as visa applications, health 
checks, and travel costs, and, in many markets, to pay recruiters and brokers for a job. In countries 
of origin, these recruiters and manpower agencies are numerous and poorly regulated. In Nepal, for 
example, over 1,000 manpower agencies, all based in Kathmandu, were licensed to recruit in 2005. At the 
time, these agencies relied on some 25,000 to 30,000 informal brokers operating across the country.37 
Recruiters charge fees that are frequently several multiples of a month’s income. In the Gulf, workers 
from South Asia frequently pay recruitment fees of around 5 or 6 months’ wages.38 According to the 
World Bank, Pakistanis temporarily migrating to Saudi Arabia for work pay twelve months’ earnings.39 
These fees are highly regressive: the less skilled (and lower paying) a job is, the more likely it is to require 
payment of recruitment fees, and the more likely it is to be accompanied by adverse working conditions.40 
Developers and contractors will happily bear the costs of recruiting higher-skilled workers; but they 
use their bargaining power in the highly competitive low-skill jobs market to push those costs off onto 
recruits themselves. And in addition to being regressive, these costs are often non-transparent: many 
workers do not know upfront how much they will have to pay for foreign jobs, so they can be induced to 
pay more than they expected once they are abroad.41
These debts have been “sequentially and systematically” linked to subsequent labour exploitation.42 
Debt works in tandem with other forms of precarity to limit migrant workers’ choice and force them to 
tolerate conditions they otherwise would not.43 Loans usually come through informal channels – family 
and friends, or high-interest, informal moneylenders, in some cases from microfinance institutions. 
In some cases, recruitment agencies direct would-be migrants to specific microfinance institutions.44 
Informal lenders often charge high rates – 2 or 3 per cent per month. The high interest rates on these 
debts can lead to migrants’ and their families getting locked into cycles of indebtedness that propel 
chain migration, inter-generational indebtedness and poverty.45
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In some cases debts are repaid by the worker through wage deductions. These may seem reasonable, at 
the point they are incurred, the point of recruitment in a small village or urban centre in a country of 
origin. Only when the workers get to their job-site in the destination may the true burden of repayment 
become apparent, as they learn that work – and income – may not be steady, that there are physical 
and regulatory barriers to seeking work elsewhere, that they are often dependent on their employer 
for shelter, transport and food provided to them at inflated prices, with their debt steadily rising, and 
that conditions of work do not resemble those promised. Only when they get to the job-site does the 
deceptive nature of their recruitment and the truth of their predicament become apparent.
The scale of these fees is usually far beyond the ‘true’ cost of recruitment.46 Workers are paying to play; 
the job broker or recruitment agent is charging a rent deriving from the information asymmetry in the 
global construction industry job market. This is an additional and unnecessary cost in the industry, 
creating a drag on development, by redirecting these funds from more productive economic pursuits 
into debt repayment. But the system persists because the power of the rentiers and their allies outstrips 
the power of those harmed by these inefficiencies. The rents have both a direct value and an indirect 
value. The direct value is reflected in the emergence of secondary markets: in the Gulf countries, 
for example, there is an illegal market for work visas.47 The indirect value is the value construction 
contractors, developers and clients derive from funds that they would otherwise have to use to pay for 
recruitment, which can instead be deployed elsewhere on the project, or invested. The costs to workers, 
and to society at large, of this system simply do not show up in the books of developers and their clients. 
They are, in other words, an externality, imposed by the industry on society at large.
Put another way, these recruitment fees are a massive subsidy that poor construction workers and their 
communities make to the construction projects they work on. Workers from across South Asia are in that 
sense currently helping to pay for the erection of stadia in Qatar for the 2022 World Cup – a case we study 
further below. Why? In short, workers across these fragmented labour supply chains are simply too 
disorganized and powerless to address this deeply unequal system. It is not only recruiters themselves, 
and contractors and clients, who benefit from this scheme and would thus resist changes in the status 
of quo. It is also actors in countries of origin. The countries themselves would benefit from the workers’ 
wages being more productively deployed, rather than used to pay off debt. But there are frequently actors 
within countries of origin who benefit from the rentier system: the owners of recruitment agencies, and 
those they fund through corrupt kickbacks and financial contributions.48 Workers and other stakeholders 
who would gain from the prohibition of recruitment fees face cross-border organizational challenges 
to achieve that result. This points to a potential role for the development community in helping them 
overcome those challenges, to unlock resulting efficiencies and development benefits. We return to that 
opportunity at the end of the chapter. 
Kafala: what does it guarantee?
As we have seen in previous chapters, migrant workers are vulnerable to exploitation in part because 
they are removed from support networks and social capital. That isolation and vulnerability is further 
heightened by rules, practices and institutions that restrict their mobility in the country of destination, 
including physical isolation in special worker accommodation, confiscation of passports and 
identification documents, and employer control of workers’ labour mobility. One institution that serves 
to further constrain migrant workers’ economy agency is the ‘tied’ or ‘sponsored’ visa. 
The most notorious form of this institution is the ‘kafala’ system. This is a collection of laws, administrative 
regulations, norms and customary practices governing labour migration across the Middle East, in which 
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a migrant worker’s immigration and legal residency status is tied to an individual 
sponsor (kafeel) throughout the contract’s period, in such a way that a migrant worker 
cannot typically enter the country, resign from a job, transfer employment, nor – in 
some cases – leave the country without first obtaining explicit permission from the 
employer.49
Kafeel is Arabic for ‘guarantor’ – and carries a similar dual aspect as the concept does in English:50 
someone who both provides a safety net for a person in a time of hardship, but also guarantees that 
the migrant will not disrupt broader society. Kafala is an inherently hierarchical and paternalistic 
framework, not unrelated analytically to the condition of the criado encountered in Brazil, discussed in 
Chapter 3. It represents a fundamental restraint on economic agency, giving “local employers significant 
power over their workers, making it difficult for migrants to change jobs, lodge complaints, or even to 
return home without permission from their employers.”51 (Often, in Middle Eastern countries, ‘employer’ 
means the recruiter, who moves workers between different work-sites in response to shifting demand 
from different construction contractors.) With the backing of the State, the employer becomes a rent-
taker from control of the worker’s economic agency, specifically their exercise of outside options in the 
labour market. 
This arrangement also tends to curtail workers’ political agency. Construction workers may struggle 
to understand and exercise their labour rights because of language barriers, limited literacy, limits on 
time and space for organizing, or simply the sheer legal complexity of construction sites.52 Indebtedness, 
whether to a recruiter or an employer, curtails workers’ willingness to advocate for improved conditions, 
which makes worker organizations and unionization all the more important as a source of advocacy 
and representation for workers. In most countries that continue to operate kafala systems, however, 
workers’ – and especially migrant workers’ – unionization rights are greatly constrained. Yet in some 
countries that have operated their migrant labour markets as kafala systems, there are some signs of 
liberalization and enlargement of worker agency. Perhaps the most notable of these is Qatar. 
Qatar: Constructing a free labour market in a “21st 
Century slave State”?
Two in every five people of working age in Qatar work in construction.53 Most of them are migrant 
workers. As of December 2019, Qatar hosted migrant workers from India (737,050), Bangladesh (430,739), 
Nepal (352,911), the Philippines (240,721), Egypt (212,223), Pakistan (156,285), Sudan (68,547), Jordan (56,114) 
and the Syrian Arab Republic (54,630), amongst other countries of origin. In fact, migrant workers 
outnumbered Qatari citizens by roughly 6:1. Over 90 per cent of migrant workers are male.54
Qatar has been built using revenues from oil and especially natural gas. Public procurement has 
driven construction and infrastructure development, but there is a growing turn to public-private 
partnerships.55 For the last decade, preparations for the 2022 FIFA World Cup have been central to 
infrastructure development. This has involved construction not only of stadia but also hotels, roads, an 
airport, metro and railway system and a port. The World Cup has been billed by organizers as a driver 
of sustainable development.56 In 2014, Hassan al Thawadi, Secretary-General of the Supreme Committee 
for Delivery and Legacy, the local organizing body, called the event a “catalyst to accelerate positive 
initiatives” that will result in “meaningful progress” for worker welfare.57
Such claims have been met with some scepticism. Historically, numerous workers have been harmed 
during the construction of stadia and other infrastructure for mega sports events such as the Olympics 
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and the World Cup, with human rights and civil society researchers alleging everything from late payment 
of workers in Russia58 to labour rights violations in South Africa, Brazil and Beijing.59 Additionally, Qatar’s 
labour market has traditionally operated through a kafala system, with migrant workers tied to ‘sponsors’, 
prohibited from unionizing, and having extremely limited economic agency.60 Groups such as Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and the International Trade Union Confederation have documented 
labour exploitation, up to and including forced labour, arising across this system – including on World 
Cup construction sites – since at least 2013.61 An independent UN human rights report in 2014 found that 
“exploitation is frequent and migrants often work without pay and live in substandard conditions”.62 
The work was dangerous: Nepali Government figures suggest over 1,400 Nepalis died in Qatar between 
2009 and 2019.63 Several migrants would seek refuge in the embassy of their country of origin each day.64 
This may have been in part because migrant workers were not afforded the same protections as Qatari 
citizens. Another UN Special Rapporteur, writing in April 2020, described the interaction of public policy 
and private practice in Qatar as generating “a quasi-caste system based on national origin”.65 In 2014, 
Sharan Burrow, General Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation told one journalist 
that “Qatar is a 21st-century slave State”.66
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Yet on 30 August 2020, the Government abolished the ‘No Objection Certificates’ that migrant workers 
had been required to receive in order to change job, and established a non-discriminatory minimum 
wage, applicable across the entire economy. This was not the first major labour market reform, but 
rather the culmination of a series of steps over several years. Former critics heralded the move as the 
end of the kafala system, and the dawn of a free labour market. Sharan Burrow said: 
Qatar has regularised its industrial relations system and dismantled the systematic 
power imbalance between workers and employers. These changes are a break with 
the past and offer a future for migrant workers in Qatar underpinned by laws which 
respect workers, along with grievance and remedy systems.67
What generated such dramatic reform in Qatar, in under a decade? 
Disrupting the domain
Like other modern slavery systems, the unfree labour market for migrants in Qatar endured in part 
because those who benefited from it engaged in domain maintenance (a concept introduced in Chapter 
2). A key part of that work, to protect the autonomy of the system from international anti-slavery norms, 
involved keeping migrant workers voiceless and suppressing stories of abuse. 
In the construction industry, this was facilitated by a “culture of silence” embedded in the industry’s 
institutions and practice, with clients writing confidentiality agreements into both construction 
contractors’ and employees’ contracts.68 It was also aided by the kafala-based Sponsorship Law, which 
placed a positive duty on employers to report “absconding” – migrants leaving their jobs without their 
sponsors’ permission. As a UN Special Rapporteur writing in early 2020 explained, this chilled worker 
voice by instilling a fear that claims of abuse would be met by employer retaliation: contract termination 
of false accusations of “absconding” – an offence punishable by imprisonment. The result was a “climate 
of fear”.69
When FIFA awarded the World Cup to Qatar in December 2010, the strategic calculus faced by Qatar’s 
rulers changed. They were now literally inviting the world to come into their domain, and in the process 
opening the country to being judged against international norms and standards. The opportunity to 
disrupt business as usual in the Qatari construction industry was clear. And the downsides to continuing 
to try to suppress worker voices soon became apparent.
Journalists, human rights researchers and civil society actors mobilized to tell the stories of workers 
in Qatar’s construction industry. In September 2013, a report in The Guardian alleged abuses against 
Nepalis working on World Cup-linked construction sites.70 Subsequent reports in the same newspaper 
provided further details of allegedly abusive conditions.71 Building on such stories, and following a 
series of approaches to the Qatari Government, in 2013 the ITUC and the Building and Woodworkers 
International (BWI) made a representation against Qatar to the ILO under Article 24 of the ILO 
Constitution, alleging a failure to adhere to the requirements of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 
29) (ILO C29), which Qatar ratified in 1998. It focused on the sponsorship laws and migrant workers’ lack 
of access to remedy.72
The disruption caused by the World Cup spotlight had, however, created space for dialogue and iterative 
adaptation. In 2013, the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy published a Workers’ Charter which 
outlined principles related to the protection of workers’ health, well-being, safety and security. In 2014, 
the Supreme Committee launched Workers’ Welfare Standards, more stringent than Qatari law, and 
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required for contractors working on Supreme Committee projects, cascading down to subcontractors. 
They covered issues including ethical recruitment, timely payment of salaries, and a complete prohibition 
of forced labour. World Cup workers were also moved to new and improved accommodations, while the 
Supreme Committee also launched a programme to make payments to thousands of workers who had 
paid recruitment fees.73 
Over time, the Supreme Committee has also developed a multi-layered audit system, comprising 
internal audits, Ministry of Labour audits, expert audits by IMPACTT (a specialist labour management 
organization) and a joint-assessment process undertaken in conjunction with BWI. Continuation of 
contracts with the Supreme Committee depends on contractors’ satisfactory performance in this audit 
process against the Standards. Audits have identified non-compliance. In August 2018, for example, 
contractors working on one of the World Cup stadiums were found to have breached a summer working 
hours ban that prohibits outdoor work at times when dangerously high summer temperatures pose a 
very serious risk to workers’ health.74 In February 2018, an audit of 19 contractors working on World Cup 
sites showed that abuses such as contract substitution and excessive working hours remained present 
in a significant majority of the companies analysed.75 The Standards were updated in 2016, when the 
Supreme Committee announced the system of joint labour and accommodation inspections with BWI, 
which included a focus on strengthening worker voice. Yet while it strengthened protections, this Welfare 
Standards based system applied to only around four per cent of the country’s construction workers.76 
Unsurprisingly, despite these positive initiatives within the World Cup construction context, external 
pressure for broader reform of Qatar’s labour market continued to build. French NGO Sherpa filed suit 
against Vinci, a construction firm involved in Qatari construction, in 2015. The company counter-sued 
for defamation, but this led to closer judicial scrutiny, culminating in a criminal investigation being 
opened in November 2019.77 Still in 2015, BWI filed a complaint with the Swiss OECD National Contact 
Point, a dispute mechanism relating to misconduct by multinational enterprises, over alleged abuses of 
worker rights in construction of Qatar’s World Cup stadia. In 2016, FIFA was a named defendant in a suit 
brought (unsuccessfully) in Zürich by Dutch trade union FNV on behalf of Bangladeshi workers.78 The 
same year, Amnesty International issued a new report suggesting World Cup contractors were tied to 
labour abuse,79 with one worker at the Khalifa Stadium likening life in Qatar to a “prison”.80 This recalled 
a reported comment of the Nepali ambassador to Qatar in 2013, that compared Qatar to an “open jail”. 
(She was quickly recalled to Kathmandu, and her replacement stated that Nepali migrant workers were 
“safe and fully respected” in Qatar.81) And until 2019, there were ongoing reports82 relating to worker 
safety,83 recruitment fees and deceptive recruitment practices,84 restricted mobility,85 and late and non-
payment of wages.86
Workers’ organizations also continued to press for reform through the ILO supervisory system. In June 
2014, workers’ delegates to the International Labour Conference raised a complaint against Qatar for 
alleged failure to take the necessary action to remedy various labour violations, including under ILO 
C29. The delegates also called for the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, a rarely used quasi-
judicial investigation procedure in the ILO’s supervisory toolkit.87 The ILO Governing Body requested 
that Qatar receive a high-level tripartite (government, workers, employers) visit to examine progress 
on labour reforms. During the visit, which took place in March 2016, the ILO delegation met with the 
Qatari Prime Minister, the Minister of Administrative Development and Labour and Social Affairs, 
visited construction sites, including the Khalifa Stadium, and visited worker accommodations. The 
resulting report of the high-level tripartite visit welcomed the reforms made to date, but noted ongoing 
challenges for enforcement, especially “for workers in small companies operating at the subcontractual 
level, as well as for workers whose primary employers are manpower companies who represent a very 
vulnerable category of workers.” The ILO Governing Body urged the Qatari Government to follow-up on 
the visit’s report and assessment, and deferred its decision to establish a Commission of Inquiry, leaving 
a sword hanging over Qatar’s head.88 It returned to the issue several times through the course of 2016 
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and 2017, but ultimately closed the complaint against Qatar in late 2017, upon the agreement of a three-
year, in-country technical cooperation program.89
Changing the calculus: FIFA and the Gulf blockade 
At this point, Qatar’s situation in some ways resembled, and in some ways differed from, that of the 
Uzbek Government, discussed in Chapter 5. Like the Uzbek Government, the Government of Qatar had 
agreed to a programme of in-country technical assistance from the ILO, after a period of extended 
pressure. Yet there were also fundamental differences. The Uzbek course correction came after the 
death of a President, at a moment of broader political liberalization likened to a perestroika. There was no 
such shift in the regime in Qatar, at least not ostensibly. So what did change to alter the strategic calculus 
of Qatar’s rulers sufficiently for them to put their labour market model in play? Arguably, two things: 1) 
the growing risks to prestige and revenues if the World Cup was to be negatively affected, for example 
through boycotts; 2) a subsequent, major shift in Qatar’s geostrategic environment, which opened a path 
to realignment of domestic governance.
The awarding of the 2022 World Cup in 2010 not to the USA, but to Qatar – with less than half a million 
citizens and, in 2010, limited visibility in the global game – came as something of a surprise. By 2020, 
US prosecutors had alleged that the vote was tainted with bribery,90 allegations Qatar denies. Already by 
2015, however, related allegations had led to a senior FIFA official raising the possibility that the award 
could be cancelled, and Qatar could lose the World Cup.91 While Qatar pushed back against the idea, 
ongoing allegations of labour abuse around World Cup construction did not assist its case or make it 
easier to enlist support. 
FIFA itself also faced growing reputational costs associated with both the bribery scandal and the 
labour abuse allegations, as well as other questions around its impact on human rights. In response, 
in 2015 the organization commissioned Harvard political scientist, John Ruggie, the architect of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, to make detailed recommendations on how it could 
strengthen its respect for human rights.92 Subsequently, in 2016 FIFA established a monitoring system 
for working conditions at World Cup stadium construction sites that was first implemented in 2016 for 
the Russia 2018 World Cup.93 In 2017 FIFA adopted a human rights policy aligned with the UNGPs,94 and 
created an independent, unpaid Human Rights Advisory Board to help it act in accordance with the policy. 
This included representatives from trade unions, including the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, BWI, as well as major brand sponsors (with leverage to back up the positions of 
the Advisory Board). (Disclosure: the author’s spouse has chaired this board since its inception.) The 
Advisory Board has engaged in sustained dialogue with FIFA for several years on progress on workers’ 
rights in Qatar, including visiting Qatar, engaging with senior officials from the Supreme Committee, 
and making detailed recommendations on ways to strengthen protections of labour and other human 
rights.95 
In April 2016 Ruggie and FIFA President Gianni Infantino spoke in Doha, with Infantino linking the 
establishment of the Human Rights Advisory Board to the need for better protections for workers in 
Qatar, and Ruggie warning that “when the tournament comes around, the whole world will be watching 
‘not only the games on the pitches but what it took to get there’.”96 His remarks point to the significant 
departure FIFA’s presence in Qatar created. The revenues Qatar stood to make from the World Cup 
turned on the ability to broadcast images from Qatar to the world. This fundamentally disrupted the 
calculus around keeping abused workers away from international gaze, making it both harder to achieve 
that outcome, and the costs of failure higher. FIFA’s turn to human rights amplified both factors. This 
meant that even if labour market reforms would be costly, they might be less costly for Qatar than not 
reforming. And FIFA’s involvement, and increasing activity on human rights issues, worked to provide 
political cover for a reform effort, should Qatar choose to move in that direction. 
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Yet it still had one strong incentive not to: resistance from its peers in the Gulf, especially other countries 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council that have traditionally relied on the kafala system. Those States, many 
of them emirates and monarchies with highly stratified social structures, have been reluctant to see one 
of their numbers break ranks and institute wholesale labour market reforms, lest this increase pressure 
for them to follow suit.97 That logic changed almost overnight in June 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic and trade ties with Doha, and imposed a sea, land and air blockade. 
The claimed basis was Qatari support for terrorism and the influence of Iran. Qatar rejected the claims, 
and took the UAE to the International Court of Justice.98 The dispute remains essentially unresolved, 
and has spilled in unexpected directions, including to questions of access to postal services, football 
broadcast rights and ownership of leading football teams in European professional leagues.99
Another result has however been that Qatar now has fewer incentives to restrain its own impulses towards 
reform. It has subsequently emerged as a leading voice on a number of international themes, from 
counter-terrorism to international accountability to implementation of the Sustainable Development 
Goals. It ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR.100 And the blockade arguably gave it the space it needed to agree 
to an ILO presence. It does not seem purely coincidental that after several years of effort by the ILO to 
place an office in the country, agreement was forthcoming in the last quarter of 2017, just a few months 
after the blockade was announced. Suddenly, Qatar was free to adopt the labour market reform agenda 
as its own.101 
Towards a free labour market
An ILO office was quickly established to work with the authorities on reforms in five main areas: 
the sponsorship or kafala system; access to justice; worker voice, health and safety; and pay and 
recruitment.102 
In 2015, the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs had launched a Wage 
Protection System to electronically monitor payments and ensure workers across the economy receive 
their wages in full and on time.103 The Wage Protection System (WPS) provides for “blacklisting” companies 
who fail to pay workers, which means that companies cannot recruit new employees or carry out certain 
other bureaucratic procedures. For the WPS, the new ILO Qatar office recommended improvements 
such as closer coordination between public entities to ensure penalties are enforced on non-compliant 
companies; expansion of WPS coverage to include smaller enterprises; and implementation of a more 
robust data collection system.104 (It bears noting that Human Rights Watch remains critical of the WPS, 
describing it as a “misnomer for a software that, in reality, does little to protect wages, and can be better 
described as a wage monitoring system with significant gaps in its oversight capacity.”105)
The Government has also taken steps to strengthen worker voice. In August 2017, Qatar passed a law 
that established the Labour Dispute Resolution Committees, a judge-led “fast track” labour dispute 
mechanism aiming at improving access to justice by settling labour disputes within three weeks of 
a worker filing a complaint. The mechanism became operational in March 2018 and has somewhat 
improved the speed with which workers’ labour complaints are considered, but is allegedly still slower 
than legally required, with some workers giving up and returning home unpaid. To help address this, 
in November 2018 the Qatari authorities announced the establishment of the Workers’ Support and 
Insurance Fund, which will pay workers immediately after a decision by the Labour Dispute Committee, 
leaving the Government to recoup the money from the company instead.106 This system is similar to the 
international surety scheme used to provide income protection to abandoned seafarers,107 and builds on 
a 2006 wage regulation in China. It points to a key role for the State in helping to disrupt the negative 
socio-economic impact of the late payment practices in the construction sector – a point to which we 
return at the end of this chapter. Unfortunately, however, the system is not yet fully operational, some 
two years after its establishment. However, a third, less well-known step by the Government of Qatar has 
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proved important: agreement to allow global trade unions – ITUC, BWI and ITF – to embed community 
liaison officers in the ILO office in Qatar.108 This has had a positive impact on worker voice and worker 
agency, giving workers access to the expertise and guidance of global trade unions, with positive results.
Perhaps the critical step in constructing a free labour market, which external actors have been calling 
for almost a decade, was the need to dismantle restrictions on migrant workers’ labour market mobility. 
That step, as we saw at the beginning of this section, took place with the termination of the ‘No Objection 
Certificate’ system and the adoption of a non-discriminatory wage, on 30 August 2020.109 The end of 
the NOC system, coupled with the removal of exit permit requirements earlier in the year, effectively 
dismantles the kafala sponsorship system in Qatar. The new minimum wage will apply to all workers, of 
all nationalities and in all sectors, including domestic workers. In addition to the basic minimum wage, 
employers must now also ensure that workers have decent accommodation and food. The legislation 
also stipulates that employers pay allowances of at least QAR 300 and QAR 500 to cover costs of food and 
housing respectively, if they do not provide workers with these directly – a move that will help ensure 
decent living standards for workers. 
Yet there is still unfinished business in building a truly free labour market in Qatar – and as in 
Uzbekistan, this is in particular around workers’ political agency, their rights to associate and organized 
and advocate for themselves and others. As we have seen, migrant workers remain excluded from 
unions and prohibited from unionization. When the Government ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR in June 
2018, it entered important reservations that made clear it did not intend to change this situation, but 
rather would interpret Article 8 ICESCR references to “trade unions” as being in line with its own law.110 
The Government instead committed, as part of its agreement with the ILO, to work on the formation 
of worker committees and representative joint committees to provide migrant workers with a greater 
voice. Such committees have in fact been established in the context of World Cup construction, with 
support from BWI, and the experience has proven positive. Yet the FIFA Human Rights Advisory Board 
has noted a need to transfer learning from that context to the broader Qatari labour market.111
Myanmar: forced labour, military power and 
market governance
In March 2018, the Government of Myanmar organized the Myanmar Infrastructure Summit to showcase 
its infrastructural needs to investors.112 Infrastructure development is a key component of Myanmar’s 
Vision 2030, the country’s plan for sustainable development.113 Indeed, one independent assessment by 
The Economist identified it as “the most important requirement for a positive economic trajectory”:
Modern infrastructure—whether power, water or transport—remains scarce across 
Myanmar, and will be a bottleneck to faster economic growth in the coming years. 
Without massive investment from the government, development finance institutions 
(DFIs) and the private sector, the growing infrastructure gap will put the brakes on 
Myanmar’s economy.114
Myanmar thus seems poised to offer the global development community a singular opportunity to 
harness construction and infrastructure for sustainable development. But the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights at the time of the Myanmar Infrastructure Summit, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, sounded a 
warning:
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Well-conceived infrastructure projects are vital for development, connecting 
producers to markets and people to sources of education, healthcare and jobs. Only 
20% of Myanmar’s roads are paved, and only 35% of the population is connected to the 
electricity grid: the need is clear. But the shocking violations of human rights which 
have driven hundreds of thousands of people to flee the country should heighten the 
vigilance of any investor. 115
The High Commissioner’s warning came in the wake of growing evidence of massive violations of the 
human rights of the Rohingya of Myanmar’s Rakhine state, by the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw. 
The Rohingya, like other minority ethnic groups living in Myanmar’s periphery, have long suffered 
systematic forced labour imposed by the Tatmadaw, often in connection with military construction and 
infrastructure development. To understand how this historic pattern of military-imposed forced labour 
could pose risks for today’s foreign investors, and what that means for the development community, we 
first have to understand how the role of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s governance has shifted over time, 
how that has generated changes in the function and operation of forced labour in Myanmar – and the 
international community’s attempts to address forced labour. 
Forced labour, military rule and State-building 
Forced labour for infrastructure development has long been tied up in the Burmese State-building 
project, including the use of force and coercion to impose Burman ethnic dominance over other ethnic 
groups in Myanmar. Imposed on civilian populations accused of lending support to armed insurgencies, 
forced labour has been a tool in the military’s campaigns of pacification, designed to establish territorial 
control in Burma’s post-colonial periphery, and to subjugate ethnic minorities.It was, from the 
outset, employed not only for commercial purposes (labour cost reduction), but also for political ones 
(domination). It both asserted the control of those imposing it and literally helped them make in-roads 
into areas where the State’s writ was contested. In Myanmar, forced labour is not simply a business 
strategy, but also a governmental one.
The 1947 Panglong Agreement between the interim Government (preparing for British colonial exit), 
led by General Aung San, and the Shan, Kachin and Chin peoples, had promised autonomous rule for 
ethnic groups, within the Union of Burma. But armed conflicts broke out soon after independence in 
1948 – and in some cases are still running today, making Myanmar the site of the longest-running civil 
war in the world. One of these early conflicts, to which we shall return, started as a rebellion by a Muslim 
minority in Rakhine state – a minority that had generally cooperated with the British during World War 
Two, while the Buddhist majority in the province had tended to side with the Japanese. In this part of 
Myanmar, at least, military intervention, which brought with it forced labour, was thus part of a race- 
and religion-inflected State-building project. 
The civil war enlarged the military’s access to resources and ambitions. In 1962 General Ne Win took 
power in a coup, establishing Burma as a one-party dictatorship soon after, with an increasingly 
introverted governing philosophy. In 1968 the military launched the Pya Ley Pya or ‘Four Cuts’ strategy, 
adapted from British counter-insurgency doctrine developed during the Malaya insurgency, 1948-
1960, and thus a doctrinal cousin of the ‘strategic hamlets’ doctrine the US deployed in Viet Nam. It 
was designed to cut insurgents off from four resources: funding, food, intelligence and recruits. The 
strategy divided the country into black (insurgent controlled), white (government controlled) and brown 
(shared or contested control) zones. Black zones were essentially free fire zones, in which government 
military forces terrorized civilian populations. British counter-insurgency doctrine had emphasized 
building local consent; in the Four Cuts version, coercion, not consent, was the dominant mode of 
engagement with civilian populations.117 Forced relocations, sexual violence, and forced labour, including 
conscription, forced construction and porterage, were ubiquitous.118 
226 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
Two colonial era laws – the Towns Act 1907 and the Villages Act 1908 – facilitated this. They empowered 
the Government to call up civilians for mandatory, unpaid porterage duties under the supervision of the 
military and police. From early on, however, the Four Cuts strategy, and these two acts, were used for 
infrastructure development. For example, in the late 1960s the Government used forced labour to clear 
the site for the construction of the Lawpita dam.119 This was intended for domestic use, and to extend 
the State-run political economy into ethnic armed groups’ territory. With Burma largely inward-looking 
under Ne Win, it was not until the 1990s that infrastructure development became oriented towards 
export and internationalized value chains. 
Demonstrations against Ne Win grew through the 1970s and 1980s, peaking in 1988. Ne Win resigned in 
July, but the military suppressed the protests and seized power in a coup in September 1988, instituting 
martial law and installing the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as a junta. In 1990 
SLORC allowed multiparty elections to proceed, but when the opposition won overwhelmingly, the 
military nullified the results and resumed repressive rule. Western governments and aid institutions cut 
off formal ties, but some private actors continued to trade with the country.120 
SLORC – reorganized in 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – adopted a strategy 
of self-reliance, initiating a domestic infrastructure-development programme both to create jobs and to 
continue the project of extending State – now meaning Tatmadaw – control over the country’s territory. 
This included the development of roads, dams, irrigation canals and railroads, and often relied on the 
forced labour of hundreds of thousands of people.121 It was a form of corvée labour, with each household 
expected to contribute a (usually male) family member to ‘volunteer’ their labour. They often had to 
travel to and remain for months in areas far from their homes. Labourers also provided their own 
subsistence and constructions tools. By the mid 1990s, one ILO expert on the country estimates, “forced 
labour on infrastructure projects had a market value of perhaps 7 per cent of GDP, or about one-quarter 
of the Government’s total annual expenditure.”122
Just as the Uzbek Government worked through local authority figures to undertake forced labour 
mobilization to pick cotton (see Chapter 5), so Myanmar’s Tatmadaw relied on village heads and policemen 
for labour recruitment. Prisoners were also forced to work on construction projects, in conditions that 
were often worse than those endured by ‘free’ labourers. In some cases, ‘volunteers’ were recruited to 
act as human minesweepers to clear the way for safe passage of military convoys. Again similar to the 
Uzbek system, the Tatmadaw imposed quotas and timetables on those at the top of the command chain, 
who then delegated quotas down, with those at the bottom suffering coercion and abuse to meet these 
demands.123 However, demands were imposed in an uncoordinated way, with the result that the same 
village could be subjected to numerous forced labour demands from both village headmen and directly 
by the military. Formal legal authority under the Towns Act and the Village Act was supplemented by 
extra-judicial use of force, intimidation, torture, and sexual violence. As in Uzbekistan, impunity led 
to extortion with people who wanted to escape forced labour demands paying a ‘porter’ fee or a “self-
reliance development” fee to get out of it.124
The normalization of forced labour by the military created a heavy drag on development. It took farmers 
from their land and children from their lessons. It was regressive and helped to entrench inequality, 
since the poorer, landless labourers were least likely to be able to buy their way out of the burden. The 
burden was often so heavy that it led to flight from the country, especially for those non-Burmese 
minorities that were most targeted, including the Rohingya, Karen and others in areas of ongoing armed 
conflict.125 The system also had a negative impact on the country’s human capital, since it frequently led 
to sickness, injury and death, with appalling living and working conditions.Yet it served to reinforce the 
power of the military, and keep restive minority populations subjugated. To the exploiters, despite the 
reputational risks involved, it must have seemed like a worthwhile strategy.
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Forced labour rents as a peace dividend: bringing international 
capital in
With the demise of Ne Win in 1988, China withdrew long-standing military and financial support to the 
Communist Party of Burma and the 20,000 strong separatist Wa Army. This set off a series of events 
leading to a weakening of several of the armed insurgencies with which the Tatmadaw was still wrestling. 
Operating from a position of relative strength, SLORC soon shifted from a counter-insurgency strategy 
to a negotiating strategy. This rested on a simple proposition: reduced violence would generate a 
peace dividend, as the Tatmadaw worked with their former foes to connect to international trade and 
capital circuits, and extract rents from the resources ethnic groups controlled. The resulting ceasefire 
agreements created “ceasefire zones” in which national military and State officials both share power 
and compete with non-State authorities, such as ceasefire political organizations, insurgent groups and 
paramilitaries. Deals soon emerged allowing for the economic development in these zones of resources 
both licit – timber, jade – and illicit – opium poppy and, more recently, methamphetamine. Both ethnic 
leaders and the Tatmadaw benefited handsomely – but there was little effort to invest the rents captured 
back into infrastructure development, social services, or public sector capacity-building. Significant 
sums instead moved off-shore. 
Moving Myanmar’s political economy from isolation onto a more outward-facing development trajectory 
involved working with foreign partners to develop and capture value from the country’s resources.126 In 
many cases, this involved informal cooperation with Chinese entities. In other cases, for example in the 
development of Myanmar’s timber resources, South East Asian actors played a key role. In some areas, 
such as road development, there was limited support from international aid organizations.127 And in the 
area of oil and gas, Myanmar turned to the West. 
The most notorious such project was the Yadana gas pipeline, a joint venture between the Government 
of Myanmar, France’s Total, the United States’ Unocal (now Chevron), and the Thai State-owned energy 
company, PTT.128 This aimed to develop a large natural gas field that had been discovered in the Andaman 
Sea, delivering gas to Thailand, offering revenue of around USD 400 million each year to Myanmar. The 
pipeline was designed to run through a conflict zone, so the project partners agreed that the Tatmadaw 
would “provide security protection”. Human rights organizations soon documented that this included 
use of forced labour to fell and clear trees, and to build barracks and helipads, roads, buildings, and other 
pipeline infrastructure. Confronted with the allegations, Unocal hired a consultant, who confirmed them. 
Yet Unocal and Total argued that the project was a basis for constructive engagement by the West with 
SLORC, creating livelihoods and growth, and “offering a compelling example, every day” to the people 
of Myanmar “of respect for individuals and their rights”.129 Yet as armed resistance to the infrastructure 
development increased, Total looked to the Government to “pacify” the area,130 and told Infrastructure 
Magazine that it could not be expected to guarantee that the military was not using forced labour.131 Both 
Western companies excused the use of forced labour. Total’s spokesman argued that it was a necessity: 
“if there is forced labor in Burma, it is not out of spite or malice that the leaders are obliged to call upon 
it”.132 Unocal’s President put the blame at the feet of insurgents, who had brought forced labour upon 
themselves: “If you threaten the pipeline, there’s gonna be more military. If forced labor goes hand in 
glove with the military, yes, there will be more forced labor. For every threat to the pipeline there will be 
a reaction.”133 (After almost a decade of litigation, in 2004 and 2005, Karen plaintiffs who had alleged that 
they or their family members had been subjected to relocation, forced labour, torture, murder, and rape 
on the Yadana pipeline project reached multi-million dollar settlements with both Unocal and Total.134)
The strategy of partnership with foreign capital that the Tatmadaw embarked on in the 1990s allowed 
the Myanmar military and State to extend their influence deep into contested political spaces, using 
transnational capital flows to help convert de jure sovereignty into de facto control.135 As the scholar 
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Kevin Woods has explained, in this approach, the “Burmese regime allocate[d] land concessions in 
ceasefire zones as an explicit post war military strategy to govern land and populations to produce 
regulated, legible, militarized territory.”136 Woods describes this as “military territorialization”: regional 
military commanders and relevant State agencies working in tandem to allocate resource concessions 
to [investors]. Burmese State and military officials directed capital flows into resource-rich, formally-
ethnically controlled territory, “as an act of creating effective national State and military authority, 
sovereignty and territory in practice.”137
Just as forced labour in Uzbekistan shifted from a command economy modality to a more market-based 
modality after land reforms in that country, so in Myanmar, the turn to foreign markets increasingly 
inscribed forced labour in a market economy context. As with construction and infrastructure 
development in more liberal markets, there was now a commercial imperative in Myanmar to keep 
labour costs in infrastructure projects as low as possible, so as to maximize rents and profit. Forced 
labour was a useful tool for that purpose, and was now embedded in this larger market logic.138 But it 
simultaneously continued to serve a political purpose: subjugation of both land and people, through 
primitive accumulation and military territorialization. As we see further below, that aspect of the use of 
forced labour became important in contexts where territorial control once again became contested, such 
as the crisis in Rakhine state that started around 2012. By that point, however, Myanmar had undergone 
significant internal political shifts, and come under significant pressure from the international 
community to address its forced labour problem. It is to that pressure that we now turn.
ILO supervision and engagement
ILO supervisory bodies have been demanding Myanmar address forced labour since 1964.139 As reports 
of forced labour grew in the mid-1990s, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
submitted a report to the ILO’s Committee of Experts alleging the widespread use of forced labour in 
military porterage. This was followed by a 1996 complaint by 25 worker delegates to the International 
Labour Conference, calling for a Commission of Inquiry.140 The complaint led to a detailed report outlining 
the Myanmar military’s extensive use of forced labour for porterage, infrastructure development and 
construction, including to develop the country’s oil and natural gas reserves and tourist infrastructure.141 
By 1997 the ILC had appointed a Commission of Inquiry, a quasi-judicial, ad hoc investigative body, made 
up in this case of a former Chief Justice of India and Member of the UN Human Rights Committee, a 
former Chief Justice of Barbados and Member of the Privy Council, and a former Judge of the Industrial 
Court in South Australia. 
The Commission of Inquiry received over 10,000 pages of written evidence and heard the oral testimony 
of around 250 people, including children, while visiting the region.142 The Government of Myanmar 
largely sat out the hearings and refused to cooperate with a proposed visit by the Commission to the 
country. The Commission found “a saga of untold misery and suffering, oppression and exploitation 
of large sections of the population inhabiting Myanmar by the Government, military and other public 
officers.” There were large numbers of people victimized: approximately 800,000 people forced to work 
on the construction of the Aung Ban Loikaw Railway connecting Shan and Kayah states; 922,000 people 
built a railway from Pakokku to Monywa; and over 44,000 people contributed labour on a single day on 
the Ye to Tavoy railway, known as “Death Railway”.143 Forced labour was also exacted for construction 
and maintenance work on military infrastructure, including building camps on land confiscated from 
local villagers without compensation.144 In other cases, workers were forced to cultivate crops, fire 
bricks or undertake logging, with the produce being used by the military themselves, or sold to raise 
funds to pay others for forced labour.145 The Commission concluded that there was widespread and 
systematic use of forced labour across all divisions and states of Myanmar, but particularly pervasive in 
outlying states where there was a strong military presence, including in construction and infrastructure 
development.146 In particular, non-Burman ethnic groups such as the Muslim population in Rakhine 
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state and other parts of the country bore the brunt of the practice. It held that this was a violation of a 
peremptory norm against forced labour in international law and could give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility for a crime against humanity.147 
The report also provided a series of recommendations for the Government to begin enacting needed 
reforms. The ILO offered its technical support to assist with implementation.148 Unlike in Uzbekistan 
or Qatar, however, the Government of Myanmar was unwilling to cooperate, at least at first. Indeed, 
speaking at the annual meeting of ASEAN Labour Ministers in May 1999, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt 
asserted the autonomy, sovereignty and unique, Buddhist-influenced culture and normative context of 
Myanmar as a justification for the situation. He explained that the perception of forced labour was 
largely due to misconception and misunderstanding of the situation and the mentality 
of our people. Since a sound infrastructure is essential for economic development, our 
Government has placed special emphasis on this sector. Hence, a sustained effort to 
improve the infrastructure of our economy by building roads, bridges, rail network, 
dams and reservoirs has been undertaken. Realising the benefits to the communities 
from these projects, people have voluntarily contributed labour so that they can be 
completed sooner. Moreover, in Myanmar thinking, the contribution of labour not only 
brings immediate material benefit in the present life, but also merit for future cycles. 
Without understanding these factors, some people have made all sorts of allegations… 
the allegations of forced labour are groundless.149
With reports of forced labour continuing, the report of the Commission on Inquiry in 1998 led to two 
firsts in the ILO’s supervisory, tripartite (governments, workers, employers) process. First, lacking 
any constitutional mechanism to expel or suspend Myanmar, in 1999 the ILC adopted an emergency 
resolution calling on the SPDC to end the practice of forced labour, “nothing but a contemporary form 
of slavery”, and limiting Myanmar’s role in the ILO to technical cooperation to implement ILO C29 until 
forced labour was ended.150 The Government responded by playing the sovereignty card, describing 
the resolution as an “unfair and biased” interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs backed by “western 
nations”.151 
The second unprecedented action came a year later, with the first ever application of Article 33 of the 
ILO Constitution, authorizing special measures to ensure that the recommendations of the Commission 
of Inquiry were carried out, including an annual special sitting of the ILC on Myanmar on Convention 
No. 29, and giving a green light to Member States to take their own steps to encourage compliance.152 This 
resolution was not adopted lightly, as former ILO official Richard Horsey explains: Article 33 was vague, 
and since it had never been invoked before, the effectiveness of any penalty imposed was both uncertain 
– and would inevitably shape how other regimes responded to pressure from the ILO’s supervisory 
system in future.153 States ultimately proved unwilling to move the issue from the ILO onto the broader 
political track of the UN Economic and Social Council in New York, as the Resolution contemplated,154 
and the restriction of participation in the ILO system did not carry any financial or trade consequences 
for the SPDC. But for more than a decade, different ILO supervisory bodies held regular discussions.155 
Slowly, this attention and pressure began to generate engagement from Yangon. In 2002 the SPDC 
agreed to ILO placing a Liaison Officer in Myanmar to assist with the elimination of forced labour.156 
Yet by 2006, there seemed to be only negligible progress, with the Government even threatening publicly 
to prosecute anyone who reported forced labour to the ILO.157 ILO personnel received anonymous death 
threats. Pressure built for a more forceful response. After a request from delegates, the ILO advised on 
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the possibility of referring Myanmar to the International Court of Justice, and the potential for individual 
criminal responsibility for those behind the system of forced labour.158 The ILO Governing Body set a 
date in March 2007 for discussing such steps.159 At the same time, some States initiated discussion in 
the UN General Assembly,160 sending a signal to the SPDC that the issue was no longer seen in narrowly 
technical terms, but was instead beginning to have broader political implications. Finally, Myanmar 
reacted, agreeing in February 2007 to the creation of an independent domestic forced labour Complaints 
Mechanism to be established in cooperation with the support of the ILO.161 
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From command economy towards a market economy 
As Western powers moved to isolate Myanmar in the 1990s, the Tatmadaw turned increasingly towards 
Beijing. Beijing sold arms to Yangon at “friendship” prices, trained military officers, and protected 
Myanmar in the United Nations Security Council.162 Chinese State-owned enterprises received 
concessions in mining, timber and energy, and by 2010 held around 40 per cent of Myanmar’s foreign 
debt.163 China was Myanmar’s second-largest source of FDI between 1989 and 2011, and accounted for 
one fifth of all Myanmar trade in the same period.164 China also became a key partner in infrastructure 
development, including for construction of a deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu in Rakhine state, with planned 
oil and gas pipelines running to China’s Yunnan Province. This was an important strategic project for 
China: once constructed, these pipelines would allow China to import energy from the Middle East while 
bypassing the Malacca Strait chokepoint. 
Yet Beijing-Yangon relations were not without their complications. The people of Myanmar voiced 
increasing dissent about the environmental and social costs of various resource extraction and 
infrastructure development projects undertaken with Chinese involvement, and questioned who 
ultimately benefited from the projects.165 In 2011, Myanmar’s President Thein Sein halted plans to build the 
China-funded Myitsone dam in Kachin after popular protests.166 The Government also renegotiated the 
Kyaukpyu deep sea port project, which critics feared was going to burden Myanmar with extraordinary 
debt, further deepening its dependency on China.167 The project was scaled back from roughly USD 
7 billion to 1.3 billion, the port was downsized from 10 berths to 2, and the project was divided into 
sequenced phases.168 China’s links to the ethnic armed groups on Myanmar’s periphery also frequently 
complicated the bilateral relationship, with Yangon nervous that China could use these armed groups to 
safeguard their own interests in Myanmar.169 Yet while it remained under Western sanctions (which had 
escalated in the late 1990s), Yangon had few outside options.170
The search for outside options may have led the Tatmadaw to the conclusion that it would have to 
adopt governance reforms in order to woo back the West. In 2003 it announced a seven-step Roadmap 
to Democracy, which envisioned the military stepping back from day-to-day executive control of the 
country, into a guardianship role. This was a roadmap for entrenching the military’s influence and control 
and protecting its leadership from accountability, while creating the changes needed to allow greater 
engagement with global markets.171 In 2008 the SPDC promulgated a new constitution, guaranteeing the 
Tatmadaw one quarter of the seats in both houses of the National Assembly, giving it veto power over 
key decisions. The Constitution also retained military autonomy, with forces reporting to a commander-
in-chief, not the civilian president, and immunizing officials for actions undertaken in connection with 
official duties.172 
In 2010, Myanmar held elections heralded by the international community as a turning-point. The 
elections ushered in not only electoral but also economic reforms.173 The Myanmar Government has 
subsequently instituted many reforms increasing workers’ economic agency, including allowing freedom 
of association, establishing a minimum wage and improving health and safety measures. But the military 
continued to dominate the commanding heights of both Myanmar’s electoral system and its economy. 
Myanmar’s embrace of the ILO in 2007 must be understood against this larger strategic backdrop. 
As Chow and Easley explain, “Myanmar’s strategic decision to pursue reform and opening depended 
heavily on the prospect of improved relations with alternative diplomatic partners through increased 
compliance with international norms.”174
In 2011, the new Government signed a memorandum of understanding for ILO technical cooperation to 
assist the Government to eliminate all forms of forced labour by 2015,175 and the ILO’s tripartite governing 
bodies lifted restrictions on Myanmar’s participation. The ILO’s activities spanned a variety of projects, 
including drafting an action plan for combatting forced labour; providing rights-based training and 
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community support as part of the Myanmar Peace Initiative; and organizing a series of awareness-
raising seminars and trainings for government officials, community-based organizations and the wider 
public. More recently, the ILO established its first Decent Work Country Programme in Myanmar, which 
provides guidance and tools to achieve “employment, social protection, social dialogue, and fundamental 
principles and rights at work.”176
The ILO’s supervisory bodies have continued to monitor the situation.177 And the Complaints Mechanism 
ran throughout this period. From March 2007 to June 2018, it received 754 cases, of which 739 were 
related to underage recruitment, 13 to forced labour and 2 to other issues. 377 military personnel, 
including 64 officers, were punished by military disciplinary action for underage recruitment and forced 
labour. Only one person was punished under section 374 of the Penal Code.178 One trend that has become 
apparent is a shift in complaints from those arising from a command economy to those arising in a 
more liberalized labour market, such as unlawful detention of housekeepers or trafficking of children. 
The ILO representative in the country, Steve Marshall, put this down to a growing understanding in the 
country that “these principles apply right throughout [society]” – i.e. not only to those forced to work by 
public entities, such as the military, but also in the private sector.179
Even as Myanmar’s economy has become more market-oriented, however, the Tatmadaw have retained 
influence within it, and their control over key State decisions.180 It continues to rely on forced labour as 
a way to keep labour costs down and subjugate ethnic minority populations to advance infrastructure 
projects, such as hydroelectric dams.181 As a United Nations Human Rights Council-manded Fact-
Finding Mission reported in 2019, over the last decade the Tatmadaw has extended its influence 
beyond the construction and natural resources sectors, into manufacturing, tourism, banking and 
insurance, agriculture, and logistics.182 It has embedded itself at the centre of what the US Embassy in 
Yangon described as an “elaborate system of patronage”, through which it retains power.183 Military-run 
conglomerates, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic 
Corporation (MEC), provide off-budget financing to the Tatmadaw and are involved in natural resource 
extraction. Since 2011, both companies have received significant international investment through joint 
ventures. Military officials are also embedded across the governance bodies of the country’s major 
natural resource extraction State-owned economic enterprises. The Tatmadaw’s ability to supplement 
its budget with alternative sources of revenue, outside the official military budget, is a clear vehicle for 
bypassing civilian oversight.184 
The political utility of forced labour in Myanmar has thus shifted over the last twenty years, as its 
governance and political economy have evolved. Where forced labour was once part of a project of State-
building and military territorialization within Myanmar, it must now be understood as part of a rentier 
system embedded within the context of larger, transnational value chains, organized through liberal 
market structures. This is an important shift, since in theory it introduces foreign actors into the value 
chains on which exploiters rely in order to capture value. Yet that begs the question: has that theoretical 
shift translated into any practical change in outcomes? Or does forced labour continue?
The continuing plight of the Rohingya and other minorities
Political liberalization in 2011 allowed ethnic groups to more freely celebrate their cultures and identities. 
But it also led to the open organization of politics on increasingly strident ethnic and ethno-nationalist 
grounds. In Rakhine state, the home of the largely Buddhist Rakhine people, the largely Muslim Rohingya 
population, and other ethnic minorities, that soon proved a combustible mix.
Rakhine was wracked by inter-communal violence in 2012 and 2013, with Rakhine Buddhists particularly 
targeting the Rohingya and other Muslim communities.185 In the aftermath, a militant group – Harakah 
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al-Yaqin, later renamed the Arakan Rohinyga Salvation Army – launched attacks on border guards and 
military bases. The military responded with overwhelming retaliatory force, followed by extensive 
“clearance options”, returning to its earlier Four Cuts counter-insurgency policy.186 In the months that 
followed, more than 700,000 minority Rohingya fled or were expelled to neighbouring Bangladesh, 
leading to allegations of genocide, an ongoing criminal investigation at the International Criminal Court 
and an inter-State lawsuit at the International Court of Justice187. The armed conflict has continued, 
escalating further after another group, the Arakan Army, attacked police posts in northern Rakhine state 
in January 2019, with the Government designating the Arakan Army a terrorist organization in March 
2019.
Over the last three years, UN investigators have also found a consistent pattern of Tatmadaw use of both 
Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine men, women and children for forced labour.188 Since the Arakan Army’s 
attacks began in early 2019, forced labour against ethnic Rakhines has however decreased, perhaps over 
security concerns, but forced labour of Rohingya has apparently increased.189 The pattern of compulsion 
resembles the traditional corvée under the Towns and Villages Acts, with Tatmadaw tasking the village 
head with furnishing specific numbers of villagers to work unpaid for a certain period of time, without 
any prior notice or consultation. Labour generally lasts weeks, during which workers are maltreated, 
extorted, intimidated and sometimes killed. Victims have been forced to work on construction of both 
Tatmadaw camps and camps for displaced people, amongst other purposes.190 A 2018 UN mission found 
similar patterns in Kachin and Shan States.191
Forced labour risks have contributed to refugee flows.192 (Sadly, refugees also face significant modern 
slavery risks once they arrive in refugee camps, some, for example, being trafficked into slavery in the 
Thai fishing fleet, as we discussed in Chapter 6.193) The UN’s fact-finding group has concluded that forced 
labour also contributes to the conditions that make it impossible for Rohingya to return to Myanmar.194 
That may, in fact, be part of the point: in line with the Four Cuts doctrine, the use of forced labour has 
helped to establish State control, through terror, in Rakhine state, driving away competitors to the State 
and its governmental power. It appears to be a return to form for the Tatmadaw, with forced labour 
serving a directly political purpose, and not only a commercial one.
All of that points to deep and persisting problems with the normalization of forced labour in and by the 
Tatmadaw, and by the State of Myanmar more broadly. While welcoming progress made through the 
technical cooperation programme between the ILO and the Government, the ILO’s supervisory bodies, 
confronted by this evidence, have shown growing concern about the effect of this policy of constructive 
engagement. Responding to the facts found by the Human Rights Council’s mission in 2018, in 2019 the 
CEACR requested the Government of Myanmar to explain how it was applying ILO C29, at the 2019 ILC 
conference. This returned the issue to the political level for the first time in almost a decade.195 The ILC 
CAS did not take further action, but did express concern “over the persistent use of forced labour”.196 The 
issue remains on the ILO’s agenda, and is likely to be a focus at meetings in 2021.
Meanwhile, the World Bank has proposed a USD 100 million project for Rakhine state, aimed at 
fostering an inclusive economy through the creation of livelihood opportunities and rebuilding of 
inter-communal trust to ensure sustainability.197 Programming would include livelihoods training and 
asset transfer, ongoing grants, financial assistance and business development support services. The 
laudable aim is to help the Rakhine economy begin to recover on an inclusive footing. Yet the questions 
the Bank must consider include whether such programming can be delivered on a non-discriminatory 
basis and without addressing underlying human rights concerns,198 and whether such an approach 
risks subsidizing organizations now accused, elsewhere in the UN system, of serious human rights 
violations, including forced labour. Careful human rights due diligence will be required to ensure that 
Bank funds are not coopted by organizations controlled the Tatmadaw, which would have the effect of 
the Bank potentially subsidizing the strategy discussed earlier – military territorialization. That will be 
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operationally challenging, and demand significant resourcing for safeguards. For example, the Bank has 
indicated that it intends to pro-rate participation in funded projects based on population shares in the 
target area. But it is unclear what baseline it will use to assess those shares: pre- or post-displacement? 
The danger here is that programming that bases participation on post-displacement population shares 
risks rewarding ethnic cleansing, while programming that bases participation on pre-displacement 
population ratios may meet with resistance from local partners. Either way, what presents as a narrowly 
technical issue will, in reality, be a deeply political one. 
The Rakhine Recovery and Development Support Project should also be read against the backdrop of the 
May 2020 Country Partnership Framework for Myanmar for the period FY20-23, agreed by the Bank and 
the Government.199 It is notable that despite the scale of forced labour in Myanmar, and the long-standing 
and ongoing drag it has placed on development, the issue is not mentioned in that framework. Child 
labour is. And the strategy has a strong focus on financial inclusion of poor and vulnerable households, 
with promoting inclusion, including in conflict-areas, being the central theme. A strategy that seeks to 
promote inclusion will help to maximize the economic agency of the people of Myanmar. Yet the absence 
of such a significant impediment to Myanmar’s sustainable development as forced labour has proven to 
be for more than half a century strongly suggests that, in Myanmar, the development sector continues to 
suffer from what, in Chapter 1, we described as a major ‘blind-spot’.
The desire for constructive engagement is understandable. But the devil lies in the details. Will the 
engagement envisaged create sufficient incentives for change? Or will it simply entrench existing 
power structures? On this, the last word is perhaps left to a group of Karen survivors of forced labour 
in Myanmar:
As Burmese citizens, we certainly want to see Burma becoming a developed country. 
But we must say that material development alone, which lacks the ingredients of 
human, moral, and environmental factors, is far from being desirable. The so-called 
“constructive engagement” may be constructive for those countries who are desperate 
to devour our natural wealth. It may also be constructive for the SLORC because it 
gives them the sense of being recognized as well as a huge financial wealth. But how 
can we consider such engagement constructive when it results in blood and lives being 
shed on it, when families are scattered and hopes are shattered, when so many widows 
and orphans are left behind to fend for themselves. May we be allowed, at this point, to 
remind you that your activities are in direct connection with these miseries.200
Lessons and opportunities
Several lessons emerge from these case studies about the conditions that may foster successful 
interventions to address forced labour in construction and infrastructure-driven development. In this 
section, we consider these lessons, and the opportunities the sector now enjoys to accelerate sustainable 
development. First, we consider the importance of effective international strategic coordination to seize 
windows for change. Second, we consider the unique opportunity that Mega Sporting Events (MSEs) 
provide in that regard. Third, we consider the opportunity for development actors to drive multi-
stakeholder efforts to change global construction and infrastructure business practices, especially 
through promotion of the Employer Pays principle in sectoral recruitment, the use of project bank 
accounts, and related wage protection schemes. Fourth, we consider the role of sustainable finance 
in shaping the social impact of the sector. We consider the risks associated with financialization of 
the industry, including the G20’s Infrastructure as an Asset Class push, and point to potential new 
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approaches, including social finance, briefly considering an innovative model being rolled out in the 
Indian construction sector. Finally, we consider what a whole-of-value chain based approach to these 
questions might look like, and the increasing turn towards shared responsibility and joint liability-based 
solutions.
When do regimes abandon systematic forced labour? 
Former ILO representative in Myanmar Richard Horsey has explained the ILO’s approach to forced 
labour in Myanmar as a “good-cop/bad-cop approach”, with the Member States playing the bad cop role, 
and the Director-General of the ILO and the ILO team in Geneva (and later on the ground) playing the 
good cop role.201 This characterization suggests that change is most likely to occur if one actor shows the 
target a stick, while another offers them a carrot. And indeed, we see a similar pattern in both Qatar – 
with the ILC again playing bad cop, and the ILO playing good cop – and even Uzbekistan (see Chapter 4 
above), where the World Bank’s Inspection Panel played the bad cop, and the ILO again played the role 
of good cop.
This is a neat story. Perhaps too neat. It leaves out many of the actors involved in generating behavioural 
change. In each case, the position taken by foreign trading and investment partners – both public and 
private – seems to have factored more significantly into the target regime’s calculus than this story 
allows. And it also does not explain the timing of the decisions by these regimes to abandon systematic 
forced labour. In each case, in fact, that decision appears to have been driven by a significant shift in the 
regime’s strategic environment that altered the pay-offs from reform – a shift outside the control of the 
ILO or any other single actor. 
In Qatar, this came from a combination of the award of the World Cup 2022, and the imposition of a 
blockade by Gulf States, encouraging and liberating Qatar to build a free labour market. In Uzbekistan, 
the inflection point came with the death of former President Karimov, against the backdrop of declining 
productivity, yields and profitability in the cotton sector. And in Myanmar, the trigger was not a single 
event, but the steady shift by the Tatmadaw from a command economy and junta-based rule, to a 
guardianship strategy involving partnership with foreign capital to develop and capture rents from 
natural resources, while retaining a veto over political processes. The shallowness of the military’s shift 
on forced labour is now, arguably, being revealed by events in Rakhine. The lack of a major shift in 
the regime’s strategic environment may help explain the fundamental continuity of the Tatmadaw’s 
approach to forced labour. 
What is clear, however, is that while these events may serve to trigger major policy shifts on systematic 
forced labour, they simply create a window of opportunity. If, at that moment, demands from the 
international community are not clear and consistent, that window can close, as those resisting change 
effectively counter-mobilize. This is what powerful forces in Brazil attempted (see Chapter 3), and may 
have achieved in Thailand (Chapter 6) and Bangladesh (Chapter 7). 
Clear and consistent messaging on required behavioural changes is very hard to achieve. As Horsey 
points out in relation to Myanmar, the international community is more prone to conflict, confusion 
and contradiction, than to coherent strategic messaging.202 He highlights one solution to this challenge 
offered by the Myanmar case: have actors (in that case, States, workers and employers) agree what 
conduct is required, but leave it up to them to decide individually which carrots and sticks they will 
use to encourage that shift. This was the effect of the ILC’s resolutions in 1999 and 2000, which made 
clear that Myanmar must cease forced labour – “nothing but a contemporary form of slavery” – but left 
States to decide how to encourage that. As he points out, this approach avoided negotiation to the lowest 
common denominator to ensure the measure’s passage through the Conference.203
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Development actors clearly have an important role to play in helping the international community 
organize around a shared set of expectations and demands to address modern slavery. To date, the 
ILO has played the key role, both as a forum for discussion and development of those ideas, and as 
mechanism for assisting States once they decide they are ready to undertake reforms. Alliance 8.7, 
essentially a multi-stakeholder forum controlled by the ILO, now offers a supplementary arena for 
such discussions, and its Pathfinder system may offer a way to organize assistance on a broader footing 
than purely through ILO programming. Yet development actors have, as we saw in Chapter 1, largely 
been absent from these discussions. If we understand anti-slavery interventions as a way to remove 
impediments to development – which is the implication of Chapter 2 – then the implication is that 
development actors offer reform-minded regimes significant carrots: improved economic and social 
development results. Those carrots have significant potential, if combined with effective pressure. 
Developing Freedom through Mega Sports Events 
Mega Sports Events may provide a unique sustainable development opportunity – and, arguably, a 
unique opportunity for Developing Freedom. As the case of Qatar studied in this chapter shows, the 
involvement of powerful foreign actors in the construction and infrastructure development sector in a 
host country or region can create a unique constellation of forces, creating a rare opportunity to initiate 
a conversation about issues such as labour market mobility, recruitment fees, payment practices, and 
worker voice – so long as foreign actors are willing to use their leverage to this end.
Preparations for, and hosting of, Mega Sports Events can reshape a country’s political economy and shift 
its development trajectory. In some cases, this has been for the worse, with investment skewed towards 
funding for white elephant infrastructure, communities evicted, workers harmed, and societies saddled 
with long-term debt to pay for a few weeks of the international spotlight and partying foreign tourists. 
Yet, as the Qatar case shows, Mega Sports Events also provide a unique opportunity for structural 
and policy reform, including to labour markets. Given the potential development pay-offs from such 
reforms, there is a case for development actors to get more involved with these processes, working 
with global and regional sports organizations to turn Mega Sports Events into platforms for developing 
freedom.204 This is consonant with calls from a growing number of States for greater integration of SDG 
Targets and respect for human rights into global sports governance.205 Given the risks of child trafficking 
in some sports, there is a case for putting anti-trafficking and anti-slavery efforts at the centre of such 
a conversation. 
Infrastructure development for Mega Sports Events could be used to introduce new practices into the 
sector in the country or region in question, as they have been in Qatar. This would require embedding 
anti-slavery and broader human rights standards in global and regional sports organizations’ bidding 
and hosting arrangements – as FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, for example, now 
do.206 And it might also point to the possibility for a greater role of development actors in designing, 
financing and evaluating the social impact of Mega Sports Events. A closer alignment between the work 
of development actors and global and regional sports organizations would align with growing efforts by 
those organizations to adopt the Sustainable Development Agenda, and to benefit from the SDGs brand. 
It would also align with the idea that development actors should move from a negative, operational 
agenda on modern slavery – seeking to reduce modern slavery risks arising from project delivery – to 
a more positive, strategic agenda: designing programme to proactively reduce broader modern slavery 
risks in the economy and society. We return to this broader theme in the final Part of the study. 
Changing sectoral business practices
One insight from this chapter is that the institutional environment that is conducive to exploitation 
is a product not only of national law, but also transnational industry practices. Development actors 
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have considerable leverage to change these practices – as financiers of large-scale projects, as thought 
leaders and knowledge creators, and as policy advisers to governments. Two areas of industry practice 
stand out as ripe for action: recruitment fees, and payment protocols.
THE DEVELOPMENT CASE FOR ENDING RECRUITMENT FEES
As we have seen, recruitment fees represent a major externality imposed by the industry on society at 
large. They create a drag on the development of recruits themselves, on their families and friends, and 
on the countries from which they come. As the World Bank has pointed out, if average recruitment costs 
are around USD 4,000 and there are 1 million workers subject to such costs, removing those costs would 
put USD 4 billion back in workers’ hands, with significant positive knock-on economic effects in their 
communities and countries of origin.207 
This system endures because workers face obstacles to organizing to challenge them, while corrupt 
government officials favour personal gain over good public policy. Construction companies and financiers 
largely stay silent, since they benefit from reduced project costs. There are exceptions; recently a group 
of 38 investors with over USD 3 trillion in managed assets called for action by companies in the Gulf 
on recruitment fees.208 But this is the exception that proves the rule. On the whole, those affected face 
a significant collective action problem that would need addressing if there was to be systemic change.
Development actors have a role to play here. SDG 10.7 commits States to “facilitate orderly, safe, and 
responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-
managed migration policies.” Indicator 10.7.1, the official statistic used to track progress towards SDG 
10.7, is “recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of monthly income earned in country 
of destination”. The World Bank and ILO serve as joint ‘guardians’ for this Indicator, working with 
governments to develop capacity to collect relevant data.209 And there are numerous other opportunities 
for additional programming to institutionalize those practices. 
First, such programming could address the information asymmetries in global recruitment markets 
and along specific migration corridors. The construction industry would be a good place to start. 
Development actors could work with construction industry partners to give recruits access to information 
about potential recruiters and brokers – adapting the Glassdoor model used to share information about 
workplaces, for example. This would empower workers and make them more resistant to exploitation, 
but would need to grapple with questions of workforce fragmentation, limited literacy and trust.
Second, such programming could aim to disrupt recruiters’ business model, for example by undercutting 
it through a public option. This is the approach being taken in some South East Asian countries. It has 
proven difficult for these organizations to achieve competitiveness with informal recruiters, because 
more formalized models may have higher operating costs and not draw on social capital in the same 
way.210 Development actors may have a role to play in helping to subsidize such models, for example by 
issuing social bonds to finance public recruitment agencies, with donors buying down interest based on 
the performance of the agency against certain slavery-prevention benchmarks. 
Third, development actors could instead leave the sector’s recruitment arrangements in place, but 
improve workers’ access to low-interest migration financing, both to fund emigration and to assist after 
return to country of origin.211 BRAC, one of the world’s largest NGOs and microcredit providers, has 
been offering such loans to prospective Bangladeshi migrants for several years and also has lending 
programmes targeting remittance-receiving households. Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam 
have all implemented or piloted similar programmes.212 There is, however, a danger that this approach 
helps to sustain a culture of indebtedness in the industry – a particularly problematic ideas in the 
COVID-19 era, given reductions in income and rises in household debt in some communities.213 One 
review concluded that “[w]hile low-interest migration loans might be beneficially coupled with other 
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changes (such as oversight of recruitment agencies, the reduction of migration costs), on their own they 
do little to mediate the way that debt shapes migrant vulnerability.”214 Supplemental programming to 
beneficiaries to enhance the financial literacy and thereby help them maximize their economic agency 
might be a useful part of any such package. But here, again, evidence on impacts is mixed.215
Fourth, development actors could embed the Employer Pays principle across their work, making 
respect for that principle a condition of procurement, lending and investment decisions. There are 
several relevant standards that might be useful to such an approach, and multi-stakeholder initiatives 
from which development actors can learn. These include Verité’s Ethical Framework for International 
Labor Recruitment,216 the Institute for Human Rights and Business’s Leadership Group for Responsible 
Recruitment (which includes construction multinational Vinci),217 IOM’s Corporate Responsibility 
in Eliminating Slavery and Trafficking (CREST) in Asia Programme and the IOM/IOE International 
Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS) – a voluntary multi-stakeholder certification system. The Building 
Research Establishment has also launched an Ethical Labour Standard BES 6002 in February 2017.
DISRUPTING LATE PAYMENT PRACTICES
As we saw in an earlier section, late payment of subcontractors and workers is normalized in many parts 
of the construction and infrastructure sector, though it heightens vulnerability to exploitation in several 
different ways. The practice is closely connected to the thin margins on which most levels of the supply 
chain operate, and their limited access to working capital. Various solutions to this problem are now 
emerging, which may deserve attention from and scaling by development actors. 
In Qatar, the Government-run Workers’ Support and Insurance Fund pays workers in certain 
circumstances, leaving the Fund to carry the risk and chase their employers for outstanding debts. 
Private sector companies, such as Greensill, with a similar strategy have emerged that purchase small 
contractors’ invoices at a discount, giving them access to working capital, leaving the contractor to secure 
full payment from the debtor. Another solution is the Project Bank Account, a ring-fenced account held 
in trust or escrow for the supply chain, administered independently to assure on-time payment and 
prevent late payment being used to abuse market power. In the UK, Project Bank Accounts are mandatory 
for certain types of large-scale projects.218 Development actors could help promote this practice in their 
own project management, and in others’ work. Finally, there may also be scope to innovate in financial 
instruments to encourage on-time payment, for example through linking capital cost reductions to 
anti-slavery benchmarks. In fact, financial innovation offers a range of opportunities for strengthening 
sustainability outcomes in the infrastructure sector. We turn now to these opportunities – and associated 
risks. 
Infrastructure as an asset class
The world’s construction and infrastructure financing needs until 2030 are enormous, and look set to 
grow further, as infrastructure development becomes an important forum for international cooperation. 
Estimates are that additional investments of USD 15 trillion in infrastructure investment will be needed 
to meet the Sustainable Development Goals. There are a range of inter-governmental initiatives now 
under way to promote infrastructure spending. The One Belt, One Road initiative, discussed in Chapter 
1, is perhaps the best known example. In 2016, Japan launched the Expanded Partnership for Quality 
Infrastructure, at the Group of Seven summit it hosted that year. The same year, at the 11th East Asia 
Summit in 2016, ASEAN, Australia, China, India, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, the US and Japan 
adopted the Vientiane Declaration, committing amongst other things to work together on infrastructure 
development. 
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In November 2019, the ‘Blue Dot Network’ was launched by the US International Development Finance 
Corporation (previously Overseas Private Investment Corporation), in co-operation with the Japan 
Bank for International Cooperation and Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This is 
a multi-stakeholder initiative to bring together governments, the private sector and civil society to 
promote high-quality, trusted standards for global infrastructure development, to rate international 
infrastructure projects.219 Where One Belt, One Road and the AIIB are funding platforms, the Blue Dot 
Network is more like a transnational ratings agency.220 
It purports to build on and operationalize the earlier G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, 
themselves connected to the G7 Charlevoix Commitment on Innovative Financing for Development and the 
Equator Principles, the project finance risk management framework used by many financial institutions 
around the world. Principle 5.3 of the G20 Principles proclaims:
5.3. All workers should have equal opportunity to access jobs created by infrastructure 
investments, develop skills, be able to work in safe and healthy conditions, be compensated 
and treated fairly, with dignity and without discrimination. Particular consideration 
should be given to how infrastructure facilitates women’s economic empowerment 
through equal access to jobs, including well-paying jobs, and opportunities created 
by infrastructure investments. Women’s rights should be respected in labor market  
participation and workplace requirements, including skills training and occupational 
safety and health policies. 
This seems to offer an important opportunity for embedding social sustainability goals, such as slavery 
reduction, in infrastructure project assessment and deal-making. Yet details remain scarce, though 
there are signs the concept continues to be developed, with discussion during President Trump’s visit to 
India in February 2020, and during the US-Australia Ministerial Consultations in late July 2020.221
All of these frameworks are increasingly coming into play as it becomes apparent that even in a time of 
historically low borrowing costs, infrastructure investment needs outstrip available public financing. 
Public institutions are turning increasingly to private partners to finance large-scale construction and 
infrastructure development, often through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and so-called ‘blended 
finance’. In the process, construction and infrastructure are increasingly approached not just as physical, 
productive assets, but as financial assets: sources of a future income stream, which can be leveraged, 
optioned, securitized, and harnessed in a variety of different ways by financial markets. 
The creation of an infrastructure ‘asset class’ has been a focus of G20 for several years now. During the 
German G20 Presidency in 2017, a set of principles was formulated aimed at the creation of a tradeable 
asset class backed by infrastructure projects.222 Building on these ‘Hamburg Principles’, a roadmap to 
‘Infrastructure as an asset class’ was released during the Argentine Presidency of 2018. The roadmap 
recognized the particularly risky nature of infrastructure projects, a significant barrier to bringing 
these projects to market that has made “de-risking” the centre of much subsequent discussion. Further 
work in the subsequent two years has clarified commitments to Principles for Quality Infrastructure 
Investment (issued under the Japanese Presidency in 2019), which include a commitment to respect for 
human rights throughout the infrastructure project life cycle (para 5.2),223 and the creation of an MDB 
Infrastructure Cooperation Platform.224 Attention to infrastructure financing continued into the Saudi 
Presidency, with a growing focus on the benefits of infrastructure development for regional connectivity. 
Numerous development actors have consequently moved to implement this strategy, from the World 
Bank’s Infrastructure Finance business line, to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s (AIIB) recent 
Infrastructure Private Capital Mobilization Platform, and the creation of the Australian Infrastructure 
Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP).224
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The creation of an asset class involves bundling together instruments with similar legal and contractual 
characteristics into one pool of assets. Then securities, backed by the expected revenues from the 
underlying assets, are sold to investors. The challenge here, is that if the price or the profitability of the 
asset (an airport, a dam, or a road network, for example) is based on a labour model that relies on forced 
labour in the supply chain, we are all but creating an asset class that securitizes slavery. This is not de 
jure mortgaging of slaves. The world has seen what happens when that is practiced at scale, through 
the development of the Mississippi Valley in the 1830s which, as we explore further in Chapter 9, was 
based on a similar securitization strategy. But the structure of the system, and the underlying de facto 
exploitation that lies at the root of its profitability, has some disturbing similarities. 
This raises important questions about the need for strong social risk management frameworks in any 
such public-private partnerships.226 Indeed, infrastructure projects are already the source of around 
half of all complaints to MDB accountability mechanisms.227 How can we scale up investment in 
infrastructure and other development projects to promote growth and reduce poverty, while protecting 
against inadvertent increases in social risks, such as modern slavery? A central part of that answer, it 
turns out (as we explore more in Chapter 9), relates to who monitors and manages social risk. Where 
development finance institutions delegate social risk assessment to entities who have strong incentives 
to under State modern slavery risks, there is a risk of the system malfunctioning. For infrastructure, the 
Blue Dot Network may be part of the answer, ensuring that accountable public actors are at the heart of 
that process, strengthening market transparency in the process. 
Social finance in the Indian construction sector
Another part of the answer may lie in innovating in the financial instruments that are used to fund 
infrastructure projects. Instruments that tie capital costs to performance against social sustainability 
benchmarks may work to disrupt the strategic logic of the management practices that lead to exploitation 
in the first place. This could allow development finance actors to promote the kinds of practical changes 
canvased above, such as rejecting recruitment fees, promoting on time-payment. And such initiatives 
are already under way. 
One powerful example comes from Kois and the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery, in India. India’s 
construction market is worth around USD 150 billion per annum. It is India’s second-largest employer 
at roughly 60 million jobs.228 Before the pandemic, the sector was growing strongly, creating strong 
demand for a low-skill, temporary workforce, which attracted large numbers of migrants from rural 
areas to cities – perhaps 30 million people overall. These workers, recruited through networks stretching 
from their rural villages to urban centres, were highly vulnerable to debt bondage and trafficking into 
exploitation by micro-contractors.229 Although there are several government schemes in place to provide 
this workforce income protection and social security, many still fall through gaps. Micro-contractors 
typically recruit and manage crews of around 35 people. They often operate informally, with limited 
access to workforce management skills and technologies. They struggle to grow because of limited access 
to finance and the delayed payment practices of the construction value chain. Payment from developers 
and contractors often takes one to two months. And in order to win contracts, micro-contractors need 
to be able to raise working capital within one to two weeks. Formalized financing often cannot reach that 
benchmark given the informality of these firms, so micro-contractors turn instead to informal financing 
– family, friends, money lenders. This often leads to high interest rates and profit-share schemes, which 
puts significant pressure on payroll costs. This suggests there is a gap for a socially responsible financing 
solution, if it can compete on capital cost. 
The Kois/GFEMS solution is a social bond that ties capital costs to adoption of practices that reduce 
modern slavery risks. Social investors lend the initial capital for a revolving fund, which makes working 
capital loans to micro-contractors. Meanwhile, donors buy down interest from these loans at rates 
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dependent on the performance of the investment financed by the fund, against certain risk indicators 
– such as timely payment to workers. At the same time, donors finance grants for technical assistance 
to upskill micro-contractors, to strengthen their performance and reduce micro-contractors’ interest 
burden.230 Kois and GFEMS aim to reach 100,000 at-risk labourers through an initial USD 3.8 million 
of outcome funding. The aim is to create a cadre of better-performing micro-contractors, who are 
then white-listed for hiring by larger buyers. This points to both a potentially highly efficient way of 
financing prevention of modern slavery, and significant scalability. And it also points to a very different 
approach to de-risking than simply moving risk off the lender’s balance sheet, as some blended finance 
solutions aim at. Instead, de-risking is achieved not only through donors providing guarantees of 
the initial capitalization, but also by financing the technical assistance on the ground that upgrades 
microcontractors’ skills, and intervention in the labour-buying practices of the value chain. If this 
proves to work, it offers a powerful new opportunity for development financiers to intervene in modern 
slavery systems. 
Sharing responsibility across the value chain 
Finally, we might ask, what prospect is there in the global construction sector of a multi-stakeholder 
approach to sustainability along the value chain, along the lines of, for example, the RSPO discussed in 
Chapter 4? Or is there some other way in which joint action and responsibility sharing might emerge? 
The relatively decentralized nature of the lower ends of the construction value chain, with most 
contractors being local operators, rather than national or global businesses, might work against such 
an approach. But mobilization at the national or regional level may be feasible. In the UK, British-
based built environment institutions have formed a Construction Coalition to raise awareness of and 
eradicate modern slavery from the sector’s supply chains. The coalition is supported by CIOB, Build UK, 
Constructing Excellence, Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, Royal Institute of British Architects, 
Chartered Institute of Procurement & Supply and the Supply Chain Sustainability School, as well as a 
number of business and civil society organizations including the Ethical Trading Initiative, the Business 
& Human Rights Resource Centre and the Institute for Human Rights and Business. Some Coalition 
members have also worked with Stronger Together, another multi-stakeholder initiative, to develop 
construction-specific training and advice on tackling modern slavery. 
At the global level, the concentration is largely at the project finance stage, or amongst large design, 
engineering and major construction firms. The Equator Principles already addresses project finance, 
and align standards expectations with the IFC Performance Standards and prohibitions on forced 
labour, slavery and human trafficking. In February 2017, six major construction and engineering firms 
– Bechtel, Fluor, Jacobs (formerly CH2M), Multiplex Middle East, Vinci, and Wood (formerly Amec 
Foster Wheeler) – launched Building Responsibly, a business-led coalition supported by Business for 
Social Responsibility that aims to promote the rights and welfare of workers through pre-competitive 
collaboration to strengthen standards, policies and practices. In 2018 it launched ten principles on 
worker welfare and vulnerability, that include a commitment to freedom from forced labour, trafficking 
and child labour.231 
Perhaps the key question, though, is what approach to value chain management such a collaboration 
would seek to promote. We have seen some elements of this in previous sections: encouraging employers 
to pay for recruitment; disincentivizing late payments; providing workers protection and safety nets. 
But these elements arguably do not get at the underlying business forces that lead the construction 
value chain to “normalise hardship”, as Chris Blythe put it (see earlier in this Chapter). To disrupt those 
business dynamics, we must ask hard questions about who is responsible for addressing the externalities 
created by outsourcing and short-term profit-taking, including the shareholder-value driven treatment 
of construction and infrastructure as financial assets, rather than productive assets. The UN Guiding 
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Principles on Business and Human Rights and relevant OECD Guidance get at those questions, by 
reminding businesses of their responsibility to respect human rights (independent of States’ duty to 
protect human rights). Mechanisms such as international framework agreements (discussed in Chapter 
7), provide one method for multinational corporations to discharge their responsibilities to workers, 
regardless of the legal structures of specific project value chains that link them to the company. 
Increasingly, there is also a recognition that giving that philosophy of ‘shared responsibility’ force may 
require embedding these notions in law. And in the construction sector, even pre-dating the UN Guiding 
Principles, that impulse has translated into joint liability frameworks, holding developers and other 
users of labour liable for payment of the wages of their contractors’ workers, or for protecting them 
in other ways.232 There has been movement in this direction, specifically for the construction sector, 
in a variety of jurisdictions in recent years: in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, EU, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Spain.233 There may be a role for development actors to play in 
encouraging learning from these countries’ experiences, and promoting a consistent approach to joint 
liability and human rights due diligence in the construction sector, especially through project bidding 
and contracting arrangements.
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CHAPTER 9: FROM CRISIS TO 
OPPORTUNITY
Introduction
As the OECD recently put it, “Building back better [after COVID-19] means integrating long-term risk 
management into policies and financing strategies while leaving no one behind.”1 The World Bank’s 
June 2020 Global Economic Prospects notes that the recession triggered by COVID-19 will “leave lasting 
scars through lower investment, an erosion of human capital through lost work and schooling, and 
fragmentation of global trade and supply linkages.”2 The Bank highlights the need for urgent action to 
protect vulnerable populations and set the stage for a lasting recovery. In this final Part of the study, we 
draw on the insights from the previous two Parts to consider where the Developing Freedom agenda fits 
into the process of recovery. We argue that introducing the Developing Freedom agenda into recovery 
efforts will help prevent people not simply being left behind, but being left out altogether. For that is what 
enslavement represents: the total exclusion from economic agency that comes from being treated as 
though you were owned by someone else. This is why the great American-Jamaican sociologist Orlando 
Patterson described slavery as ‘social death’.3 
We begin with a focus on COVID-19, asking how the Developing Freedom framework helps us 
understand the pandemic’s implications for modern slavery risks. The pandemic puts people’s health 
at risk, makes livelihoods more precarious and reduces income. These effects all reduce economic 
agency and increase people’s vulnerability to modern slavery. At the same time, the pandemic is also 
disrupting supply chains, markets and business models, leading exploiters to adapt their strategies. 
And finally, it is generating policy and institutional responses that may be conducive to modern slavery, 
such as reductions of worker protections with a view to securing foreign investment and demand. The 
interaction of these three elements – people’s vulnerability, exploiters’ strategies, and institutional 
environments – is amplifying existing modern slavery risks, and also laying the groundwork for new 
slavery systems. 
Next, we zoom in on the pandemic’s impact in one particular area of policy response: development 
finance. The pandemic is reducing public revenue and may reduce ODA spending. But there are also 
signs that it is has accelerated investors’ turn to environmental, social and governance (ESG) investing. 
Capital markets are realizing that worker vulnerability can spell vulnerability for both firm performance 
and economic growth. This offers a significant opportunity for ‘maximizing finance for development’. 
Multilateral actors already looking to use public spending to crowd-in private capital investment have 
an opportunity now to do this in a way that helps reduce modern slavery risks, develop freedom and 
achieve SDG targets such as those in 5.2, 8.7 and 16.2. 
Yet this turn to the private sector to finance recovery and broader sustainable development also carries 
risks. To understand them, we look to a crisis of the past: the 1830s development of the Mississippi Valley 
and American south-west.We show how public actors worked to create a market for private investment 
in the development of the American southwest, leading to a boom in cotton – and in slavery. The 
unintended results were catastrophic – not only for the Native Americans displaced and the hundreds of 
thousands of African-Americans enslaved, but for America. In the short term, the boom led to a financial 
bubble, the Panic of 1837 and an economic depression not matched until the 1930s. In the longer term, 
the bursting of the cotton bubble led to a shift in financial power from New Orleans and Philadelphia to 
New York, an altered balance of power between Southern and Northern elites, and the destabilization of 
the American polity that led two decades later to the American Civil War. 
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This episode almost two centuries in the past holds unexpected lessons for today’s development 
sector. The key financing strategy used to develop the Mississippi Valley was remarkably similar to 
an approach being resurrected by the G20 and development finance institutions today – the creation 
of a tradeable asset class pooling risk from multiple underlying development projects. In the 1830s, 
public actors facilitated the creation of bonds, underpinned by mortgages of plantations and even of 
slaves themselves. These bonds were sold into European capital markets. Today, public actors aim to 
facilitate the creation of a class of tradeable assets securitizing infrastructure projects, again to facilitate 
crowding-in private capital. Given the known ties between large-scale infrastructure projects, labour 
migration and modern slavery, discussed in Chapter 8, the echoes of the past here are clear, even as 
there are significant differences.
The echoes suggest a need for the development sector to learn lessons from the earlier episode. We 
highlight two. First, the dangers of encouraging private risk-taking without mandating centralized 
monitoring and management of resulting systemic risk. Second, the dangers of delegating risk 
assessment and management to private actors, whose incentives may not align with the public interest. 
But the episode also points to the possibility of creative solutions, such as the construction – by American 
abolitionists including a young Abraham Lincoln – of a market for reliable risk information. We show 
how this may point to an important role for development actors in regulating today’s sustainable finance 
to help reduce modern slavery risks. 
This points to the final lesson for recovery from the current crisis from this earlier one: the fact that 
development is shaped not just by single interventions or even national development strategies, 
but by global market regulation and conditions. If the development sector is serious about reducing 
vulnerability to modern slavery, it must think not only about how to safeguard against modern slavery at 
the individual project level, but also at the systemic level. That means thinking about how aid interacts 
with trade, investment, tax and competition law, about whether the growth models and development 
pathways promoted by the development sector are in some cases conducive to modern slavery, and 
about the limitations of a country-by-country approach. 
COVID-19’s impact on modern slavery
The COVID-19 crisis impacts all three dimensions of modern slavery systems: people’s vulnerability; 
exploiter strategies; and the institutional environment. Absent a concerted effort to address them, the 
pandemic will generate a significant increase in modern slavery.4 
More people are more vulnerable
The COVID-19 pandemic puts people’s health at risk. It makes livelihoods more precarious. And it reduces 
income. Each of these factors reduces people’s economic agency and increases their vulnerability to 
modern slavery. 
COVID-19 is a grave public health risk. Health crises – including major disease outbreaks – are a major 
trigger for the migration, debt and labour market decisions that place people at heightened risk of 
enslavement and labour coercion.5 Workers that have greater prior risk of exposure to modern slavery 
are in fact at greater risk of exposure to COVID-19 – because they lack power to resist being so exposed.6 
As official COVID-19 guidance from the Australian Government explains, “[f]actory shutdowns, 
order cancellations, workforce reductions and sudden changes to supply chain structures can 
disproportionately affect some workers and increase their exposure to modern slavery and other forms 
of exploitation.”7 The effects of the pandemic are thus regressive: those who are most marginalized, 
discriminated against, and impoverished suffer the greatest increase in risk of exploitation. They are 
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vulnerable to exclusion from adequate healthcare, to having their already-constrained movement 
restricted further by border closures and travel disruptions, and risk stigmatization and discrimination 
by nativist rhetoric and politics. There is accordingly a danger of exponential growth in risk: those 
vulnerable to slavery are more vulnerable to COVID-19, which increases their vulnerability to slavery, 
and so on. Indeed, in the US, calls to the national anti-trafficking hotline almost doubled in the month 
after COVID-19 broke out.8 
The pandemic is also making people who may not in the past have been vulnerable to modern slavery 
more vulnerable to it. The World Bank recently estimated that this year will see the worst economic 
performance in developing countries in 60 years, and the highest fraction of countries witnessing 
per capita income contractions in 150 years.9 40 to 60 million people could be pushed into extreme 
poverty,10 or even more.11 In the face of such a sudden reduction in incomes, people everywhere will be 
much more vulnerable to labour coercion. Evidence from prior downturns suggests that workers will 
work longer hours and accept more dangerous working conditions, and will also turn increasingly to 
informal, household and child labour.12 Risks will grow particularly where governments’ ability to provide 
temporary protection is limited by fiscal bandwidth, technical and technological reach into informal 
workforces, or limited social support for extending protection to marginalized or migrant communities. 
Women and girls are at heightened risk.13 Women’s greater involvement in care work and domestic 
workplaces them at greater risk of infection. Lockdowns increase risks of exploitation and violence 
during periods of isolation. Increased domestic work and childcare leads to reduced workforce 
participation and educational participation, engendering longer-term vulnerability. As the downturn 
reduces household income, this will lead to worse access to food and healthy nutrition for women and 
girls, making them more susceptible to health crises and vulnerable to risky labour market decisions. 
Government support for childcare can help ensure continued female participation in non-care work. 
Careful reflection is also required on including sex workers in protection systems: the Japanese 
Government chose to include sex workers in a fiscal relief package after a national debate about the 
benefits of an inclusive approach to protection.14
Children’s vulnerability to trafficking and labour coercion is also likely to increase.15 Parental ill-health 
and morbidity is a key driver of child labour.16 It has risen due to the pandemic, so child labour will also 
rise. Impoverishment is also a key driver of child labour and will also increase. Estimates suggest a 1 
per cent rise in poverty leads to a 0.7 per cent increase in child labour rates, or more.17 Most estimates 
suggest multi-digit rises in global poverty as a result of COVID-19,18 pointing to a high risk of reversal 
of the reductions of child labour achieved in recent decades.19 Remittances are expected to decline 
by roughly 20 per cent,20 likely removing household income that helps keep children in school.21 And 
reduced incomes can induce child labour migration, both voluntary and involuntary – that is, selling 
children into exploitation.22
Migrant workforces are especially vulnerable to labour coercion as a result of the pandemic downturn. 
Stranded migrant workers are at heightened risk of exploitation as they seek to avoid deportation, 
compete for jobs, seek to avoid loss of securities or deposits and fight to keep visas and work permits 
valid.23 And repatriated migrant workers risk exclusion from social assistance programmes. 
Informality will be a key factor in determining vulnerability. Informality increases vulnerability to modern 
slavery, forced labour and child labour, in part because informal firms are more labour-intensive.24 Lost 
jobs will mean a rise in informal work, as people seek any income. Even before the pandemic struck, 80 
per cent of all enterprises in the world were informal.25 The pandemic will grow the ranks of the informal 
economy, as people lose jobs and SMEs – with less access to working capital than larger enterprises – 
fold.26 Informal workers have incomes around 19 percent lower than formal workers, as well as more 
limited savings.27 They also have limited access to government provided income protection, financing 
247 Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking
mechanisms, healthcare and social protection systems. In one third of emerging market and developing 
economies with pervasive informality, 40 per cent of the population is just one health crisis away from 
poverty – and typically unemployment payments in these countries are accessible to around 1 person 
in 40.28 Informality thus spells both greater vulnerability and more difficulty in delivering effective 
response.29
Access to credit will be another key vector for vulnerability. Access to credit is a crucial cashflow-
smoothing mechanism for poor households and SMEs, and thus a key bulwark against debt bondage.30 It 
is a crucial mechanism to increase economic agency and prevent slavery.31 Yet the pandemic threatens 
a debt and credit crisis, especially in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs),32 with 
grave implications for global microfinance. Early signs suggest around 90 per cent non-repayment 
rates in global microcredit markets, threatening the solvency of microcredit institutions worldwide, 
unless bailed out.33 In the country with the largest per capita indebtedness to microfinance institutions, 
Cambodia, Human Rights Watch has pointed to growing impoverishment as debtors struggle to pay 
back loans.34 Reduced access to microcredit will mean worse economic, social and health outcomes for 
women and girls, reduced household investment in education, reduced education participation rates, 
and increased child labour.35 There is already growing anecdotal evidence of just such results.36
Exploiter strategies are adapting
At the same time, the pandemic is also disrupting supply chains, markets and business models – leading 
to adaptations in exploiter strategies. 
In some sectors, the collapse in global demand means firms are competing for shrinking demand. Some 
firms resort to illegal labour practices to compete on cost. The International Trade Union Confederation 
reports labour rights violations are at a seven-year high.37 In some other sectors, there has been a sudden 
boom in demand. This might be expected to increase workers’ bargaining power, but where workers 
lack voice and rights, and State enforcement of labour standards is weak, it has instead simply increased 
employers’ incentives to turn to coercion. In the personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical 
supply industry, for example, there are recurring accounts of worker rights violations as firms chase 
windfall profits from a sudden spike in demand,38 possibly including used of forced Uighur labour.39 
Similar patterns have been alleged in some agricultural supply chains, where labour supply has been 
suddenly constrained and migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to coercion.40
In other cases, exploiters are developing new profit-making strategies and new slavery systems are 
emerging. More households are turning to child labour as a coping strategy,41 and there is growing 
evidence of a rise in child marriage,42 likely as a coping strategy. Sadly, there are also significant reports 
of a major rise in online sexual abuse of children – often by family members.43 Reported abuse has more 
than doubled in several jurisdictions since the start of the pandemic.44
Institutional responses to the pandemic may increase  
vulnerability 
People’s vulnerability to modern slavery is shaped by the institutional context in which they are 
embedded. And exploiters respond strategically to the incentives generated by this context. So how 
institutions respond to the pandemic will play an important role in determining the shape and dynamics 
of modern slavery. Past evidence has demonstrated that reduced protection in the wake of disaster 
can make people more vulnerable to trafficking.45 But it also shows that policy choices matter: social 
assistance programming can, for example, lead to improved child labour outcomes, even during 
economic downturns.46
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Vulnerability is significantly increased by exclusion of marginalized workers from healthcare and social 
protection. Migrant workers, in particular, have proven to be at risk of contracting the disease.47 They are 
placed at greater risk due to their – often State-mandated – living arrangements, frequently in crowded 
and confined communal spaces.48 And disease spread patterns around the world have revealed that 
low-income and immigrant communities are at greater risk of contracting the disease, often because 
they have no choice but to continue to work, even as wealthier households shelter in place.49 Some 
countries have responded by temporarily enlarging protection coverage, extending healthcare coverage 
to migrant workers (Canada, France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia), or extending income 
and benefits protection (Australia, Brazil, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Myanmar, Trinidad and Tobago).50 
Yet in many countries, the demands of pandemic response have diverted State resources away from 
protection, and simply disrupted the organization of traditional protection and risk management 
strategies. Lockdown disrupts traditional mechanisms for risk monitoring and prevention, such as 
education systems (for child labour), and inspection and reporting systems. In Brazil, for example, the 
lockdown disrupted labour inspections.51 The UK also saw significant reductions in reporting of modern 
slavery.52 And in many countries, governments may choose to divert funds away from anti-trafficking 
measures, to other needs. Even where anti-trafficking remains a priority, the economic downturn will 
mean reduced tax and other public revenues, likely impacting response.
The danger is that some countries will respond to the downturn by relaxing labour protections, hoping 
to support efforts by business to compete on labour costs for a shrinking market. This may increase 
modern slavery risks. In India, for example, State governments have seemingly competed to relax 
worker protection in a ‘race to the bottom’.53 And similar concerns have arisen in Brazil, China, Saudi 
Arabia, Viet Nam and some States in Latin America.54
The turn to sustainable finance: opportunities  
and risks
All of this raises the question what approach development actors should take. How can economic growth 
be rekindled, without vulnerability to modern slavery increasing further? And what role will development 
finance play in reshaping State policies and institutional response? To answer these questions, we must 
first understand the impact the pandemic is having on development finance itself.
In the wake of the pandemic, UN Member States have committed to use development finance to stimulate 
the economy, both through promoting labour demand and through improving access to finance.55 ODA is 
a key counter-cyclical flow in crisis. It is likely to be particularly important in promoting fiscal resilience 
and health and social protection systems in developing economies.56 OECD DAC members have declared 
their ambition to “strive to protect ODA budgets” during the COVID-19 crisis.57 
Yet there are a number of reasons to think that ODA will decline. If DAC members keep the same ODA to 
GNI ratios as in 2019, ODA will decline in real terms by USD 11 to 14 billion.58 If, under political pressure 
to spend more at home, they reduce ODI spending as a share of GNI, the declines will be even larger. And 
the pandemic is also impacting private capital flows. The OECD foresees private finance for low- and 
middle-income countries eligible for ODA declining by up to USD 700 billion year on year.59
Two factors could offset these declines. First, multilateral institutions are mobilizing to address the 
resulting gap. The IMF has announced over USD 100 billion in emergency lending. The World Bank Group 
will lend around USD 150 billion until mid-2021. The G20 has announced a freeze on debt payments by 
the 76 IDA-eligible countries, worth around USD 16.5 billion. Second, COVID-19 may be accelerating 
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the turn to sustainable finance – the growing attention to environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
factors in investing. ESG investments have roughly doubled in the last decade.60 While this growth has 
largely been driven by attention to the ‘E’ in ESG, especially climate risk, the pandemic has magnified the 
importance of the ‘S’ – social risks. There is growing evidence that firms that identify and address worker 
vulnerability are more resilient. During the pandemic, this has buoyed the stock prices of those with a 
reputation for addressing such vulnerability and punished those with reputations for not conducting 
themselves this way.61 This indicates the emergence of a feedback loop that will likely further accelerate 
the turn to sustainable finance.
That turn could appear well-timed for the global development sector. Since the adoption of the SDGs 
and the subsequent Addis Ababa Agenda for Action (AAAA) the official doctrine of the UN, World Bank 
and major development actors has been to use multilateral and public development finance to crowd-in 
private capital, including through bespoke public-private partnerships. Increasingly, investors look to 
the SDGs as a framework for analysing and assessing ESG impacts.62 The World Bank and other MDBs 
officially adopted this catalytic approach to financing development in 2015 with an initiative under the 
slogan ‘From Billions to Trillions’.63 That ambition has proven hard to meet. The Overseas Development 
Institute has found that on average one dollar of public investment from MDBs and bilateral DFIs 
mobilises 75 cents of private investment in low- and middle-income countries, or 37 cents in low-income 
countries (LICs).64 The OECD has sized ‘blended finance’ at just over USD 200 billion between 2012 and 
2018.65 In contrast, the ‘SDG gap’ has been estimated at USD 2.5 trillion (until 2030).66 One commentary 
consequently calculates that mobilization of private finance would have to increase “by a factor of 16 
over the next decade” to fill this gap.67 The financing strategy has accordingly been repackaged in more 
recent World Bank and UN documents in terms of ‘Maximizing Finance for Development’. UN Member 
States have aligned themselves with this approach through work in the UN Economic and Social Council. 
The aim, Member States have declared, is to orient development interventions to generate an “enabling 
environment” for foreign direct investment, “aiming at effectively mobilizing and aligning a wide range 
of financing sources and instruments with the 2030 Agenda” and using this to crowd in private finance 
to support “nationally-owned sustainable development strategies”.68 
One way that development actors are implementing this approach is by increasing investment in and 
lending to intermediary financial institutions. The aim here is to create a flywheel effect, investing in a 
range of financial intermediaries with their own investor and client pools, tapping into their networks 
of private investors and enlarging the pool of investments to accelerate progress towards the SDGs. 
Yet there is a growing recognition that this approach creates real challenges for managing social risks, 
including modern slavery risk. Intermediary financial institutions may or may not be subject to relevant 
ESG standards in different circumstances,69 limiting the ability of original investors to ensure respect 
for ESG standards in the projects ultimately financed by intermediaries. The IFC’s own Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman has queried the extent to which the IFC can accurately assess the social impact of 
projects undertaken by the financial institutions in which it invests.70 
Beyond that specific limitation, there is a broader concern emerging about the robustness of ESG risk 
assessment and management in private capital markets. The limited transparency in how investors 
assess social risks has led to cautions about the growing dangers of ‘social washing’ or even – after 
the SDG’s rainbow logo – ‘rainbow-washing’. This is when “issuers claim that proceeds will go towards 
worthy causes but the money ends up elsewhere”, or the net social impact of the project is not as 
claimed or assessed.71 There are also growing indications of principal-agency problems in private capital 
more generally, with emerging evidence that returns to asset managers significantly outstrip returns 
to owners, and some signs that companies that are financed by private capital may suffer reduced 
resilience.72 Going further, some commentators suggest that the development sector’s turn to private 
capital markets risks repeating the deregulatory mistakes of the Washington Consensus, replacing it 
with a ‘Wall Street Consensus’ in which ownership of transportation, education, healthcare and other 
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public services is moved up and out into globalized capital markets.73 The danger is that, as Daniela Gabor 
puts it, development is “recast as an exercise in the privatization or commercialization of public services 
to generate returns for global finance, with State bureaucracies focused on how to sell development 
finance to the market rather than” how to deliver outcomes for local publics.74
This should give the development sector pause. Will the convergence of ESG investing and the 
development sector’s attempts to maximize finance for development work to protect people and 
maximize their economic agency, or will it leave them more vulnerable? What kind of strategies will 
promote the first outcome? To answer those questions, we must look to lessons from past episodes of 
financialized development. Serendipitously, there are important lessons to learn from one such earlier 
episode that was deeply connected to forced labour and slavery: the 1830s expansion of the United States 
economy into the Mississippi Valley and American south-west. It is to that episode and those lessons that 
we now turn. 
Ghosts of crisis past: financialized development, 
slavery and the Panic of 1837 
Any reflection on the economic impacts of slavery must reckon with the legacies of transatlantic slavery. 
While we considered some of these legacies in Chapter 2, in this section we consider one particular episode 
that may help illuminate the risks of the current turn to the private sector to finance development: the 
financial Panic of 1837 in the United States, which was closely connected to the growth of slavery in the 
US after the formal abolition of the transatlantic slave trade.75 There are important similarities between 
the strategy of securitization that underpinned the development of the American southwest, through 
slave labour, in the 1830s, and current development sector ‘blended finance’ initiatives such as the G20’s 
‘Infrastructure as an Asset Class’ project (discussed in Chapter 8). Given how disastrous the unintended 
consequences of that 1830s episode proved to be, it may be useful to think about how today’s efforts to 
maximize financing for development can learn from it, to avoid similar mistakes. 
Slavery as an asset class 
Globalized cotton value chains were at the heart of the transatlantic economy and both American and 
British development in the 1830s. The forced displacement of tens of thousands of Native Americans 
by the US Government under President Andrew Jackson opened up the fertile Mississippi valley for 
American settler expansion. This access to new, highly fertile land provided a powerful capital injection 
for American and British economic development, but the value of that capital was developed through 
forced labour.76 The cotton was produced by more than 250,000 slaves traded and marched into the 
Valley from the eastern States, their families typically broken up in the process.77 Booming demand for 
cotton in British factories (themselves major sites of child labour) led prices to rise rapidly. Profits for 
were enormous, because capital costs were kept low by the US Government subsidizing land grants to 
promote white settlement, with labour costs reduced through slavery. 
Financial innovation and speculation were the result. Because slavery remained legal in the US (even as 
the international slave trade had been prohibited), slaves served not only as labour but also as capital 
assets. As Peter Doyle has noted, slaves served a similar role as stores of value to that played in more 
recent times by houses – and were worth about the same.78 They represented collateral for further 
borrowing and hedging, and became the basis for the creation of complex securities, similar to the 
securitized housing mortgages that, almost two centuries later, were at the heart of the Global Financial 
Crisis. Slavers and plantation-owners worked with the State legislatures they controlled to charter 
banks that financed those involved in the cotton economy. The liquidity for this financing was generated 
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by the banks issuing bonds, backed by a State (public) guarantee and by the mortgages on plantations 
– and on slaves themselves. Those bonds were sold by financial intermediaries such as Baring Brothers 
into European capital markets. More than USD 50 million in bonds were sold this way by the second half 
of the 1830s – around USD 1.5 billion in today’s terms.79 
It was slaves’ stolen labour and stolen economic agency that created the profits that European 
capital markets were buying into. In this way, securitized slavery underwrote the development of 
the southwestern frontier of the US and the expansion of its cotton empire.80 As Edward Baptist has 
commented, “[f]or the investor who bought it from the House of Baring Brothers or some other seller, a 
bond was really the purchase of a completely commodified slave: not a particular individual, but a tiny 
percentage of each of thousands of slaves.”81
The results of this approach were disastrous on two levels. The first was the social disaster of slavery in 
the Mississippi Valley, a disaster both for those enslaved, and for all subsequent Americans, especially 
their descendants. Over 250,000 people were marched from the eastern States to forced labour in 
Mississippi Valley. Huge numbers died. Enslaved families in the eastern seaboard States were scattered 
to the winds. At the end of that march awaited a life of forced labour, rape, coercion and limited, if not 
entirely denied, economic agency. As we saw in Chapter 2, the economic and social costs have redounded 
through generations, leading us to the Black Lives Matter movement today – and the growing debate on 
reparations. 
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The second disaster befell the American economy itself. It came in the form of financial panic and 
depression. Like the securitized sub-prime mortgages that fuelled the Global Financial Crisis, the 
securitized slavery of the 1830s created a precarious pyramid of risk, susceptible to collapse once debts 
started being called in and credit dried up. When the bubble burst in 1837, it quickly morphed into a 
seven-year depression – not surpassed in depth until the Great Depression of the 1830s. 
The trigger for the bursting of the bubble was the convergence of three factors in 1836. First, British lending 
had tightened. This was in part the result of the 1833 Slavery Abolition Act (UK), and the manumission of 
46,000 West Indian slaves. N.M. Rothschild and Moses Montefiore put together what was then the largest 
syndicated loan in history, worth around 40 per cent of British annual central government expenditure, 
to pay GBP 20 million in compensation to slave owners – many of them powerful Members of Parliament. 
The final payment on this loan was only made by Her Majesty’s Government in 2015. The size of the loan 
meant that credit tightened significantly for several years afterwards.82 Second, the expansion of cotton 
supply from the Mississippi Valley had been so rapid that by 1836 supply was out-stripping demand, 
leading naturally to a price decline. And third, with growing concern in the US about a proliferation 
of currency-issuing banks and risks of financial fraud, President Andrew Jackson moved to require all 
payments for land grants to be made in specie (gold or silver) rather than in private bank notes, suddenly 
devaluing much private debt.83 
By the end of 1836 three massive Liverpool and London cotton firms were unable to meet their debts 
and collapsed. By late March 1837 all top ten cotton-buying firms in New Orleans had collapsed. This 
sent shockwaves through the cotton value chains at the heart of the south-western economy. Banks 
that relied on cotton revenues were unable to meet coupon payments to European creditors. In the 
face of that insolvency, State legislatures began repudiating their guarantees of bank bonds. Business 
and consumer confidence collapsed, and a seven-year depression set in, during which unemployment 
hit 25 per cent in some parts and prices dropped by up to 33 per cent. By the early 1840s Wall Street had 
emerged as the main financier of the Southern economy, replacing New Orleans, Philadelphia and the 
State banks (and through them the European capital markets). This fundamentally altered the political 
economy of the United States, creating new tensions between northern and southern elites, with slavery 
at its centre, which led, two decades later, to Civil War.84
Who monitors and manages social risk? 
In the 1830s, mispricing of risks associated with slavery-fuelled development led to significant costs 
for both slaves and the American economy. This holds two important lessons for today’s development 
sector, including those pushing for blended finance solutions, such as the Infrastructure as an Asset 
Class initiative discussed in Chapter 8. 
AT THE SYSTEMIC LEVEL
First, securitization of development projects encourages private investors and their public partners 
actors to ‘de-risk’ assets by separating them from the risks they generate – including risks to people. 
Governance and ownership of those development projects are repackaged to fit the preferred risk/
return profiles of investors. The result is that private incentives may become disconnected from public 
interests. If no one is mandated to monitor and manage systemic risk levels, there is a danger that they 
silently build up to toxic levels. 
In the 1830s, this outcome was the result of President Jackson’s veto of a bill for the charter of the second 
Bank of the United States in 1832, which essentially abolished the era’s equivalent of a central bank.85 The 
effect was to delegate economic risk assessment and management to private banks, creating a vacuum at 
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the centre in managing systemic risk levels – and fostering the boom in speculative banks and financial 
institutions.86 When exogenous shocks arrived that changed market conditions (reduced lending, 
reduced cotton prices), the system was unable to operate while carrying such risk, and collapsed. A 
similar pattern played out in the Global Financial Crisis: weak regulation of investment banks led to a 
rapid growth in securitization of sub-prime mortgages, generating unrecognized and ultimately toxic 
levels of risk at the system level. 
Both episodes point to the importance of centralized risk monitoring and regulation to align private 
financial behaviour and risk-taking with public interests. Otherwise, there is a danger that de-risking 
serves as a cipher not for risk reduction, but for risk reallocation – away from capital to labour, away 
from owners to workers, and ultimately to societies and States. Profits are privatized, and risks are 
socialized. Yet ultimately when those risks are socialized, it is the least powerful and most marginalized 
that pay the steepest price. In the 1830s, enslaved African-Americans of the southwest were sold through 
multiple hands to settle debts and insolvencies during the 1840s depression. And in 2008 and the years 
that followed, it was people of colour and disadvantaged communities that paid the heaviest price 
following the Global Financial Crisis.87 
Global regulators made significant efforts, after the 2008 crisis, to strengthen the global financial 
system’s risk monitoring, management and coordination systems. Since then, there have been 
significant reforms to mandate management of climate risks in the global financial system, following a 
similar logic. The COVID-19 pandemic suggests that something similar might be required to understand 
systemic risk levels around supply chain and worker vulnerability. Yet to date, there is no coordinated 
mechanism for understanding and managing systemic levels of social risk across the global financial 
system. Development actors, relying increasingly on private financing to drive positive social outcomes, 
have a large stake in ensuring effective systemic risk management. If development actors want to rely 
on private capital to help strengthen social outcomes, they may need to do more to build the policy 
infrastructure needed to manage these systemic risks. Without that infrastructure, we cannot be sure 
that the animal spirits of capital markets have been effectively tamed, and that the financialization of 
development is working effectively for people and planet.
AT THE PROJECT LEVEL
Second, the 1830s episode also holds lessons relating to project-level risk management. The excessively 
cosy relationship between legislatures, State banks and borrowers in the 1830s undermined effective 
risk assessment in lending to develop the Mississippi Valley. The danger today is that the development 
sector’s eagerness to woo private capital may have a similarly dangerous impact on risk assessment, 
leading to the ‘social washing’ or ‘rainbow washing’ of risky investment. Daniela Gabor, for example, 
argues that the shift in bargaining power towards private investors entailed by the Maximizing Finance 
for Development agenda risks allowing investors to “demand their own ESG criteria on MDB loans that 
would be securitized, or cherry-pick loans that are consistent with their ESG framework.” This risks 
giving private investors excessive influence over MDB safeguards and social risk management policies, 
incentivising MDBs to dilute their ESG standards.88 It is also leading to fragmentation, since private ESG 
criteria are not coordinated or consistent – and may actually be a point of commercial differentiation 
for investors. Moreover, once assets are removed from an MDB’s balance sheet, it becomes unclear 
who has responsibility for enforcing social standards.89 If an issuer defaults on obligations under an 
infrastructure bond, and ownership of the underlying asset passes into private hands, who will ensure 
the owner respects environmental and social safeguards and protects workers against modern slavery? 
As Gabor explains: 
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The MDBs’ turn to securitization may further dilute accountability, by increasing 
intermediation chains and reducing the (already weak) incentives for continuously 
enforcing [ESG] compliance. Private ESG criteria are likely to become the norm in 
sustainability-oriented securitization. The “ESG evangelism” at the core of the global 
policy agenda downplays the fickleness of this indicator, and the potential for SDG-
washing inherent in the private and thus far unregulated ESG provision.
This does not necessarily mean that securitization is inherently problematic; instead, it points to the 
importance of improving ESG risk assessment. A reliable, well-regulated market for ESG information will 
be crucial to prevent ‘social-washing’, ensure capital costs align with true social outcomes. Development 
actors have a large and growing stake in this outcome. 
Another insight that emerges from a review of the development experience of the American southwest 
in the 1830s is that innovation in the provision of market information is not only feasible, but also aligns 
with anti-slavery objectives. When credit dried up during the Panic of 1837, American merchants did 
not know which of their clients and debtors to trust. Commerce and confidence quickly shrank, leading 
the US economy into a depression. One group of merchants, who knew and trusted each other from 
their shared fight to abolish slavery, found an innovative solution: they pooled commercial intelligence 
to create a subscription-based credit ratings service. They were led by Lewis Tappan, founder of the 
American Anti-Slavery Society, who organized legal representation before the US Supreme Court for the 
slaves aboard the Amistad. And amongst the ranks of those providing intelligence into this new credit 
ratings service were two young lawyers: from Illinois, one Abraham Lincoln; and from Ohio, one Salmon 
P. Chase – later Governor of and US Senator for Ohio, Secretary of the US Treasury, and Chief Justice 
of the United States. The firm that Tappan founded, the Mercantile Agency, evolved to become Dun & 
Bradstreet, even today a leading business information purveyor.90 And credit ratings are now central to 
the global financial system.
Just as abolitionism was at the heart of the drive for market transparency after the Panic of 1837, so anti-
slavery efforts may need to be at the vanguard today of ensuring that global capital markets accurately 
price ESG risks. Given their growing reliance on those markets, development actors have a growing 
incentive to ensure the effectiveness and coherence of ESG risk assessment methods and benchmarks. 
Yet when it comes to social risk – as opposed to environmental risk – the MDBs and other major 
development organizations have largely been silent on these issues.
The final lesson for pandemic recovery from the development of America’s south-west is thatdevelopment 
outcomes – and modern slavery outcomes – are shaped not only by local and national-level development 
interventions, but by global market regulation. Developing Freedom requires action not just at the 
individual intervention or project level, but at the level of the market – reshaping the global institutions 
in which vulnerability is situated, and to which exploiters strategically respond. If the development 
sector is serious about reducing vulnerability to modern slavery, it must think not only about how to 
safeguard against modern slavery at the individual project level, but also at the systemic level. That 
means thinking about how aid interacts with trade, investment, tax and competition law, about whether 
the growth models and development pathways promoted by existing development interventions are in 
some cases conducive to modern slavery, and about the limitations of a country-by-country approach. 
In the final chapter, we consider what such an approach might entail.
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CHAPTER 10: AN AGENDA FOR 
DEVELOPING FREEDOM 
In this final Chapter, we draw on the insights from all preceding chapter in the study to spell out a 
‘Developing Freedom Agenda’. At the heart of this agenda is the recognition that modern slavery is all 
about the intentional denial of individual economic agency, and the stunted human, economic and 
social development that results. Developing Freedom, as an agenda for development sector thinking 
and action, is thus centrally concerned with protecting and sustaining all individuals’ economic agency 
to prevent enslavement and to unlock the potential of those who have been enslaved. 
We offer five recommendations for implementing this Developing Freedom agenda: 1) commit to develop 
freedom; 2) slavery-proof development pathways; 3) supply freedom; 4) finance freedom; and 5) organize 
communities for freedom. In each area, we offer both a longer-term agenda and specific short-term 
measures needed to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Recommendation 1:  
Commit to Developing Freedom 
In Chapter 1 we explored how the global development system approaches modern slavery. One 
conclusion was that the reduction of modern slavery, forced and child labour, and human trafficking 
is not currently a significant objective of the global development system. Yet, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
evidence suggests there would be development gains – both economic and social – from ending slavery. 
Also in that chapter, we considered the case for putting developing freedom – the maximization of 
people’s economic agency – at the heart of development practice. 
There is a utilitarian case for doing this. Unlocking the potential of those formerly enslaved will lead to 
significant economic and social pay-offs, cascading over generations. But there is also a normative case, 
based not only in notions of ‘leaving no one behind’ but also in human rights. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights includes a right to be free from slavery (Article 4). Development is not sustainable if it 
comes at the cost of creating a permanent under-class, intentionally denied their basic human rights to 
make decisions for themselves. 
Taking the sustainable development case for ending modern slavery seriously means reviewing and 
recasting development strategies, policies, lending and programming through a Developing Freedom 
lens. It requires consideration of the impact of development strategies on people’s economic agency, 
and, centrally, preventing the intentional denial of that agency which modern slavery represents. In 
subsequent recommendations we spell out some of the operational measures required to achieve 
this. Before these are undertaken, the first and most fundamental step will, however, be to commit to 
developing freedom – to create formal institutional mandates for such an operational approach. 
This means elevating developing freedom to the level of a strategic goal of the development system, 
alongside goals such as economic growth and poverty alleviation. For bilateral development agencies, it 
means going well beyond treating modern slavery as an anomaly to be addressed through niche technical 
programming. Instead they will need to make protection and maximization of people’s economic agency 
a more central focus of research, capital allocation and strategy. For the World Bank, other MDBs and 
DFIs, it means going beyond treating forced and child labour as a safeguards issue in project lending 
and bringing analysis of economic agency more centrally into policy lending and advice. And for the 
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UN Development System, it means bringing efforts to reduce modern slavery, forced labour, human 
trafficking and child labour to the centre of discussions with host countries about growth trajectories 
and development pathways. At present they are treated as a niche issue, siloed into voluntary initiatives 
such as the Alliance 8.7 Pathfinders programme. 
Creating the requisite institutional mandates will require reflection, discussion and mobilization (to 
which we return in Recommendation 5, below). Yet this study also offers insights for the short term, 
as the global development system considers how to foster economic recovery from the COVID-19 
pandemic. These are also spelled out in the four other recommendations that follow. For now, we limit 
ourselves to three insights into what it means to ‘commit to develop freedom’ in building back better. 
Resilience
The first insight is that committing to develop freedom will promote resilience. Modern slavery is, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, both a product of and a spur to lack of resilience. Those who lack resilience – because 
they do not have access to savings or credit, for example, during periods of financial shock, or because 
their physical environment makes them more susceptible to natural disaster – are more likely to end up 
in modern slavery. And ending up in modern slavery makes you less resilient, makes your community 
less resilient, and makes your descendants less resilient. There is a reinforcing feedback loop between 
lack of resilience and vulnerability to modern slavery. So developing freedom will promote resilience, 
and ensure that our economy works for people, not against them. Any effort to promote a Developing 
Freedom agenda should therefore note the links between this agenda and the resilience agenda in the 
SDGs, especially Goals 2 (Zero Hunger), 3 (Good Health and Well-being), 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), 
11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities) and 13 (Climate Action), but also 12 (Responsible Consumption 
and Production), 14 (Life below Water) and 15 (Life on Land). 
In the immediate short term, Building Back Better thus means focusing efforts to promoting economic 
agency on those whose resilience is being most tested. It means starting with those ‘furthest behind’. 
Social assistance programmes already account for around 60 per cent of the measures undertaken in 
response to COVID.1 But there is a need to ensure these protect most vulnerable, especially those in 
informal sector, and those that are structurally at a risk of exclusion, such as migrant workers.2 There is 
a particular need to provide fiscal space to least developed countries (LDCs) and low-income countries 
(LICs), to allow them to scale up and extend social protection and social assistance programmes 
including food aid, cash or in-kind transfers, or rent and utility bill waivers.3
Empowerment
The second insight is that committing to develop freedom means addressing questions of power. Vulnerability 
to slavery and lack of resilience are both connected to a lack of power. And enslavement is the ultimate 
denial of economic power, because it involves being recast not as an economic agent but as an economic 
object. Committing to developing freedom requires addressing questions of power, rights and ensuring 
‘no one left behind’, notions central to the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development. Any short-term 
commitment to address modern slavery should explicitly identify the connections between the 
Developing Freedom agenda and the SDG’s empowerment goals, especially Goals 1 (No Poverty), 4 (Good 
Education) and 5 (Gender Equality), but also Goals 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), 8 (Decent Work and 
Economic Growth), 9 (Industry, innovation and infrastructure), and 10 (Reduced Inequality). 
Institutions
A third crucial insight from this study is that slavery systems operate through the interaction of three 
factors: people’s vulnerability; exploiters’ strategies; and the institutional environment. So committing 
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to develop freedom requires addressing institutions. Any commitment to the Developing Freedom Agenda 
is thus intimately linked to SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions). 
This requires thinking not just about formal institutions, but also informal ones. A lesson common 
to both the COVID-19 crisis and other contemporary crises of institutional legitimacy (as reflected in 
the Black Lives Matter movement, and the Me Too movement) is that formal freedoms can be quickly 
hollowed out when they are embedded in larger institutional settings – whether formal or informal 
– that normalize exploitation. So committing to develop freedom means continuing to address social 
institutions such as gender norms, caste, and race; continuing to develop the institutional agenda in 
global development practice; but also considering how global institutional arrangements – on trade, 
competition and tax, amongst others – engender vulnerability. We spell out the implications of this 
insight in later Recommendations.
Recommendation 2:  
Slavery-proof development pathways
Realizing a commitment to developing freedom requires promoting development pathways that maximize 
people’s economic agency. This means looking at development pathways through a Developing Freedom 
lens: testing whether they are unintentionally creating slavery-conducive conditions – and, where they 
are, correcting that tendency, for example by addressing vulnerabilities or shifting growth to sectors 
that are less prone to generate modern slavery. This is an exercise is slavery-proofing development 
pathways.
Labour coercion responds to sector-specific demand.We know that some sectors – especially those 
involving skill-intensive exports – promote human capital formation, while unskilled labour-intensive 
exports discourage it, and may sometimes promote use of child labour.5 And we know that foreign direct 
investment in sectors prone to labour coercion can amplify it.6 It follows that a development policy that 
is committed to fighting slavery must encourage investment in industries that are not coercion-prone – 
such as skill-intensive exports – and discourage investment in those that are more coercion-prone; or, 
at the very least, adopt strategies designed to mitigate coercion-inducing effects. 
A frank reflection will thus be needed on the role that Global Value Chains (GVCs) – as currently 
structured and governed – may play in generating contemporary forms of slavery. As we saw in Chapter 
2, the World Development Report 2020 acknowledges the possibility of what is sometimes called the 
‘adverse’ incorporation of communities into GVCs, and the fact that GVCs sometimes reduce labour 
protections.7 As the case studies in Part Two illustrate, incorporation into GVCs can promote overall 
economic growth and employment, while also reproducing precarity and increasing vulnerability to 
labour exploitation and, in some cases, modern slavery. And this generates vulnerability not only for 
workers, but also for supply chains, as the COVID-19 crisis has revealed.
Development strategies predicated on enlarging the addressable global market by extending the reach of 
GVCs may sometimes increase modern slavery overall, unless those tendencies are somehow mitigated. 
A commitment to Developing Freedom thus requires careful reflection on the relationship between aid 
and trade, and global investment, tax and competition rules. Both the EU and US have shown in recent 
years that linking trade market access to respect for labour standards can prove effective in raising 
standards – with US Customs and Border Protection now detaining goods suspected of being made by 
forced labour, and the EU suspending market access for goods from jurisdictions with recurring labour 
rights concerns.8 Trade preferences and boycotts were a recurring feature of anti-slavery interventions 
studied throughout Part Two. Yet almost no thought has been given, to date, to what a Developing 
Freedom agenda would look like at the WTO. 
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A trade-oriented dimension to the Developing Freedom agenda must go beyond merely attempting to 
accelerating the pace at which countries ‘upgrade’ in GVCs through vertically specialized industrialization 
(VSI): that simply accelerates the churn of communities in and out of the at-risk zone, and fails to 
address the risk-generating properties of the value chain system itself, as currently organized.9 We risk 
treating labour exploitation as a necessary ‘growing pain’ on the path to development. That proposition 
is dubious not only morally, but also empirically. It assumes that countries ‘graduate’ out of labour 
exploitation, whereas there is growing evidence that under contemporary conditions modern slavery is 
present in ‘labour chains’ in countries at all income levels – and responds more to a sectoral logic than a 
national one. VSI risks socially unbundling communities within countries, into high-skilled, capitalized 
winners in cities, and low-skilled wage workers in rural areas. The risk is that some parts of society 
move up the curve, capturing more value and greater shares of returns on capital, while other segments 
of society slide down the curve in the opposite direction. The danger is that VSI leaves low-wage and 
low-skilled workers behind, and splits national economies into two, operating on two different speeds.
What would an alternative approach look like? The answer lies in the commitment to developing 
freedom – and translating this into a re-conception of the developmental role of State. The case studies 
in Part Two makes clear that in a globalized world, the State’s involvement – or abstention – is central to 
modern slavery systems. Given States have committed to end modern slavery, the continued existence 
of modern slavery is clearly a product of State forbearance, collusion, or weakness. As Daron Acemoglu 
has explained lucidly, labour coercion emerges in “the conditions under which producers can use the 
State or other enforcement mechanisms to exercise coercion and pass laws reducing the outside option 
of their employees.”10 And as Andrew Crane has explained those ‘other enforcement mechanisms’ are 
carefully cultivated and maintained social norms and institutions. They operate in non-State domains 
whose separation from the State is a result of strategic action by exploiters, corrupt forbearance by State 
officials, or the limited reach of the State – sometimes quite voluntary.11 
The obvious policy conclusion is that ending slavery requires the active involvement of the State to 
reduce the size and profitability of those domains. As the former IMF Director Peter Doyle has recently 
suggested, it involves rethinking the developmental role of the State to go beyond economic growth, 
poverty alleviation and social development, broadly understood, and to specifically include the protection 
and maximization of people’s economic agency.12 The aim is to ensure that no one gets removed from 
the economic game altogether by being treated not as an economic decision-maker, but as an economic 
object. 
This might sound like a recipe for protectionism. It is not. Protectionism will lead to retrenchment 
and segmentation of existing GVCs, reductions in trade and purchasing power, increase informal and 
precarious work, reduce incomes, and increase vulnerability to modern slavery.13 Protectionism thus 
reduces people’s economic agency. Instead, we argue that realizing the Developing Freedom Agenda – 
both in the longer term and in the immediate context of efforts to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic 
– means promoting development pathways that provide safety nets, promote human development, and 
promote entrepreneurialism and capital formation. These pathways have five main characteristics, to 
which we now turn. 
Development pathways that reduce modern slavery… 
The exact shape of slavery-proof development pathways will vary from country to country, depending 
on numerous context-specific factors, including the factor endowments of the country in question,14 
and how changes in peer and competitor countries impact competitive advantage. 
In some countries, the focus may need to be on reforming governance and institutions; in others, it may 
be more on labour market regulation. Juliette Faure has pointed out, for example, that trade liberalization 
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was successful in reducing labour exploitation in Vietnam in part because consumers – whose rice prices 
went up – were also rice producers. There, institutional reforms that fostered integration into global 
markets enhanced people’s economic agency. In contrast, in Brazil, trade liberalization has not had the 
same effects, in part because land-ownership is highly concentrated. As we saw in Chapter 3, landless 
workers have not benefited from the returns to capital brought on by trade liberalization, and have 
instead been exposed to the down-side risks from adverse incorporation into GVCs.15 In such cases, 
developing freedom may require a greater focus on reforming markets (as the ILO has in Uzbekistan, as 
we saw in Chapter 5, and Qatar, as we saw in Chapter 8), to make the inefficiencies of forced labour more 
visible, and hence disrupt exploiter strategies. 
Thus, there is no one-size fits all solution to slavery-proofing development pathways, but rather a 
set of common characteristics that derive from a central focus on maximizing economic agency. The 
reforms needed to realize those characteristics will depend on the context. Whether the chosen pathway 
focuses on an institutional, market or some other transformational vector, what emerges is that slavery-
proofing policy mixes involve States taking a much more direct and active role in protecting economic 
agency. This is a vision of States steering their people towards skills-based entrepreneurialism, even – 
or perhaps especially – in countries with large informal workforces. This is a vision of a developmental 
State that absorbs and manages risk, empowering its people to develop not just as wage laborers but as 
capital formers and as creators.16 Broadly, these pathways are likely to do five things: 
…develop human capital
As we saw in Chapter 2, economic empowerment is central to addressing vulnerability. Capital formation 
– including human capital development – is central to empowerment. This is why education emerges 
in recent IMF analysis as the key driver of economic benefits from terminating child marriage,17 and 
has long been recognized as a key intervention to address child labour. Slavery-proofing development 
pathways will require greater investment in human capital development not only through school 
education, but also through more attention to tertiary education, professional skills development, and 
life-long learning. In the immediate context of Building Back Better, it suggests a need to ensure all 
children have access to education despite public health measures such as lockdowns. And it requires 
prioritizing those furthest behind, especially migrant communities, for example through language 
training and recognition of existing skills and qualifications, to unlock their potential as resources for 
building back better.
… promote entrepreneurialism and pre-distribution of wealth
Maximizing economic agency and reducing vulnerability to coercive labour means giving people the 
ability to be their own boss. This has several elements. First, increasing labour mobility, both within 
national labour markets and across borders. States should work together to promote safe, regular 
and legal migration and facilitate remittance flows. As we saw in Chapter 8, development actors have 
important roles to play here in addressing the risks and inefficiencies associated with recruitment 
fees.Second, financial inclusion, especially access to credit, working capital and insurance. And 
third, fostering saving and capital formation, for example through policies promoting pensions and 
retirement saving, even amongst informal workforces. One idea that is receiving growing attention is 
‘pre-distribution’ of wealth through mutualization of new technologies.18 For example, countries that 
rely heavily on industries especially susceptible to automation or the green transition could cushion 
those transitions by promoting mass ownership of replacement technologies (green technologies, 
industrial robots) – both to offset looming job losses, and to serve as a driver of growth in a manner 
akin to mass home ownership during the twentieth century.19 And another idea that emerges from Part 
Two as worthy of close scrutiny is the use of cooperative forms of production and organization to allow 
small-scale producers to achieve scale without sacrificing autonomy through vertical integration and 
control. 
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… provide safety nets
Safety nets promote economic agency, not only by protecting people’s capabilities in crisis, but also by 
fostering responsible entrepreneurialism and risk-taking. Relevant policies include: establishing national 
social protection floors; access to universal healthcare; access to childcare; and strengthened access to 
unemployment, sickness or disability benefits. In the short term, there is a particular need to think 
about how to extend safety nets to informal and marginalized workers. Conventional measures relying 
on formal payroll structures – such as wage subsidies and tax relief – will struggle to achieve impact 
in those contexts. So innovative mechanisms may be needed, such as harnessing digital government-
to-person (G2P) platforms used for healthcare, utilities or disaster recovery to reach informal workers. 
Multilateral lenders and donors may also need to increase funding to support developing countries to 
extend income and food support. 
… promote high-skilled growth
In Chapter 2, we saw that, as Andrew Crane has argued, one way to reduce modern slavery is to make it 
less profitable than other management practices. The development sector should encourage countries 
to adopt industrial and labour market policies that promote skilled jobs and reduce incentives for use 
of low-productivity, low-wage labour. This may involve industrial policy to promote skills-intensive 
exports, backed up by education investments and training incentives. Wage policy is also relevant: by 
mandating high wages at the bottom of the distribution, governments encourage employers to automate 
and encourage workers to move into higher-skilled, higher-paying roles. This depends, however, on 
workers having access to safety nets and educational opportunities, to allow them to move safely to 
other roles, without in the meantime becoming vulnerable. In order to justify sinking investments in 
upskilling, governments may need to enter into arrangements with employers to assure continued 
demand from employers for this skilled labour. 
… reduce inequality of economic agency
Finally, this study suggests that modern slavery is closely connected to inequality – not simply of wealth 
or income, but of economic power. Modern slavery involves some actors profiting from controlling 
the economic agency of others. Policies that work to reduce inequalities of economic agency – such as 
progressive taxation policies, competition policies that reduce market concentration and the oligopsony 
power of lead firms, and corporate regulation that serves to flatten wage distribution – will all help to 
reduce modern slavery. 
To achieve this vision of States using their power to develop economic agency, States will themselves 
need access to finance and investment – a key role for the development sector, discussed further below. 
But States will also need to be willing to exercise that power. They will need to be prepared to discharge 
their role as intermediaries between global markets and people – and to resist efforts by global capital 
to play States against each other to maximize returns by watering down labour protections. 
The COVID-19 crisis arguably facilitates a move in this direction, because it has enlarged the role of 
the State as an owner, investor and manager in many value chains. It gives States a greater ability to 
govern the interaction of international capital flows with local labour, and to manage international 
labour movements. That power is particularly significant where States are willing to work together. How 
States work together in coming years to govern value chains – supply chains, labour migration, and 
capital flows – thus emerges as a key question for the Developing Freedom Agenda. We turn next to those 
questions.
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Recommendation 3:  
Supply freedom 
Development actors have enormous leverage over their clients’ and partners’ business practices – and, 
under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, a responsibility to use that leverage 
to encourage efforts to prevent and remedy modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking. That 
leverage has grown significantly as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic: many government budgets 
have expanded through unprecedented bail-outs of private industry, in return acquiring large equity 
positions and debt books. To foster recovery from the pandemic, development actors should encourage 
clients, companies and suppliers to which they are connected to prioritize protecting people as effective 
economic agents.
Development actors should use their resources and leverage to encourage responsible business 
conduct in supply chains, including human rights due diligence and steps to transform supply chains 
that are particularly likely to generate modern slavery risks. As the OECD has noted, promotion and 
implementation of responsible business conduct “is an opportunity for long-term market-oriented 
development solutions that can have an economy-wide impact.”20 Immediate steps are needed to 
safeguard workers, suppliers and other business partners from the modern slavery risks associated 
with COVID-19 and the resulting economic downturn. In the short term, they should prioritize sectors 
and value chains where COVID-19 has most severely reduced economic agency and heightened modern 
slavery risks. The central goal should be to keep as many people involved in the economy as active 
agents as possible. This means taking immediate steps to mitigate worker vulnerability, and longer-
term measures to foster resilience, through formal conditionalities and accountabilities in new lending 
or variation of existing loan and grant terms, through relevant environmental and social assessments, 
and through new strategic initiatives.21 Examples of steps that development actors can take to address 
modern slavery risks in their own, clients’ and partners’ supply chains, include:
Protect workers’ health, incomes and livelihoods
Lenders and investors should provide information to governance bodies and to business partners 
about how to address modern slavery risk in COVID-19 response. Some multilateral organizations and 
governments are already doing this.22 
Development actors should ensure partners foster compliance with relevant occupational health and 
safety standards, including on personal protective equipment (PPE). Where possible, borrowers and 
clients should be encouraged to maintain supplier relationships and even relax delivery terms, while 
extending orders, accelerating payments and front-loading supplier financing. They should, as far as 
possible, retain workers on payroll, and continue their access to health-care, sick-leave, family leave and 
childcare. Development actors can encourage governments to offer affected businesses wage subsidies, 
loan guarantees, and flexible payment schedules for tax and social security contributions.
This also requires reviewing pandemic-period business decisions, including contract terminations and 
withholding of payments, for modern slavery risk. Development actors may need to consider whether 
after-the-fact remedial measures are needed where clients’ and borrowers’ decisions have contributed 
to or caused increased modern slavery risk.
Work together 
Governments, business and international organizations face common challenges managing high-risk 
supply chains. They all stand to gain from a collective approach, particularly in mapping modern-slavery 
risks and in shaping response plans. 
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Development actors at all levels should encourage ongoing social dialogue among governments, 
employers and workers’ organizations, to design effective strategies to protect workers and their 
families. This should encourage worker engagement and assure non-discrimination, including on the 
basis of union affiliation, or on the basis of contract type when providing severance pay or remediation 
measures. One area that requires particular attention is high-risk labour migration corridors – i.e. 
those where labour trafficking, corruption in recruitment practices, and debt bondage are especially 
prevalent. Both businesses and governments stand to benefit from a collective approach to managing 
repatriation, and to re-opening and managing those corridors, as do workers. 
Yet ‘supplying freedom’ also means thinking in more transformative terms: moving from treating 
respect for human rights as a supply chain safeguards issue in projects aimed at other development 
objectives, to organizing projects aimed squarely at transforming supply chains to reduce modern 
slavery risks. This requires thinking about how governments can reshape markets and value chains so 
that they are not so prone to generate modern slavery as they are now. The case studies in Part Two 
make clear that even notionally ‘private governance’ of supply chains takes place in the shadow of the 
State.23 The GVC model is a product of ongoing action by States to maintain and adapt the global market 
conditions, structures and systems within which GVCs operate.24 As we saw in Chapters 4 (palm oil), 6 
(fisheries), and 7 (garments and apparel), some countries have begun to assert themselves in and over 
private governance of supply chains as they recognize that “firm-driven governance of GVCs affects their 
sovereignty over territory, rulemaking, producers and economic organization.”25 The conditions that 
render public-private partnerships to govern GVCs most effective remain contested.26 Yet it is clear that 
cooperation between business, governments and international actors can work – that is, it can create 
both economic growth and improved social outcomes. In Vietnam, for example, the ILO-IFC Better 
Work Programme combined with complementary government action to disclose the names of firms 
failing to meet key labour standards, even as the relevant sectors experienced significant growth.27 The 
UK-funded Work in Freedom project, involving governments, suppliers and international organizations 
in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Jordan, Lebanon and some Gulf countries, has also provided rich insights.28
What is missing in many cases, however, is a truly whole-of-value chain approach to GVC governance and 
transformation. Supply chains are transnational; development programming continues to be conceived 
and delivered largely at the national level. This suggests a need for closer cooperation amongst major 
development actors and firms along specific value chains, to identify modern slavery risks and develop 
agreed strategies for collective action to address them. It also suggests an important role for the UN 
Development System, using its Regional Economic Commissions and coordinated action by UN country 
teams along specific corridors or value chains, to foster that collaboration. This goes well beyond the 
current approach in the UN’s Alliance 8.7, which has to date limited its efforts to country-by-country 
engagement. Yet, governments may be receptive to such an approach: they have a common interest in 
effective modern slavery risk management, to develop a more equitable arrangement for sharing the 
social costs of modern slavery amongst themselves and with business, rather than the poorest and most 
marginalized bearing them alone. 
In the short term, pandemic recovery offers a new start – a chance for governments to work with value 
chain stakeholders to reshape those value chains, collaborating, rather than competing. This could 
begin, for example, with development of a set of shared expectations of suppliers in specific high-risk 
value chains – such as PPE, or specific agricultural value chains with rising rates of child labour (such as 
the cocoa industry) or forced labour (fisheries and aquaculture or cattle). 
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Recommendation 4:  
Finance freedom 
The role of development finance in realizing the Developing Freedom Agenda can be understood on 
two time-scales: the immediate needs of crisis response, and the longer-term opportunities for use of 
development finance as leverage for systemic change. 
Responding to the crisis: keeping people afloat 
In the context of the pandemic and resulting economic downturn, maintaining economic agency is 
centrally a question of keeping people and businesses afloat. Development actors have immediate and 
clear roles to play here. 
INCREASE LIQUIDITY AND FINANCIAL ACCESS AT ALL LEVELS
With income and cashflow down at every level – individual, household, business, economy – development 
actors have a crucial role to play to forestall a spiralling debt crisis. There are a variety of ways they can 
do this. They can relax sovereign debt repayment terms, and increase access to liquidity, for example 
through emergency loans and access to Special Drawing Rights. They can increase liquidity for business 
finance through expanded guarantees, trade finance, collateralization of existing property, and simply 
making additional funds available. The Dutch development bank, FMO, for example, is at the time of 
writing standing up a special financing facility to support clients’ efforts to provide income protection 
and other assistance to workers. And where development actors have investments in or lending to 
intermediary financial institutions, they can encourage those clients to adopt a similar approach by 
relaxing repayment timelines, covenants on factors such as repayment rates, net asset values, and 
capital adequacy ratios.29
Particular attention should be paid to extending access to savings mechanisms and insurance to informal 
sectors, for example through social insurance such as the Micro Pension Plan in Nigeria, Ejo Heza LTSS 
in Rwanda and Mbao in Kenya.30 Financing for such projects could help enlarge their reach and provide a 
mechanism for drawing informal workers into social registries that may have other benefits for tracking 
and addressing worker vulnerability. This is the approach underpinning World Bank support for the 
West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion.31
PROTECT MICROFINANCE
At the time of writing there was a looming liquidity crisis in the global microfinance industry. Microfinance 
providers whose lending is critical for poor and underprivileged populations were excluded from most 
of the COVID-19 financial relief packages.32 Yet the microfinance industry currently supplies around 
140 million low-income people worldwide credit worth around $124 billion. 80 per cent of these people 
are women, and 65 per cent live in rural settings.33 These are all people disproportionately vulnerable 
to trafficking. Microfinance providers typically rely on high repayment rates – they do not have large 
reserves. Yet around 90 per cent of all borrowers were at risk of default (at the time of writing), suggesting 
a need for consideration of a global rescue plan.34 Given their significant exposure to the industry, this 
is a serious concern for DFIs, yet some commentators described them as “missing in action”.35 We have 
seen some coordination amongst European microfinance investors on potential responses,36 but there 
is a need to go further. 
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EXPAND DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION
Pandemic lockdowns are fuelling a rapid acceleration of digitalization of payments and finance.37 Some 
governments are moving towards issuing centrally-backed e-currencies,38 while others are encouraging 
firms to use digital payments to keep services running during the crisis.39 This has positive implications 
for slavery reduction, because digital finance offers new and more inclusive ways to assess the 
creditworthiness of low-income households and small business.40 It also has empowerment impacts: for 
example, moving firms onto digital wage payments, as it likely reduces women’s vulnerability.41 Enlarging 
financial inclusion even has macroeconomic benefits including economic growth and reduced income 
inequality,42 and building out government to person (G2P) platforms can assist with a variety of forms 
of service-provision and protection by the State.43 But the crisis has also highlighted unequal access to 
digital infrastructure, pointing to important openings for development actors over the longer term. 
Using development finance as leverage for systemic change
In that longer term, development finance has a key role to play in mobilizing finance against slavery and 
trafficking. Finance is a lever that can move the economy.44 Development finance, as a key link between 
global capital markets and national economic strategies, has a crucial role to play in determining the 
direction in which that leverage is applied. 
In Chapter 9 we saw how current approaches to development finance aim to use public instruments to 
crowd-in private financing to promote achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
We also saw that there are some concerns around social risk management in blended finance. The 
obvious conclusion is that if development actors are serious about tackling modern slavery, they should 
work to strengthen modern slavery risk management in blended finance and development finance more 
broadly. There are several aspects to this. 
EXCLUDE KNOWN MODERN SLAVERY RISKS FROM MULTILATERAL FINANCING
As we saw in Chapter 1, many bilateral and development actors have safeguards frameworks in place 
to prevent financing of forced and child labour. In some cases – such as the 15 European DFIs in the 
European Development Finance Institution association (EDFI), and the IFC – this extends to formal 
‘exclusion lists’.45 Some major (non-concessional) institutional investors, such as the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global, have similar exclusion arrangements in place.46 In Brazil, the national 
development bank (BNDES) – the second largest domestic development bank in the world – also excludes 
financing entities on the Government-published lista suja (or ‘dirty list’). Yet to date there seems to have 
been little effort by development actors to pool this information or create mutual enforcement schemes. 
This lack of coordination to exclude modern slavery risks from development finance contrasts to progress 
in two related areas. First, multilateral development banks do have arrangements in place to mutually 
enforce each other’s decisions to bar entities from competing for contracts, based on past association 
with fraud or corruption.47 The African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank 
Group mutually enforce each other’s debarment actions, with respect to four “harmonized sanctionable 
practices”, i.e. corruption, fraud, coercion, and collusion. Coordination includes the creation of a pooled, 
public database of debarment decisions and barred entities.48 Yet this does not include forced labour or 
child labour: using them in a project financed by one MDB will not get you barred from financing by the 
others. Second, there is growing attention to modern slavery risks in public procurement. For example, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US and UK have committed to exclude known modern slavery risks 
from public procurement.49 And OSCE countries have also taken action in this area.50 Yet to date this 
does not extend to public finance – lending and investment. 
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All of this points to low-hanging fruit: a coordinated effort on exclusion from financing of modern 
slavery risks by the MDBs, other major development finance entities and perhaps also non-concessional 
institutional investors. At a minimum, this could include sharing information about entities barred from 
financing, facilitating each entity’s own due diligence and screening efforts. Ideally it would include 
some sort of mutual enforcement arrangements as well. 
STRENGTHEN ESG RISK INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Next, development actors should use their advocacy for and participation in blended finance to help 
develop a more robust, transparent and reliable social risk information regime, especially in relation to 
modern slavery and human trafficking risks. This means developing a common taxonomy of social risks, 
standardized risk measurement methods, and incentives for their use. Instead of relying on borrowers 
and financial intermediaries to set and implement their own ESG standards and assessment methods, 
MDBs, DFIs and major donors will need to agree and set global standards and work to harmonize these 
with commercial offerings. Capital markets are keen to see ESG standardization; development actors 
have an important role to play in that process. 
MONITOR SYSTEMIC LEVELS OF MODERN SLAVERY RISK
Third, as we saw from earlier sections in this Chapter, where financial risk management is decentralized 
and privatized – as it is in the ESG context, currently – there is a particular need for monitoring systemic 
risk levels. At present, neither development actors nor global financial regulators consider management 
of systemic risks related to modern slavery or labour exploitation as being within their remit. Yet the 
system-wide impacts of the build-up of these risks suggests that central banks, the Financial Stability 
Board and the IMF, should all be mandated to consider these risks. 
TACKLE ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM MODERN SLAVERY AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Fourth, modern slavery, forced labour and human trafficking concerns should be brought into the 
development sector’s discussions on illicit financial flows and stolen assets recovery. 
States are increasingly turning to sanctions instruments to exclude actors involved in forced labour 
and modern slavery from the financial system. The United Nations Security Council sanctioned six 
Libyan human traffickers in 2018.51 The United States has sanctioned both individuals and organizations 
suspected of involvement forced labour in human trafficking,52 and the UK Government recently imposed 
sanctions on two North Korean entities involved in forced labour.53 
The relevant regimes require financial institutions to cease doing business with designated persons, 
and sometimes to freeze or even seize assets. To date, however, asset freezing, seizure and recovery 
associated with forced labour and human trafficking is almost non-existent. This reflects a broader 
pattern of failure to recover assets in anti-trafficking cases. In Europe in 2015-2016, 72 orders freezing 
assets associated with trafficking cases were reported, freezing property worth EUR 6,099,984.54 A further 
38 asset confiscation (seizure, not merely freezing) orders recovered property worth EUR 2,008,416. This 
is a very small fraction of the total asset freezes and seizures for that period across all offences – around 
EUR 2.4 billion and EUR 1.2 billion respectively.55 Limited seizures means limited restitution to victims. 
In the United States between 2012 and 2016, the average restitution award in trafficking cases was USD 
59,244.25.56
Development actors could work with relevant law enforcement entities to strengthen recovery of assets 
corruptly acquired through organized forced labour. This is particularly relevant where State organs are 
involved, as may be the case in Eritrea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Myanmar, some central 
Asian countries, China, and Libya. Recovery of such assets would help finance freedom, especially if 
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development actors worked together to earmark recovered assets associated with forced labour for 
remediation of resulting harms, and further prevention efforts. 
Recommendation 5:  
Organize communities for freedom
Finally, one of the central insights of this study is that slavery is not only an economic, but a political 
system that illegally redistributes wealth from labour to coercive capital. Disruption of slavery systems 
has always generated resistance and backlash and will continue to do so in future. In Part Two we saw 
how those with interests in slavery systems meet anti-slavery mobilizations with their own counter-
mobilizations, harassing, intimidating and even killing activists; mounting court challenges and 
outflanking legislative manoeuvres; enlisting allies in law enforcement and the executive; or simply 
waiting until the anti-slavery mobilization runs out of puff. To develop freedom therefore requires 
sustained political engagement and, as we also saw in the case studies in Part Two, deliberate and 
effective community mobilization and strategic coordination – from the local level to the global level.
Community mobilization is essential to changing the institutional environment that sustains slavery 
systems. As we saw especially in Chapter 7’s discussion of the Freedom Fund strategy in Tirupur, 
development interventions that have focused on community empowerment show particular promise 
in the fight to end slavery.57 But the need for community mobilization does not end at the local level. It 
applies equally to the development sector itself, and is central to recent initiatives such as Alliance 8.7 
and the NGO-led Freedom Forum. However, simply put, there is currently no common strategy at the 
global level for ending slavery – and certainly not one that involves major development actors, who are 
largely absent from those forums. There has been no articulation to or by development actors of what 
it would cost to end slavery, what the pay-offs would be, or how to allocate resources strategically to 
achieve this result – whether globally or for a specific industrial sector. And five years into the 2030 
Agenda, there is not even a formal indicator approved by the UN Statistical Commission to address 
modern slavery under SDG 8.7, nor any informal set of metrics. It has fallen to civil society actors such as 
the Minderoo Foundation’s Walk Free initiative to pioneer work in this area.58 
What would effective community organization by the development sector look like? 
A Developing Freedom Forum
First, recognizing that developing freedom and disrupting slavery is a political project, there needs to 
be mobilization and organization by development actors. Like-minded actors could begin by forming 
a Developing Freedom Forum to share information, learn lessons, and develop coordinated strategy, 
building on past efforts.An agenda for discussion in this Forum could include:
• mapping modern slavery risks relating to specific geographies, value chains and development 
pathways;
• impact measurement frameworks:
  developing programming codes on modern slavery to supplement OECD DAC codes;
  agreeing relevant M&E variables for programme evaluations; 
  sharing information on spending, evaluations and impact;
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• coordinating financing exclusions on modern slavery grounds;
• common risk management guidance for clients and partners, especially financial intermediaries and 
those with supply chains characterized by salient modern slavery risks;
• coordination on the handling of modern slavery in ESG risk information disclosure regimes, governance 
and markets;
• joint analysis of the price of freedom and the freedom dividend, i.e. the costs and pay-offs of the 
transformations required to end modern slavery in specific countries, value chains, and/or at the 
global level (discussed below); and
• slavery reduction strategies for specific countries or value chains (also discussed below). 
Identify the price of freedom
Second, there is a need for a discussion about the price of freedom – and what Kevin Bales has called the 
‘freedom dividend’. Governments, business and other stakeholders will be reluctant to disrupt specific 
slavery systems until they understand both what up-front and opportunity costs are involved – the 
price of freedom – and who will gain what pay-offs – the ‘freedom dividend’. This approach need not, 
initially, be ‘global’. Given the limited state of knowledge about what works to disrupt modern slavery, it 
may prove too difficult to put a single, reliable price-tag on achieving SDG 8.7 globally, for example. But 
it almost certainly is possible to begin to develop such assessments for specific communities, countries 
and value chains. And until development sector actors do that, any advocacy for ending modern slavery 
is unlikely to get the attention of public policy actors. 
Expect resistance – and strategize accordingly 
Finally, development actors will need to be strategic. We must be honest – and serious – about the 
fact that developing freedom means there will be losers: the rentiers who currently benefit from the 
extractive institutions of slavery. They are often both wealthy and powerful. This is why disrupting 
slavery has often been costly: rentiers must either be shown that the new dispensation will make the 
better off, they must be repressed, or they must be bought off. Achieving these results requires strategy 
– and coordination.
As we saw in Part Two, to be successful, development interventions aimed at reducing slavery will need 
to combine not only financial resources and technical know-how, but also political influence. As those 
case studies show, this is possible. But it requires sustained effort and – crucially – alignment of strategy 
amongst diverse actors, often including major donors, multilateral partners, business, and civil society 
organizations, around concrete reform demands. The need for multi-stakeholder coordination only 
increases as interventions move from the local to the national to the value chain to global regime level, as 
the regime complex shaping the value chain becomes more complicated. Yet without such coordination 
arrangements, the case studies in Part Two suggest, efforts to intervene in modern slavery systems are 
unlikely to succeed. Those systems, stealing some people’s agency to enrich others, will remain in place 
– and with them a significant drag on sustainable development.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 – List of search terms used in literature mapping
Core term Related search terms
Antislavery Slavery; antislavery (anti-slavery); modern slavery; contemporary 
slavery; contemporary forms of slavery; Forced labour; compulsory 
labour; forced work; coerced labour; institutions and practices similar to 
slavery; slavery-like practices; serfdom; debt bondage; bonded labour; 
unfree labour; peon-age; exploitative adoption; human trafficking; 
trafficking in persons; traf-ficking in human beings; trafficking in people; 
sex trafficking; labour traf-ficking; worst forms of child labour; child 
exploitation; forced marriage; servile marriage; prevalence of slavery; 
prevalence of modern slavery; slav-ery prevalence (and analogous terms 
for other words above); ef-fect/effects/impacts of terms above
Sustainable 
development
Sustainable development; development; development goals;  
international development
SDG1: End poverty Poverty reduction; poverty alleviation; social welfare; social protection; 
equality; equal rights
SDG2: Zero hunger Sustainable food production; nutrition, malnutrition; food security;  
food insecurity; agricultural productivity; food production systems
SDG3: Good health  
and wellbeing
Maternal mortality; child mortality; mortality rates; morbidity rates; 
mater-nal health; child health; disease reduction; drug treatment; alcohol 
treat-ment; traffic accident reduction; sexual and reproductive health 
services; access to family planning; universal health coverage; health 
services; vac-cination; birth rates; children per household
SDG4: Quality 
education
Free primary school education; free secondary school education;  
primary school education; secondary school education; quality primary 
education; early childhood development care; quality secondary 
education; primary school participation; secondary school participation; 
quality tertiary educa-tion; skills development; literacy; numeracy
SDG5: Gender 
equality
Gender equality; elimination of discrimination; elimination of gender-
based violence; social protection; equal pay;sexual and reproductive 
health services
SDG6: Clean water 
and sanitation
Safe drinking water; sanitation; pollution reduction; water resources 
man-agement; environmental protection
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Core term Related search terms
SDG7: Affordable and 
clean energy
University access to modern energy; renewable energy; energy efficiency; 
clean energy; energy infrastructure; energy technology development
SDG8: Decent work 
and economic growth
Economic growth; economic productivity; Increase in GDP; access to 
financial services; employment opportunities; productive employment; 
labour rights; decent work; fair work; national income per capita;  
product per capita; marginal product of labour
SDG9:  
Industry, innovation  
and agriculture
Quality infrastructure; reliable infrastructure; resilient 
infrastructure;inclu-sive industrialization; sustainable industrialization
SDG10: Reduced 
inequalities
Reduced inequality; income growth; sustained income growth;  
duty free treatment; fiscal protection policies; wage protection policies; 
social protec-tion policies; official development  




Adequate housing; safe housing; affordable housing; access to 
transport sys-tems; sustainable urbanization; regional development 




Sustainable consumption; sustainable production
SDG13: Climate 
action
Climate change measures; climate change action; climate change plans; 
climate change mitigation; early warning systems
SDG14: Life below 
water
Marine pollution management; marine system management; marine 
man-agement; marine protection; coastal management;  
IUU management plan-ning; IUU regulation; sustainable management  
of fisheries; sustainable aq-uaculture
SDG15: Life on land Forest conservation; conservation of ecosystems; biodiversity  
plans; biodi-versity protection; genetic resource management
SDG16: Peace, justice  
and strong 
institutions
Rule of law; corruption; anti-corruption; bribery; anti-bribery; 
transparent institutions; representative decision-making; democratic 
systems; legal iden-tity; birth registration
SDG17: Partnerships Domestic resource mobilization; official development assistance; debt 
sus-tainability; debt reduction; multi-lateral trading system; duty free 
market access; quota free market access; macroeconomic stability
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Appendix 2 – PRISMA flow chart for sources in the literature 
mapping
Records identified through database 






Text excluded, with justification
N = ...
1.    Justifications... N = ...
2.    Justifications... N = ...
3.    Justifications... N = ...
4.    ...            
Records screened
N = ...
Full texts assessed for eligibility
N = ...
Studies coded for evidence gap map
N = ...
Adapted from Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzla	, J., Altman, D. G., & The PRISMA Grpup, 
‘Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA 
statement’ (2009) 6(7) PLoS Med
Justifications
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Appendix 3 – Literature mapping – initial coding terms 
INTERVENTION CATEGORIES
Intervention scope
Y1 Explicit antislavery  
intervention (objectives)
Identifies whether antislavery is specifically addressed  
in intervention objectives.
Y2 Explicit development  
intervention (objectives)
Identifies whether development is specifically  
addressed in intervention objectives.
Individual level
A1 Economic, income  
generation
Includes impact and other types of evaluations, and 
systematic reviews of economic interventions and their 
effects on development outcomes. Examples include 
vocational or skills training, cash transfer programs, 
microfinance.
A2 Social, skills building, 
awareness raising,  
education
Includes evaluations and systematic reviews of non-
economic interventions, such as programs targeting 
awareness raising, skills building, education, and access 
to services.
A3 Health Includes evaluations focusing on psycho-social assistance 
of slavery survivors, victim care programs
Household level
B1 Family interventions Interventions targeting households that are at risk  
of e.g. pushing children to leave school and migrate,  
or into forced marriage.
B2 School based activities Interventions targeting school aged children that teach 
children about e.g. the risks of trafficking with a slavery 
prevention aim.
B3 Economic programs e.g. microfinance, cash transfers
Community level
C1 Communication  
and advocacy campaigns
Awareness campaigns that aim to raise awareness 
or increase knowledge about slavery as an issue. 
Interventions include television, radio, newspaper, 
magazine or other print publication advocacy, social 
media campaigns, and so on. The campaigns use 
marketing to attempt to change perceptions, attitudes, 
and behaviours, and encourage positive behaviour.
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C2 Private sector 
interventions
Campaigns and targeted training in workplaces; 
workplace regulations; supply chain mapping etc.
Institution level
D1 Awareness and advocacy 
focused on authorities
Interventions aimed at increasing awareness and capacity, 
or mobilising resources, at the institutional level e.g. 
political actors, government agencies, law enforcement 
personnel, the judiciary. 
D2 Promotion of standards, 
legislation
Initiatives to establish, or to promote e.g. the ratification 
of key instruments, establish minimum age of marriage, 
minimum age of work etc.
Society level
E1 Creation, adoption of 
standards designed to  
protect individuals  
from slavery
Initiatives to develop e.g. Codes of Conduct, Standards, 
regional or international laws to protect workers from 
exploitation.
E2 Building welfare systems Initiatives to build and/or strengthen welfare systems so 
that children and vulnerable persons are protected and 
supported prior to exploitation occurring.
E3 Unionization Initiatives to allow workers to advocate  
for their legal rights.
E4 Durable solutions Initiatives to e.g. grant slavery survivors long-term visas, 
refugee status.
Emerging trends in slavery prevention
F1 ICT based interventions Includes mobile phones, apps, Internet, hotlines. 
F2 Multi-component 
interventions
Included here are studies evaluating interventions that 
operate across various levels, either evaluating a program 
as a whole, or evaluating multiple interventions at more 
than one level. For example, an intervention aiming to 
empower women and girls by teaching them skills, while 
also providing psycho-social counselling, would be coded 
under this category. 
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Outcome scope
X1 Explicit antislavery  
outcome(s)
Identifies whether antislavery outcomes (positive or 
negative) are specifically identified in relation to the 
intervention. 
X2 Explicit development 
outcome(s)
Identifies whether development outcomes (positive or 
negative) are specifically identified in relation to the 
intervention. 
Individual level
G1 Increased awareness of slavery
G2 Improved life skills
G3 Improved access to, and use of services
G4 Improved socio-economic factors (reduction in poverty, employment)
G5 Improved education factors (enrolment in/continuation of education)
G6 Improved health (psycho-social benefits, sexual health
G7 Decreased incidence/exposure to slavery
Household level
H1 Increased awareness of slavery
H2 Improved life skills
H3 Decreased incidence/exposure to slavery
H4 Improved decision making (e.g. regarding child marriage, child labour)
Community level
I1 Decreased incidence, prevalence and exposure to slavery (e.g. reports on the percentage 
of people in situations of slavery in a particular community will be included here). 
I2 Improved community response to slavery
I3 Improved gender equality
OUTCOME CATEGORIES
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Institution level
J1 Improved knowledge of slavery and related issues at the institutional level; improved 
ability to prevent and respond to slavery
J2 Improved relationships and cooperation between institutional actors (e.g. government 
agencies, and government-NGO partnerships); examples are establishment of National 
Referral Mechanisms
J3 Increased funding or mobilization of resources to issues related to modern slavery  
or development
Society level
K1 Adoption of new or existing human rights laws
K2 Decrease in incidence of slavery (e.g. reports on the percentage of adults  
and children in situations of slavery, at national/regional level, will be included). 
K3 Reduced corruption
K4 Improved public health
K5 Improved education systems/structures
K6 Improved socio-economic conditions (reduction in poverty, unemployment,  
inequality etc)
K7 Improved health systems/structures
K8 Increased labour productivity
K9 Improved social welfare/protection systems
K10 Improvements to terms of trade
K11 Economic improvements (GDP, GNP, PPP, public revenues, costs of capital etc)
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CROSS-CUTTING THEMES AND ADDITIONAL CODING
Intervention scope
L1 Cost-effectiveness
L2 Long-term impact Measures impact 24 months or more after baseline or 
intervention implementation
L3 Focus on women and girls
L4 Vulnerable populations 
(beyond women and girls)
L5 Focus on men and boys
L6 Focus on forced marriage
L7 Negative effects of 
intervention/s
L8 Type of evaluation Impact / process
L10 Evaluation methodology Quantitative / qualitative / mixed-methods
L9 Evaluation design Experimental / quasi-experimental / Randomised 
controlled trial (RCT) / Propensity score matching (PSM)
L11 Intervention status Completed / ongoing
L12 Geographic scope Country / region
L13 Publication year
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Appendix 4 – Literature mapping – consolidated coding terms 
Antislavery intervention types Initial classification system
A1 Modern slavery survivor 
rehabilitation and health 
services
Includes interventions focused on 
rehabilitation, health, and other psycho-social 
assistance for survivors of modern slavery
A3
A2 Public communications, 
awareness and advocacy 
campaigns
Awareness campaigns aiming to raise 
awareness or increase knowledge about 
modern slavery. Interventions include 
television, radio, newspaper, magazine or 
other print publication advocacy, social media 
campaigns, and so on. The campaigns use 
marketing to attempt to change perceptions, 
attitudes, and behaviours, and encourage 
positive behaviour.
C1
A3 Private sector antislavery 
interventions
Interventions focused on private sector 
actors, including campaigns and targeted 
training in workplaces, workplace regulations, 
supply chain mapping etc.
C2
A4 Institutional antislavery 
awareness, advocacy and 
access programmes
Interventions aimed at increasing awareness 
and capacity, or mobilising re-sources, at 
the institutional level e.g. political actors, 
government agencies, law enforcement 
personnel, the judiciary. This includes 
training of officials and police on existing 
standards and frameworks, and initiatives 






A5 Legislative, regulatory, 
and standards-based 
programmes
Creation, promotion and adoption of 
standards designed to protect individuals 
from modern slavery. This includes initiatives 
to develop e.g. Codes of Conduct, Standards, 
regional or international laws to protect 
people from exploitation and efforts to 
establish, or promote e.g. the ratification of 
key instruments, establish minimum age of 
marriage, minimum age of work etc.
D3  
E1
A6 ICT-based interventions Internet communications and technology-
based interventions, including mobile phones, 
apps, internet solutions and access, hotlines. 
F1
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Antislavery outcomes
A7 Increased awareness and 
knowledge about modern 
slavery
Increased awareness and knowledge of 
modern slavery and related issues, and 





A8 Decrease in incidence of 
modern slavery
Decrease in incidence, risk, or exposure to 
modern slavery, including reports noting 
changes in the numbers and percentage of 







A9 Improved responses to 
slavery
Improved responses to modern slavery across 
various levels, local, regional, national, and 
transnational, including adoption of new laws, 








Improved relationships and cooperation 
between institutional actors (e.g. 
government agencies, and government-
NGO partnerships), and increased funding 
or mobilization of institutional resources 





D1 Economic pro-grammes Includes impact and other types of 
evaluations, and systematic reviews of 
economic interventions and their effects on 
development outcomes. Examples include 




D2 Education pro-grammes Includes education initiatives, skills building, 
and life skills programmes, covering 
interventions targeted at improving access, 




D3 Social welfare and health 
pro-grammes
Initiatives to build and/or strengthen social 
protection and health systems and improve 
access to services. 
E2
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D4 Unionization Initiatives to allow workers to advocate for 
their legal rights through unionization, 
including changing of laws and regulations 
restricting and/or protecting rights to 
collective organization and action, as well 




D5 Improved social protection 
and health systems and 
conditions
Improved social welfare/protection and  
health systems and structures, increased 
access to services, improved health outcomes 






D6 Improved socio-economic 
factors and conditions
Improved socio-economic factors and 
conditions, including e.g. reductions in  
poverty, unemployment, and inequality. 
G4  
K6
D7 Improved education 
systems and factors
Improved education systems, conditions,  
and factors, including improved access, 
creation of new structures, increases 
in enrolments, and improved quality of 
education. This includes life skills and 





D8 Improved gender equality Improvements in gender equality, including 
decreases in gender-based violence and 
discrimination, improved access to services 
for previously excluded genders etc. 
I3
D9 Reduced corruption Decreases in corruption of public officials, 
including bribery, participation and  
complicity in abuses and violations. 
K3
D10 Improved  
macro-economic 
conditions
Improved macro-economic conditions and 
factors, including labour productivity, terms 
of trade, public revenues, costs of capital, 
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Classification/Type/Typology of evidence
A Systematic reviews and probabilistic approaches to primary data collection
B Literature reviews and other non-systematic reviews (drawing on a comprehensive 
range of sources covering analyses of both secondary and primary data)
C Primary data collection (through non-systematic or non-probabilistic approaches to 
data collection, including discrete case studies)
D Hypothetical modelling or analysis based on non-specific primary data (no primary  
data collection specific to the questions under consideration)
E Discussion papers and conceptual pieces (drawing on a limited or selective body of 
evidence, often predominated by secondary sources)
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